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[00:03:14] And now on BBC Persian Television, current
[00:03:18] issues.
[00:03:21] Francis Fukuyama is one of the most well-known political theorists
[00:03:24] of the last few decades, a thinker whose name became
[00:03:28] famous worldwide at the end of the Cold War with this controversial idea:
[00:03:32] "The End of History." He argued that with
[00:03:35] the collapse of communism, liberal democracy and market
[00:03:38] economy had become the most unrivalled model for
[00:03:41] the political organization of societies. An idea that has been challenged
[00:03:45] many times since then, and Fukuyama himself has repeatedly explained that
[00:03:49] he didn't mean that nothing else would happen
[00:03:52] in history. Francis Fukuyama, who also has a background
[00:03:56] working at the US State Department, is currently a professor of political science
[00:03:59] at Stanford University. In his new book, "In the Realm of
[00:04:02] the Last Man," he revisits more than three decades of global political changes
[00:04:06] and his own evolving views, from the rise of Donald
[00:04:09] Trump and populism to the crisis of democracy, the Ukraine war, and
[00:04:13] the return of ethnic nationalism. In this
[00:04:16] interview with the BBC Newsnight program, Nicholas Wade asks Francis
[00:04:20] Fukuyama how much today's world differs from the world he
[00:04:24] envisioned at the beginning of the 1990s.
[00:04:27] My
[00:04:29] understanding
[00:05:05] is that you're a bit upset because people interpreted the first part of the book's title, "The End of History," as if you meant
[00:05:09] that history was over. Everything was resolved, everything was good, and
[00:05:13] would continue to be good, whereas you say the issue was more
[00:05:16] complex than that. Exactly where was it
[00:05:20] misinterpreted?
[00:05:21] شده؟
[00:05:26] The idea of the end of history comes from the German philosopher Hegel. He was the first
[00:05:29] philosopher to see history as a long-term evolutionary process, what
[00:05:33] we call modernization or development
[00:05:35] today.
[00:05:40] this idea that there would be an end of history:
[00:05:42] Then Karl Marx took his idea and said the end of history is communism,
[00:05:46] meaning the culmination of this historical process of development
[00:05:49] is communism.
[00:05:53] In 1989,
[00:05:59] I wrote an article and asked whether such a thing would really happen or
[00:06:03] not, because in the former Soviet Union, communism was basically
[00:06:06] being dismantled. I thought if there was an end to history,
[00:06:10] it wouldn't be communism, but rather a form of liberal
[00:06:14] democracy and a market economy. This was the concept
[00:06:17] of the end of
[00:06:18] history.
[00:06:22] Then in 1992, I turned this idea
[00:06:24] into a book. But the last five chapters of the book
[00:06:28] were about the Last Man. This part comes from another
[00:06:31] philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, who said the end of history would not be a pleasant
[00:06:34] period, but rather a tense one. Because people don't
[00:06:38] just want peace and prosperity. The good things that liberal democracy
[00:06:42] also does are not enough for them. People seek struggle and
[00:06:45] conflict and strive for something different, and this
[00:06:49] leads to the erosion of democracy. So you shouldn't be too
[00:06:52] complacent, because the story continues. 35 years have passed since
[00:06:56] the publication of that book, and today we have entered a completely different
[00:07:00] political era.
[00:07:05] So, it can be said that not only were we not completely wrong and didn't say that
[00:07:09] history had really ended, but perhaps in...
[00:07:15] the book, we somewhat predicted it, because in your new book you write that in 1992,
[00:07:18] you had a clear vision of the emergence of a kind of demagogic populism
[00:07:22] that we have experienced from the mid-2020s until today. You
[00:07:26] wrote about this about 30 years ago.
[00:07:28] بودین.
[00:07:31] Yes, that's right. I think what led me to this conclusion was that one of
[00:07:34] the important driving forces of history is the desire for
[00:07:37] recognition. Some want to be recognized as superior to others.
[00:07:41] رسمیت شناخت.
[00:08:12] become president and enter politics. In fact, what I was unaware of
[00:08:16] at that time was this unstable part of democracy. That very
[00:08:20] ambitious people can completely disrupt the established system.
[00:08:23] بزنن.
[00:08:25] Don't you have mixed feelings about your reference to Donald Trump in 1992?
[00:08:29] Because his name really appears there. I think on page
[00:08:33] 328, meaning you had noticed
[00:08:36] something about him even then, but as you say, your
[00:08:40] understanding was that he would be satisfied in a liberal market
[00:08:43] economy because he could become wealthy. I think you told
[00:08:47] the New York Times a few days ago that you didn't know that just being rich
[00:08:51] wouldn't be enough for him.
[00:08:54] Yes, that's right. I think ultimately you're also looking for political
[00:08:58] recognition, not just, for example, a luxury jet to travel everywhere
[00:09:02] with. That wasn't enough for Trump, and I think
[00:09:05] this political ambition, this desire for dominance, is the root
[00:09:09] of many of our current political problems.
[00:09:42] Except perhaps for the Civil War, we have never seen such an attack on American
[00:09:46] democracy, and he has managed to convince perhaps a third of Americans
[00:09:50] that Biden became president through election fraud, which is completely
[00:09:53] false. This is very dangerous for
[00:09:56] democracy.
[00:09:59] Just to be clear, since 1863,
[00:10:03] we've had two world wars, racial segregation,
[00:10:06] the civil rights movement, Martin Luther
[00:10:10] King, and all those events.
[00:10:25] system, for example, the civil rights movement, in my opinion, was actually
[00:10:28] the fulfillment of the promise of American institutions. The Declaration
[00:10:31] of Independence says all men are created equal, but in practice,
[00:10:35] they were not treated equally. With the civil rights movement,
[00:10:38] finally the laws changed. Legal segregation ended,
[00:10:42] and African Americans were given the opportunity to vote and
[00:10:45] participate. So, that was actually the fulfillment
[00:10:49] of the original promise. What we didn't predict was the rise of a politician
[00:10:53] who would not accept democratic results. Trump did not accept the democratic
[00:10:57] results of the 2020 election, but in 2016,
[00:11:00] he won under this same system, and in 2024, he won under this
[00:11:04] same system. He won two presidential elections.
[00:11:08] Yes, that's right. In a way, the second election was even more concerning
[00:11:11] than the first because it happened after January 6th, but he won
[00:11:15] both the Electoral College and the popular vote. Yes,
[00:11:18] that's right, and I don't think electing someone with such a record paints
[00:11:22] a positive picture of the American voter, but
[00:11:55] well, no university tells you everything comes down to just one person.
[00:11:59] I think many of the things you mentioned play a role.
[00:12:02] A different social structure has emerged, and there's a lot of
[00:12:06] anger and resentment between less-educated individuals and the educated
[00:12:10] elites who run many of the country's major institutions.
[00:12:13] Globalization has exacerbated many of these tensions, because after
[00:12:16] China joined the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s,
[00:12:20] many jobs were moved to China.
[00:12:24] شد.
[00:14:05] to divert attention from the fact that he was unsuccessful as president.
[00:14:09] So maybe we'll hear about Greenland
[00:14:12] again, or new wars will start. But yes,
[00:14:16] in the short term, I think he will face a major setback.
[00:14:19] The main problem, in my opinion, is 2028, because
[00:14:23] for now, there's no strong figure from the party.
[00:14:27] As far as energy and momentum go, it's mostly on the very
[00:14:30] left wing of the party, a bit like the Labour Party during Jeremy Corbyn's
[00:14:33] era. Their first response to years of Conservative
[00:14:36] rule. I'm worried something similar might happen in the US.
[00:14:40] بیفته.
[00:14:46] You actually anticipated my next question. If Republicans suffer a setback
[00:14:49] in the midterm elections, is that good for Democrats?
[00:14:53] For example, control of Congress.
[00:15:26] We hate Donald Trump, and we are not Trump. They need a positive reason
[00:15:30] why people should vote for them, and finding that reason
[00:15:34] has become difficult. Many young people feel they don't have enough opportunities.
[00:15:52] if Republicans nominate, it gives a big
[00:15:55] advantage.
[00:15:57] It's interesting that you said some parts of the Democratic Party have become a bit like the Labour
[00:16:00] Party during Jeremy Corbyn's era. We've seen candidates on the left
[00:16:04] wing. Some of them even call themselves socialists, which
[00:17:37] for example, in California, there will be a referendum on a billionaire tax, because people are
[00:17:41] very unhappy that people like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos are doing so well
[00:17:44] while ordinary Americans are struggling. So there's a lot
[00:17:48] of energy behind these kinds of proposals.
[00:17:52] I'm not sure if this is what will make you win a national
[00:17:55] election, but it will definitely mobilize left-wing
[00:17:58] voters. So left-wing candidates do well in Democratic primaries,
[00:18:02] but the closer it gets to the 200 presidential
[00:18:05] election...
[00:18:37] this might be one of those unknowns that suddenly appears
[00:18:40] from somewhere.
[00:18:43] Asaf is very good. He speaks well and has good arguments.
[00:18:47] There are a few others who could potentially be appealing.
[00:18:51] But for now, those who are attracting the most attention are
[00:18:55] like Ocasio-Cortez in New York, Mamdani, and that Arab-American
[00:18:58] candidate for governor of Michigan. Everyone is focused on these people, and
[00:19:02] Republicans are very happy about this situation, because nothing
[00:19:05] is better for them than their opponent.
[00:20:37] I don't rule out major changes on the Russian
[00:20:39] side. What's your understanding of Donald Trump's
[00:20:43] mindset? We all remember that famous confrontation in the Oval Office. I think
[00:20:47] it was February 2024,
[00:20:50] shortly after Trump returned to the White House, where he told Zelensky,
[00:20:53] "You have no cards in your hand." But in recent months,
[00:20:57] Ukraine has had military successes with its drones, and it seems
[00:21:00] Trump now thinks maybe Ukraine actually has cards in its
[00:21:04] hand. What do you think is going on in Trump's
[00:21:06] mind? Frankly, I think this is just a
[00:21:10] superficial maneuver, and he is fundamentally still pro-Russia.
[00:21:13] This is one of the things we've all been confused about for a long
[00:21:17] time. In the 1908s, when the Soviet Union
[00:21:20] still existed, he went to Moscow. Then he spent tens of
[00:21:24] thousands of dollars and ran an ad in the New York Times saying
[00:21:27] NATO was to blame for the Cold War confrontation and the US should
[00:21:31] not pay for NATO because NATO is financially exploiting
[00:21:34] us. So for decades, he has been first pro-Soviet and then pro-Russia.
[00:21:38] It's a strange issue. No one really
[00:21:41] understands why, but it's been a consistent line in his views. I don't
[00:21:45] believe for a moment that he is now more sympathetic to Ukraine.
[00:21:49] He's upset because he thought the Russians would really defeat
[00:21:53] Ukraine, and he's frustrated that it didn't happen and Ukraine
[00:21:57] wasn't forced to make a deal. But he hasn't changed
[00:22:00] his mind. Of course, Donald Trump will probably say, "Look, I just want this war
[00:22:04] to end. I don't like the killing, and my frustration is that they're still
[00:22:07] fighting." I think he's looking for the glory of being recognized
[00:22:11] as a peace broker, but I doubt he'll achieve
[00:22:15] that. You're in Britain now and you're interested in politics. The Labour
[00:22:19] government recently without
[00:22:50] England, you can remove a Prime Minister so quickly,
[00:22:53] although you probably do it a bit too much.
[00:22:55] میکنید
[00:22:58] But I think this is more a sign of a deeper problem than a feature
[00:23:01] of the system, namely the stagnation of the British economy, especially
[00:23:05] since Brexit. I think this stagnation has created a lot of
[00:23:09] discontent, and as a result, a series of politicians have come
[00:23:12] who haven't really been able to address the root causes of the problem.
[00:23:16] But has the economy stagnated since Brexit, or since
[00:23:50] because other countries also had COVID and recovered much faster than Britain.
[00:23:53] So I think some of the policies that Britain has adopted after
[00:23:57] COVID have really been problematic.
[00:24:00] بوده.
[00:24:05] One of the debates we're having in this country now is about national identity, and you
[00:24:08] also wrote about it in your book. One of the topics
[00:24:12] raised is ethno-nationalism, meaning the view that
[00:24:15] national identity comes from ancestry and background, not simply from obtaining
[00:24:19] citizenship.
[00:24:50] I think ethno-nationalism is very dangerous. If you look at the Balkans and the wars
[00:24:54] that happened there in the 1980s and 90s, their roots were in ethnicity
[00:24:57] and tribalism. A particular ethnic group feels historically oppressed,
[00:25:01] and then you want to kill people from the neighboring ethnic group. Ultimately, the cause of
[00:25:04] the two World Wars was also these aggressive nationalisms
[00:25:08] that clashed with each other. The reason we build liberal societies
[00:25:12] is to move past this stage. You want people to be able to tolerate
[00:25:16] those who are not like them and live together.
[00:25:19] People who might speak a different language or
[00:25:23] have a different appearance. In my opinion,
[00:25:26] the success of a liberal society lies here. Therefore, nationalism,
[00:25:29] just like religion in an earlier period, is really
[00:25:33] an enemy of stability. So ethno-nationalism is an enemy of stability, but you yourself
[00:25:36] write that perhaps simply building a national identity around an
[00:25:40] idea, for example, a piece of paper like the Declaration of Independence
[00:25:44] or the US Constitution, might not be enough, and something richer
[00:25:47] might be needed.
[00:25:50] In a liberal society, I think national identity, well, first
[00:25:54] of all, you need a national identity. People need to have a common
[00:25:57] understanding of where they came from and where they are going, otherwise
[00:26:01] you practically don't have a country.
[00:28:58] they use fake names. Their phones are one-time use.
[00:29:10] They are journalists from BBC World Service,
[00:29:13] and this is the Global
[00:29:15] Eye program from BBC Persian. Is
[00:29:18] Iranian culture a suitable ground for violence?
[00:29:22] Can it be said that insensitivity to violence in public
[00:29:25] or verbal violence are among the signs of violence
[00:29:29] in Iranian culture? The issue. Suppose
[00:29:33] you go to witness an execution.
[00:29:36] Do you see this as violence
[00:29:39] or as the execution of justice?
[00:30:26] Hello again, we are with you with a short news segment. The Kremlin says Vladimir
[00:30:30] Putin, the Russian president, has conveyed Iran's views on ways to resolve
[00:30:33] the Tehran-Washington conflict to Donald Trump. The presidents
[00:30:37] of Russia and Iran met the day before yesterday on the sidelines of two summits of Caspian
[00:30:41] Sea littoral states and Commonwealth of Independent
[00:30:45] States in Turkmenistan. At the same time, the naval
[00:30:48] force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said that dealing with vessels
[00:30:52] that they consider to be in violation will not be limited to the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:30:55] According to the IRGC, any vessel that