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[00:00:04] And now on BBC Persian TV, BBC
[00:00:07] issues
[00:00:11] of the day. Welcome to the special live interview exclusively on the US midterm elections.
[00:00:15] Simultaneously with these elections,
[00:00:18] an important question is what decision Donald Trump will make
[00:00:22] after the elections. Negotiation or
[00:00:25] military attack? Mohsen Milani, Professor of Political Science
[00:00:29] at the University of Southern California, Director
[00:00:32] of the Center for Strategic Research at this university, has spent years researching
[00:00:36] the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and the competition between Iran and the US in the
[00:00:39] Middle East, and is one of the prominent experts in this field.
[00:00:43] He wrote the book "The Rise of Iran and its Competition with the US in the
[00:00:47] Middle East" last year, in which he argued that these policies
[00:00:50] have transformed Iran into a regional power and that Tehran's Achilles' heel
[00:00:54] lies within the country itself in its dealings with the Iranian people.
[00:00:58] He also wrote an article before the 12-day war
[00:01:00] in which he argued that Iran, due to its geographical
[00:01:03] position, would have the upper hand in any war. Mr.
[00:01:07] Milani now believes that this war might change the balance of power
[00:01:10] in the Persian Gulf. He also mentioned this in his latest article. I am
[00:01:14] Farnaz Ghazizadeh, and this is a special live
[00:01:18] interview with Mohsen
[00:01:21] Milani.
[00:01:43] Dr. Mohsen Milani, welcome to this
[00:01:47] special program. Can this election
[00:01:50] really change Donald Trump's decision about
[00:01:54] war, or has it only postponed his
[00:01:57] decisions?
[00:02:01] With greetings to you and the respected listeners and
[00:02:05] viewers of the BBC, in
[00:02:08] the American political system,
[00:02:12] regarding foreign policy, the president
[00:02:14] has the final say, and even
[00:02:17] if the US Congress is in the hands of the opposition,
[00:02:21] the president can pursue
[00:02:25] the policy he wants. The same can be said
[00:02:28] about the Iran issue. However, the problem that
[00:02:32] Mr. Trump will face is that today,
[00:02:35] at least according to the latest statistics I've
[00:02:39] seen, the polls I've seen show that at least
[00:02:42] 70 percent of Americans believe that this war
[00:02:46] was a mistake, and the US should not have
[00:02:50] entered this war. Many Americans are also
[00:02:54] concerned about this war due to
[00:02:57] economic issues, which go back to
[00:03:00] the control of Iran in
[00:03:03] Hormuz and other issues related to
[00:03:06] the expenses the US has incurred.
[00:03:10] Usually, in America, when a war
[00:03:14] starts, Americans initially support
[00:03:17] it, but then they gradually
[00:03:21] become opposed to it. Regarding
[00:03:25] the war with Iran, regarding the war between Israel and the US against
[00:03:28] Iran, from the very beginning of this
[00:03:32] war, most Americans were against it. And more
[00:03:36] importantly, unlike the wars the US waged in Afghanistan
[00:03:40] and Iraq, which cost much more than
[00:03:43] the expenses the US incurred regarding Iran, there
[00:03:47] is a fundamental difference between these
[00:03:51] that answers your question.
[00:03:54] And this fundamental difference is that the expenses
[00:03:57] the US is incurring are...
[00:04:00] American voters feel it every day they go to fill
[00:04:04] up their gas. The two
[00:04:07] trillion dollars the US spent on Afghanistan and Iraq
[00:04:10] is much more than what the US spent on Iran. But this
[00:04:14] was over a long period, and Americans didn't
[00:04:18] feel it. But now, because of
[00:04:21] the high prices, they do feel it. The poll you
[00:04:25] mentioned, the latest figures I have are from the Reuters poll, which was conducted
[00:04:28] in mid-October a few days ago, stating that
[00:04:31] 54% of respondents believed that the war with Iran
[00:04:35] was not worth its costs, and only 34%
[00:04:39] agreed with this attack. As you said, most Americans
[00:04:42] oppose this war, but what meaningful
[00:04:46] effect can this have on Mr. Trump's decisions?
[00:04:49] If the Democrats win the Congress,
[00:04:52] what tools do they have to change
[00:04:55] his decisions? Important.
[00:04:59] مهم.
[00:05:13] This will not happen on day one. It will
[00:05:16] take some time, but the party that controls
[00:05:19] the parliament will also control the committee that
[00:05:23] determines the US government's budget. Therefore,
[00:05:27] they can exert a lot of financial pressure on Mr. Trump.
[00:05:31] Second, many of these committees can start
[00:05:34] investigating the war, investigating the damage
[00:05:38] this war has inflicted on the US.
[00:05:41] On American bases, they can start
[00:05:45] investigating the expenses
[00:05:48] that the US government has incurred in the entire Middle East,
[00:05:52] and most importantly, they can start investigating
[00:05:55] the economic issues related to
[00:05:59] Mr. Trump's family. Therefore, they can have
[00:06:02] a significant impact, but the main
[00:06:05] point is that they cannot seriously change US policy
[00:06:09] towards Iran. Exactly.
[00:06:12] The main issue is what you just pointed out, and
[00:06:16] it's about timing. You said that the Democrats can do these things,
[00:06:20] but for the next 60 days, when the Congress is still the previous Congress,
[00:06:24] even ignoring that, the issue
[00:06:27] is immediate. Regarding the war with Iran, the threats
[00:06:30] we hear these days, there is even talk about
[00:06:33] the possibility of using nuclear bombs, which has greatly worried
[00:06:37] many. This is about
[00:06:41] these events possibly happening immediately. How much do you think
[00:06:44] Mr. Trump will immediately decide on a widespread
[00:06:47] military operation at the levels that are being discussed?
[00:06:50] Ms. Gadi, unfortunately,
[00:06:54] I cannot answer your question precisely because
[00:06:57] we are dealing with a person who wants to create problems
[00:07:01] for others to wonder what he will do.
[00:07:05] Personally, I think that
[00:07:08] the first war that the US started with Iran was based on a series of
[00:07:12] wrong calculations, and that's why most Americans are against
[00:07:16] this war. They also made a series of serious mistakes in the second war
[00:07:20] they started. For example, they thought that
[00:07:23] in the system of the Islamic Republic, individuals are much more important than institutions.
[00:07:27] They thought that if they cut off the head
[00:07:31] of the snake, the snake would be gone, whereas we saw that this did not
[00:07:34] happen. The main question for me is what
[00:07:38] the US wants to achieve in the third war
[00:07:42] that it did not achieve in the first and second wars. Therefore,
[00:07:45] it's very difficult, but I can tell you with
[00:07:49] certainty that this "neither peace nor
[00:07:53] war" situation cannot be sustainable because
[00:07:56] it is costly for the US, and it is costly for the Islamic
[00:08:00] Republic, and it is costly for Iran as a
[00:08:04] country. Therefore, we can
[00:08:07] see that some important changes are happening in the region,
[00:08:10] some changes
[00:08:12] in Iran's defensive doctrine are happening,
[00:08:16] and most importantly, some events are happening regarding
[00:08:19] US allies in the Persian Gulf and
[00:08:23] in the Middle East, regarding how much they can
[00:08:26] trust the US. We will definitely talk about them,
[00:08:29] but this issue, in fact, you have largely explained
[00:08:33] the situation of the US to us, which is very important considering
[00:08:37] today's conditions and the US elections. But the other side of the
[00:08:40] coin, in your opinion,
[00:08:42] you argued in multiple articles that Iran's geographical position,
[00:08:46] due to the situation, due to the Strait of Hormuz, has given it the upper hand,
[00:08:50] and it has been able to change the balance. But if
[00:08:53] a country has to use these levers to exercise its power, the levers that
[00:08:57] Iran has used during this period, has it really gained
[00:09:00] more power or has it only been able to divide the cost
[00:09:04] of defeat between itself
[00:09:06] and others?
[00:09:10] Certainly, the situation in Iran today
[00:09:13] is not as good as before October
[00:09:16] 7, when Hamas attacked Israel, because
[00:09:20] Hezbollah does not have its previous power. This is clear
[00:09:23] to everyone. More importantly,
[00:09:26] Iran's most important Arab ally, Bashar al-Assad,
[00:09:30] was overthrown from power. Even
[00:09:33] Iraqi Shiite groups do not have the power they
[00:09:37] had before, and the Prime Minister who rules
[00:09:41] in Iraq today does not have a good
[00:09:44] relationship with Iran. However, there are two important
[00:09:47] points to mention here. First of all,
[00:09:51] Ms. Ghazizadeh, what happened in Iran in the past
[00:09:54] year is perhaps unprecedented in Iran's contemporary history,
[00:09:58] and even in the history of the Middle East. Look, two nuclear
[00:10:01] countries. One of them spends
[00:10:04] one
[00:10:06] trillion dollars on military
[00:10:10] expenses annually. Israel also spends somewhere
[00:10:14] between 40 and 50 billion dollars.
[00:10:17] The Islamic Republic's maximum military expenditure
[00:10:21] is between 10 and 20 million dollars.
[00:10:25] What happened that the Islamic Republic, after
[00:10:27] at least 50 of its most important leaders were killed,
[00:10:31] destroyed almost all, no, many of
[00:10:35] Iran's military infrastructure, this system has not
[00:10:38] yet been destroyed. Tell us what happened in your opinion.
[00:10:42] What happened? In my opinion, what happened
[00:10:45] was, first, that the US relied too much on
[00:10:49] individuals, and this goes back to the Pahlavi
[00:10:53] era. You see, during the Pahlavi
[00:10:57] era, when Mohammad Reza Shah left Iran,
[00:11:00] after a while, the entire system he had
[00:11:04] built, the fifth largest military
[00:11:07] power in the world, Mohammad Reza Shah had created
[00:11:11] in Iran. This was destroyed in less than two
[00:11:15] months because in that system, individuals were much more important than
[00:11:18] institutions. This is not true for the Islamic Republic.
[00:11:22] This is true for most revolutions as well.
[00:11:26] Revolutions usually create institutions. When you create
[00:11:29] an institution, even if you kill the individual, the system
[00:11:33] does not collapse. This is one. Second, Americans were suspicious
[00:11:37] because many of our people
[00:11:40] are dissatisfied with the government of the Islamic Republic, and
[00:11:43] they have the right to be dissatisfied. The figures I saw
[00:11:47] indicate that about 80 to 85 percent of the people are dissatisfied.
[00:11:50] But the mistake Americans made was to think that this
[00:11:53] dissatisfaction meant that the people would remain silent
[00:11:57] or even support it when their country
[00:12:00] was attacked. This did not happen either.
[00:12:03] Third, and most importantly,
[00:12:07] the Islamic Republic showed that it has
[00:12:10] the power and is willing to use what it
[00:12:14] has to close the Strait of Hormuz. Americans thought
[00:12:18] Iran was bluffing because they thought if
[00:12:21] it closed the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:12:25] its own economic situation would be destroyed.
[00:12:29] And finally, the last issue that Americans, in
[00:12:32] my opinion, and Israelis did not pay serious
[00:12:35] attention to is that it is true that Iran's defensive system was very
[00:12:39] weak, but Iran's offensive system was not as
[00:12:43] weak as Americans thought. In the same article you
[00:12:47] are referring to, this is the point I made two weeks before the first
[00:12:51] war started. I said that if Iran is attacked,
[00:12:55] you will face a new
[00:12:58] system that is willing to do anything to
[00:13:02] gain power. Therefore, when you put
[00:13:06] all these together, it means that Americans did not
[00:13:09] think that Iran would attack Arab countries,
[00:13:12] target the infrastructure of Arab countries, and
[00:13:16] do it with such precision. Approximately 12
[00:13:19] of US military bases in the Persian
[00:13:23] Gulf or almost
[00:13:35] it shows how these bases have been weakened. Therefore,
[00:13:38] when you put all these together,
[00:13:41] I understand your points, but just recently, Mr.
[00:13:44] Araghchi said in a TV interview that during this time, he went to
[00:13:48] many countries in the region and, according to him,
[00:13:51] spoke to them in a way that scared and threatened them.
[00:13:55] The important issue is that Iran has clearly had power in that
[00:13:59] region, and it is clear that with the operations
[00:14:03] it has carried out in the past few months, it has scared the countries in the region.
[00:14:06] But in the long run, can Iran sustain this in a region
[00:14:10] where it has an enemy like Israel above it, the US above it, and
[00:14:14] the regional countries only deal with it out of fear, not
[00:14:18] because they really want to cooperate with it?
[00:14:21] The answer is certainly no. You are absolutely
[00:14:25] right. And in the same book that, if you remember, we talked
[00:14:29] about it in London a little over a year ago,
[00:14:32] you had a program, and in that book, before
[00:14:36] this war started, my main conclusion was that
[00:14:40] Iran cannot sustain the power it has gained.
[00:14:43] It must make fundamental changes
[00:14:47] in its foreign policy, and the important point I made
[00:14:51] then, I repeat today, is that we have
[00:14:55] historically exaggerated Iran's power
[00:14:58] and underestimated the power of others.
[00:15:02] The Islamic Republic of Iran,
[00:15:05] whatever government comes after this,
[00:15:08] cannot fight with Israel,
[00:15:11] with America, and with Saudi Arabia
[00:15:14] simultaneously. It cannot.
[00:15:18] That is, even if it lasts for a while,
[00:15:21] it is not sustainable in the long run. And most importantly,
[00:15:25] our country's economic situation is getting worse every
[00:15:28] day. That's why I've been making this point for 30
[00:15:32] years, that until Iran's relationship with the US
[00:15:35] becomes normal, the relationship
[00:15:44] between Iran and the US will not lead to a real
[00:15:48] agreement. In 2015,
[00:15:50] you were very happy with the previous agreement and said it could be
[00:15:54] the main and initial step. We saw where it led.
[00:15:58] The next issue is that in the last year or two, every
[00:16:01] time Iran has gone to the negotiating table, that negotiating
[00:16:05] table has been blown up by the US. The negotiations have essentially
[00:16:09] led to war, even. How can
[00:16:12] one essentially trust negotiations in these
[00:16:15] circumstances? How can the Islamic Republic trust negotiations and go to the negotiating
[00:16:19] table? You see,
[00:16:22] the main problem with the JCPOA, the problem
[00:16:25] that many of us who supported it did not
[00:16:29] notice carefully, was that the Americans
[00:16:32] took cash and gave credit. This time,
[00:16:36] the Islamic Republic is not going to make this mistake.
[00:16:40] That is, in my opinion, the sequencing issue,
[00:16:43] that is, who should take the first step,
[00:16:47] will be very important. In any case, what you are saying
[00:16:50] is completely true. It was the US that withdrew from the JCPOA, and
[00:16:54] twice the US attacked precisely at the time it was negotiating
[00:16:58] with Iran. But the Americans themselves are slowly coming to the conclusion
[00:17:02] that Iran's nuclear issue, which is an important
[00:17:05] issue, is not the only important issue. Iran's nuclear
[00:17:09] issue and the future of Hormuz
[00:17:13] do not have a political solution. They do not
[00:17:15] have a military solution. They have a political solution, and as long
[00:17:19] as the US tries to come
[00:17:22] and turn negotiations into
[00:17:25] "you must do it,
[00:17:28] and then I will decide what to do," well, this
[00:17:32] will not lead anywhere. This war will continue
[00:17:35] and will be to the detriment
[00:18:11] Look at the Mecca agreement, look at the reason. It's because Saudi Arabia has come to the conclusion that the US cannot
[00:18:15] unilaterally protect Saudi
[00:18:18] Arabia's interests. They saw that regarding the attack
[00:18:22] on Saudi Arabia, they can, because now
[00:18:25] in any case, Saudi Arabia has been attacked repeatedly in the past few
[00:18:29] weeks by the Houthis, who are considered Iran's partners in a way
[00:18:33] and have a very close relationship with Iran.
[00:18:37] From...
[00:18:53] Changing foreign policy on political issues is like changing the direction of a very large ship, which you
[00:18:57] see this change of direction
[00:19:00] in one or two days, it takes time. You see, the fact that Saudi
[00:19:03] Arabia has requested from Turkey and requested
[00:19:07] from Pakistan
[00:19:10] to enter the Persian Gulf is very important. In addition,
[00:19:13] you see that every day
[00:19:15] the economic and political power
[00:19:19] of China is increasing in the Persian Gulf.
[00:19:23] It is taking America's place. Mr. Milani,
[00:19:26] China cannot take America's place, but China can
[00:19:30] take some of America's power, which until the war
[00:19:34] between Iran and the US, in my article for Chatham House,
[00:19:37] my whole argument was that until the Iran-US war,
[00:19:41] America's power
[00:19:45] was not challenged in the
[00:19:48] Persian Gulf, meaning it was Pax Americana. But after
[00:19:52] this, that power is slowly being challenged.
[00:19:55] It cannot change America. America's importance
[00:19:59] will remain in its place, but
[00:20:02] other countries such as China or even
[00:20:05] the Islamic Republic itself can play a greater role
[00:20:09] in the Persian Gulf, and
[00:20:13] therefore, the order in the Middle East
[00:20:17] will be very different from today. We just had
[00:20:21] elections for the Israeli Knesset a few
[00:20:24] days ago, and it was announced that Mr. Netanyahu will remain as
[00:20:28] caretaker for now. My question is, if he, now he has to face
[00:20:32] another election with conditions that will become clearer
[00:20:36] in the coming days and weeks, if someone like Mr. Eizenkot
[00:20:39] replaces him, will we see a major change? Because we constantly
[00:20:43] hear that Mr. Netanyahu has dragged Mr. Trump into this
[00:20:47] war.
[00:20:49] Yes, I think that if Mr. Netanyahu
[00:20:53] is not elected, meaning he cannot stay in power,
[00:20:56] which is possible, Israel's policy
[00:20:59] regarding Iran will change somewhat.
[00:21:03] If you look at what Mr. Eizenkot himself
[00:21:07] has said, he
[00:21:10] has very clearly stated that
[00:21:13] he does not pursue a regime change policy,
[00:21:17] whereas Mr. Netanyahu wants to
[00:21:20] pursue this policy, not that if
[00:21:24] Israel pursues this policy, it will succeed, but in
[00:21:27] any case, when a powerful country announces that it
[00:21:31] wants to overthrow the regime of another country,
[00:21:34] this is a very important issue. Therefore, Mr.
[00:21:38] Eizenkot, despite believing
[00:21:40] that Iran's nuclear program and Iran's missile
[00:21:44] program are a very serious threat, agrees
[00:21:48] with Mr. Netanyahu. But
[00:22:04] in foreign policy matters, even in democratic
[00:22:07] countries, they play an important role. Mr. Netanyahu
[00:22:10] has been in power for years, and he has built a very powerful
[00:22:14] network of friends and supporters,
[00:22:18] and he has a kind of personality that can solve many
[00:22:22] problems. Therefore, if he leaves, it will take
[00:22:26] a long time for Mr. Eizenkot to
[00:22:29] make up for the impact that
[00:22:33] Mr. Netanyahu has had. But unlike
[00:22:37] what many people think, that there will be no change
[00:22:40] in Israel's policy, I think
[00:22:43] that if Eizenkot wins the election,
[00:22:46] if Eizenkot is asked to
[00:22:50] form a government and can form a government with Arab
[00:22:53] groups, in Israel's foreign
[00:22:57] policy regarding Iran, we will see some good
[00:23:01] changes. The government of Iran, you yourself mentioned
[00:23:05] in this interview, is a government that a large segment of the people currently have problems
[00:23:08] with, are critical of it.
[00:23:11] They are interested in overthrowing it. You yourself have repeatedly said that you are against revolution
[00:23:15] and believe that revolution does not yield the desired
[00:23:18] results. War also, apparently, has not given the results that some
[00:23:22] of the people, at least, wanted. In your opinion, what can be the solution
[00:23:26] for the Iranian people now? You are absolutely right. Revolutions,
[00:23:30] usually, if you look at all these revolutions around the world, from
[00:23:33] the French Revolution to Russia to China and
[00:23:37] other revolutions, revolution is for people who think they can
[00:23:40] achieve very rapid progress, meaning, as they say,
[00:23:44] they can find a shortcut, and this usually doesn't
[00:23:47] happen. War is the same. War usually
[00:23:50] changes the nature of governments. The Iran-Iraq War
[00:23:53] changed the nature of the Islamic Republic. I think
[00:23:57] what needs to happen in Iran, I don't know how much
[00:24:00] will happen, but for
[00:24:04] me, this is the most fundamental issue that Iran is facing.
[00:24:07] These policies of the Islamic Republic in the last
[00:24:10] 45 years, 50 years, have not reached where
[00:24:14] they wanted to. Therefore, there needs to be a kind of review,
[00:24:18] and this review must have three pillars:
[00:24:21] First, they must enhance Iran's power
[00:24:24] and Iran's deterrent power. Second, the issue
[00:24:28] of development and the economic situation of the people
[00:24:31] must be the second pillar. And third, democracy.
[00:24:34] Ms. Ghazizadeh, for 150
[00:24:38] years, from before the Constitutional
[00:24:41] Revolution until today, we have talked about
[00:24:44] modernity, we have talked about development. These
[00:24:47] three pillars that I mentioned:
[00:24:50] power, development, and improvement of the people's situation, and
[00:24:53] democracy, all three must go
[00:24:56] hand in hand.
[00:24:58] We have not moved this forward. Two years ago, around these very days, I think,
[00:25:02] was the first time Mr. Pezeshkian came to New York at that meeting
[00:25:05] where many prominent Iranian experts were present, and you were
[00:25:09] also there. You told Mr. Pezeshkian these very things. Did
[00:25:13] you give him such proposals? What did he say? What do Iranian
[00:25:16] officials say in response to these words to people like you? Well,
[00:25:20] this meeting that took place, this meeting was with about
[00:25:24] 12 or 13 Iranian
[00:25:27] professors, and each of
[00:25:30] us had no more than 3 or 4 minutes.
[00:25:33] We said very general things. To be honest,
[00:25:37] I didn't take notes, but I'm sure if I said
[00:25:40] anything, it was about normalizing the relationship
[00:25:44] with the US, because this is my main theme.
[00:25:48] Because I believe that as long as Iran does not normalize its relationship
[00:25:52] with the US or does not try to
[00:25:55] learn how to deal with each other's
[00:25:59] opposition, their opposition
[00:26:52] Mohsen Milani, Professor of International Relations. Thank you for
[00:26:54] joining
[00:26:56] us.
[00:27:02] You were with us.
[00:27:13] An old American politician has a famous quote. He says that all
[00:27:17] politics is local, meaning before reaching the streets
[00:27:21] of Washington, those who want to enter Congress must pay attention
[00:27:25] to the demands of the local people who are going to choose only
[00:27:40] videos like this are all over social media,
[00:27:44] easily produced, high volume, and often very
[00:27:47] weird. AI is making it easier to scam us. It was
[00:27:51] my voice, it was my phone number. On that day,
[00:27:54] I hadn't spoken to her. In the
[00:27:57] age of artificial intelligence, panorama asks, is
[00:28:01] seeing?
[00:28:11] a few months ago, meaning the internet was reconnected, but in practice, many VPNs
[00:28:15] still work with difficulty or are frequently disconnected. Well, the reality is
[00:28:18] that the internet in Iran has not yet returned to its state before the massacre and war.
[00:28:22] So, what is its state? Observer groups say that users in Iran still
[00:28:26] have a fragile and debilitating connection to the internet,
[00:28:29] but that so-called national internet, or
[00:28:33] the Iranian government, is encouraging or forcing people to use
[00:28:36] it. After all these restrictions and increased costs,
[00:28:40] it still hasn't been able to replace the internet for many people.
[00:28:43] A poll conducted by ISPA tells us that still
[00:28:46] 71% of users are using foreign social networks.
[00:28:50] Of course, the dominant pattern is that they usually have an account on at least
[00:28:54] one of the domestic platforms or domestic messengers, and also use
[00:28:57] foreign social networks. The reason for their use of these
[00:29:01] domestic platforms is, I think, clear, because from approximately last winter
[00:29:05] to this spring, we had no access to international internet for almost half
[00:29:08] of this period. We faced various types of filtering, restrictions
[00:29:12] were tightened, and in addition to that, we still cannot call
[00:29:16] this an optional alley to a domestic platform because many
[00:29:19] users are still forced to use these domestic platforms or messengers
[00:29:23] for various administrative, educational, and medical services.
[00:29:26] There are a few other interesting data that show
[00:29:30] the actual status of platforms.
[00:29:52] We should, that these ISPA poll data tells us that
[00:29:55] internet blackout policies, filtering, and all of these have not yet been able
[00:29:59] to discourage users or push them
[00:30:02] towards using domestic
[00:30:04] platforms.
[00:30:11] And now on BBC Persian TV, science.