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[00:00:00] which had previously launched Twitter, is available for both Apple devices and
[00:00:03] Android. It is built on blockchain, and its security is high. Its code is
[00:00:07] available open source to technical people, which makes it more reliable.
[00:00:18] years, the term
[00:00:20] "Axis of Resistance" has been used to refer to
[00:00:23] the proxy forces of the Islamic Republic. These are groups
[00:00:26] that Tehran finances and arms,
[00:00:30] and uses them to serve its regional objectives.
[00:00:33] But is this picture fundamentally
[00:00:37] correct? Hamid Reza Azizi, a researcher on Iranian affairs and
[00:00:40] Middle East security, in his new book "The Axis
[00:00:44] of Resistance," focuses on this image and presents a different perspective.
[00:00:47] According to this view, the forces known as the
[00:00:51] "Axis of Resistance" are not a collection of forces under Iran's command,
[00:00:55] but rather a network of actors who make decisions together,
[00:00:58] influence each other, and each
[00:01:02] has their own interests and priorities. This network,
[00:01:05] facing the Gaza war, the weakening of Hezbollah, the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government,
[00:01:09] and direct war between Iran, America, and Israel, is confronted with
[00:01:13] the biggest crisis in its history. Now that many of the
[00:01:16] foundations of this network have been weakened, how does the Axis of Resistance
[00:01:20] function? Can it rebuild itself, and to what extent has its
[00:01:23] function been positive for Iran? I am Farnaz Ghazizadeh,
[00:01:27] and this is a special interview with Hamid Reza Azizi.
[00:01:47] Welcome. After a long time, we are pleased to have you here in the studio. You have written a new book
[00:01:50] titled "The Axis of Resistance," which, as
[00:01:54] you heard, I described what the main subject
[00:01:57] of this book is. Now I want to hear more details from you. You
[00:02:01] say that it wasn't the case that these were only
[00:02:04] Iran's proxy forces, but rather
[00:02:08] they have their own interests and sometimes act based on those interests. Could you elaborate on this for
[00:02:11] our audience? What exactly do you mean? Thank you very much for
[00:02:15] inviting me. I am very happy to be here.
[00:02:18] A key word that was in your introduction
[00:02:22] and somehow encompasses the main
[00:02:25] idea of this book is "network."
[00:02:28] That is, it
[00:02:32] views a linear relationship between Iran and the members
[00:02:36] of the Axis of Resistance, in which Iran,
[00:02:39] specifically the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force, is at the top, and all of them are at
[00:02:43] the bottom, and the relationships are such that a command
[00:02:46] comes from above, and all of them are obliged to implement it.
[00:02:50] When we talk about the concept of a network, we are actually talking about a series
[00:02:53] of reciprocal relationships
[00:02:57] in which, although Iran's role
[00:03:01] as the only state actor in this group,
[00:03:04] naturally, during the time that
[00:03:06] both Assad father and Bashar Assad were in power,
[00:03:10] Syria was also a member of this, but overall, as the main supporter
[00:03:14] of this network, when it is present, the type
[00:03:17] of relationship is naturally asymmetric. However,
[00:03:21] it is not the case that they
[00:03:23] simply obey Tehran. This is one aspect
[00:03:27] of the network. The other aspect of the network refers to
[00:03:30] the different nature of the relationships that
[00:03:34] exist between the various members of this
[00:03:37] network, the various members of this axis, and Iran. That is, the type of relationship that Iran has with Hezbollah, for example,
[00:03:41] is different from the type of relationship it has with Hamas.
[00:03:44] It is different from the type of relationship it has with some smaller Iraqi groups
[00:03:48] like Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah
[00:03:52] al-Nujaba. And this is a spectrum in which a
[00:03:55] group like Hezbollah can be seen as an ally of Iran,
[00:03:59] a group like Hamas can be seen as a partner of Iran, and
[00:04:02] groups like Kata'ib Hezbollah and others are in a proxy relationship,
[00:04:06] meaning a relationship in which two factors
[00:04:10] exist: one factor is material support,
[00:04:14] not just financial, meaning that whether in terms of military support,
[00:04:17] financial support, and so on, this is the main axis of the relationship.
[00:04:21] And coercion for intervention. These two
[00:04:24] factors do not exist in that form for a group like Hezbollah.
[00:04:28] For Hamas, it exists to a much lesser extent, but it does for these smaller groups. In
[00:04:32] Syria, at the height of the civil war, the groups that Iran
[00:04:35] had formed, whether from within the various
[00:04:38] segments within Syria, or the Fatemiyoun
[00:04:42] and Zainabiyoun that it had brought from outside, these were also proxies. Therefore,
[00:04:45] this is a complex relationship. The problem is
[00:04:49] that the perception and image we had until now was not this. How important
[00:04:53] is it that we see this in the way you
[00:04:56] presented it in the book? You see, the main aspect
[00:04:59] of this issue is that, for many
[00:05:03] years, the idea existed that
[00:05:06] weakening the Islamic Republic would mean the eradication
[00:05:09] of all these groups in the region. And
[00:05:13] basically, the main debate,
[00:05:16] the main discussion among various analysts
[00:05:20] and at the political level among politicians, specifically in Israel, has been whether we
[00:05:23] should first start with Iran's so-called "arms" and
[00:05:27] reach Iran by weakening them, or whether, as they say, we should
[00:05:30] "cut off the head of the octopus" and then this network will stop working. But
[00:05:34] when we look at what the nature of this network basically was
[00:05:37] and how it has evolved over time,
[00:05:41] well, this shows
[00:05:44] that this view is a bit simplistic. For example, if we look at
[00:05:48] the relationship between Iran and Hamas, Hamas, which has been the main focus
[00:05:52] of all developments in the last three years since October 7th, which ultimately
[00:05:55] affected Iran itself, October
[00:05:58] 7th was something that, at least in
[00:06:02] terms of timing and in terms of,
[00:06:05] as I mentioned, its details, that type of attack, that
[00:06:09] type of massacre that occurred, of Israeli settlers,
[00:06:12] was not coordinated with Iran and even with Hezbollah. But now, someone like Khamenei, someone
[00:06:16] like, well, anyone else in the Islamic Republic's system, looks
[00:06:20] at this in that broader ideological
[00:06:24] context. Well, what Hamas
[00:06:26] did was in line with shared interests.
[00:06:30] Did Khamenei take the right step
[00:06:33] by not distancing himself from that attack and claiming it as his own? You see, if we look at
[00:06:37] the course of developments that happen after October 7th,
[00:06:41] Esmail Haniyeh travels to Tehran twice. The first
[00:06:45] time is in November 2023, almost a month
[00:06:49] after October 7th, a little over a month. Nothing is reported then. After
[00:06:52] he leaves Tehran, Reuters mentions
[00:06:56] that Ismail Haniyeh was in Tehran. Khamenei even told him that
[00:07:00] the criticisms you are making in Hamas about us
[00:07:03] are not correct. You did this, and we will not enter the war for you,
[00:07:07] and so on. The second time is in the spring
[00:07:10] of 2024, when Ismail Haniyeh, along with
[00:07:13] Ziyad al-Nakhalah, the leader of Islamic Jihad, come to Tehran.
[00:07:17] They are welcomed like heads of state. What happens in this interim?
[00:07:21] What happens in this period of less
[00:07:24] than six, perhaps, is that
[00:07:27] this perception, or rather misconception, arises in the Islamic Republic
[00:07:31] that Hamas, on the one hand, and by then Hezbollah
[00:07:35] had intervened and opened the northern front, and the Houthis were firing missiles from the south
[00:07:39] and had made Bab al-Mandeb, the Red Sea, insecure. This
[00:07:42] effectively grounded Israel, and now is the time
[00:07:46] for us to come and claim credit for this. Exactly
[00:07:50] that was where a miscalculation happened. You see, in
[00:07:53] May 2024,
[00:07:55] Mr.
[00:07:58] Safavi, Rahim Safavi, who was Khamenei's advisor,
[00:08:01] I think he is still Mojtaba Khamenei's advisor, comes and
[00:08:05] says that we have reached the shores
[00:08:09] of the Mediterranean for the third time in Iran's history. The first time,
[00:08:42] Iran gives money, then waits to see what they do. How does this
[00:08:46] relationship form? You see, this is where
[00:08:49] I said we need to differentiate between the various groups
[00:08:53] that exist in this network. For example,
[00:08:56] when we talk about Palestinian groups, well, Hamas
[00:08:59] is fundamentally a newer organization compared to some
[00:09:03] other groups, like the Palestine Liberation Organization, which later formed the Palestinian
[00:09:06] Authority. Or Islamic Jihad
[00:09:10] is also relatively newer.
[00:09:14] The issue of Palestine has been, ever since the revolution, as I mentioned, at
[00:09:17] the heart of
[00:09:19] Iran's foreign policy and regional policy.
[00:09:23] And in line with that, it had ties with Palestinian
[00:09:26] groups, and also with Hezbollah.
[00:09:30] And now, what happens
[00:09:34] is that as a result of a few things, first
[00:09:37] the positions that Arafat and the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization
[00:09:41] generally took during the Iraq war, being more inclined towards Saddam,
[00:09:44] and second, as a result of the Oslo Accords in the early
[00:09:48] 90s, which were peace agreements, Iran concludes that the support
[00:09:52] it was giving them to fight Israel is useless.
[00:09:56] Then they turn to Hamas, which was an Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) in its approach.
[00:09:59] Well, what I want to say is that what Iran has done is to search
[00:10:03] for groups in the region that align with its
[00:10:07] ideological and strategic
[00:10:10] context, centered on confrontation with America
[00:10:13] and, consequently, confrontation with Israel.
[00:10:16] It has established contact with them and supported
[00:10:20] them under the banner that "we are all working towards a common goal."
[00:10:24] That common goal is actually
[00:10:27] confronting Israel and weakening the role of the United States. But there is a key
[00:10:31] element in all of this, and that is Qassem Soleimani. That is, from a certain
[00:10:35] point onwards, which perhaps, in my opinion, after
[00:10:38] the 2003 Iraq issue,
[00:10:41] Qassem Soleimani creates a new image.
[00:10:44] Could you elaborate a bit on this development
[00:10:48] and what effect the assassination of Qassem Soleimani had on this axis?
[00:10:51] You see, Qassem Soleimani,
[00:10:55] as an individual, was someone who played a pivotal
[00:10:58] role in this Axis of Resistance. That is, we
[00:11:02] are talking about a system called the Islamic Republic. Within this system, we are talking about an
[00:11:06] organization called the Quds Force. But the one who transformed the Quds Force
[00:11:10] into what we know it as today, or at least until 2023,
[00:11:13] was Qassem Soleimani. In this sense,
[00:11:17] well, the roots of the formation
[00:11:20] of the Quds Force, as the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard,
[00:11:24] actually, as a transnational force, go back to the time of the Iraq war,
[00:11:28] when the Ramadhan Base was formed. Iran supported Saddam's
[00:11:31] opponents, who were Shiites, which formed the main root of Iran's
[00:11:35] relationship with these groups. But
[00:11:39] until Soleimani's time, and from the time Soleimani came,
[00:11:42] again, until the Arab Spring, the Quds
[00:11:46] Force was not a very well-known entity. The Quds Force
[00:11:49] was something that even within Iran, it was not really allowed
[00:11:53] to talk about it, if you recall. Qassem Soleimani himself was not a figure
[00:11:57] that we knew very well and talked about.
[00:12:00] But what he had done until 2011 was to create
[00:12:03] a network
[00:12:06] that was largely hierarchical, as a way
[00:12:09] for Iran to communicate with them. That is, it's true that
[00:12:13] I emphasize that this proxy relationship
[00:12:16] cannot be used for all these groups.
[00:12:20] But the network he had formed was a hierarchical network,
[00:12:23] Qassem Soleimani himself. Soleimani had representatives
[00:12:26] in each of these countries. In Iraq, it was Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. In
[00:12:30] Lebanon, of course, it was Hassan Nasrallah himself. In Syria, when
[00:12:33] the civil war happened, it was Hamdani, and after him,
[00:12:37] two other commanders who came. This was a hierarchical
[00:12:41] network that Qassem Soleimani controlled here. Qassem Soleimani was very well
[00:12:44] known in the region, especially among
[00:12:47] Shiite factions in Iraq and
[00:12:51] Lebanon, for his personal connections. And this is something that,
[00:12:56] despite the survival of the organization as the Quds Force
[00:12:59] and the arrival of Qaani, and despite the changes
[00:13:02] that happened in the axis, which I explain in this book, that it moved towards decentralization
[00:13:06] as an approach to preserve itself, where a joint operations
[00:13:10] room was formed, despite all this,
[00:13:13] none of them could fill Soleimani's shoes,
[00:13:17] because this network was very personality-centric. After
[00:13:20] Soleimani, we reach a moment-by-moment
[00:13:23] picture, up to today, where in each picture, a figure
[00:13:27] from this axis has been removed.
[00:13:30] In one section, Assad is removed.
[00:13:33] In another section, Nasrallah is removed. What effect did each
[00:13:37] of these individuals who played a central
[00:13:40] role have? Well, the Quds Force itself
[00:13:44] was involved, now specifically Qaani, the commanders
[00:13:47] of the Palestinian and Lebanese branches of the Quds Force,
[00:13:51] who were also killed in the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus
[00:13:55] in April 2024. These were them. And then Hassan
[00:13:58] Nasrallah himself was the one who tried to fill
[00:14:01] Soleimani's shoes, because
[00:14:05] Qaani
[00:14:07] did not have that general acceptance among the Iranian-backed groups,
[00:14:11] especially in Iraq. He faced a crisis. Was there
[00:14:14] another figure among the Revolutionary Guard commanders
[00:14:18] who could fill Soleimani's position? A charismatic figure who could fill Soleimani's position?
[00:14:22] No. And that's why after Soleimani, in terms of
[00:14:25] an individual, it was Nasrallah himself. But in terms of developments,
[00:14:29] the most important geopolitical development was naturally the fall
[00:14:33] of Assad, because all the energy and
[00:14:36] capital that Iran invested, both financially and in terms of
[00:14:40] human resources, from 2011 until the year
[00:14:44] 2024, when Assad fell, was based
[00:14:47] on preserving this geographical connection
[00:14:51] between the two main pillars of the axis,
[00:14:55] the two Shiite pillars of the axis, which were Iraq and
[00:14:58] Lebanon. Well, Assad's fall destroyed this. The logistics
[00:15:02] of the axis suffered a crisis, and we are still
[00:15:06] seeing the results of this, of course,
[00:15:09] in the situation that Hezbollah in Lebanon is facing. Yes, and another
[00:15:13] part that I definitely want to talk about before we move to the future is the Houthis.
[00:15:17] The Houthis have a strategic position. In this whole
[00:15:20] scene, they seem to be the most isolated
[00:15:23] from Iran,
[00:15:26] in relation to Iran, I mean. But they can act more effectively.
[00:15:29] Could you elaborate a bit on their position and characteristics
[00:15:33] for us? In terms of strategy,
[00:16:07] Saudi Arabia, which is a serious rival for us in the region, there is a force here that is challenging
[00:16:11] it, and it's also in its neighborhood. It's not like there was no connection before.
[00:16:14] Of course there was. The Houthi leaders, well, they are Zaydis, although they are not
[00:16:18] Twelver Shiites. They used to come to Iran for education.
[00:16:21] Assad wasn't there either. However, what
[00:16:24] the Houthis did was to add a new geographical
[00:16:28] pillar to the axis, which now, after the fall of Assad,
[00:16:31] coincidentally, we are seeing signs that the overall
[00:16:35] approach of the Islamic Republic is shifting in that direction. Now, you
[00:16:38] remember that May 2024, when I mentioned Safavi's remarks.
[00:16:42] Then just
[00:16:44] recently, during the 40-day war, meaning
[00:16:48] immediately after that, during the ceasefire, Qaani, the commander
[00:16:52] of the Quds Force, speaks. This time he says that from the Strait
[00:16:56] of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandeb and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea,
[00:16:59] it is Iran's security belt. What does this tell us? This is saying that that geographical
[00:17:03] focus, as far as it concerns Iran, the geographical focus has now shifted.
[00:17:27] Given the Shiite-centric aspect that has become even more prominent after the killing of
[00:17:31] Khamenei, Hezbollah still plays
[00:17:34] a very important role in the approach, but in terms of developments,
[00:18:02] have an effect on the revival of the Axis of Resistance. As they say, the discussion
[00:18:05] of Khamenei's death should be viewed in a larger context,
[00:18:09] which I also wrote an article about shortly
[00:18:12] after the war started and was published in Foreign Affairs.
[00:18:16] There, I raised this issue that several
[00:18:20] developments are taking place that are redefining the Axis of Resistance based on its
[00:18:23] Shiite identity. One is the
[00:18:27] actions of Israel in Lebanon, where effectively
[00:18:31] the southern areas, which are the habitat of Shiites,
[00:18:34] are completely under occupation. More than one million Lebanese are displaced,
[00:18:38] regardless of whether they are Hezbollah or not. In fact,
[00:18:41] only the sectarian identity, what we know as sectarianism in the region,
[00:18:45] is very different from someone who, in Iran, even the most devoted
[00:18:49] person who considers himself a Shiite in Iran, still defines himself as
[00:18:52] a Shiite sect. In Lebanon, Shiite means the entire
[00:18:56] identity of an individual that distinguishes him from Druze, from
[00:18:59] as I mentioned, Sunni, and so on. Well, here Israel
[00:19:03] is exerting pressure. The Lebanese government, a government that after
[00:19:06] all, Mr. Nawaf Salam and Mr.
[00:19:10] They are exerting pressure, and this has created
[00:19:14] a perception of threat among Shiites. On the other hand,
[00:19:17] Iraqi Shiites see that the fall of Assad led
[00:19:21] to someone coming to power who, no matter how much change has occurred
[00:19:24] in his approach, was after all the commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mr.
[00:19:27] Ahmad al-Shahar. And this has actually
[00:19:31] increased the perception of threat among the Iraqi side
[00:19:34] as well. And now, in the midst of this, the killing of Khamenei, whom these groups, especially in Iraq and
[00:19:38] Lebanon, consider their religious authority, well, this
[00:19:42] is presented again as
[00:19:45] a major plan to strike all Shiites in
[00:19:49] the region, and in terms of
[00:19:53] public mobilization, it provides a ground that
[00:19:56] the Islamic Republic can potentially use better than before.
[00:20:00] Let's go back to what you just mentioned about Iran's strategic depth
[00:20:04] and what areas it covers, and Qaani's remarks. There are
[00:20:08] other discussions that are also very much heard within Iran that
[00:20:11] we should shift from
[00:20:14] this Axis of Resistance towards the Persian Gulf.
[00:20:18] Does Iran have the capability to actually
[00:20:21] make such a shift and make the Persian Gulf
[00:20:25] the place where its main power lies? We are now witnessing
[00:20:28] a distinction between strategic depth and the axis. These were two different
[00:20:32] concepts for many years, defined within
[00:20:36] a single framework. Why? Because
[00:20:50] the path to Israel would prevent Israel from even considering an attack on
[00:20:54] Iran, exactly as we fight in Syria instead of on our own soil.
[00:20:57] If you listen to the
[00:20:59] statements of analysts close to the government, they say that everything started with the fall of Assad.
[00:21:03] Until then, we had it, but now we are witnessing
[00:21:07] two things, as I mentioned
[00:21:10] to you. One issue relates to
[00:21:14] the identity of regional
[00:21:18] mobilization, and
[00:21:22] the ideological core of the Islamic Republic, which
[00:21:25] is still present in Iraq and Lebanon. This is one aspect.
[00:21:28] The other aspect is that strategic depth,
[00:21:32] in the sense of something that can create deterrence, is not just the presence of these groups.
[00:21:36] It's about straits. And where do we ourselves control a strait? In
[00:21:39] the Persian Gulf. And the second strait is controlled by
[00:21:43] the ally of the Islamic Republic, which are the Houthis. In this way, this shift has occurred. There is
[00:21:46] a decoupling between these two concepts. And another issue
[00:21:49] that has always been raised, again related to what
[00:21:52] we just talked about regarding the Persian Gulf,
[00:21:56] is strategic loneliness, what we hear a lot about, that Iran is a
[00:21:59] Persian
[00:22:01] country in the midst of Arab
[00:22:05] Sunnis in the region, or now in the case of Turkey,
[00:22:08] Turkic-speaking. Can we still look
[00:22:11] at the issue from this perspective, or has there been a shift in this regard too? I think
[00:22:15] this has even intensified compared to before, because Ali Khamenei
[00:22:19] considered himself the "Wali al-Amr" (Guardian of the Islamic Community)
[00:22:22] of the Muslim world. And essentially, the definition of Hamas
[00:22:26] within this network, and this is where another simplistic
[00:22:29] aspect that existed in describing the axis,
[00:22:33] especially in the West, was that it is a Shiite axis, which is not correct,
[00:22:37] because neither Hamas is Shiite, nor was Assad Shiite, nor are the Houthis Shiite
[00:22:40] in that sense. Well, now this has actually become more prominent.
[00:22:44] You see, the Islamic Republic sets a condition
[00:22:48] for
[00:22:50] signing an agreement with the United States. What is it? It is that Lebanon
[00:22:54] must be present in this. Why Lebanon? Why not Palestine?
[00:22:58] Why not even Yemen? Well, this has actually
[00:23:01] become more prominent because
[00:23:04] the belief has emerged that ultimately,
[00:23:07] if it wants to recreate
[00:23:10] its regional influence,
[00:23:14] especially in the Levant region,
[00:23:18] it needs
[00:23:20] to have the Shiites of Lebanon with it. And on the other hand, the same applies to Iraq.
[00:23:24] Therefore, the focus on the Shiite factor
[00:23:27] in the Islamic Republic's approach has even increased. But as I
[00:23:31] mentioned, these are concepts that were all lumped
[00:23:34] together and formed Iran's approach to the Axis of Resistance
[00:23:37] and Iran's regional policy in its general sense. Now they
[00:23:41] have been separated. Each of them is performing
[00:23:44] a different task. But we should not
[00:23:47] forget that we are currently, both within Iran, in terms of, naturally, domestic
[00:23:51] politics, and in foreign and regional policy, going through a transitional period.
[00:23:55] It is not clear whether, or rather, the fact that we say this has
[00:23:58] happened does not necessarily mean that it will be successful. This is a shift that is currently
[00:24:02] underway. And there is
[00:24:05] a slogan that is a very widely
[00:24:08] heard slogan: "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran."
[00:24:11] Can it be said that this Axis of Resistance,
[00:24:15] on the whole, acted in Iran's interest,
[00:24:18] not the Islamic Republic's?
[00:24:20] Or rather, has it been more detrimental to Iran?
[00:24:24] You see, it is very difficult to give a very straightforward
[00:24:28] answer to this, because it depends on
[00:24:31] what lens we look through. If we look through the same
[00:24:35] lens I mentioned earlier, for example, that the October 7th action by Hamas
[00:24:38] and its consequences affected Iran, then ultimately,
[00:24:42] this network not only did not create deterrence
[00:24:45] for Iran, but because it was in
[00:24:48] a
[00:25:20] Islamic Republic as a geographical entity, if we look at it this way, it has
[00:25:23] these characteristics you mentioned, and it had them before, at least since the Safavid era.
[00:25:27] Iran, a Persian-speaking Shiite country in a
[00:25:30] Sunni Arab-speaking region, or now in the case of Turkey, a Turkic-speaking country,
[00:25:34] did not have the option to go in this direction. That is, if we
[00:25:37] look at the Shah's era, the strategic
[00:25:40] connection between Iran
[00:25:42] and the Shiites of Lebanon,
[00:25:45] which later formed the Amal movement and after that Hezbollah,
[00:25:48] was
[00:25:53] guided by the Shah and SAVAK. In Iraq,
[00:25:56] Iran's connection with the Kurds was within the framework
[00:26:00] of containing Saddam. Therefore, the issue is that,
[00:26:03] as I mentioned, the two wings,
[00:26:07] or rather, the two pillars of Iran's regional approach, ideology and
[00:26:10] strategy, were not equally strong. The ideological pillar became so
[00:26:14] bloated that it effectively overshadowed strategic considerations.
[00:26:18] Iran's connection with non-state actors in the region could
[00:26:22] have been beneficial for Iran's regional influence if the approach
[00:26:25] hadn't been ideological,
[00:26:28] if the approach hadn't been anti-systemic, meaning that all its efforts
[00:26:32] were aimed at expelling America
[00:26:34] from the region, the destruction of Israel, and so on. Thank you, Hamid
[00:26:38] Reza Azizi, our guest on the special interview. Thank you very much.
[00:26:58] Jürgen Habermas was one of those philosophers who
[00:27:02] received a great reception in Iran. Why? What
[00:27:06] ideas in his political philosophy were paid attention
[00:27:09] to in Iran? Habermas is not a pacifist at any cost.
[00:27:13] In Eastern Europe in the late
[00:27:16] 80s, when revolutions were taking place, he supported them. When
[00:27:20] we look at his opinion regarding Israel and Palestine,
[00:27:23] we see that he becomes a German
[00:28:02] The week's tech news from Click. AI shows
[00:28:06] a false image of women. UN Women
[00:28:10] states this based on a study. This organization, whose mission
[00:28:13] is to promote gender equality globally and
[00:28:16] support the rights of women and girls, states that some
[00:28:20] AI chatbots mostly associate women with concepts
[00:28:23] such as home, family, and children, and reproduce
[00:28:26] stereotypes and sexist attitudes.
[00:28:30] This means that instead of showing women with diverse abilities and roles,
[00:28:34] like men, they reiterate old societal
[00:28:38] patterns. This research, conducted at UC Berkeley
[00:28:41] on 133 AI systems or chatbots,
[00:28:45] shows that nearly half of these
[00:28:49] chatbots exhibit incorrect gender
[00:28:52] biases and classify women based on existing
[00:28:56] societal stereotypes. The findings of this
[00:28:59] research have gone so far as to conclude that 26%
[00:29:03] of these chatbots also have racial biases.
[00:29:07] in addition to gender. For example, when asked to create a story about
[00:29:10] a doctor and a nurse, AI
[00:29:13] always portrayed the doctor as a man and the nurse as a woman.
[00:29:17] And it associated male names more with work,
[00:29:21] income, occupation, and success.
[00:29:24] But why is this important? Because artificial intelligence
[00:29:27] is no longer just an entertainment tool. From recruitment and
[00:29:31] education to searching for information, content creation,
[00:29:34] and even decision-making in some public services, artificial
[00:29:38] intelligence is becoming more involved every day. If these
[00:29:41] systems portray women as less capable, less experienced,
[00:29:45] and limited to traditional roles, this image
[00:29:49] can influence real decisions about women.
[00:29:52] From job opportunities and visibility in
[00:29:56] the online space to the image that future generations will have of
[00:30:00] women's roles in society.
[00:30:02] If you work in the field of artificial intelligence or would like to know more about it,
[00:30:06] send me a message on Instagram and write your comments for me.
[00:30:09] Click
[00:30:14] every week on BBC
[00:30:16] Persian.
[00:30:23] And now on BBC Persian Television,
[00:30:26] a documentary.