BBCPERSIAN — broadcast
20260915 213000 UTC
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[00:00:26] the Iranian government's system for monitoring opponents outside the country with
[00:00:30] Alaj. Is the government trying to expand repression and threats abroad
[00:00:34] from its borders? We ask a former writer and political prisoner
[00:00:38] why the focus on opponents and critics of the Islamic Republic abroad
[00:00:42] has increased. We also ask a lawyer
[00:00:44] whether these actions and threats have a legal basis.
[00:00:48] اقدام و تهدید ها مبنای حقوقی
[00:00:57] in an effort to counter the Houthis. Yemen's president
[00:01:01] emphasized free navigation in Bab el-Mandeb.
[00:01:04] کرد.
[00:01:07] Four years after the start of the Women, Life,
[00:01:10] Freedom movement in Iran, what a difficult path women have traveled and
[00:01:13] what their achievements have been. After
[00:01:16] the Mahsa uprising, it seems that the hijab situation has improved,
[00:01:19] but no law for optional hijab has been approved. As a woman,
[00:01:23] I am still obliged to wear a headscarf and even a chador
[00:01:27] in government offices.
[00:01:29] Soaring prices of stationery and books on the eve
[00:01:33] of schools reopening in Iran. Last year, one million students
[00:01:36] gave up on education.
[00:01:38] زدند
[00:01:41] Security warning from three Western countries about
[00:01:44] the Iranian government's new spyware. The US, UK,
[00:01:48] and Netherlands say the goal is to collect information from activists,
[00:01:51] opponents, and journalists.
[00:01:54] است.
[00:02:18] a system called Alaj. A system to monitor
[00:02:21] Iranians abroad. Apparently,
[00:02:25] it is intended to deal with those they call traitors to the homeland,
[00:02:28] and even revoke their citizenship privileges.
[00:02:31] The call to identify opponents is a familiar
[00:02:35] pattern whose history goes back to the first years of the revolution
[00:02:39] and in recent years has been used to identify protesters
[00:02:42] against compulsory hijab. However,
[00:02:46] it is still unclear which body is responsible for the new
[00:02:50] system and how the personal information published in it
[00:02:53] was obtained. What is the goal of the Islamic Republic in taking
[00:02:57] such actions at this time? Can it control
[00:03:00] Iranians abroad through intimidation and legal cases?
[00:03:04] We will talk more about this. First, let's go to Farzad Saifikaran, my colleague
[00:03:08] from the BBC verification department who has researched this system.
[00:03:12] Farzad, what have your investigations
[00:03:15] revealed about the details of this system? Well, Farnoosh,
[00:03:19] we have examined the Alaj system platforms
[00:03:22] that were released last night. Even the state broadcasting organization
[00:03:26] published a detailed report on this last night. This is part of the website.
[00:03:30] If we go back to the previous image,
[00:03:32] we can actually see that
[00:03:36] a lot of personal information about Iranians abroad
[00:03:39] has been publicly released. Their pictures are
[00:03:43] there, and if we go back to that same image, these pictures,
[00:03:47] of course, their faces are not blurred, we blurred them to protect
[00:03:50] their identity. But well, it's clear from the name, it's a kind
[00:03:54] of threat, it asks people
[00:03:57] to report Iranians abroad and those who are somehow political opponents of the government
[00:04:01] or are in conflict with the government,
[00:04:04] and to provide any personal information they have about them
[00:04:08] to the Alaj system and they will publish it.
[00:04:12] When we were examining this system, we
[00:04:15] actually saw that there was
[00:04:18] very detailed information about these
[00:04:21] individuals. If we can go to the next image, we can
[00:04:25] see that a profile has been created for each person, like
[00:04:28] what is here. This profile, in addition to having the person's picture,
[00:04:32] contains very personal information such as date of birth,
[00:04:36] place of residence, father's name, and even national
[00:04:39] ID or their job, the university they study at, all
[00:04:42] of them are registered there. It is clear how they obtained
[00:04:46] this information. This is a very important question that we still don't know,
[00:04:50] but since this system has asked people
[00:04:53] to provide this information to them, meaning that it has actually
[00:04:57] asked citizens to spy on other citizens,
[00:05:00] some of this information may have been obtained through
[00:05:03] the relatives of these individuals or other people who are somehow familiar
[00:05:07] with them, because on this page we even see that a large number of
[00:05:10] social media posts of these individuals
[00:05:14] are placed here. Even their family photos,
[00:05:17] photos of their children, or even in one case,
[00:05:21] there are references to the family relationships of these individuals, which shows
[00:05:24] how much this information has been collected and categorized.
[00:05:28] Now, this very personal information is being publicly
[00:05:31] displayed, and this, of course, raises many
[00:05:35] concerns because it encourages citizens to spy on each other.
[00:05:39] One thing that I noticed when I looked at this website
[00:05:43] is that it is not clear who is responsible
[00:05:46] for and runs this website and this
[00:05:50] whole system. Have you found anything
[00:05:53] in your research? Exactly, we still haven't been able to come to a conclusion
[00:05:57] in this regard, but
[00:06:00] there is a very important point, Farnoosh, when we look
[00:06:04] at this website, a lot of content related
[00:06:08] to the judiciary has been published here. Even threats against
[00:06:12] Iranians abroad who are opponents of the government have been raised
[00:06:15] here. It is somehow referred to laws that
[00:06:19] the judiciary has recently approved or the Iranian parliament has approved,
[00:06:23] such as the law on increasing the punishment for spies
[00:06:26] or combating enemy agents, which the judiciary
[00:06:29] has constantly referred to confiscation of property in recent
[00:06:33] months, especially after the war, but it is still
[00:06:36] not clear which government
[00:06:39] or security body in Iran the Alaj system
[00:06:43] belongs to. They haven't even announced anything about it on this website.
[00:06:46] Is it clear what the purpose of this project
[00:06:50] is? The purpose of this project is, in a way,
[00:06:54] to create intimidation and actually identify
[00:06:57] opponents. For example, they said
[00:07:00] that they have identified and monitored 1600
[00:07:04] people, and as it is clear here,
[00:07:07] 600 of them were identified through
[00:07:11] public reports. The information of 60
[00:07:13] people has been published on this website so far,
[00:07:17] and it has been said that judicial action has been taken against 40 people,
[00:07:21] and what kind of judicial action is this? It mentions
[00:07:24] that, for example, their property in
[00:07:27] Iran may be confiscated, out-of-turn trials may be held
[00:07:30] for them, their citizenship rights may be revoked,
[00:07:33] which can be very broad because, after all, even Iranians abroad have
[00:07:37] rights as Iranian citizens,
[00:07:40] or it refers to temporary detention, which may mean
[00:07:44] that if they want to return to Iran, they may be
[00:07:48] arrested. As it is also mentioned on the website,
[00:07:52] they are actually emphasizing the law on increasing the punishment
[00:07:55] for espionage and cooperation with the Zionist regime, which they mean
[00:07:59] Israel, the language that the Islamic Republic uses,
[00:08:02] is actually equating any kind of opposition
[00:08:17] However, Mehdi Aslani, writer and
[00:08:25] heard Farzad's explanations about the details of this system.
[00:08:29] Do you think why the Islamic Republic has deemed
[00:08:33] it necessary at this time to, while intensifying internal repression,
[00:08:36] also create restrictions for Iranians abroad
[00:08:40] and want to control them?
[00:08:51] targeting those abroad, contrary to the tradition
[00:08:54] of the government's confrontation with those abroad in previous
[00:08:57] years, where their operations were limited to selective
[00:09:01] assassinations abroad. More than anything else,
[00:09:04] the governmental Alaj is trying to display
[00:09:07] an aspect of its power externally.
[00:09:11] We are everywhere, we have a powerful
[00:09:14] presence, and in fact,
[00:09:17] the message to at least a part of the opposition
[00:09:21] is that we have a vast army,
[00:09:24] it doesn't matter where you are, we have the power to see
[00:09:28] from Hyde Park to Toronto, Washington, and Frankfurt. We have eyes and ears
[00:09:31] everywhere, which is of course based on espionage.
[00:09:35] The primary function of such schemes and their public
[00:09:38] announcement is to cast a shadow
[00:09:41] of fear over those abroad so that out of fear
[00:09:44] of the subsequent consequences, they will stop
[00:09:47] their activities or participation in gatherings. Here too,
[00:09:51] let's really pause on this issue,
[00:09:54] that the punishments they announced
[00:09:58] may not be applicable to
[00:10:00] exiles and political refugees
[00:10:03] and may mostly affect others. The second
[00:10:07] function of this Alaj
[00:10:10] issue is to create
[00:10:13] theoretical conflict and schism within the entire opposition.
[00:10:16] Externalizing this government action is both a declaration
[00:10:19] of power and a creation of a kind of suspicion, to show that we have
[00:10:23] secret agents that you don't know. Mr. Aslani,
[00:10:27] if, as you say, the government's goal is to send the message
[00:10:31] that we are everywhere and our eyes are on
[00:10:34] all Iranians here, why is there no
[00:10:38] transparency about who runs
[00:10:41] this system? You see, we are witnessing
[00:10:44] one of the most complex crises in the history of the Islamic Republic's
[00:10:48] rule. It is not clear who the mastermind
[00:10:51] is, a kind of command in the shadows
[00:10:55] which, by the way, in these circumstances, helps
[00:10:58] this chaotic structure of the government, which has been intertwined
[00:11:01] with crisis from the first day and lives with crisis.
[00:11:05] This structure, without accountability,
[00:11:08] can at any moment overturn the table,
[00:11:12] saying that the intention was this, not that, the captain's policy was something
[00:11:16] else, the leader's opinion was something else. In fact, this structure and the military-security
[00:11:19] oligarchy, by not officially accepting responsibility,
[00:11:23] has freed itself from the consequences
[00:11:26] and accountability, unlike the era in the 1980s
[00:11:30] during Ruhollah Khomeini's time or the first three decades
[00:11:33] of Ali Khamenei's leadership, when major decisions
[00:11:37] were usually made through
[00:11:39] speeches and messages he delivered. This system,
[00:11:43] in its orphanhood and lack of ownership, due
[00:11:46] to this creation arising from the physical absence
[00:11:50] of the leader and
[00:11:53] executive and strategic
[00:12:00] power, has actually entrusted it to a network of security and military Revolutionary Guards, a fragmented structure that,
[00:12:04] under the pretext of
[00:12:06] a wartime situation, can stifle any voice.
[00:12:10] We are witnessing that
[00:12:13] this system has come
[00:12:17] and encouraged people to provide information
[00:12:20] about each other. A pattern that
[00:12:23] you probably remember was implemented in the 1980s
[00:12:27] and was used again later. Do you think
[00:12:31] the same pattern is being implemented, or is the situation
[00:12:35] now very different from the 1980s and such methods
[00:12:39] may not yield the desired results
[00:12:42] for the government? You see, more than anything else, the name of this monitoring
[00:12:46] and intelligence system, Alaj, itself indicates its nature and content.
[00:12:49] They cannot manifest the 1980s.
[00:12:53] What needs to be found
[00:13:00] in the evaluation is the solution
[00:13:03] by the government's security operators. More than anything,
[00:13:07] the government is trying to cure a cancer that has metastasized
[00:13:10] with a home remedy. Of course, it is resorting
[00:13:13] to, as your report mentioned, resorting to the always-present
[00:13:16] ummah, which has a long history,
[00:13:20] dating back to the era of madness in the 1980s.
[00:13:23] The calling of the 36-million-strong ummah,
[00:13:27] the intelligence network, the 20-million-strong army,
[00:13:31] Khomeini's charisma, after all, there was a significant
[00:13:34] social base among a considerable part of society and his supporters.
[00:13:37] But today is completely different, especially
[00:13:41] in this leaderless government, where we no longer have any
[00:13:44] decisive word. In fact, especially
[00:13:48] the young people of the homeland and the Iranian people are in a
[00:13:51] confrontation with the government in the government's non-existence.
[00:13:55] The government only wants to push this back.
[00:13:59] This is actually nothing but propaganda
[00:14:01] and nothing but a public
[00:14:05] image of creating a kind of
[00:14:08] intimidation. That is, when
[00:14:11] a 250,000-toman dollar has turned grocery stores into
[00:14:14] museums, a large part of the urban poor go
[00:14:18] to watch from behind the glass. The 1980s, even with
[00:14:22] mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, is impossible.
[00:14:47] that arises now is that, well, this system
[00:14:50] does not have a clear authority
[00:14:54] currently announced.
[00:15:04] and similar cases, can they actually
[00:15:08] legally pursue and implement
[00:15:11] such a process?
[00:15:15] I would like to say, before I say whether they can legally or not, because
[00:15:18] essentially, the law is a tool for them and they don't even need the law
[00:15:22] when they want to commit a crime or perpetrate
[00:15:26] it, I will say that since last night when I saw this system
[00:15:29] with the term Alaj, I remembered Mr. Mohammad Javad Zarif,
[00:15:33] who used to say, if a crime has occurred, tell us so we can try to justify it.
[00:15:37] But this time it is preemptive,
[00:15:41] meaning that Alaj itself is the prelude to the commission of a crime.
[00:15:44] A crime against the privacy of citizens,
[00:15:48] promoting defamation, and violating the minimum
[00:15:52] rights of people to life, such as consular
[00:15:55] rights or confiscation of property under this pretext.
[00:15:59] Secondly, when a system
[00:16:02] is launched, we must see how new this event
[00:16:06] or decision is. Then we must see who founded it.
[00:16:10] Firstly, the idea that such a system, named Alaj
[00:16:14] or any other name, with this certainty, you report it, we will take
[00:16:17] decisive action, which is not clear where the judicial
[00:16:20] process, the police process, the judicial
[00:16:24] process will take place. If I report it, you immediately take action. What does that even mean?
[00:16:28] It means that all citizens against each other, regardless of this,
[00:16:31] it also has a background. Even if this time they don't say who is responsible for it,
[00:16:35] none of us forget,
[00:16:37] we have 110 for the police, we have
[00:16:40] 113 for the Ministry of Intelligence, meaning
[00:16:43] you report to the Ministry of Intelligence with 113. This has been around
[00:16:47] for over 30 years. In the past two or three decades,
[00:16:51] 114 was also added for the Basij,
[00:16:55] and it still exists. Meaning, the Basij, which they say is a popular force,
[00:16:58] but it is an armed force, it receives its budget from the government,
[00:17:02] it is under the command of the IRGC, it is one of the security
[00:17:06] forces. The mere fact that I, for example, report against you,
[00:17:09] can this be the basis for the judiciary
[00:17:12] to issue a verdict against you?
[00:17:16] That's the point. That's the history. Meaning, previously, if you reported
[00:17:20] to the 114 Basij, the Basij, whose job was not
[00:17:23] legal, whose job was not judicial, had to act as an agent, but they were not
[00:17:26] an agent. Later, they changed their title to agent so they could do this.
[00:17:30] But in practice, from A to Z, the case
[00:17:33] was in the hands of the Basij, the IRGC,
[00:17:40] you asked a good question. You see, fundamentally, in classical terms,
[00:17:44] for someone to be responsible for anything, an incident,
[00:17:47] a crime must occur, and this crime must be proven
[00:17:51] by the police. The evidence must be collected,
[00:17:54] the accused must be identified, and the court, as the judicial
[00:17:58] authority, must convert the individual and criminal responsibility
[00:18:01] of the accused, if there is a suspect or accused,
[00:18:05] into a convicted criminal. None of these processes happen here.
[00:18:30] The second circle was the instances of media and media
[00:18:33] figures, which included all these people and media.
[00:18:37] And the third circle recently was this fight against infiltration
[00:18:41] that they had raised. This plan to fight infiltration,
[00:18:44] although it hasn't become law yet, these three are practically
[00:18:48] like triangles that are security circles that target
[00:18:51] all citizens, especially activists in the diaspora,
[00:18:55] because they used to prefer their opponents to leave the country
[00:18:58] so that, as they say, they wouldn't bother them. Now they have seen
[00:19:02] that these people have mobilized in the diaspora, gained
[00:19:05] power, and can advocate. Now they want to deprive them of the minimum
[00:19:08] consular services, from property to criminalization
[00:19:12] and considering them spies, all against each other.
[00:19:15] In this system, the
[00:19:18] terms used, such as "anti-homeland," "sanction
[00:19:22] supporter," "traitors," these, after all, do not have a clear
[00:19:26] legal definition, they are very simple.
[00:19:29] In this case, isn't it possible that anyone, even if they are not a critic
[00:19:33] or opponent, simply because they have an activity or
[00:19:37] an opinion, will be considered
[00:19:40] an accused?
[00:19:42] 100% exactly. In principle, when we talk about the legality
[00:19:46] of crime and punishment, the crime must be defined in law,
[00:19:50] its instances precisely, and the punishment in the same way.
[00:19:53] If we are to proceed with this trend, decisions are actually
[00:19:57] being made and actions are being taken by a government
[00:20:01] that is "anti-homeland" in this government. That is, it fundamentally lacks a national perspective,
[00:20:05] a purely Shiite Islamic and ideological perspective
[00:20:08] on the people of Iran. Here, in fact, nationalist
[00:20:12] movements should come forward more and claim, discuss
[00:20:16] whether it is really correct that non-legal terms
[00:20:19] of slaughter should enter principles that lead to confiscation of property,
[00:20:23] dehumanization of people, then condemnation to death,
[00:20:27] and execution in the name of the homeland from a country that
[00:20:31] believes not in the nation, but in the ummah. This is the first point. The second is that
[00:20:35] the terms used here are not only selective and
[00:20:38] murderous, but also fundamentally not legal, because the issue
[00:20:42] of homeland, the issue of treason, is something that they talk
[00:20:45] about in terms of patriotism or love of homeland, none of which
[00:20:49] are defined anywhere in the laws. Moreover, who can
[00:20:53] prove that the person who reports does not have a personal
[00:20:56] vendetta? Many of these things are
[00:20:59] not new either. For example, in America in the 1950s,
[00:21:02] we had McCarthyism, where out of fear of Soviet influence,
[00:21:05] all citizens were turned against each other, or in
[00:21:09] Germany, the Stasi, what they did was turn all citizens
[00:21:12] into security suspects, all against each other. This "divide and rule"
[00:21:16] is a historical pattern of rotten politics.
[00:21:20] But why does the government do this? Because it cannot control
[00:21:23] its own surroundings. All this infiltration, all these actions,
[00:21:27] all these espionage issues, actually went all the way to the IRGC Intelligence
[00:21:30] and the Supreme Leader's office. That's why many people were exposed
[00:21:34] and then came to power, and many of them gave information
[00:21:48] decisively to attacks by Yemen's Houthis. According to Riyadh,
[00:21:52] 13 people were wounded in Saudi Arabia in the latest
[00:21:55] attacks by the Iran-backed group. The Houthis have recently, in addition
[00:21:59] to renewing attacks on Saudi Arabia, seized strategic
[00:22:02] points on the western coast of Yemen and have also
[00:22:06] consolidated their control over the Bab el-Mandeb strait.
[00:22:09] The possibility of further disruptions to shipping in this important
[00:22:13] waterway, alongside the Strait of Hormuz, has increased
[00:22:17] concerns about the escalation of the global energy crisis. Mohammed bin Salman,
[00:22:20] Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, met with the Egyptian president
[00:22:24] today in Cairo.
[00:22:26] Elizabeth Kendall, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Head
[00:22:29] of Girton College,
[00:22:36] that arises now is that if we
[00:22:40] put ourselves in the shoes of the Yemeni Houthis,
[00:22:43] can it be said that they are looking
[00:22:46] for more than this, and how far do they want to go?
[00:23:48] Energy also pays them.
[00:23:50] That is, they also gain financial power. This is what they want.
[00:23:54] How far will they go? It's not clear. Perhaps they won't
[00:23:58] stop here, because in the final analysis,
[00:24:01] their ideology gives them
[00:24:03] political legitimacy not only to govern,
[00:24:07] but to govern in the Islamic world. If such a thing could be implemented,
[00:24:11] how much of what we said do we consider to be the Houthis'
[00:24:14] own decision, and how much of it might actually be
[00:24:18] part of Iran's strategy in the region?
[00:24:21] منطقه
[00:24:28] I think the latest developments indicate
[00:24:31] both cases. Both the Houthis' decision-making and
[00:24:35] the fact that, well, it works for Iran. It's not right
[00:24:39] to completely separate Iran from the Houthis.
[00:24:42] It's also not right to see them as proxies
[00:24:46] who simply listen.
[00:25:20] who see themselves as oppressed and weak
[00:25:24] forces who have stood up against what they call imperialist
[00:25:27] and Zionist conspiracies. At the same time,
[00:25:30] Iran also benefits from this because it causes
[00:25:34] maximum pressure on Saudi Arabia and
[00:25:37] the international community due to
[00:25:40] the control that is established over shipping
[00:25:43] in Bab el-Mandeb. This works well for Iran,
[00:25:46] strengthens Iran's leverage, and consolidates
[00:25:50] Iran's position in the negotiations
[00:25:53] that it will later use to reach an agreement
[00:25:57] in the Middle East crisis. You mentioned that the Houthis
[00:26:01] consider themselves victims. They now say
[00:26:04] that their actions were due to Saudi pressure.
[00:26:08] How much traction does this have in their strategy
[00:26:12] within Yemen?
[00:26:13] داره؟
[00:26:20] I think the Houthis now want to present
[00:26:24] themselves as champions of the oppressed.
[00:26:27] They are now presenting themselves as winners,
[00:26:31] with great confidence and a sense of
[00:26:34] recent superiority.
[00:26:38] I don't think the image they have of themselves is an image
[00:26:42] that all Yemenis share. But what resonates
[00:26:46] with the Yemeni audience is that the Houthis
[00:26:49] are defenders of Islam. They are defenders
[00:26:52] of Palestinians in Gaza, defenders
[00:26:56] of Palestinians in the West Bank, and
[00:26:59] oppressed Muslims in Lebanon,
[00:27:02] Muslims who were harmed
[00:27:05] in Yemen by
[00:27:07] the Saudi blockade. This narrative resonates well
[00:27:11] in Yemen. But the narrative that does not resonate
[00:27:14] well is for the Houthis to say,
[00:27:18] "We are defenders of Iran." No, the Houthis don't
[00:27:22] say these things, and in their narratives, this discussion of Iran
[00:27:26] has no place. Another issue is,
[00:27:29] of course, Saudi Arabia, which is engaged in conflict
[00:27:32] with the Houthis. What do you think Saudi Arabia can do
[00:27:36] with the Houthis? On the one hand, if it wants to escalate
[00:27:39] these conflicts, it will have to pay a heavy price. But on the other
[00:27:43] hand, if it continues its strategic patience, it will be in a position
[00:27:47] of weakness and can expand the Iran-US war front.
[00:27:51] What solution do you think
[00:27:53] Saudi Arabia has?
[00:27:59] Saudi Arabia does not have
[00:28:03] good options for what
[00:28:06] Saudi Arabia can do is what it has done
[00:28:09] so far. First of all, the war with the Houthis,
[00:28:13] which it waged from 2015 to 2022. That did not work
[00:28:17] very well and eventually led to a ceasefire
[00:28:21] before intense negotiations. I think this issue
[00:28:24] will continue. Saudi Arabia will probably
[00:28:28] also consider military options, but with the goal
[00:28:32] of being able to put themselves in a position where they can reach
[00:28:36] an agreement with the Houthis. This, in my opinion, is inevitable. In addition
[00:28:40] to these, Saudi Arabia needs new
[00:28:43] partners. We know that
[00:28:46] the United States is reluctant to
[00:28:50] get involved militarily and directly with the Houthis.
[00:28:53] Last year, it tried to do this,
[00:28:56] but it didn't work very well for them.
[00:28:59] Perhaps
[00:29:02] they can get help from the US in milder
[00:29:06] or consultative ways, for example, intelligence
[00:29:10] regarding their targeting or logistical
[00:29:14] support. But
[00:29:17] Saudi Arabia is looking for new partners and allies. We know that today
[00:29:21] they also spoke with the Egyptian president. We know that they also
[00:29:24] had discussions with Turkey and Pakistan within the framework
[00:29:28] of the Mecca Pact. However, it is very unlikely
[00:29:32] that any of these countries would want to get involved
[00:29:35] in a direct military conflict with the Houthis.
[00:29:39] That's why that Saudi Arabia
[00:29:42] should really think about an agreement, a solution
[00:29:46] that includes an agreement not only with
[00:29:49] the Houthis, but also with other regional players
[00:29:53] and even Iran itself. Elizabeth Kande, professor of Middle Eastern studies,
[00:30:04] Four years have passed since the killing of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the morality
[00:30:08] police, and even though the hijab law in Iran has not
[00:30:11] officially changed yet, these days some women appear
[00:30:15] with optional head coverings in public places and even some official ceremonies.
[00:30:19] Has the Woman, Life, Freedom movement ended, or does
[00:30:22] that movement continue to exist in other forms? Paria
[00:30:26] Manzarzadeh has taken a look at the evolution of the situation
[00:30:30] of women here.
[00:30:39] Four years ago, this image of two women without mandatory hijab
[00:30:43] in a cafe in south Tehran was a media sensation.
[00:30:45] Dunia Rat was arrested because of this photo.
[00:30:49] شد.
[00:30:53] But other women also joined
[00:30:55] them.
[00:30:58] From familiar names in Iranian cinema to athletes
[00:31:01] and other women.