BBCPERSIAN — broadcast
20260806 170000 UTC
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[00:00:00] have actually been the Houthis are making, people's money. That missiles. funded by the Iranian manufacturers of weapons, is, these claims that that they are the biggest that they have submarines,
[00:00:23] Control of strategic waterways is considered
[00:00:25] to be Iran's most important deterrent these
[00:00:29] days. And the importance of the Houthis in such
[00:00:32] a strategy has become a question that has many people engaged
[00:00:36] as to how far their control is possible for Tehran,
[00:00:39] with Keyvan.
[00:01:11] In a tweet, he wrote that they targeted a Saudi oil tanker by launching ballistic missiles. The Houthi
[00:01:14] group, officially known as Ansar Allah, has
[00:01:18] controlled a large part of northern and western Yemen,
[00:01:21] including the city of Sana'a, for more than a decade. They
[00:01:25] now control about one-third of Yemen's territory, which
[00:01:29] accounts for 70% of the country's population, in that
[00:01:32] blue region. And of course, the geographical
[00:01:35] location of this country next to the Bab al-Mandeb
[00:01:39] Strait allows the Houthis to influence a route that
[00:01:43] is one of the most important strategic waterways of
[00:01:47] the world economy. But how did the Houthis gain
[00:01:50] such power? The roots of the Houthi movement go
[00:01:54] back to the Zaydi Shiite community in northern Yemen,
[00:01:58] a community that ruled
[00:02:00] there for centuries. The first support for the Zaydi
[00:02:04] forces in Yemen by Iran also occurred during the
[00:02:07] reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, during one of the civil
[00:02:10] wars in Yemen in the 1960s. Where the Shah's government,
[00:02:14] along with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Israel,
[00:02:17] supported the Zaydi Shiite monarchy in Yemen against
[00:02:20] the secular republicans.
[00:02:23] However, the Zaydi Shiites were defeated in this war,
[00:02:26] and their imamate government fell, and a country called
[00:02:30] North Yemen was formed alongside South Yemen. After
[00:02:33] the collapse of the Soviet Union, these two countries
[00:02:37] united. In the south, Sunnis were the majority, and in
[00:02:41] the unified country of Yemen, Shiites became a 35%
[00:02:44] minority demographically.
[00:02:47] It was in this atmosphere that a movement for the
[00:02:50] revival of the political and religious identity of
[00:02:53] Yemen's Zaydis took shape, with the Houthi family
[00:02:57] at its center. Badreddin al-Houthi, a prominent
[00:03:01] Zaydi cleric, and his sons Hussein and Abdul-Malik
[00:03:05] immigrated to Qom a few years after the establishment
[00:03:08] of the Islamic Republic and spent years
[00:03:11] in Iran. This is one of the images that was published
[00:03:15] by the Holy Defense News Agency and is said to have
[00:03:19] been taken in the city of Qom. In this picture, Badreddin
[00:03:23] al-Houthi is seen next to his son Hussein al-Houthi
[00:03:26] in the mid-1980s. They were influenced by the literature
[00:03:30] and model of the Islamic Revolution. Slogans like
[00:03:34] "Death to America," "Death to Israel," the discourse
[00:03:37] of the oppressed against the oppressors, and even
[00:03:40] the name of the Ansar Allah group were among the things
[00:03:44] that the discourse of the Islamic Revolution inspired
[00:03:48] them. In 2004, after the killing of Hussein al-Houthi,
[00:03:51] his brother Abdul-Malik took over the leadership
[00:03:54] of the group. They grew stronger in six wars
[00:03:58] with the central government of Yemen, and finally, in
[00:04:01] 2014 and 2015, they captured Sana'a and important parts
[00:04:05] of the country. The Islamic Republic also became the
[00:04:09] only country that practically recognized the sovereignty
[00:04:12] of the Houthis and treated them as a legitimate government.
[00:04:16] But how exactly is the relationship between Iran and the Houthis
[00:04:19] defined? Abdul Jalil Shaif, a Yemeni researcher and
[00:04:23] political activist, author of the book "Southern Yemen:
[00:04:26] A Gateway to the World," and former head of the
[00:04:30] Aden Free Zone, is with us on this program. Mr.
[00:04:34] Shaif currently heads the Friends of Southern Yemen
[00:04:38] group and is the representative of the Southern Transitional
[00:04:41] Council to the United Nations in Geneva. Mr. Shaif,
[00:04:45] welcome to the program, Page 2. I know the question I'm about
[00:04:49] to ask is very difficult due to the ambiguities
[00:04:51] in the relationship between
[00:04:58] the Houthis and the Islamic Republic, and the secrecy
[00:05:01] they maintain. Nevertheless, you have been closely
[00:05:04] involved in the political developments in Yemen and
[00:05:08] are very familiar with this group. How do you assess
[00:05:11] the relationship between
[00:05:18] Iran and the Houthi group? I think they have very
[00:05:22] important relations. It's a very important relationship.
[00:05:25] But if I want to simplify it and explain it simply,
[00:05:28] this relationship is complete control
[00:05:32] of the Houthis by Tehran, while some others say
[00:05:36] that there is a strategic alliance and partnership
[00:05:40] between the two. And in my opinion, it's somewhere
[00:05:44] in between these two. There's a distance between the
[00:05:47] two, where they are very loyal to Iran, but they
[00:05:51] also have their own identity. However, it cannot be
[00:05:55] ignored or denied that in terms of intelligence,
[00:05:58] political support, and military support, its
[00:06:02] heart beats in Iran, and Iran has helped them. But
[00:06:06] it is also true that they have their own interests
[00:06:10] and consider their own concerns when they want to take
[00:06:14] action. Now, given what's happening in the Persian
[00:06:17] Gulf and the war between Iran, as well as the issue
[00:06:21] of the Strait of Hormuz and the Islamic Republic's
[00:06:23] attempt to control the Strait
[00:06:31] of Hormuz, do you see a similar situation for
[00:06:34] the Houthis in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, or not?
[00:06:37] Can they also close Bab al-Mandeb, like the Islamic
[00:06:41] Republic? Yes, definitely. I think
[00:06:44] there is a possibility of this happening, and it
[00:06:48] might even happen. There's both a chance and a possibility
[00:06:51] of it, and this relationship, in my opinion, the relationship
[00:06:55] between the Houthis and Tehran, is based on influence,
[00:06:58] not control and obedience. They try, the Iranians
[00:07:01] tried to bring the Houthis into the equations and
[00:07:05] have them close Bab al-Mandeb. However,
[00:07:07] at the same time, the Houthis
[00:07:10] have their own concerns and
[00:07:13] in the issue of foreign hostilities, they were very
[00:07:17] involved with, for example, Saudi Arabia, and they
[00:07:21] used that to gain support for themselves within Yemen,
[00:07:25] for example, in northern Yemen, they told the people
[00:07:28] of northern Yemen, "Look, foreign powers are attacking
[00:07:32] you, we are not," and for that reason, they were
[00:07:35] able to gain support.
[00:07:39] Their base of supporters
[00:08:12] is from the people,
[00:08:15] not from economic and political
[00:08:19] issues. They want to find
[00:08:22] a common
[00:08:26] ground, a common area between their
[00:08:30] own interests, Iranian interests, and Houthi
[00:08:34] interests. But we know that Houthi interests
[00:08:37] are also domestic interests that they want
[00:08:41] to make sure people in the country
[00:08:43] support them. You mentioned Saudi Arabia.
[00:08:47] What is its role now, given the events happening
[00:08:50] in the region, and the issue of Saudi Arabia
[00:08:54] and the Houthis, and the war that is still ongoing?
[00:08:58] How do you see Saudi Arabia's role in this
[00:09:01] new regional power balance, and what do you think
[00:09:05] its position will be regarding the Houthis,
[00:09:09] especially now that they might affect this vital
[00:09:21] waterway? The Saudi Arabian monarchy made
[00:09:25] two strategic mistakes in the past 10 years
[00:09:28] and in the war with the Houthis. The first
[00:09:31] was to continue bombing the Houthis, even though
[00:09:35] it could have, instead of doing
[00:09:38] that, focused its efforts
[00:09:42] on southern Yemen and increased its
[00:09:46] political control there, and even
[00:09:50] given the people in southern Yemen
[00:09:53] more political power, and even could have done
[00:09:57] the same economically in southern Yemen,
[00:10:00] giving them economic power. Now they are
[00:10:04] economically deprived, their salaries have
[00:10:08] not been paid, there is a terrible,
[00:10:10] astronomical inflation there. Prices
[00:10:13] are extremely high. These
[00:10:16] have been the mistakes that Saudi Arabia
[00:10:19] has made in the past
[00:10:22] 10 years. For example, in the
[00:10:25] south or in the north, they looked at each other
[00:10:29] and compared each other. The north said, "Well,
[00:10:33] the situation in the south, which is not controlled
[00:10:36] by the Houthis,
[00:10:39] is not better than ours." And for that reason,
[00:10:43] they continued their support. On the other hand,
[00:10:46] another mistake
[00:10:50] they made was their interference in January
[00:10:53] 2006 in support
[00:10:56] of the Emiratis. This coalition
[00:10:59] that was formed at that time
[00:11:02] was composed of the UAE
[00:11:05] and Saudi Arabia. But now,
[00:11:08] even they have disputes
[00:11:12] between them. And in
[00:11:15] Hadhramaut, the consequences
[00:11:18] are that the Emiratis
[00:11:22] have left. There is no
[00:11:25] Arab coalition anymore. The Emiratis
[00:11:29] left, Saudi Arabia remained,
[00:11:33] and those powers that had
[00:11:36] military force and capability
[00:11:40] were themselves disbanded, of course, by Saudi Arabia. And these
[00:11:44] two strategic
[00:11:46] mistakes have caused the Houthis to be able
[00:11:50] to consolidate themselves, increase their power,
[00:11:53] and even their
[00:11:55] power has become more than imagined. And now
[00:11:59] Saudi Arabia is also left wondering what it can even do
[00:12:02] in this situation,
[00:12:05] given these two mistakes they made.
[00:12:08] They lost their support in the south,
[00:12:12] popular support, and
[00:12:16] of course,
[00:12:19] it is true that maybe they won a battle,
[00:12:23] but they did not win the war overall.
[00:12:27] And in my opinion,
[00:12:31] an explosive action
[00:12:34] will happen soon by the Houthis.
[00:12:38] Thank
[00:12:42] you, Mr. Abdul Jalil Shaif, Yemeni researcher
[00:12:45] and political activist. In the continuation of this
[00:12:49] program, we will discuss these developments in Yemen
[00:12:52] with Mehrdad Khansari,
[00:12:56] a diplomat during the Pahlavi era and an analyst of
[00:13:00] Iranian foreign policy, who is joining us from Madrid,
[00:13:03] and also Alam Saleh, honorary professor of Iranian
[00:13:07] studies at the Australian National University, who
[00:13:10] has joined us from the beautiful city of Ramsar,
[00:13:13] and Farzin Karbasi, international relations analyst from
[00:13:17] Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. I welcome all three guests
[00:13:21] to this program and thank you for participating. Mr.
[00:13:25] Khansari, let's start with you. You were in the Ministry
[00:13:29] of Foreign Affairs during the Pahlavi era and are somewhat
[00:13:33] familiar with the foreign policy of that era. What
[00:13:36] is in northern Yemen that we see this happening,
[00:13:39] and a connection being formed between the Iranian
[00:13:43] government and this group of Zaydi Shiites in northern
[00:13:47] Yemen, both during the Pahlavi era and during the Islamic
[00:13:50] Republic? Thank you and greetings
[00:13:54] to your dear guests and dear viewers of this program.
[00:13:58] Well, first of all, during
[00:14:01] the Pahlavi era, Iran's intervention in Yemen,
[00:14:05] especially in the 1960s, which marked the beginning
[00:14:08] of a period of unrest in Yemen with the overthrow
[00:14:11] of their then Imam, which was mostly
[00:14:14] due to the provocations of Egypt and Nasser and
[00:14:18] such things, the motivation of the Imperial Iranian
[00:14:21] government at that time was to confront the policies
[00:14:26] pursued by Cairo and Nasser, and to assist
[00:14:30] the forces that were against them. That was
[00:14:34] the main motivation. It wasn't that they wanted
[00:14:37] to help the Zaydi Shiites and such things, but that
[00:14:41] strategic importance in the Shah's grand calculations,
[00:14:45] who was engaged with Nasser on various fronts, was
[00:14:49] more important at that time. In the
[00:14:52] 1970s, this scene changed after
[00:14:56] Nasser's death and after relations between Iran
[00:14:59] and Egypt were re-established and were good relations.
[00:15:03] I myself, as a diplomat at that time, traveled
[00:15:07] to North Yemen, and at that time, one of the
[00:15:10] motivations of our government was to support North
[00:15:13] Yemen against South Yemen, which was being
[00:15:16] infiltrated by the Soviet Union and China and
[00:15:20] other communist countries, both there
[00:15:23] and in places
[00:15:26] like Oman, where the Dhofar
[00:15:30] War was being fed through
[00:15:33] South Yemen. And the motivation was
[00:15:37] completely different from the issues that subsequently
[00:15:40] arose. Of course,
[00:15:44] at that time,
[00:15:47] Saudi Arabia played
[00:15:50] a very effective role in North
[00:15:53] Yemen. In fact, it could be said
[00:15:57] that the Saudi ambassador there
[00:16:00] was the most important person in Sana'a
[00:16:03] due to the enormous financial aid he
[00:16:07] provided to the then government. But these
[00:16:10] relations also came under pressure over
[00:16:14] time, and we saw that the situation
[00:16:17] eventually led to what happened
[00:16:19] after the Arab
[00:16:23] Spring. I understand. Thank you very much,
[00:16:27] Mr. Khansari. Mr. Saleh, we heard about
[00:16:30] the Shah's government's motivations, and Mr.
[00:16:33] Khansari believes that the current motivations
[00:16:37] are completely different.
[00:16:38] How do you assess the
[00:16:41] motivations of the Islamic Republic, its role, influence,
[00:16:45] and extent of influence over the Houthis?
[00:16:48] It has always been important how the equations
[00:16:52] of power and the balance of power in the region
[00:16:55] are formed. Security regions from the time
[00:16:59] of the Sassanids, who supported the Lakhmids
[00:17:02] against Rome, and also the Ghassanids, who
[00:17:05] were supported by the Romans, show that geopolitical
[00:17:09] equations determine the type and form of alliances
[00:17:12] between countries. In the 1960s, the Shah
[00:17:15] of Iran supported only the Houthis in Yemen
[00:17:18] and against the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser's
[00:17:22] Arab nationalism in the region, but also
[00:17:25] supported the Shiites of Lebanon directly
[00:17:28] through the mediation of Imam Musa Sadr
[00:17:31] to prevent the rise of Arab nationalism
[00:17:35] and Gamal Abdel Nasser and his policies. We
[00:17:41] also witnessed this in the case of the Dhofar revolutionaries in Oman
[00:17:45] in the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, we
[00:17:48] saw military coups in the Arab world
[00:17:52] that led to the overthrow of monarchies in Iraq,
[00:17:55] Syria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and even Yemen,
[00:17:59] which changed the new form and behavior
[00:18:02] of governments in the region. So, for the Shah
[00:18:06] of Iran, as it is
[00:18:15] important for the Islamic Republic today, what
[00:18:18] happens is not ideology,
[00:18:22] but geopolitical reality of the region that changes
[00:18:25] the shape and type of alliances, just as we saw in
[00:18:28] the case of the Kurds and Iran and Iraq.
[00:18:32] That is why Iran's relationship with the Houthis,
[00:18:36] who ruled Yemen for over a thousand years,
[00:18:39] is not necessarily based on ideology and identity,
[00:18:42] but on the reality of the equation and balance of
[00:18:45] power, and the Houthis enjoy a large degree
[00:18:49] of political, identity, and intellectual independence.
[00:18:52] However, the alignment of the Houthis' geopolitical
[00:18:56] and strategic goals with Iran has led to
[00:18:59] these two countries cooperating
[00:19:02] and coordinating their thoughts regarding
[00:19:05] their common enemies and adversaries
[00:19:07] in the region. Now, we will definitely talk
[00:19:11] more about their ideological independence, because
[00:19:15] the discourse of the Islamic Revolution is very evident
[00:19:18] in what the Ansar Allah group promotes. Mr. Karbasi,
[00:19:22] how do you see this situation? Mr. Khansari believes that
[00:19:26] the conditions before the revolution and after the
[00:19:30] revolution were completely different, and this happened
[00:19:34] in two different contexts. However, Mr. Saleh believes
[00:19:37] that part of this cooperation and perhaps unwritten
[00:19:41] alliance that has formed between the Zaydi Shiites
[00:19:45] and the Islamic Republic is a result of a geopolitical
[00:19:48] situation that has developed in this region since the
[00:19:52] beginning of the 20th century, and such relations will
[00:19:55] continue whether it is the Shah's government or
[00:19:59] the Islamic Republic or the next government. Do
[00:20:02] you agree with either of these two guests, or
[00:20:06] do you have a third opinion?
[00:20:09] Look, in fact, this discussion
[00:20:13] complements each other, meaning that both during
[00:20:17] the time of the former Shah and today,
[00:20:20] all these equations are related. That is,
[00:20:24] what Mr. Alam Saleh says, that these are
[00:20:28] geopolitical issues, alignment of interests,
[00:20:31] all of this is correct, but in my opinion, the
[00:20:35] glue between these two factors that binds
[00:20:38] them together and strengthens them
[00:20:42] is the ideological issue. That is, when
[00:20:45] you gave an introduction at the beginning of the
[00:20:48] program, this past that the Houthi leaders
[00:20:51] had in Iran, and in fact, the Islamic
[00:20:55] Republic has not been stingy, neither
[00:20:58] with the Houthis nor with Hezbollah of Lebanon
[00:21:01] nor with the Shiites of Iraq,
[00:21:04] which I myself witnessed at the time I lived
[00:21:07] in Tehran, what a place and position
[00:21:11] they had, what facilities they had, the Badr
[00:21:15] Corps and the issues that we are seeing now,
[00:21:18] meaning the fruit of these events that have
[00:21:22] happened. In fact, today we see that the
[00:21:26] Houthis are actually a strong proxy for the
[00:21:29] Islamic Republic, and the people of that region
[00:21:33] also support the Islamic Republic. This is not
[00:21:37] just one part of the power holders in that
[00:21:40] region, they are not rulers, but the people
[00:21:44] also support them,
[00:21:46] and this has its roots in that ideological
[00:21:50] issue that the Islamic Republic has worked on,
[00:21:53] and the Houthis, apart from their own interests, apart from the demands
[00:21:57] they have for the future, actually see themselves
[00:22:00] as partners with the Islamic Republic. Just
[00:22:03] today, the Hashd al-Shaabi and Islamic Resistance
[00:22:07] groups in Iraq threatened that they would attack
[00:22:10] Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.
[00:22:14] Well, this is in line with those interests
[00:22:18] that they actually see themselves as partners
[00:22:21] with the Islamic Republic and are willing to defend
[00:22:25] it for its sake. Yes, Mr. Saleh, what is
[00:22:29] your answer? This is actually a very fundamental
[00:22:32] question that often causes disagreement. Is this
[00:22:36] foreign policy a realistic foreign policy
[00:22:39] based on the inherent national interests of
[00:22:43] Iran due to its location, or is it because of the
[00:22:46] Shiite Islamist ideology that the Islamic Republic
[00:22:50] is currently present in Yemen?
[00:22:53] States and governments are usually rational
[00:22:56] actors. Rational in the sense that they calculate
[00:23:00] costs and benefits and determine their behavior
[00:23:03] based on that. And usually there is no difference
[00:23:05] between these countries in the form and type of
[00:23:09] strategic policy behavior. It's the structures,
[00:23:12] regional structures, military structures, and sometimes
[00:23:16] identity structures that can determine such behaviors. But the issue
[00:23:23] is the balance of power and the struggle
[00:23:27] to gain power. In such cases, countries
[00:23:30] will have and create ideological and identity
[00:23:33] coverings to achieve their goals. Whether
[00:23:36] they are Western countries or what.
[00:23:40] The important thing is that when you strive
[00:23:43] for a power struggle, you must create
[00:23:46] an identity and ideological covering, and this is
[00:23:50] during the Shah's time, done in the name of
[00:23:52] Shiism,
[00:23:55] which certainly the Houthis are not Shiites. Even
[00:23:58] the Alawites,
[00:24:02] when Imam Musa Sadr called the Alawites
[00:24:05] Shiites, it was completely for political
[00:24:09] reasons. Excuse me, regarding
[00:24:13] whether these are Shiites or not, because none
[00:24:16] of the guests and I myself probably don't
[00:24:20] have much knowledge of Shiite theology,
[00:24:24] they themselves might consider themselves Shiites,
[00:24:27] and they do have differences with Twelver Shiites,
[00:24:30] as you said. I want to ask Mr. Khansari
[00:24:34] what his response is to your explanations,
[00:24:37] and whether he also has the same assessment
[00:24:40] regarding the effects of ideology on the relationship
[00:24:43] between the Islamic Republic and the Houthis.
[00:24:47] Look, what Mr. Alam Saleh
[00:24:50] said, in my opinion, did not contradict
[00:24:54] what I said at all. Iran's motivation during
[00:24:57] the Shah's time is different from Iran's
[00:25:00] motivation now, and that's because of the
[00:25:04] conditions and situation of the time. For example,
[00:25:08] at that time, during the Shah's time, we
[00:25:11] didn't have clear disputes with Saudi Arabia.
[00:25:15] During the Islamic Republic, when Saudi
[00:25:18] Arabia fully intensified the war against the Houthis,
[00:25:22] and the current Crown Prince made the same
[00:25:25] mistakes that Mr. Trump made in the war with
[00:25:29] Iran, by starting a war that he couldn't end,
[00:25:33] or thought would end after a week. This
[00:25:36] was at a time when the Saudi Arabian government
[00:25:40] was in complete opposition to the Islamic Republic
[00:25:44] of Iran. So it was natural for the Islamic
[00:25:47] Republic to want to develop and find a relationship
[00:25:53] with the forces in Yemen, and these so-called Houthis,
[00:25:57] and expand it beyond what, for example,
[00:26:00] the conditions were during the Shah's time,
[00:26:04] which were completely different. It was about
[00:26:07] the war of pride, it was about the imamate,
[00:26:10] it was about other issues that were mentioned,
[00:26:13] and of course, the Shah also supported
[00:26:17] Shiite governments in a way, but Musa
[00:26:21] Sadr never had a close relationship with the Shah,
[00:26:24] and the aid we provided... But that's not the point.
[00:26:27] The point is not that today, in the current
[00:26:31] situation, the Houthis, who look to Iran,
[00:26:35] are trying to ensure that Iran does not lose,
[00:26:39] does not get harmed, and can stand on its
[00:26:42] own two feet, because if it stands, their position
[00:26:46] will be stronger. Regardless of whether they obey
[00:26:49] Iran in that sense, they are not, as your
[00:26:52] previous guest said. But they have common
[00:26:56] interests. The situation that is developing
[00:26:59] or has developed in Bab al-Mandeb helps these
[00:27:02] negotiations that Iran is pursuing with America,
[00:27:06] because it gives Iran an additional leverage
[00:27:10] to reach a better outcome,
[00:27:13] or a faster one. So I'm saying
[00:27:16] the motivations are different, and
[00:27:20] this part of your speech, I think, is
[00:27:23] very important, because if we consider the interests
[00:27:26] of the Iranian nation and the interests
[00:27:30] of the Islamic Republic as two parallel concepts,
[00:27:34] do you think that the relationship with the Houthis
[00:27:37] is not necessarily in the interest of the
[00:27:40] nation, and only in the interest of the
[00:27:44] Islamic Republic? Look,
[00:27:47] in these circumstances, when the
[00:27:51] country is being bombed by
[00:27:53] foreign countries, I think these
[00:27:57] differences between the nation and the regime
[00:28:01] become less pronounced than when there is no
[00:28:04] war, and the issues are primarily
[00:28:07] differences among ourselves. No Iranian
[00:28:11] wants their country to be attacked by foreigners.
[00:28:15] In these circumstances, in these circumstances
[00:28:18] where the Iranian government is trying
[00:28:22] to somehow keep itself
[00:28:24] on its feet, it can make
[00:28:28] the maximum use of the only
[00:28:32] leverage it has, the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:28:35] In a situation where it has been
[00:28:39] proven that Trump, despite all
[00:28:43] his forces and power
[00:28:46] and resources, is not willing
[00:28:50] to pay extra costs, it is obvious
[00:28:53] that the presence of this relationship
[00:28:56] between the Houthis and the Islamic Republic
[00:29:00] that has developed and expanded
[00:29:04] in the last 10-20 years brings a benefit,
[00:29:08] a share, for the fact that, let's say,
[00:29:11] there is no attack on Iran right now.
[00:29:15] An attack on Iran would not only harm
[00:29:18] the Islamic Republic. In that war, 56,000
[00:29:21] innocent Iranians were killed. So
[00:29:24] I'm saying, the issue should be
[00:29:28] looked at differently, in my opinion.
[00:29:31] But if one wants
[00:29:34] Many claim that undoubtedly, undoubtedly,
[00:29:38] the Islamic Republic has supported them, and
[00:29:41] in fact, has not left their pockets empty. These things are done with money.
[00:29:45] Where does this money come from? Yemen, that
[00:29:48] part where the Houthis are, is not
[00:29:51] very wealthy. So, this money has been taken from the pockets of the Iranian people.
[00:29:55] The fact that we are currently in this time and in this
[00:29:58] situation does
[00:30:01] not allow us to disregard the rights of the Iranian people,
[00:30:05] who today are living in poverty
[00:30:08] and misery. In fact, the word "misery" must be used.
[00:30:12] They are living this way as a result of these policies. The impoverishment
[00:30:15] of the Iranian people and the enrichment
[00:30:19] and preparation for a war in which the Iranian people
[00:30:22] actually have no stake is the result of these
[00:30:26] policies. Now, no matter how we try to
[00:30:29] justify it,