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[00:00:08] in the basement, if these cracks were 45-degree
[00:00:11] diagonal cracks or horizontal cracks, you must refer
[00:00:15] to an engineer. The next elements are the floor and finally
[00:00:19] the doors and frames. And I constantly, when I say "evaluated," I really want
[00:00:22] to emphasize that I'm not referring to a regular civil or architectural engineer;
[00:00:26] I mean an engineer specializing in damaged structures.
[00:00:30] He has experience, meaning an engineer who has previously worked with damaged structures.
[00:00:33] I ask my compatriots that if they have taken steps to hire an engineer to come and
[00:00:37] evaluate the building, they must ask if he has experience with damaged structures
[00:00:41] or if he is a regular civil or architectural engineer who designs
[00:00:45] and constructs new structures
[00:00:46] in fact.
[00:00:52] And now, on BBC Persian Television, current
[00:00:56] issues.
[00:00:59] Habermas was one of those philosophers who were met
[00:01:03] with great reception in Iran. Why?
[00:01:07] What ideas in his political philosophy received
[00:01:10] attention in Iran?
[00:01:36] Hello, Jürgen Habermas, the German philosopher who passed away
[00:01:40] this year, had a long
[00:01:43] and detailed career. He wrote about trends
[00:01:47] that were observable in both Western industrial societies and
[00:01:51] in countries that grapple with the contradictory
[00:01:54] aspects of modernity. It's no wonder that
[00:01:58] concepts like communicative action and discourse ethics in the public
[00:02:02] sphere have been attractive to scholars and
[00:02:05] political activists in Iran as well. However,
[00:02:08] Habermas also had many critics, and in the last
[00:02:11] years of his life, when he defended Israel's actions
[00:02:15] in Gaza, he was added to the ranks of these critics.
[00:02:18] Habermas's defenders attributed his support for Israel
[00:02:22] more to the German public sphere than
[00:02:26] to the core of his theories in political philosophy. His
[00:02:30] opponents, referring to his position in the
[00:02:33] German intellectual sphere, evaluated this support for Israel
[00:02:36] as a failure of Germany's moral
[00:02:39] conscience. In this week's discussion, we ask:
[00:02:42] What are the main ideas in Habermas's
[00:02:46] political philosophy? From what angles
[00:02:50] have criticisms been raised against him? Mehdi
[00:02:53] Parsa, a researcher of philosophy in Germany, says:
[00:02:57] Habermas, despite trying to keep the
[00:03:00] legacy of the Enlightenment alive, ultimately failed
[00:03:04] to make his abstract concepts useful and
[00:03:07] effective for contemporary turbulent societies.
[00:03:09] However, Iqan Shahidi,
[00:03:12] a researcher of political science at Cambridge University,
[00:03:16] says: The main concepts of Habermas's political philosophy
[00:03:20] actually address many of the challenges that
[00:03:23] modern societies or societies in transition face.
[00:03:26] Welcome, Mehdi.
[00:03:30] Wouldn't it be better if I called you
[00:03:34] by your first name? Let's start from here, as I know you
[00:03:37] are a critic of Habermas. Let's start by discussing what you think are
[00:03:41] Habermas's main ideas, so we can then move on to criticizing
[00:03:44] them. Yes.
[00:03:47] Well, Habermas, throughout his four or five
[00:03:50] decades of work, has created
[00:03:53] various concepts. I've been thinking about which
[00:03:57] of Habermas's concepts, if we take it as an entry point,
[00:04:00] would connect the different parts of his thought.
[00:04:02] I came to the conclusion that
[00:04:05] the distinction between
[00:04:08] Lebenswelt, the lifeworld, and System,
[00:04:12] the distinction between the lifeworld and the system.
[00:04:15] Yes. Now, I translate
[00:04:18] "lifeworld" as social life and "system" as
[00:04:22] social system. Well, social life
[00:04:25] and the social system, which were introduced in the second volume
[00:04:29] of the book "The Theory of Communicative Action,"
[00:04:33] were actually the main theme of the second volume of this
[00:04:36] theory of communicative action, this distinction. I think starting
[00:04:40] from here is a good entry point into Habermas's thought.
[00:04:44] You see, well, actually,
[00:04:47] at the end of this book, Habermas proposes this idea.
[00:04:50] He calls it "colonization,"
[00:04:54] meaning how the social system colonizes
[00:04:57] social life. It controls
[00:05:01] it or expropriates it. Expropriates it. Yes, the social
[00:05:04] system expropriates social life. Well, this social
[00:05:08] system and social life have always existed.
[00:05:11] In
[00:05:44] every remote village, every remote city,
[00:05:47] a governorate is established, a part
[00:05:50] of it is established, a bureaucratic apparatus is established
[00:05:53] that expands into
[00:05:57] various aspects of social life, and Habermas sees this as a threat.
[00:06:00] Well, the threat that social
[00:06:04] life, as that which is actually
[00:06:07] derived from historical traditions, from culture,
[00:06:11] people living in a society have this cultural
[00:06:14] and traditional basis that connects people to each other.
[00:06:18] Well, but the social system, from top to
[00:06:21] bottom, creates a different
[00:06:24] form of social interaction
[00:06:28] that actually poses a threat to this
[00:06:32] social life. Now, actually, from modernity
[00:06:35] onwards, from the late 18th century onwards,
[00:06:38] with the strengthening of
[00:07:12] it, and this is actually
[00:07:16] simultaneously the beginning of a process that he calls
[00:07:20] the formation of a public sphere. Am I right?
[00:07:23] Through institutions like coffee houses,
[00:07:26] local associations, first I wanted to explain the
[00:07:29] strengthening of the system first and then
[00:07:33] how the transformation of the public sphere took shape.
[00:07:37] Let me say that, yes, in fact,
[00:07:40] this pervasiveness of the system is in the form
[00:07:43] of a strengthening of the state, the ideological
[00:07:46] state or the welfare state. Similarly, with the formation
[00:07:50] and strengthening of capitalism, the capitalist system,
[00:07:53] the economy and economic relations also developed
[00:07:57] this power in economic relations to completely control, yes,
[00:08:01] to completely dominate social life. But at the same time, this point that
[00:08:05] you made, that in fact,
[00:08:07] simultaneously with the formation
[00:08:11] of a powerful social
[00:08:14] system, something else also happened, the point you
[00:08:17] mentioned, and that is that social
[00:08:19] life
[00:08:21] became democratic. And Habermas in his first book, "Structural
[00:08:25] Transformation of the Public Sphere," actually,
[00:08:29] whose title is
[00:08:33] the structural transformation of the public sphere
[00:08:37] or the public arena, shows this in such a way
[00:08:40] that something emerged from the late 17th century
[00:08:44] onwards, gradually something emerged as
[00:08:48] an independent public sphere, yes,
[00:08:51] an independent public sphere. This
[00:08:54] is actually a space in social life where
[00:08:57] social relations exist that are independent
[00:09:01] of that system, of the social system.
[00:09:04] Well, now, Habermas's theory is that how
[00:09:08] this social life
[00:09:13] took shape, yes, it became more powerful,
[00:09:16] and then how it gradually declined
[00:09:20] in the late 19th century and then the 20th century, and there is actually a tension
[00:09:24] in society
[00:09:26] between the system that tries to impose itself and
[00:09:30] then this public sphere that tries to actually
[00:09:33] establish itself as having political
[00:09:37] agency. Yes, and in this public sphere, something
[00:09:40] called action takes shape.
[00:09:50] describes the public sphere and social life based on
[00:09:54] dialogue and language, meaning that
[00:09:57] he believes that what defines
[00:10:01] the public sphere and social life as
[00:10:05] an independent framework, an independent matter,
[00:10:08] and describes it is
[00:10:12] language-based interactions between individuals. People in
[00:10:16] society communicate with each other, and Habermas
[00:10:19] describes the logic of this dialogue, the conditions of this dialogue. He calls it
[00:10:23] communicative action, meaning that actually, individuals
[00:10:27] in society perform various actions. We, in
[00:10:30] our lives, perform various actions.
[00:10:33] Some of these actions are object-oriented, which he calls strategic,
[00:10:37] and these are not communicative actions. Yes, yes, some of our
[00:10:40] actions are subject-oriented, meaning when I encounter another subject,
[00:10:44] another human being, it is oriented towards understanding, towards mutual
[00:10:47] understanding, towards understanding the subject.
[00:10:49] Well,
[00:10:52] from Habermas's perspective, this mutual understanding,
[00:10:55] communicative action, and not strategic action, as you said, not object-oriented
[00:10:59] action, but communicative action, is
[00:11:02] actually the essence and core of the public
[00:11:06] sphere and social life, as you also mentioned
[00:11:09] in your speech. That in
[00:11:12] the 18th century, in the late 17th century in Europe, for example, in
[00:11:15] London or in Paris,
[00:11:19] what happened was that in coffee houses, in
[00:11:21] salons,
[00:11:25] people would gather and converse with each other, and these
[00:11:29] conversations were not strategic or instrumental,
[00:11:32] like in the past, where it was only
[00:11:35] about profit and loss or about economic issues,
[00:11:39] but rather they would discuss political issues, social life,
[00:11:43] social life. Well, and Habermas says that here
[00:11:46] is actually the flourishing
[00:11:50] and birth of democratic life.
[00:11:53] Yes, a
[00:12:25] context for this
[00:12:28] dialogue he calls
[00:12:31] discourse, meaning that
[00:12:34] it must be free from external control and domination,
[00:12:38] dialogue, meaning that the dialogue that takes place
[00:12:41] should not be under external
[00:12:44] threat or external pressure that influences
[00:12:48] its progression. Rather, only dialogical
[00:12:51] rationality should govern it. Habermas says that the only force
[00:12:55] that should exist is the force of the better
[00:12:59] argument. Only the better argument should prevail to determine
[00:13:02] the outcome of this dialogue. So, in the public discussion space, there should be no intimidation.
[00:13:05] If there is intimidation,
[00:13:08] it indicates that the public sphere, which is a condition of democracy,
[00:13:12] does not exist in that society. Very well, it was decided that you would explain these concepts and then
[00:13:16] criticize them. Yes, but let's leave the criticism for
[00:13:19] later. If you allow me, do
[00:13:23] you think that the
[00:13:26] main concepts of Habermas's
[00:13:30] political philosophy have been explained, or
[00:13:33] are there other things that need to be added? Yes, no,
[00:13:37] it was a great introduction, thank you. And
[00:13:41] I think that, following Mr. Parsa's
[00:13:44] comments, this argument that Habermas
[00:13:48] makes, that the public sphere is genealogically
[00:13:52] traceable to places like cafes, salons of
[00:13:55] conversation, newspapers, and so on, and
[00:13:57] his argument
[00:13:59] is that these are places where citizens can argue
[00:14:03] about public affairs. But after 20 years, in his
[00:14:07] next book, "The Theory of Communicative Action,"
[00:14:10] he is essentially answering the question of why argument
[00:14:14] is better than force. And it is there that this communicative
[00:14:17] rationality, its concept, emerges. That humans
[00:14:20] have the ability to argue,
[00:14:24] they have the ability to persuade, they have the ability
[00:14:28] to admit their mistakes. This leads
[00:14:31] to a different rationality than mechanical
[00:14:35] rationality
[00:14:37] or instrumental rationality that Weber referred to. Habermas says
[00:14:40] it's strategic, yes, but why is this important,
[00:14:44] not only in the theoretical distinction that separates
[00:14:48] Habermas from Weber, that separates Habermas from the
[00:14:51] first generation of intellectuals. Because the Frankfurt School was a critical
[00:14:58] school that existed in Germany, as its name suggests,
[00:15:02] and people like Adorno and Horkheimer
[00:15:06] were from its first generation,
[00:15:08] and
[00:15:11] they examined the causes of the crisis of modernity
[00:15:15] and saw rationality,
[00:15:18] modern science, as part of
[00:15:22] this problem. And it seems Habermas tries
[00:15:25] to put forward an argument that, well,
[00:15:28] if we want to consider this entire modern system,
[00:15:32] this crisis of modernity, as corrupt,
[00:15:35] meaning rationality, science, then on what basis
[00:15:39] can we argue? Our argument is based on
[00:15:42] reason. And therefore, he tries to separate a sphere
[00:15:46] under the title of communicative rationality,
[00:15:49] which distinguishes it from the general rationality
[00:15:53] that Adorno and Horkheimer, for example, talked about.
[00:15:56] He snatches rationality from the jaws of the wolf, so to speak, and says
[00:16:00] that this legacy of the Enlightenment must be preserved.
[00:16:03] Am I right? And for this reason, they say
[00:16:06] Habermas belongs to the Enlightenment era, but
[00:16:09] what does he mean by rationality? With a bit
[00:16:12] of academic background
[00:16:15] in the field of language and linguistics,
[00:16:19] I see his argument is somewhat similar
[00:16:22] to Chomsky's. Chomsky said that humans have
[00:16:25] a capacity that, in his words, is "wired"
[00:16:29] into our brains, which causes
[00:16:32] us to learn language quickly from childhood. So it's
[00:16:36] as if this is an inner force, an inner ability.
[00:16:39] It seems Habermas also says that this rationality
[00:16:43] is something that humans have, and in the modern era,
[00:16:46] it has particularly flourished. Is such a thing correct? But this
[00:16:50] rationality, in continuation of your remarks, is not
[00:16:53] an independent and isolated rationality. You see, Kant
[00:16:57] also, for example, regarding how humans
[00:17:01] can reach a consensus that something is ethical
[00:17:04] or not, believed in a type of rationality
[00:17:10] that means every individual can independently think whether
[00:17:14] what they do has the ability to become
[00:17:17] a universal law or not. And this is exactly where
[00:17:20] Habermas's important point of difference lies,
[00:17:24] that our rationality is not just
[00:17:27] the result of our thinking. It
[00:17:31] is the result of an intersubjective
[00:17:34] interaction. We live in society, in a family.
[00:18:10] deliberative or consultative, he talks
[00:18:14] about this. He has such a pattern of communication
[00:18:17] in mind, where the citizens of a
[00:18:20] society, in an ideal state of dialogue, as he
[00:18:24] mentioned, without pressure, without external force,
[00:18:27] without suppression, without fear of
[00:18:30] the consequences of expressing their views, come and present
[00:18:34] their ideas and persuade each other. Citizens, each
[00:18:37] of whom has their own logic, and have been
[00:18:41] born and raised in a religious or non-religious tradition,
[00:18:44] and now interact with each other based on a common
[00:18:48] language, a common language. This interaction,
[00:18:52] in social life or in the lifeworld, can actually
[00:18:56] transform the relationship between the system and social
[00:18:59] life. For example, laws from
[00:19:02] above should not dominate
[00:19:06] social life. Rather, from below, as a result of deliberation
[00:19:10] or consultation, they should be transferred upwards. This system
[00:19:13] that Habermas talks about, perhaps I should ask you, but
[00:19:17] you have used less time, Iqan. Is this
[00:19:21] system not a bit idealistic for the existing world?
[00:19:24] This is actually one of the criticisms leveled against Habermas,
[00:19:28] that he seems to be using
[00:19:31] these concepts with too much compromise
[00:19:34] or too much tolerance.
[00:19:37] But it seems that Habermas himself answers
[00:19:41] this and says that I need this distinction between the
[00:19:44] system and the lifeworld
[00:19:47] or the social world for my analytical distinction.
[00:19:51] And he puts it forward, and even many of Habermas's commentators,
[00:19:54] when they talk about this idea, believe
[00:19:58] that Habermas completely regards
[00:20:01] the system as a thing, a
[00:20:04] hand that is completely oppressive. They believe it because
[00:20:26] what social environments and community spaces
[00:20:29] are also not environments that are free from domination,
[00:20:33] meaning he also gives a feminist answer.
[00:20:36] He doesn't see them as completely separate, but we can't completely separate them, but
[00:20:40] Habermas says he needs this conceptual or analytical
[00:20:44] distinction to be able to advance his theory.
[00:20:47] Interestingly, we conclude his remarks at the
[00:20:51] beginning of your speech, the distinction
[00:20:53] between system and social life or the lifeworld.
[00:20:57] Do you also
[00:20:59] believe that these concepts and
[00:21:03] generally this system that Habermas
[00:21:07] proposes is interesting that Nancy Fraser,
[00:21:11] one of Habermas's feminist critics, says that
[00:21:15] Habermas was the last philosopher to build
[00:21:18] a system. A philosophical system. Do you
[00:21:21] think this philosophical system is idealistic,
[00:21:25] actually too optimistic,
[00:21:28] or is this answer Habermas gives,
[00:21:32] which Iqan quoted, enough for you? You see,
[00:21:36] first of all, generally, the criticism
[00:21:39] or analysis that
[00:21:40] Habermas
[00:21:43] offers of modernity and modern social life
[00:21:46] is, in my opinion, very important. It must be taken
[00:21:50] seriously. It is truly appropriate. I want to see
[00:21:54] what your main criticism of Habermas is. You see,
[00:21:57] my criticism of Habermas is that
[00:22:00] I can
[00:22:02] categorize it into several parts, but generally,
[00:22:06] if I want to explain the feeling of my criticism, it is that
[00:22:10] Habermas seems to propose
[00:22:12] a homogeneous
[00:22:16] and idealistic structure
[00:22:22] of social life and the public sphere, if we want to say
[00:22:25] so, based on dialogue and language.
[00:22:29] Well, it seems that in this
[00:22:31] ideal world, people have this ability, this
[00:22:35] capacity to engage in this understanding. Well,
[00:22:39] they understand each other through language. Well,
[00:22:42] Habermas seems to reduce society to those
[00:22:46] who can enter this rational dialogue. Many material
[00:23:05] factors are needed that
[00:23:08] relate to, for example, the distribution of wealth in society, the distribution
[00:23:12] of power in society, and therefore it's not
[00:23:15] that actually a class, now,
[00:23:18] as Habermas says,
[00:23:23] there should be a class that is
[00:23:27] beyond economic needs and
[00:23:30] connections to power, in a safe
[00:23:33] space, to converse with each other about political and social issues
[00:23:37] and influence politics. Your criticism is like
[00:23:40] the criticism that Michel Foucault makes of Habermas. There was also
[00:23:44] an extensive dialogue between them, but if
[00:23:47] Habermas says that he is looking at the potentials
[00:23:51] of modernity, just as he himself said that
[00:23:55] modernity remains incomplete, yes, here
[00:23:58] I feel there is a
[00:24:01] paradox, a contradiction, in Habermas's work
[00:24:04] between historical analysis
[00:24:07] and universal,
[00:24:11] general prescription. Well, first of all,
[00:24:14] in his first book, "The Structural Transformation of
[00:24:18] the Public Sphere," Habermas provides a historical analysis
[00:24:22] based on European modernity, meaning how
[00:24:25] in Europe, yes, in England,
[00:24:29] in France, in Germany,
[00:24:32] this new form of social life was born,
[00:24:35] and how important this new form
[00:24:38] is for democratic
[00:24:41] life. Well, but he prescribes.
[00:24:45] But from this historical analysis,
[00:24:48] he derives principles...
[00:25:02] that has the capacity for understanding and is
[00:25:04] therefore political and social. Well, it's political because it's a speaking
[00:25:08] animal. Because it's a speaking animal, it's actually a Kantian
[00:25:11] definition of human beings in general, not just European humans,
[00:25:15] not just Iranian Well, and therefore, I see a
[00:25:19] contradiction here where Habermas starts with European modernity
[00:25:23] and then draws a conclusion for all human beings.
[00:25:26] My question is, is Habermas's project a
[00:25:30] Eurocentric project and
[00:25:33] limited to a specific historical period
[00:25:37] and geographical location, or is it an analysis? Yes, this is another
[00:25:41] criticism that Habermas has received from postcolonialists,
[00:25:44] those who are called post-colonial.
[00:25:47] People like
[00:25:59] from the analysis of trends in European
[00:26:02] societies, you come and give
[00:26:05] an abstract prescription about human
[00:26:08] beings, and then you actually
[00:26:12] prescribe something that many other
[00:26:16] societies might consider more idealistic
[00:26:19] and unreachable. Look at Iran. Someone
[00:26:23] made a good description after reading texts by
[00:26:27] Habermas, saying that when I am in Iran
[00:26:30] with my opponent
[00:26:32] from another political pole and I want to
[00:26:36] converse, it's like playing chess with
[00:26:40] an elephant. How is this related?
[00:26:44] How is it similar to communicative action that revolves
[00:26:47] around consensus, around agreement,
[00:26:50] or whose goal is agreement? Does agreement even happen, or will this elephant crush
[00:26:54] me? Well, I have several
[00:26:58] topics to answer. One
[00:27:01] is a criticism.
[00:27:33] answers this by saying that these conditions
[00:27:36] that I am outlining for dialogue are
[00:27:40] an ideal condition
[00:27:43] and an ideal condition that we are supposed to move towards. This doesn't
[00:27:47] mean that it was even there at the time. Habermas himself does not claim
[00:27:50] that women in the 18th century, which he is analyzing,
[00:27:54] were present. No, he knows they were not, and he considers
[00:27:57] this among his criticisms, which are feminist criticisms
[00:28:01] of this public sphere issue.
[00:28:23] speaks of rational dialogue and emphasizes
[00:28:27] that all citizens, regardless of their gender,
[00:28:30] regardless of their religion, regardless of their beliefs,
[00:28:34] must have the ability to express themselves without fear
[00:28:37] and must be present on an equal footing. This is the first point.
[00:28:41] Regarding the criticism that post-colonialists,
[00:28:43] as you said and mentioned, there are several answers
[00:28:47] that can be given. Interestingly, Habermas himself refers
[00:28:51] to three of these four answers that I will quickly mention. The first
[00:28:54] is that Habermas has written one of his last
[00:28:58] books, whose title in Persian is "A History of Philosophy."
[00:29:02] In that book, he talks about the Axial Age
[00:29:06] and refers to other intellectual frameworks
[00:29:09] such as Confucianism, Taoism,
[00:29:13] Greek philosophy, and even Judaism, which he talks
[00:29:16] about, is not very Western. And therefore, he
[00:29:20] presents a more universal narrative. You actually mean
[00:29:23] that Habermas himself was aware that what
[00:29:27] he calls rationality is not simply
[00:29:30] and necessarily only European rationality, but rather
[00:29:33] he also paid attention to other traditions. Correct. This was part
[00:29:37] of his later work. Before that, where he formulates,
[00:29:40] there is a book titled "The Western Formulation
[00:29:44] of Faith and Knowledge." He himself says that this is a Western
[00:29:48] formulation, and it emerged from Christian culture and
[00:29:51] Judaism. But at the same time, he also says this point:
[00:29:55] there are a couple of terms in philosophy that I will quickly mention:
[00:29:58] "context of discovery" and "context of justification,"
[00:30:02] or the domain of discovery, the domain of justification.
[00:30:06] Well, Habermas says it doesn't matter where we derive a subject from,
[00:30:10] how we extract it, where it came from. For example, in philosophy, they say
[00:30:13] it doesn't matter if you dream and write a formula, what matters is that the
[00:30:16] formula works or gives an answer.
[00:30:20] And how you justify it and make it extendable.
[00:30:23] If these principles work and are correct, then
[00:30:27] they can be universal. What's the difference? It's like human rights.
[00:30:31] If human rights are good.
[00:30:54] speaks universally and says that the
[00:30:57] solution to some political problems that exist
[00:31:01] is that