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20260915 230000 UTC
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[00:00:28] currently occupied by Iranian-backed Houthis.
[00:01:07] Greetings, I hope you are well and happy. After weeks of Houthi attacks on
[00:01:11] ships, airports, and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, it was
[00:01:15] expected that Riyadh's strong reaction would push them back. However, the rapid
[00:01:19] advance of the Houthis surprised many. The Houthis, who call themselves
[00:01:22] Ansarullah, first captured the port city of Mocha
[00:01:25] near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the island
[00:01:28] of Perim in the heart of this strait. A week later, the strategic islands
[00:01:32] of Hanish al-Kabir and Hanish al-Saghir, about
[00:01:35] 160 kilometers from Bab al-Mandeb, also fell into their hands. In this way,
[00:01:39] the Houthis expanded their control over one of the most
[00:01:42] important shipping routes in the world. Bab al-Mandeb
[00:01:45] connects the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea to the
[00:01:49] Suez Canal and also to Europe. With the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz
[00:01:53] during the Iran-US confrontation, the importance of this route for global trade
[00:01:57] and energy transfer has doubled. At the same time, Mohsen
[00:02:00] Rezaei, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council,
[00:02:04] emphasized on X that there would be no negotiations until
[00:02:07] Iran's conditions are met by the US. He wrote that the equations
[00:02:11] related to oil and straits have changed. Scrambling to
[00:02:15] control the consequences will not stop what is coming.
[00:02:18] Mohsen Rezaei's reference to the straits is widely
[00:02:22] interpreted as a reference to Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb. The Houthi advance
[00:02:25] in the Red Sea brought them within about 32 kilometers
[00:02:29] of the country of Djibouti, which also hosts a US
[00:02:32] military base. However, apparently, US President Donald Trump
[00:02:36] currently has no intention of direct military intervention.
[00:02:39] According to Axios, Mohammed bin Salman, the Prime Minister and
[00:02:42] Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, who is practically the main decision-maker in that
[00:02:46] country, twice asked US President Donald Trump to prevent
[00:02:49] the advance of Iranian-backed Houthis towards this vital choke point.
[00:02:53] But according to this report, Mr. Trump said that he currently
[00:02:57] has no intention of direct confrontation with the Houthis. In
[00:03:01] one or two days later, in fact, he said that the Houthis have asked
[00:03:04] the US not to engage in conflict with them and that they allow
[00:03:08] most ships to pass. Without naming Saudi Arabia, he said
[00:03:12] that they are not happy with only one country,
[00:03:16] and according to Mr. Trump, this issue will also be resolved soon. But
[00:03:19] how? This is a question that perhaps more than anything
[00:03:22] else, more than anyone, has worried Mohammed bin Salman.
[00:03:26] The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia met with
[00:03:30] Brad Cooper, commander of CENTCOM, US Central Command,
[00:03:33] yesterday in Jeddah. These developments come as a drone attack
[00:03:37] disabled Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline. A pipeline that, after the blockade
[00:03:41] of the Strait of Hormuz, became the main artery for the country's oil
[00:03:45] exports. Now two main questions are
[00:03:48] raised. Will Saudi Arabia activate the Mecca defense pact
[00:03:52] to confront the Houthis? A pact recently signed
[00:03:56] between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. And two,
[00:03:59] with the Houthi takeover of Bab al-Mandeb in Yemen, has
[00:04:03] a new front been opened in the Iran war?
[00:04:06] This is the topic of our first round table.
[00:04:10] We will have an exclusive discussion about this, which we will try
[00:04:13] to follow up on during the program. But for now, for
[00:04:16] further analysis, we have Al-Alameh
[00:04:19] Saleh, an international affairs analyst from Tehran, the capital
[00:04:23] of Iran, who is live with us.
[00:04:26] Also Ali Sadrazadeh,
[00:04:34] a Middle East affairs expert from Athens, Greece. Welcome to the program, gentlemen. Mr. Sadrazadeh, let's start with you, with the same
[00:04:37] question I posed at the end of my introduction:
[00:04:41] are we witnessing the opening of a second front,
[00:04:45] a new front in the US-Iran war, or not?
[00:04:49] To what extent can current developments
[00:04:52] be considered a logical continuation of the US-Iran war?
[00:04:55] دونست
[00:04:58] It's not a front for the Iran- US war, because as you yourself
[00:05:02] said, the US does not intend to enter a war with
[00:05:05] the Houthis. Because the Americans have their own calculations.
[00:05:09] They are already in a war with Iran. They do not
[00:05:13] want to enter a second war in the Middle East.
[00:05:16] Probably public opinion in the US also does not
[00:05:19] agree with such a thing. That's why he said that the Houthis contacted
[00:05:23] him. Whether this is true or not
[00:05:26] is unknown, but this is not
[00:05:29] a front for the US-Iran
[00:05:32] war. Undoubtedly,
[00:05:34] this activity of the Houthis in Bab
[00:05:38] al-Mandeb benefits the Islamic Republic. And
[00:05:42] without paying attention to or without
[00:05:45] the support of the Islamic Republic, the Houthis
[00:05:49] would not have been able to achieve such a victory,
[00:05:52] because all observers say that the weapons that came,
[00:05:56] the training they received from Iran, and so on,
[00:05:59] all were with the help of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps,
[00:06:02] and it was with this help that they were able
[00:06:06] to achieve these successes. Of course,
[00:06:10] the Houthis also have their own
[00:06:12] calculations in their actions. That is,
[00:06:15] internal issues in Yemen
[00:06:18] play a very big role for the Houthis. Another issue that
[00:06:22] caused their victory is that the ground force
[00:06:25] that was supposed to fight them, that is, in the south,
[00:06:28] this ground force does not have
[00:06:31] that level of cohesion We'll talk
[00:06:35] more about its forces, but Mr. Sadrazadeh, regarding
[00:06:39] whether there is another front in the US- Iran war or not, we see
[00:06:43] that officials of the Islamic Republic, in their rhetoric, are now bringing
[00:06:46] up Bab al-Mandeb as part of their issues, including, as I mentioned,
[00:06:50] Mohsen Rezaei, who is currently the Secretary of the Supreme National
[00:06:54] Security Council, speaks of straits, which, of course, we interpret
[00:06:58] as referring to the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.
[00:07:01] Is that right?
[00:07:05] This Bab al-Mandeb Strait also comes to the aid of the Islamic Republic
[00:07:08] in its war with the US, because in fact,
[00:07:12] the main goal of the Islamic Republic in this action it is taking
[00:07:16] in the Strait of Hormuz is to cut
[00:07:19] off the oil relationship with the world,
[00:07:22] that is, to plunge the world into an energy crisis
[00:07:26] so that Donald Trump, under pressure
[00:07:29] from this crisis, will agree to reach some agreements
[00:07:33] with Iran.
[00:07:35] If
[00:07:37] we also consider Mr. Saleh's opinion, what does
[00:07:41] he think? Does he really see another war,
[00:07:44] in fact, another chapter, another season, in the US-Iran war,
[00:07:48] or not? Basically, the US-Israel war
[00:07:52] against Iran for changing the geopolitics
[00:07:55] of the region has begun.
[00:07:59] They have not achieved their goals. But their main goal
[00:08:02] was a US-
[00:08:05] Israeli-centric Middle East after the so-called
[00:08:09] fall of the regime in Tehran.
[00:08:12] This did not happen. Instead, it led
[00:08:15] to Iran and its allied groups
[00:08:19] in the region changing the military superiority of the US
[00:08:23] and Israel into a geographical
[00:08:26] war. This is where geography is used as a weapon,
[00:08:29] and currently, the events taking place on the western
[00:08:33] coasts of Yemen, or the capture
[00:08:36] of the western port cities
[00:08:40] of Yemen, are certainly something
[00:08:42] more than military achievements, but rather a change in the geographical
[00:08:46] balance in this region, which is very
[00:08:50] strategically important and causes
[00:08:52] these two straits,
[00:08:55] Bab al-Mandeb
[00:08:57] and the Strait of Hormuz, to be able to be used
[00:09:01] against the US and its allies in
[00:09:04] the region as a weapon.
[00:09:08] The importance of controlling
[00:09:11] the use of these straits, which will be under blockade.
[00:09:14] For example, if we say Bab al-Mandeb also suffers the same fate
[00:09:17] as the Strait of Hormuz today, by whom will it be used
[00:09:21] as a weapon, as a tool against the US?
[00:09:25] Look, the US and Israel intended
[00:09:28] to change the geopolitics of the region with a regime change
[00:09:32] in Tehran. This did not happen. Currently, Iran and
[00:09:35] its allied groups are trying to use their active
[00:09:38] geographical deterrence against US
[00:09:42] pressures.
[00:09:45] This is the importance of the advances
[00:09:48] made by the Houthis in the past few days.
[00:09:51] It's not just control and dominance over Bab al-Mandeb,
[00:09:55] but it also leads to physical control,
[00:09:59] which makes it easier to hit what they consider their
[00:10:02] enemies with very advanced weapons,
[00:10:05] and they can do this with more control.
[00:10:09] In addition, the Houthi control
[00:10:12] over the Red Sea increases,
[00:10:16] meaning that Saudi Arabia currently has a big problem
[00:10:20] for oil exports from the only
[00:10:22] port of Yanbu, which does not
[00:10:26] use the Strait of Hormuz, in the Red Sea.
[00:10:30] We must not forget that during the 80-day war, US warships in the Red
[00:10:33] Sea were attacked by the Houthis. Currently,
[00:10:37] this can be done much more easily by the Houthis.
[00:10:41] On the other hand, what has happened allows Tehran to have
[00:10:44] more diversity in escalating tensions
[00:10:47] and to put pressure on the US through the Houthis
[00:10:51] at every opportunity. So that the US cannot use
[00:10:55] the element of language against Iran. There are many
[00:10:58] questions about the US, especially after Mr. Trump's
[00:11:01] remarks, Mr. Sadrazadeh, and as you also mentioned,
[00:11:05] perhaps at any other time in history, if this blockade
[00:11:09] happened, the first expectation would be that the US would intervene
[00:11:12] militarily, because you see that
[00:11:15] Bab al-Mandeb is in danger, and so is global shipping,
[00:11:19] and one of the main pipelines for oil transfer
[00:11:23] and oil exports is actually out of commission, which is Saudi Arabia's
[00:11:27] east-west pipeline. But what was announced
[00:11:30] is that he currently has little desire
[00:11:33] to get involved in this conflict.
[00:11:35] For what reason? Mr.
[00:11:38] Sadrazadeh, the reason is what I said.
[00:11:42] The reason is that
[00:11:45] Trump is in a war with Iran. A second war
[00:11:49] that he would have to enter would not be
[00:11:52] popular with the American public. For this reason, he refrains.
[00:11:56] In addition, I think
[00:11:59] the US is right to think that the Houthis
[00:12:02] are not a clone of the Islamic Republic.
[00:12:05] The Houthis are different from Hezbollah.
[00:12:08] The Houthis have their own history. They have
[00:12:11] their own problems within Yemen. And it's not
[00:12:15] that whatever the Islamic Republic says, they will accept. If the Islamic Republic
[00:12:19] makes these calculations that the Houthis will
[00:12:22] surely accept whatever it says, it is completely mistaken.
[00:12:25] The Houthis are not Hezbollah, which Iran created
[00:12:29] for its own purposes. The Houthis have a
[00:12:32] longer history than even
[00:12:35] the history of the Islamic Republic itself. And their
[00:12:38] problem is within Yemen. If
[00:12:42] the US gives them a green light, or even
[00:12:45] Saudi Arabia, regarding the issues of Yemen,
[00:12:49] or the issues that the Houthis have with other groups within Yemen,
[00:12:53] a light.
[00:13:02] Please accept that I don't think the Houthis will do whatever is necessary in obedience to the Islamic Republic.
[00:13:05] During the program, we will return to the issue of how much the Houthis are connected or not connected
[00:13:09] with the Islamic Republic of Iran. But I want to ask Mr. Saleh the same question I asked you,
[00:13:13] which is about the US and
[00:13:16] Saudi Arabia, this rejection by Donald Trump, as reports indicate,
[00:13:19] twice on Thursday in telephone conversations they had,
[00:13:23] of Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince.
[00:13:55] has become a regional confrontation and conflict.
[00:13:58] The Houthis, by controlling Bab al-Mandeb,
[00:14:02] have become not just a regional player, but can even
[00:14:05] become a trans-regional player,
[00:14:09] by entering into agreements with Russia and China
[00:14:13] in this regard, which can again be in line
[00:14:16] with Iran's overall policies in a region
[00:14:20] where the US has less influence.
[00:14:23] The US, in this 40-day war, proved that it not only
[00:14:27] cannot protect its so-called
[00:14:31] allied countries in the region,
[00:14:35] but also largely disregards their interests
[00:14:39] altogether. Currently, Arab countries are paying
[00:14:42] a very heavy price for an unnecessary war,
[00:14:46] an optional war that the US and Israel
[00:14:50] started, and the US's
[00:14:53] only comfort is that it has created
[00:14:56] a naval blockade for Iran.
[00:15:00] This is not considered a strategic gain.
[00:15:02] All US bases in
[00:15:05] the region are empty, and the US is largely
[00:15:09] desperate to get out of a crisis that it and Israel
[00:15:12] unnecessarily created in this region.
[00:15:15] Thank you, Mr. Al-Alameh and Mr. Ali Sadrazadeh. I ask
[00:15:19] you to stay with us. Let's open a parenthesis here and go
[00:15:22] to a guest. In fact, our own Yemeni
[00:15:26] عبدالجلیل شائف, a writer, researcher, and
[00:15:30] political activist from South Yemen,
[00:15:33] is live with us from Sheffield, England. Hello, Mr. Sha'if.
[00:15:37] I hope you can hear our voice.
[00:15:40] امیدوارم صدای ما رو می
[00:15:41] Yes, Mr. Sha'if, before everything else, I wanted
[00:15:45] to talk to you about the Houthis themselves, as many expected
[00:15:49] Saudi Arabia to attack and launch a new military campaign
[00:15:53] against the Houthis in Yemen, but what we witnessed
[00:15:57] was the rapid advance of the Houthis towards
[00:16:00] Bab al-Mandeb. How did this happen,
[00:16:03] that they made this advance and even captured military equipment
[00:16:07] that was mostly from Saudi-backed government forces,
[00:16:11] and now, in fact, it can be said that
[00:16:15] they have had a great success so far.
[00:16:36] Yes, I think your description is a correct description.
[00:16:39] Their rapid progress was definitely a huge
[00:16:43] miscalculation by Saudi Arabia and any coalition forces
[00:16:47] led by them. It can be said that the Houthis had been planning
[00:16:50] this attack for a long time and succeeded
[00:16:54] in capturing the strategic position
[00:16:57] in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
[00:17:01] Perim Island and also the port of Mocha. Yes, the clashes
[00:17:04] are still ongoing. This has caused a humanitarian
[00:17:08] catastrophe and much suffering among the people
[00:17:11] of Yemen. But the Houthis have what I call
[00:17:15] an atomic bomb because they have
[00:17:19] complete control over the Bab al-Mandeb
[00:17:22] Strait, and this itself puts
[00:17:25] them in a very, very strategic
[00:17:28] position. That is, they will have complete oversight
[00:17:32] over this strait and can create a major threat
[00:17:36] to international shipping, especially
[00:17:39] shipping by the Saudis. The Saudis
[00:17:43] who are using the Bab al-Mandeb waterway
[00:17:45] instead of the Strait of Hormuz. This was the way
[00:17:49] Saudi Arabia could export its oil.
[00:17:53] Now this issue is in jeopardy. This
[00:17:56] has a great impact on people living in England now,
[00:18:00] on the price of gasoline. Therefore,
[00:18:03] the current situation is a very complex situation, but
[00:18:12] gives a lot of leverage in negotiations.
[00:18:16] Is it only the Houthis who have this leverage for future negotiations,
[00:18:19] or do you think it also gives Iran more
[00:18:23] bargaining power in negotiations with the US? Can it be said
[00:18:26] that what has happened in Yemen can be beneficial
[00:18:30] to the Islamic Republic in its negotiations with the US?
[00:18:32] Definitely.
[00:18:36] قطعاً.
[00:18:39] This is a very, very important point that
[00:18:43] we can raise. Iran is a great supporter of the Houthis.
[00:18:46] They have a lot of influence and a lot of connection.
[00:18:50] They have given very good weapons and technology
[00:18:53] to the Houthis, especially drone technology, and this
[00:18:57] in itself is a card that Iran can
[00:19:01] play. It's not just a card that the Houthis can play;
[00:19:04] it's Iran's card. This itself is within the framework.
[00:19:37] do you think Saudi Arabia can respond? Now we see that if
[00:19:41] you allow me, I will refer to one or two cases where Mohammed bin
[00:19:44] Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia,
[00:19:47] requested help from the US and was rejected.
[00:19:51] Also, as Bloomberg reports, today Saudi Arabia has also
[00:19:54] requested help from Britain, and now it is not clear
[00:19:58] what the result will be. What exactly can Saudi Arabia do? What
[00:20:02] reaction can it show?
[00:20:03] بده؟
[00:20:07] I believe that Saudi Arabia miscalculated
[00:20:11] the entire issue when
[00:20:14] the internationally recognized government of Yemen
[00:20:18] was focusing on, for example, the
[00:20:21] Yemeni National Council, which was weakened in
[00:20:24] early 2026. This emboldened the Houthis
[00:20:28] to launch this attack. If Saudi Arabia, with
[00:20:32] its cooperation with the UAE, had continued
[00:20:36] to support the Yemeni government, it might have been able
[00:20:40] to stop the Houthis. But the Saudis
[00:20:43] miscalculated, they made military
[00:20:46] miscalculations, and they made political
[00:20:50] miscalculations. Their support for the Yemeni government
[00:20:54] was really support for someone who has no
[00:20:57] influence in Yemen, neither in the north where the Houthis
[00:21:01] have control, nor in the south where a rebellion is currently underway.
[00:21:04] That's why Saudi Arabia really
[00:21:08] put all its eggs in the basket of the Yemeni government. That's why
[00:21:12] it's time for Saudi Arabia to think
[00:21:15] a little, to be patient about tactics and strategies.
[00:21:19] That's why now the US and other
[00:21:22] countries are perhaps advising Saudi Arabia to create the alliance
[00:21:25] it had envisioned years ago. And we are also witnessing
[00:21:29] that due to, or rather, at the initiative of Saudi Arabia, the meeting
[00:21:33] between Iran and the Persian Gulf Arab countries that was supposed
[00:21:37] to be held to discuss the fate of the Strait of Hormuz has been
[00:21:40] postponed. Do you think that now because the reason could be this Houthi advance,
[00:21:44] if the next meeting is held, the issue of Bab al-Mandeb
[00:21:47] will probably be on their agenda
[00:21:50] alongside the issue of the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:21:52] شد.
[00:21:58] I think if the Houthis continue their advances in Bab
[00:22:02] al-Mandeb, undoubtedly
[00:22:05] this will change the entire game. It will change the political situation,
[00:22:09] because the Houthis will be in a very, very much stronger position.
[00:22:12] But the point I want to emphasize is that
[00:22:16] the division among those who are
[00:22:51] under Saudi support that has not been able to fight the Houthis properly.
[00:22:54] بجنگه.
[00:23:00] In addition to this, you should also look at the humanitarian catastrophe that exists in Yemen.
[00:23:04] Currently, one of the worst
[00:23:07] humanitarian disasters in the world is happening in Yemen.
[00:23:11] This is an issue that can have a great
[00:23:14] impact on the supply chains
[00:23:18] that help deliver food and medicine
[00:23:22] to truly vulnerable people in northern and southern
[00:23:25] Yemen.
[00:23:27] Thank you very much. I am grateful to Abd al-Jalil Sha'if,
[00:23:30] a writer, researcher, and
[00:23:34] political activist from South Yemen, from Sheffield, England. Thank you very much for
[00:23:37] your presence, and also I thank Saleh, international affairs
[00:23:41] from Tehran, and Ali Sadrazadeh, an expert on Middle East issues from
[00:23:44] Athens, Greece, who spoke with us earlier. And in fact, my impression was
[00:23:48] that we would return again, but with Mr. Sha'if's remarks, this part
[00:23:52] of our program has ended. And on Saturday,
[00:23:55] one of the longest standing ovations in film festival history was recorded:
[00:23:59] 25 minutes of standing ovation for the documentary film "Naza" at the Venice
[00:24:02] Film Festival. This Israeli documentary won the special jury prize
[00:24:06] of the festival. The title of the film, "Naza," is an acronym for the Hebrew
[00:24:10] phrase "Nezik Agbi," meaning collateral damage, referring to
[00:24:14] potential civilian casualties during an attack on a military
[00:24:17] target. Yuval Abraham and Rachel
[00:24:20] Sur, the filmmakers, interviewed 24 Israeli military intelligence officers
[00:24:24] whose voices and images were altered to remain anonymous.
[00:24:27] The focus of these interviews was how to determine the number of
[00:24:31] potential civilian casualties and the use of artificial intelligence
[00:24:34] or AI in Israeli attacks on Gaza. According to these officers,
[00:24:38] the acceptable number of civilian casualties for each operation varies
[00:24:41] depending on the individual targeted and can sometimes reach
[00:24:45] 500 civilians. The Israeli army, after the film's release,
[00:24:48] announced that it had not planned or approved any attack
[00:24:52] with the anticipation of 500 civilian deaths.
[00:24:54] Yuval Abraham and Rachel Sur, two years ago, also,
[00:24:58] along with two Palestinian filmmakers, won the Oscar for best documentary
[00:25:01] for "No Other Land" about the expulsion of Palestinians
[00:25:05] from villages in the occupied West Bank. However, some members of the
[00:25:09] Israeli cabinet reacted harshly. Miki Zohar, the country's culture
[00:25:12] minister, said these are hated figures and action will
[00:25:16] be taken to revoke their citizenship. Itamar Ben-Gvir, the minister
[00:25:25] Get lost! I am sure Hamas in Gaza will welcome you with open arms.
[00:25:29] Eyal Zamir, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli
[00:25:32] Army, also said that the army's lawyers are investigating possible
[00:25:36] legal action regarding this film and its creators.
[00:25:39] What could be the reason for such a harsh reaction to a film,
[00:25:43] to the extent of demanding the revocation of the citizenship of its creators
[00:25:46] by members of the Israeli government?
[00:25:50] To discuss this, we have three guests. Reza
[00:25:53] Parto, a political analyst from Amsterdam, Netherlands,
[00:25:57] is with us. Meir Javedanfar, an Israeli affairs expert
[00:26:01] from London, and Yossi Yosian, a former officer in Israeli
[00:26:05] military intelligence and a political analyst from Jerusalem. Welcome
[00:26:08] to the program. I wanted to first ask
[00:26:12] Mr. Yosian what your opinion is on this,
[00:26:16] that in fact, this reaction to a film, in fact, an artistic work,
[00:26:19] a work that was so well received at the Venice
[00:26:23] Film Festival. How normal and ordinary do you find the reaction
[00:26:26] of Israeli officials?
[00:26:29] In my opinion, with all due respect,
[00:26:33] it is not an artistic work at all. That is why
[00:26:37] the reaction to this film is a non-artistic
[00:26:40] reaction. In this film, 24 soldiers
[00:26:44] from Unit 820, the intelligence gathering
[00:26:48] branch of the Ministry of Intelligence, participated. Now,
[00:26:51] I myself was in Unit 820 for 15 years,
[00:26:55] this very unit that gathers intelligence. And regarding
[00:26:58] this "nezik," which can be said to be the letters "nezik" or
[00:27:03] its Persian translation, "collateral damage,"
[00:27:07] I am familiar with this topic.
[00:27:10] These 24 soldiers who, according to these filmmakers
[00:27:14] and directors, participated,
[00:27:17] first of all, they did not give their names or surnames.
[00:27:20] There is no background information
[00:27:24] in this regard. Secondly, they are not willing to reveal
[00:27:27] these 24 people to the army so that they can testify
[00:27:31] and say what happened. That is, based on the fact
[00:27:35] that they made a film based on 24 people,
[00:27:39] and these 24 people also have no name,
[00:27:42] identity, or family, and they are not willing
[00:27:45] to give information.
[00:27:48] If the identity of these 24 people was revealed in the film, it is said that
[00:27:52] they are Israeli security and intelligence officials.
[00:27:54] If their identity was revealed, don't
[00:27:58] you think they could have suffered a worse fate than the fate
[00:28:01] of the filmmakers?
[00:28:13] I received my last certificate of appreciation from the President of Israel. I am precisely
[00:28:17] aware of how these issues operate behind the scenes.
[00:28:20] If these 24 people were truly telling the truth, there
[00:28:24] is an organization, an entity, in Unit 820
[00:28:28] called Debelah Din Ba'alumi, meaning
[00:28:31] the international
[00:28:33] judicial unit. There, they can send all this information
[00:28:37] without even appearing in the film, without giving names or
[00:28:41] surnames. They did not refer to Unit 820
[00:28:44] beforehand, nor did they contact Debelah Din Ba'alumi, the international
[00:28:48] judicial power of Unit 80. This indicates
[00:28:51] that this issue is not an artistic issue at all,
[00:28:55] but rather a film with significant political interests. Now, if you
[00:28:59] allow me, to a few reactions.
[00:29:10] describes them as war criminals. Avigdor Liberman, former
[00:29:14] Defense Minister, called the filmmakers enemies of Israel.
[00:29:18] Naftali Bennett, former Prime Minister,
[00:29:22] and several others, Abraham and
[00:29:25] Sur, meaning the filmmakers, were called enemies of Israel.
[00:29:28] And also other individuals, in fact, there are many reactions,
[00:29:32] so much so that Ms. Parto, this cannot be ignored,
[00:29:35] that a film, what content can it have
[00:29:39] that has upset so many Israeli politicians?
[00:29:41] Look, as someone who has
[00:29:44] followed this person's previous work, we should say
[00:29:48] that he is not.
[00:29:50] Do you hear my voice? Yes, you mean the film
[00:29:53] "No Other Land," right? Yes, in the film "No Other Land,"
[00:29:57] I saw that film. Well, they won the Oscar
[00:30:00] with another director. That is, in fact, this director
[00:30:03] had something to say. But on the other hand,
[00:30:07] I completely understand the anger of Israeli officials
[00:30:11] and the anger of some Israelis, because, according to these people,
[00:30:15] this film is a been one aspect, and
[00:30:18] the other aspect, which is the
[00:30:21] Hamas terrorist attack on October
[00:30:24] 7th, he didn't mention. Well, if we want to talk
[00:30:28] about a country like Israel, where freedom
[00:30:35] he, as a filmmaker, can even criticize
[00:30:38] Israel or criticize the Israeli government or criticize the army,
[00:30:41] but the Israeli army can
[00:30:45] also, to the same extent, ask this
[00:30:48] filmmaker for more explanations regarding the country's
[00:30:52] security issue. Of course, the Israeli army has
[00:30:56] not completely denied this issue and has said
[00:31:00] that the director must provide his evidence.