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20260920 183000 UTC
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[00:00:24] The deepening recession, with the continuation of the war situation,
[00:00:28] the economic growth rate of Iran in the spring reached about negative
[00:00:32] 11. We ask an
[00:00:34] economic analyst what direction the future of Iran's economy is heading in,
[00:00:38] and what is the way out of this deep economic recession?
[00:00:41] Also, in tonight's
[00:00:43] program:
[00:00:46] Khatam al-Anbiya's warning to the US and its allies regarding
[00:00:49] a possible attack. At the same time, Trump spoke of a big decision regarding
[00:00:53] Iran. We ask a
[00:00:56] former US Army intelligence officer what options Donald Trump has in confronting
[00:00:59] it, and what he can
[00:01:02] do? Questions about the reason
[00:01:05] for Trump's early return to the White House. At the same time, the US
[00:01:09] issued a security warning to its citizens in West
[00:01:13] Asia. We ask a strategic affairs analyst if Trump is
[00:01:16] ready to enter a war against the Houthis for
[00:01:20] his ally and trading partner Saudi Arabia in the Middle East?
[00:01:23] The closure of the only official French language
[00:01:25] examination center in Iran. The judiciary accused
[00:01:29] this institution of networking
[00:01:33] for the escape of elites.
[00:01:34] And
[00:01:37] the expulsion of three students with charges related to protests. Iran's Ministry of Science
[00:01:41] says if they express remorse,
[00:01:44] their sentences will be reduced.
[00:01:58] 60 minutes live.
[00:02:07] New official statistics show how devastating the US and Israeli attacks and war conditions have been for Iran's economy in the past
[00:02:11] year. According to the report of the Statistical Center of
[00:02:14] Iran, the economy has fallen into a deep recession, and the gross
[00:02:18] domestic product (GDP) has decreased by nearly 11% compared to
[00:02:22] last year. These assessments show that exports have also
[00:02:26] decreased by one-third. In addition, in a few months,
[00:02:30] the US has imposed a strict naval blockade against Iran
[00:02:33] and increased the intensity and control of sanctions. Alongside these,
[00:02:37] the annual inflation rate has almost reached 70%.
[00:02:40] Even before the war, Iran was struggling with severe economic
[00:02:43] problems, to the point that last December, the fall
[00:02:47] in the value of the rial against foreign currencies sparked the most widespread
[00:02:50] and bloody protests in Iran's history.
[00:02:54] Donald Trump's government has not hidden its intention to collapse Iran's economy.
[00:02:58] Are things heading in that direction? We'll talk more about this
[00:03:02] with Behring Tajdin, our economic correspondent.
[00:03:05] Behring, what do the latest statistics released by the Statistical Center
[00:03:09] tell us? The quarterly report of the Statistical Center of Iran shows
[00:03:13] that the war between the US and Israel with Iran and the naval
[00:03:16] blockade caused a recession. It caused the shrinking of
[00:03:20] Iran's economy. It caused Iran's economy to, overall, become poorer.
[00:03:24] Its income decreased. This figure of 10.8% that you
[00:03:27] see, this means production. Gross domestic product, or
[00:03:31] the total income of Iran's economy, government, private sector, all of these
[00:03:35] together, this spring was practically 10.8%
[00:03:38] less than last spring. But the issue is that we don't
[00:03:42] see this decrease equally everywhere. That is, in the
[00:03:45] oil and gas sector, we see that 26% of
[00:03:49] oil and gas revenue has decreased, or the value of
[00:03:53] oil and gas extracted in Iran, despite the increase in oil prices,
[00:03:56] has decreased by approximately 26%.
[00:03:59] Another sector is agriculture,
[00:04:02] which last year had negative growth due to drought. This spring, its
[00:04:06] growth has been positive. But if we exclude oil, other
[00:04:09] mines and industries had a 5%
[00:04:12] decrease in production. That is, the value of the
[00:04:16] product that was produced decreased by 52%,
[00:04:19] or services decreased by 48%. Overall, even if we exclude
[00:04:23] oil, the gross domestic product this
[00:04:27] spring was 46% less than last
[00:04:30] spring. See, wherever I say production, you can replace
[00:04:34] it with income, you can replace it with consumption, and
[00:04:37] this is not the whole story. See, as you
[00:04:40] also mentioned, the value of Iranian
[00:04:44] exports this spring was 35.7%
[00:04:48] less than last spring. See, look, oil prices
[00:04:51] had gone up, but the amount of oil exported was so little. Now,
[00:04:55] and petrochemicals and other products, the value of which
[00:04:59] decreased by 35%. Pay attention, value does not mean
[00:05:03] the money that was actually deposited into the treasury and available.
[00:05:07] This is only the value of what left the country. Another
[00:05:10] interesting point here is
[00:05:12] this: See, when income decreases, after inflation, the issue is that
[00:05:16] the amount of consumption, the amount you spend, decreases, right? The amount
[00:05:20] of things you buy decreases. For the government, it decreased by 17%.
[00:05:23] But when you look at private consumption, the
[00:05:27] people and the private sector, you see that the
[00:05:30] amount of consumption decrease was greater. What does this mean?
[00:05:34] This means that the blow that this economic
[00:05:37] recession inflicted on the people was more severe than the blow
[00:05:40] it inflicted on the government.
[00:05:45] past, because we know that the issue of economic recession in
[00:05:49] Iran is not a matter of today or yesterday or this year or last year. Exactly.
[00:05:52] See this chart of economic growth
[00:05:56] rates by season. If you look, in the early
[00:06:00] 90s, we had a period of recession, which was the
[00:06:03] beginning of widespread sanctions, and also around
[00:06:07] 2019 and 2020. First, because
[00:06:10] of the US withdrawal in the first round of Donald Trump's
[00:06:14] presidency from the JCPOA, and then because of the COVID pandemic. But if
[00:06:18] you look, that recession of those years,
[00:06:21] that negative growth of those years, came after a period of
[00:06:25] significant growth. You see, in one season, even
[00:06:28] the seasonal growth rate reached over 20%.
[00:06:32] But that 1.8% recession this spring
[00:06:35] and more than 2% last winter
[00:06:39] came after a very, very low growth
[00:06:42] period. That is, growth was around 2%, 3% at best,
[00:06:46] sometimes reaching 5%. Okay, so what does this mean?
[00:06:50] This next chart shows it better. See, as
[00:06:54] I said, gross domestic product can also
[00:06:58] be called gross domestic income. If we remove the effect of
[00:07:01] inflation from it, which is converting it to constant
[00:07:05] prices of the year 1400 (2021), meaning as if incomes and expenses were at the
[00:07:09] level of 1400, you see that the
[00:07:20] amount is well, the problem isn't that it's only decreased a little, only
[00:07:23] 150 trillion Tomans less, less than 10% less compared
[00:07:27] to those years. The problem is that in these years, Iran's population was around
[00:07:31] 80 million people. Now the population is close to 90
[00:07:34] million. The population has increased. The total
[00:07:38] income of Iran's economy has decreased. The result of these two
[00:07:42] together is that, in fact, the standard of living,
[00:07:46] the purchasing power of the people and the entire economy, has
[00:07:50] severely declined, much more than perhaps this 5%
[00:07:53] or 10% decrease in GDP compared to
[00:07:57] ten years ago. That is, if we look
[00:08:01] at the long term, in the long term, the people
[00:08:04] of Iran, on average, these statistics show how much
[00:08:08] poorer they have become. Thank you to Behring Tajdin, our infrastructure
[00:08:16] correspondent, and also development patterns and
[00:08:20] former economic advisor at the UK Ministry of Transport from London, Mr.
[00:08:24] Zamani. Welcome to the program.
[00:08:27] First, I wanted to start from this angle, whether this situation
[00:08:31] is only related to Iran, or whether the overall
[00:08:34] global economic situation
[00:08:37] is in trouble, because we see everywhere there is talk of, for example, gasoline
[00:08:41] prices going up, diesel prices going up. Food items
[00:08:44] have become more expensive. To what extent is this
[00:08:48] influenced by the global situation?
[00:08:52] Well, other sectors of the global economy are also facing
[00:08:56] problems. But by no means
[00:08:59] to the severity of Iran. In Iran's case, the
[00:09:02] main factor is war. And another
[00:09:05] point to consider is that 11% figure you
[00:09:09] mentioned. This is related to the
[00:09:13] first three months of the year,
[00:09:16] and there hasn't been enough time
[00:09:19] for the effect of this economic blockade
[00:09:22] and naval blockade and subsequent secondary
[00:09:26] sanctions to be sufficiently reflected in these
[00:09:30] statistics. In other words, the actual
[00:09:33] severity of the recession that is forming within
[00:09:37] the system is much, much more
[00:09:40] severe than this 10% figure.
[00:09:53] Some sectors of the economy, for example, react much
[00:09:56] faster and reflect the intensity of inflation
[00:10:00] faster than other sectors. For example, take
[00:10:04] transportation. In the same statistics for the first
[00:10:07] three months of the year that you
[00:10:10] mentioned, the transportation sector
[00:10:13] shows a 17% economic recession.
[00:10:17] Or, for example, take the warehousing sector. The
[00:10:20] warehousing sector usually acts as a shock
[00:10:24] absorber. That is, it absorbs part of the pressure
[00:10:27] being exerted on the system so
[00:10:30] that it is not immediately transferred to the rest of
[00:10:33] the economy. In this same sector, you see that the
[00:10:37] intensity of the recession was 17%. All
[00:10:40] of this indicates that the recession that
[00:10:43] is forming in the system is
[00:10:46] much beyond 10- 11%, and if
[00:10:50] the US government can continue this economic blockade
[00:10:54] and keep Iran's oil exports at
[00:10:57] 200,000-300,000 barrels, the intensity of
[00:11:00] the economic recession can easily exceed 20% and
[00:11:04] even more, and this could
[00:11:07] bring about a very great catastrophe for Iran's
[00:11:10] economy. You made a good point. These statistics are
[00:11:14] from three months ago, when the economic blockade was
[00:11:18] not intensified to that extent. Now, if we
[00:11:21] consider the current situation,
[00:11:25] can we say that Iran
[00:11:29] is very close to the brink
[00:11:32] of economic collapse, or the economic collapse that
[00:11:35] Scott Bessent, the US Treasury Secretary, did not hide?
[00:11:38] He said that one of the goals
[00:11:41] is this.
[00:11:44] The system, with the current situation, if the current
[00:11:48] level of exports, the naval economic blockade of Iran,
[00:11:51] continues, it is moving rapidly in that direction.
[00:11:55] For example, consider the government sector. The government's
[00:11:59] budget is on paper 10% dependent on oil revenue,
[00:12:02] but in reality, the intensity
[00:12:05] of this dependence is more than 30%. The reason for this
[00:12:09] is that the government covers its budget deficit by
[00:12:13] drawing from the Development Fund, where oil
[00:12:16] revenues are saved. So it is supplied
[00:12:20] from there. The dependence on oil
[00:12:23] revenue is more than 30%. When this revenue decreases
[00:12:27] from 2 million barrels per day to
[00:12:30] 200 thousand barrels per day,
[00:12:34] the government practically loses 30% of
[00:12:37] its budget. In addition to that, 50%
[00:12:41] of the budget is provided
[00:12:44] by taxes. When the
[00:12:47] economy experiences a 20-30% economic recession,
[00:12:50] it can no longer collect these taxes.
[00:12:54] The government will face a very
[00:12:58] severe budget crisis. The government will go bankrupt.
[00:13:00] Unfortunately, our economy, due
[00:13:04] to the apocalyptic view that dominates
[00:13:07] the country's governance system, is
[00:13:11] rapidly heading towards a very serious
[00:13:14] catastrophe. When we were reviewing the statistics with
[00:13:18] Behring, in the past, there have been two or three
[00:13:22] instances where the recession was almost
[00:13:25] of the same magnitude. For example, in the early
[00:13:28] 90s, when the sanctions became very
[00:13:31] severe, and especially
[00:13:34] Iran's oil and gas were sanctioned, or after Corona and the
[00:13:37] US withdrawal from the JCPOA,
[00:13:41] each time they found a way to eventually increase economic
[00:13:44] growth and make it positive. This time,
[00:13:48] do you think it's different from previous times? Is the
[00:13:52] possibility lower?
[00:13:59] In previous instances, we practically did not have an economic blockade, nor a naval blockade. Now there is a complete
[00:14:03] naval blockade, and everything depends on whether the
[00:14:06] US government can maintain Iran's oil
[00:14:10] exports at this level of 250-
[00:14:12] 300,000 barrels per day.
[00:14:16] And in this equation, China is a key
[00:14:19] player, how will it act? If
[00:14:23] China does not cooperate with the US government
[00:14:26] and fully goes towards confrontation with
[00:14:30] the US government, in that case, in the best conditions, Iran
[00:14:33] can, the Islamic Republic can, have exports of
[00:14:37] approximately one million barrels, 75,000
[00:14:41] barrels per day up to one million barrels per day. In that
[00:14:45] case, the intensity of economic recession will remain
[00:14:48] around 20%. It might stay on
[00:14:51] its own two feet, but
[00:14:55] it will be a very severe, permanent bleeding.
[00:14:59] However, for China to be willing to go
[00:15:02] towards confrontation to defend the Islamic Republic
[00:15:05] and jeopardize its long-term interests in the Middle
[00:15:09] East and with the US is very, very
[00:15:12] unlikely. The stronger probability is that China
[00:15:16] will provide minimal support to the Islamic
[00:15:19] Republic, in which case, for example, the amount of
[00:15:22] Iran's oil exports will fluctuate
[00:15:29] to some extent, in which case we will practically
[00:15:31] be approaching economic collapse.
[00:15:34] Now, this.
[00:16:37] widespread droughts and also
[00:16:41] proximity to Russia not enough to circumvent these
[00:16:44] sanctions?
[00:16:47] To some extent, it can help and reduce its intensity,
[00:16:50] but the compensation is not enough to
[00:16:54] completely or significantly reduce
[00:16:57] that pressure. It might reduce the pressure by
[00:17:01] 10-15%, and in addition, regarding Russia,
[00:17:05] you should note that Russia,
[00:17:08] due to the problems it is facing—the Ukraine
[00:17:12] war, economic sanctions, and so on—is not in a
[00:17:15] position to provide serious economic assistance
[00:17:19] to Iran. Most of its assistance will be military,
[00:17:23] intelligence, and similar aspects,
[00:17:26] rather than economic. In the economic
[00:17:29] arena, China is the main player.
[00:17:33] India also cannot play a serious
[00:17:36] role. It is very unlikely to jeopardize
[00:17:40] its own interests in its relationship with the
[00:17:43] US. As a result, the impact of
[00:17:46] all these players will be relatively limited,
[00:17:49] and the severity of the problems that are
[00:17:52] forming in the economy is very high.
[00:17:56] On the surface, these figures of 10% and
[00:17:59] 20% may not seem very large, but behind
[00:18:03] these figures lie the lives
[00:18:06] and deaths of millions of Iranians.
[00:18:09] There is a close and direct relationship
[00:18:13] between economic growth rates and the population
[00:18:16] below the poverty line. For example,
[00:18:20] internationally, every 1%
[00:18:22] increase in economic growth causes the population
[00:18:26] below the poverty line to increase
[00:18:30] by 7%. This relationship in Iran,
[00:18:34] this 0.7% is a global average. In
[00:18:37] Iran, the intensity of this dependence between
[00:18:41] the economic growth rate and the population below
[00:18:44] the poverty line is much, much more severe, such
[00:18:48] that, for example, a 20% recession can
[00:18:52] easily increase the country's population below the poverty
[00:18:55] line by 20% or even more, in a situation
[00:18:59] where, according to government statistics, about 30%
[00:19:03] to 40% of the population is below the poverty
[00:19:06] line. Such a leap in the population below
[00:19:10] the poverty line due to the economic
[00:19:14] recession that is forming in the system
[00:19:17] can endanger the lives of millions of Iranians. Thank you, Mr.
[00:19:20] Zamani. Hadi Zamani, an expert on infrastructure projects and
[00:19:23] development patterns.
[00:19:26] In Iran, Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters says
[00:19:29] it has obtained information that the US, with the support
[00:19:33] of some Middle Eastern countries, is preparing to resume its attack
[00:19:36] on Iran. This high military body warned about
[00:19:40] the consequences of such an attack. At the same time, according
[00:19:44] to Fox News, Donald Trump announced a very big decision
[00:19:47] regarding Iran. He welcomed the idea of meeting with Massoud
[00:19:51] Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, but at the same
[00:19:55] time said he was thinking about whether to bomb
[00:19:59] Iran, and how to do it. Shabnam Majidi
[00:20:02] reports that in these circumstances, diplomatic efforts
[00:20:06] are still ongoing to end the conflict.
[00:20:11] Donald Trump cut short his weekend vacation at Camp
[00:20:15] David last night and returned to the White House
[00:20:18] earlier than expected, without announcing a reason for
[00:20:22] this decision. Fox News says he stated he has a big
[00:20:25] decision ahead. On the one hand, he threatened, asking when
[00:20:29] to blow up all of Iran, and warned Tehran to
[00:20:33] behave properly. On the other hand, he said he welcomes
[00:20:37] the idea of meeting with the Iranian president on the sidelines of the UN
[00:20:41] General Assembly. At the same time, a number of US
[00:20:45] embassies in West Asia issued an emergency
[00:20:47] security alert. Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters had previously
[00:20:51] issued a warning statement regarding recent movements.
[00:20:54] If the US makes a mistake against Islamic Iran,
[00:20:57] all the deployment centers and interests of that country
[00:21:01] in the region will be subject to continuous, effective, and
[00:21:05] painful attacks without any limitations or considerations. These
[00:21:09] warnings are issued while yesterday the Houthis announced
[00:21:12] they attacked sensitive targets in Riyadh with missiles
[00:21:15] and drones. The first retaliatory attack by Yemen's Ansar Allah
[00:21:18] on Riyadh. Agence France-Presse says an
[00:21:22] Aramco oil company fuel tank near the airport
[00:21:26] caught fire, but Saudi Arabia says it intercepted
[00:21:29] and destroyed the missile fired at Riyadh. The US
[00:21:33] has avoided direct involvement in this front until today.
[00:21:36] But now, with threats reaching the Saudi capital, new
[00:21:40] questions arise for this Riyadh ally.
[00:21:44] The strategic point of the port of Mocha, which the Houthis captured
[00:21:47] weeks ago, may now witness renewed
[00:21:51] clashes. Residents are also more worried.
[00:21:55] We are tired of the planes
[00:21:58] bombing us day and night. We don't even have a moment
[00:22:02] of peace. But what can we do?
[00:22:06] They are all fighting against us. They are all against
[00:22:09] Islam and Muslims, especially against Yemen.
[00:22:12] The US and all of them. We ask God
[00:22:15] to save us from this situation.
[00:22:17] Greshmeler
[00:22:20] At the same time, efforts for negotiations are also
[00:22:24] underway. The Turkish Foreign Minister says they are working
[00:22:27] with several other countries on new proposals to end the war.
[00:22:31] The Pakistani Interior Minister is also expected to visit
[00:22:34] Tehran today. Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran's
[00:22:38] Supreme National Security Council, told Al Jazeera Arabic yesterday
[00:22:42] that Iran's conditions, including an end to the war on all fronts,
[00:22:45] the release of Iran's assets, and an end to the naval blockade,
[00:22:49] have been announced to the US, and they are awaiting a response.
[00:22:53] The duality of war or negotiation is not real, and one must
[00:22:57] both fight and negotiate. The enemy knows very
[00:23:00] well that the path of deception and unilateral
[00:23:04] imposition is closed, and as long as these conditions
[00:23:07] are not met and the rightful
[00:23:11] rights of the Iranian nation are not recognized,
[00:23:14] and the commitments of the Americans are
[00:23:18] not fulfilled, there will be no window
[00:23:22] for a return to previous conditions of negotiation
[00:23:25] and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:23:28] And it seems that this waterway, to which the fate
[00:23:32] of the world economy is tied, will remain closed until that
[00:23:35] day. Shabnam Majidi, BBC.
[00:23:38] Sheida Hooshmandi, our correspondent, is with
[00:23:42] us from Washington. Sheida, what is Mr.
[00:23:44] Trump's situation? Is it clear what he wants
[00:23:48] to do? What can be understood
[00:23:52] from his latest statements? What we understand from
[00:23:54] the news and developments in the region is that things
[00:23:58] are happening, but Mr. Trump seems not to want to
[00:24:02] reveal to others what his next step is.
[00:24:06] We see that when he talks to a Fox reporter,
[00:24:09] he talks about various options, and these are options that
[00:24:13] have always been on the table: to eliminate Iran,
[00:24:17] the second option is to reach an agreement with them,
[00:24:20] and the third option is to let it collapse due to
[00:24:24] its bad economic situation. And then he talks
[00:24:27] about being willing to meet with Mr. Pezeshkian
[00:24:30] at the UN General Assembly meeting, which
[00:24:33] starts next week. So, on the one hand,
[00:24:37] he leaves the door open for diplomacy, and on the other
[00:24:41] hand, he talks about escalating tensions.
[00:24:44] This is very similar to what he told Axios
[00:24:48] a few days ago, and
[00:24:50] it seems that he has adopted the same approach
[00:24:54] regarding the Houthis and Saudi Arabia. That is,
[00:24:57] on the one hand, he says the Houthis of Yemen are
[00:25:00] in contact with us and tell Washington that they have
[00:25:03] no business with the Americans. On the other hand, he
[00:25:07] cooperates with Saudi Arabia to control the Houthis,
[00:25:10] or to have a confrontation with them. At the same
[00:25:14] time, it seems that at least publicly, he does
[00:25:17] not want to enter into
[00:25:20] a direct confrontation, but he also does not rule
[00:25:23] it out. Today, we hear from Mike Walls,
[00:25:27] the US representative to the UN, who goes on the
[00:25:31] program Face the Nation and says that when
[00:25:34] he is asked about the US approach towards the
[00:25:37] Houthis and whether Washington is willing to enter
[00:25:41] into a direct confrontation, he does not deny it and
[00:25:44] says that a decision is on the way.
[00:25:47] In the meantime, we have heard from
[00:25:50] various sources that he has cut short
[00:25:54] his stay at Camp David and returned to
[00:25:58] Washington. The discussion is about Yemen and the Houthis,
[00:26:01] and he probably wants to make an important
[00:26:05] decision in this regard. On the other hand,
[00:26:08] there are many holidays in the region.
[00:26:10] In any case, there is always a possibility
[00:26:14] that tensions will escalate. On the occasion
[00:26:17] of this, in fact, Jewish holidays, and so it is
[00:26:21] that perhaps the warnings that are being
[00:26:25] issued are related to the fact that tensions should
[00:26:28] subside a little. But what is certain is
[00:26:32] that both sides are ready for a confrontation
[00:26:36] or escalation of tensions. The decision that Mr.
[00:26:39] Trump has made is to keep his cards close
[00:26:43] to his chest for now, and to keep all options open.
[00:26:45] Thank you, Sheida Hooshmandi,
[00:26:48] our correspondent in Washington. William Putnam,
[00:26:52] former US Army intelligence officer, and also former
[00:26:56] national security researcher at the John F. Kennedy School
[00:26:59] of Government at Harvard University. Mr. Putnam also
[00:27:03] served in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. Welcome to the
[00:27:07] program. In your opinion, what can Mr. Trump do, or
[00:27:10] what options does he have
[00:27:12] in confronting Iran in the current
[00:27:19] situation? First of all, thank
[00:27:21] you for inviting me. I think
[00:27:25] we need to look at the current situation
[00:27:29] and see where we stand after 7 months of this
[00:27:32] war. I think Washington and Tehran both want to
[00:27:36] reach an agreement, but the situation has reached
[00:27:39] a point where neither side is willing to make concessions.
[00:27:43] We know that military actions, as
[00:27:46] well as economic pressure and diplomacy, all of
[00:27:50] these are ultimately aimed at reaching a political
[00:27:53] solution. But to change the
[00:27:55] strategy of our opponent,
[00:27:59] the situation is such that the more pressure
[00:28:02] the US exerts, and
[00:28:05] for example, imagine there's a dial to increase
[00:28:09] and decrease pressure, Iran is also trying to show
[00:28:13] that it has more endurance. The more pressure
[00:28:16] increases, the more Iran increases pressure
[00:28:20] in the region. Attacks on Saudi
[00:28:23] Arabia, what the Houthis are doing to Saudi Arabia,
[00:28:26] what is happening in Iraq, and even in Lebanon,
[00:28:30] they are trying to create more pressure in the Red Sea.
[00:28:38] The cost of these pressures is greater than the cost
[00:28:41] of making concessions, and it hasn't reached that point
[00:28:44] yet, it seems. What Mr. Trump can do is
[00:28:48] to increase military pressure, launch new attacks,
[00:28:52] given that the blockade is working, although Iran has
[00:28:56] shown in the past that it can cope with sanctions,
[00:28:59] it has never had a naval blockade. That naval
[00:29:03] blockade has indeed been successful, in my opinion.
[00:29:06] Maybe that naval blockade is successful,
[00:29:09] but it doesn't change Tehran's calculations. The main
[00:29:13] question Mr. Trump faces is what needs
[00:29:16] to happen in his view
[00:29:19] to change Iran's calculations and bring
[00:29:23] them to the negotiating table, and for them
[00:29:26] to agree to a deal that allows the Strait of Hormuz
[00:29:29] to be fully open. And at the same
[00:29:43] time, it seems that the Iranian side is willing to return to the Islamabad
[00:29:47] agreement. He talks about it. Mr. Trump says
[00:29:50] that no, I do not I don't have a problem
[00:29:54] now where is it, for example, if they want to return
[00:29:58] to the same memorandum of understanding, is that framework
[00:30:01] enough to say. Can both sides
[00:30:04] agree on it and is it a basis for dialogue and
[00:30:08] agreement?
[00:30:15] This possibility exists.
[00:30:18] Yes, now Iran sees
[00:30:22] that Islamabad agreement as a basis which is
[00:30:25] interesting, but there is an important issue . The United States
[00:30:29] and Washington.
[00:30:34] had a misunderstanding
[00:30:37] of this memorandum of understanding and
[00:30:41] the sequence of actions
[00:30:43] in it.
[00:30:46] One moment, excuse me, if we look
[00:30:49] at the issue that we
[00:30:52] have now.
[00:30:55] The issue is that the United States and Iran.