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[00:00:31] And now, on BBC Persian TV, the issues of
[00:00:35] the day.
[00:00:38] Welcome to the live special interview on the US midterm elections.
[00:00:42] Alongside the holding of these elections, a crucial question is what decision
[00:00:46] Donald Trump will make after the elections. Negotiation
[00:00:50] or military attack? Mohsen Milani,
[00:00:53] professor of political science at the University of South Florida, director of the Center
[00:00:56] for Strategic Research at this university, has for years researched
[00:01:00] the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and the competition between Iran and
[00:01:04] the US in the Middle East, and is one of the well-known experts
[00:01:07] in this field. He wrote the book "The Rise of Iran's Power
[00:01:11] and its Competition with the US in the Middle East" last year,
[00:01:14] in which he argued that these policies have transformed Iran into a regional power
[00:01:17] and that Tehran's Achilles' heel lies within the country
[00:01:21] in its dealings with the Iranian people. He also wrote an article before the 12-day
[00:01:25] war, in which he argued that Iran, due to its
[00:01:28] geographical position, would have the upper hand
[00:01:31] in any war. Mr. Milani now believes
[00:01:35] that this war may change the power order in the Persian Gulf.
[00:01:39] He has also mentioned this in his latest article. I am Farnaz Ghazizadeh,
[00:01:43] and this is an exclusive live special interview with
[00:01:46] Mohsen Midani.
[00:02:10] Dr. Mohsen Milani, welcome to this
[00:02:14] special interview program. Will this election
[00:02:17] really change Donald Trump's decision
[00:02:21] about the war, or will it only postpone
[00:02:25] the implementation of his decisions?
[00:02:28] With greetings to you, our esteemed listeners and
[00:02:32] viewers of BBC. In
[00:02:35] the US political system,
[00:02:39] regarding foreign policy, the president has the final say,
[00:02:41] and even
[00:02:44] if the US Congress is in the hands of his opponents,
[00:02:48] the president can pursue the policy he wants.
[00:02:52] The same can be said regarding the issue of Iran.
[00:02:55] However, the problem that Mr. Trump
[00:02:59] will face is this: today,
[00:03:03] at least, according to the latest statistics I've seen,
[00:03:06] the poll results I've seen, at least 70%
[00:03:09] of Americans believe that this war was
[00:03:12] a mistake. The US should
[00:03:15] not have entered this war, and many
[00:03:19] Americans are also concerned about this war
[00:03:23] due to economic issues related to Iran's
[00:03:26] control of the Red
[00:03:30] Sea and other issues related to the expense
[00:03:33] the US has incurred. Usually in the US, when
[00:03:37] a war starts, at first,
[00:03:41] Americans support this war, but then
[00:03:44] gradually, they become opposed to it. Regarding
[00:03:48] the war with Iran, regarding the war between Israel and the US against
[00:03:52] Iran, from the very beginning of this war,
[00:03:55] most Americans were against it.
[00:03:59] And more importantly, unlike the wars that
[00:04:03] the US waged in Afghanistan and Iraq, which cost
[00:04:07] much more than the US has spent in relation to Iran,
[00:04:10] there is a fundamental difference between these
[00:04:14] that answers your question. And this fundamental
[00:04:18] difference is that the cost the US is incurring,
[00:04:21] the American voter feels it
[00:04:24] every day when they go to buy gas.
[00:04:27] They feel that the two trillion dollars the US spent
[00:04:30] on Afghanistan and Iraq is much more than what the US has spent
[00:04:34] in relation to Iran, but this
[00:04:37] was over a long period, and Americans
[00:04:41] didn't feel it, but now
[00:04:45] they feel it because of the high
[00:04:48] cost. This poll that you mentioned,
[00:04:52] the latest data I have is from a Reuters poll
[00:04:55] that was conducted in mid-October a few days ago, which says
[00:04:58] 54% of respondents believed that the war with Iran
[00:05:02] was not worth its costs, and only 34%
[00:05:06] supported this attack. As you said, most Americans
[00:05:09] are against this war. But what meaningful effect
[00:05:13] can this have on Mr. Trump's decisions?
[00:05:16] If the Democrats win the Congress,
[00:05:19] what tools do they have to change
[00:05:23] his decisions?
[00:05:26] The most important leverage that the Democrats
[00:05:30] will have is that they can reduce or stop
[00:05:34] the funding for this war. This
[00:05:38] will not happen on day one.
[00:05:41] It will take some time, but
[00:05:45] the party that controls the House
[00:05:48] controls the committee that determines the US government's budget.
[00:05:52] Therefore, they can exert significant financial pressure
[00:05:56] on Mr. Trump. Second, many of these committees
[00:06:00] can start investigating the war,
[00:06:03] investigating the damage that this war has inflicted on the US,
[00:06:07] on American bases. They can start
[00:06:11] investigating the expenses that the US
[00:06:15] government has incurred throughout
[00:06:18] the Middle East. And then, most importantly, they can start
[00:06:21] investigating the economic issues
[00:06:25] related to Mr. Trump's family. Therefore, they can
[00:06:28] have a significant impact, but
[00:06:32] the main point is that they cannot fundamentally change
[00:06:35] US policy regarding Iran. Exactly,
[00:06:39] the major issue is what you just mentioned. And the timing
[00:06:43] also matters. You said that the Democrats can do these things,
[00:06:46] but for the next 60 days, the Congress is still the previous Congress.
[00:06:50] Even if we pass that, the issue is immediate.
[00:06:53] Regarding the war with Iran, the threats we hear these days,
[00:06:57] there is even talk about the possibility
[00:07:01] of using an atomic bomb, which has caused much concern.
[00:07:04] This is related to the possibility of these events
[00:07:08] happening immediately. How much do you think Mr. Trump
[00:07:11] will immediately decide on a large-scale military operation
[00:07:14] at the levels that are being discussed?
[00:07:17] Ms. Qadi, unfortunately,
[00:07:21] I cannot give you an exact answer,
[00:07:24] because we are dealing with a person who likes
[00:07:28] to create problems for others to guess what he will
[00:07:32] do. I personally think that
[00:07:35] the first war the US started with Iran was based on a series
[00:07:38] of wrong calculations, and that's why most Americans
[00:07:42] are against this war. The second war they started, they made
[00:07:46] some serious mistakes. For example, they thought
[00:07:49] that in the system of the Islamic Republic, individuals
[00:07:53] were much more important than institutions. They thought that if they came
[00:07:57] and cut off the snake's head, the snake would die,
[00:08:00] but we saw that this did not happen. The main question for me is
[00:08:04] what the US wants to achieve in the third war
[00:08:08] that it did not achieve in the first and second wars. Therefore,
[00:08:12] it's very difficult, but I can tell you with
[00:08:16] certainty that this issue of neither peace nor
[00:08:19] war cannot be sustainable, because
[00:08:23] it is expensive for the US, and it is expensive for the Islamic
[00:08:27] Republic, and it is expensive for Iran as a
[00:08:31] country. Therefore, we can see
[00:08:34] that some important changes are happening in the region,
[00:08:37] some important changes are happening in the policies
[00:08:41] of this defense doctrine, and most importantly,
[00:08:44] some events are happening regarding the US allies in
[00:08:48] the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East, regarding
[00:08:52] how much they can trust the US. We will certainly talk
[00:08:55] about them, but this issue, in fact, you mostly explained
[00:08:59] the situation of the US to us, which is very important given
[00:09:03] today's conditions and the US elections. But the other issue is the opposing
[00:09:07] side. In your opinion, you argued in multiple
[00:09:10] articles that Iran's geographical position, due to its situation,
[00:09:14] due to the Strait of Hormuz, has given it the upper hand and has managed
[00:09:18] to change the balance. But if a country has to use
[00:09:21] these levers to exert its power, the levers that Iran has used
[00:09:25] during this period, has it really gained more power, or has it only
[00:09:29] managed to distribute the cost of failure
[00:09:33] between itself and others?
[00:09:35] Certainly, the situation of Iran in the region
[00:09:39] today is not as good as before October 7,
[00:09:43] when Hamas attacked Israel. Because Hezbollah
[00:09:46] does not have its previous power, this is clear to everyone.
[00:09:50] More importantly, the most important Arab ally
[00:09:53] of Iran, Bashar al-Assad, has been ousted from
[00:09:57] power. Even the Iraqi Shiite groups do not have the power
[00:10:00] they used to have, and the prime minister
[00:10:04] who is governing Iraq today does not have a very good
[00:10:08] relationship with Iran. But there are two important
[00:10:11] points that I must
[00:10:14] mention here. First of all, Ms. Ghazizadeh,
[00:10:17] what happened in Iran in this last year is perhaps unprecedented
[00:10:21] in the contemporary history of Iran, and even in the history
[00:10:25] of the Middle East. Look, two nuclear
[00:10:28] countries, one of them spends
[00:10:31] one
[00:10:33] trillion dollars annually
[00:10:37] on military expenses. Israel also spends
[00:10:41] something between 40 to 50 billion dollars.
[00:10:44] The Islamic Republic's maximum military expenditure
[00:10:48] is between 10 to 20 million dollars.
[00:10:52] How is it that the Islamic Republic, after at least
[00:10:55] 50 of its most important leaders were killed
[00:10:58] and all infrastructure,
[00:11:02] well, not all, but many of Iran's military infrastructure
[00:11:05] were destroyed, this system is still not destroyed?
[00:11:08] Tell us what happened, in your opinion. In my opinion, what happened
[00:11:12] was that, first, the US relied
[00:11:15] more on individuals than it should have,
[00:11:18] and this goes back to the Pahlavi era.
[00:11:21] Look, during the Pahlavi era, when
[00:11:24] Mohammad Reza Shah left Iran, after
[00:11:27] a while, the entire system he had built,
[00:11:31] the fifth largest military power
[00:11:34] in the world, which Mohammad Reza Shah had created in Iran,
[00:11:37] was destroyed in less than two months. Because
[00:11:40] in that system, individuals were much more
[00:11:43] important than institutions. This is not true for the Islamic
[00:11:47] Republic. This is true for most revolutions as well, that
[00:11:51] revolutions usually create institutions. When you create an institution,
[00:11:56] even if you kill the individual, the system does not die.
[00:12:00] This is one thing. Second, Americans thought that
[00:12:03] because many of our people
[00:12:07] are dissatisfied with the government of the Islamic Republic,
[00:12:10] and they have the right to be dissatisfied. The figures I saw are around
[00:12:14] 80 to 85% of the people are dissatisfied.
[00:12:18] But the mistake Americans made was thinking that this
[00:12:20] dissatisfaction meant that the people would remain silent
[00:12:24] or even support it when
[00:12:27] their country is attacked. This also did not happen.
[00:12:31] Third, and most importantly, the Islamic Republic
[00:12:35] showed that it has the power
[00:12:39] and is willing to use what it has,
[00:12:42] which is to close the Strait of Hormuz. Americans thought Iran was bluffing
[00:12:46] because they thought that if it closed the Strait of
[00:12:50] Hormuz, its own economy
[00:12:54] would collapse. And finally,
[00:12:57] the last issue that I believe Americans and Israelis did not pay
[00:13:01] serious attention to is that, while Iran's defensive
[00:13:04] system was very weak, Iran's offensive
[00:13:08] system was not as weak as Americans
[00:13:11] thought. In this very article you referred to,
[00:13:15] this is the point I made two weeks before the first war
[00:13:18] started. I said, if Iran is attacked,
[00:13:22] you will face a new
[00:13:25] system that is willing to do
[00:13:29] anything to gain power. Therefore, when we put
[00:13:33] all these together, it means that
[00:13:35] Americans did not think that Iran would attack Arab countries,
[00:13:39] attack the infrastructure of Arab countries, and
[00:13:43] attack with such precision. Around 12
[00:13:46] of the US military bases in the Persian
[00:13:50] Gulf are either almost destroyed or severely
[00:13:53] damaged. Mr. Murphy, the US Senator,
[00:13:56] just a week or two ago went to the
[00:13:59] Middle East and showed how these bases
[00:14:03] have been weakened. Therefore, when you put all these
[00:14:12] said in a television interview that he had visited many
[00:14:15] countries in the region, and, as he put it,
[00:14:18] he spoke to them in a way that he scared them,
[00:14:21] he threatened them. The important issue is that Iran
[00:14:25] has clearly had power in that region, and it is clear that with
[00:14:29] these operations that it has carried out in the past few months,
[00:14:32] it has scared the countries of the region. But in the long run, is this sustainable
[00:14:36] for Iran in a region where an enemy like Israel
[00:14:40] is above it, the US is above it, and the countries of the region only deal
[00:14:43] with it out of fear, and not because they really
[00:14:46] want to cooperate with it? Certainly,
[00:14:50] the answer is no. You are absolutely right, and in that book
[00:14:53] that, if you remember, we talked about a little over a year ago
[00:14:57] in London, on your program, the main conclusion I drew
[00:15:01] in that book before this war started was
[00:15:04] that Iran cannot maintain this power it has gained.
[00:15:08] It must make fundamental changes
[00:15:11] in its foreign policy.
[00:15:15] And the important point I made then, I repeat
[00:15:18] today, is that in our contemporary
[00:15:22] history, we have usually overestimated Iran's power
[00:15:25] and underestimated the power of others.
[00:15:28] The Islamic Republic of Iran, or any government that comes after it,
[00:15:32] cannot fight both Israel
[00:15:36] and the US
[00:15:39] and Saudi Arabia. It cannot. Even if it remains
[00:15:42] stable for a while, it is not sustainable
[00:15:46] in the long run. And most importantly,
[00:15:49] our country's economic situation is getting worse
[00:15:53] every day. That's why for 30 years, I've been pointing
[00:15:56] out that until Iran's relationship with
[00:16:00] the US normalizes, the Islamic Republic, economically
[00:16:04] and politically, etc.,
[00:16:37] how can we trust negotiations in such
[00:16:41] circumstances? How can the Islamic Republic trust negotiations and go to the negotiating
[00:16:44] table?
[00:16:46] Look, the main problem with the JCPOA,
[00:16:50] the problem that many of us who supported it
[00:16:54] did not see carefully, was that the Americans
[00:16:57] received cash and gave credit.
[00:17:00] This time, the Islamic Republic is not willing to make
[00:17:04] this mistake. That is, in my opinion,
[00:17:08] the issue of sequencing, that is, who
[00:17:12] should take the first step, will be very important. In any case,
[00:17:16] what you are saying is absolutely true. It was the US that withdrew
[00:17:19] from the JCPOA, and twice the US, right
[00:17:23] when it was negotiating with Iran, attacked. But the Americans themselves
[00:17:26] are gradually coming to the conclusion that the issue of Iran's nuclear
[00:17:30] program, which is an important issue, is not the only important
[00:17:34] issue. The issue of Iran's nuclear
[00:17:37] program, the future of Hormuz, has no political
[00:17:40] solution. It has no military solution,
[00:17:44] it has a political solution, and as long as the US tries
[00:17:47] to come and turn negotiations
[00:17:51] into "you must do this,
[00:17:55] then I will decide what to do," well, this will lead
[00:17:59] nowhere. This war will continue
[00:18:02] and will harm US interests
[00:18:06] and the interests of the Islamic Republic. But there
[00:18:09] is a difference today compared to 2015. A major difference is that
[00:18:13] Arab countries, important Arab
[00:18:16] countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have realized
[00:18:19] that they must have a defense
[00:18:22] system, their military
[00:18:26] defense system should be more
[00:18:29] than just an alliance with the US. That is, if you look at
[00:18:33] this Mecca program, look at the Mecca agreement, what is the reason?
[00:18:37] Because Saudi Arabia has come to the conclusion
[00:18:41] that the US cannot alone protect
[00:18:44] Saudi Arabia's interests. They saw that regarding
[00:18:48] Iran's attack, but can Turkey and Saudi Arabia,
[00:18:51] because now, in any case, Saudi Arabia has been attacked
[00:18:55] several times in the past few weeks by the Houthis, who are, in a way,
[00:18:58] Iran's partners and have a very close relationship
[00:19:02] with Iran. It has asked for help from the US,
[00:19:05] but has not received any. It is clear that
[00:19:07] it has also asked for help from its other partners
[00:19:10] but has not received any.
[00:19:12] Yes, look, regarding political issues,
[00:19:16] changing foreign policy is like
[00:19:19] changing the direction of a very large ship.
[00:19:22] You don't see this change
[00:19:25] in direction in a day or two, it takes time.
[00:19:28] Look, the very fact that Saudi Arabia
[00:19:31] has asked Turkey, has asked
[00:19:35] Pakistan to enter
[00:19:38] the Persian Gulf is very important. In addition, if you look, you will see that
[00:19:42] every day,
[00:19:44] China's economic and political power
[00:19:48] in the Persian Gulf is increasing. Is China replacing
[00:19:51] the US, Mr. Milani?
[00:19:53] China cannot replace the US, but China can take
[00:19:57] some of the US's power that until the Iran-US
[00:20:01] war, in this Chatham House article, my entire argument was that
[00:20:04] until the Iran-US war, US power
[00:20:08] was not challenged in
[00:20:12] the Persian Gulf. That is, it was Pax Americana,
[00:20:15] but after this, that power is gradually
[00:20:19] being challenged. It cannot change
[00:20:22] the US. The importance of the US will remain
[00:20:26] in its place, but other countries
[00:20:29] like China or even the Islamic Republic itself
[00:20:32] can play a greater role in the Persian Gulf.
[00:20:36] And therefore,
[00:20:40] the order that will exist in the Middle East will be an order
[00:20:44] that will be very different from today. We just had
[00:20:48] elections in the Israeli Knesset
[00:20:51] a few days ago, which showed that Mr. Netanyahu will remain as caretaker for now.
[00:20:55] My question is, if he has to step aside
[00:20:59] now with another election, with conditions that will become clearer
[00:21:03] in the coming days and weeks, for example, if Mr. Eisenkot comes in his place,
[00:21:06] will we see a major change? Because we constantly
[00:21:10] hear that they say Mr. Netanyahu has dragged Mr. Trump along
[00:21:13] here.
[00:21:16] Yes, I think that if Mr. Netanyahu
[00:21:20] is not elected, that is, if he cannot remain in power,
[00:21:23] which is possible, Israel's policies
[00:21:26] regarding Iran will change somewhat.
[00:21:30] If you look at the statements that Mr. Eisenkot himself
[00:21:34] has made, he has clearly
[00:21:37] announced that he does not pursue
[00:21:41] the policy of regime change, whereas Mr. Netanyahu
[00:21:45] wants to pursue this policy.
[00:21:48] Not that
[00:21:50] if Israel pursues this policy, it will succeed, but in
[00:21:54] any case, when a powerful country announces that
[00:21:58] it wants to overthrow the regime of another country,
[00:22:01] this is a very important issue. Therefore, Mr.
[00:22:05] Eisenkot, from the fact
[00:22:07] that he believes Iran's nuclear program
[00:22:11] and Iran's missile program are a very, very serious threat,
[00:22:15] he is like Mr. Netanyahu, but the way he wants
[00:22:18] to deal with Iran
[00:22:21] is different. In addition, a very important
[00:22:24] point I must mention about Mr. Netanyahu is this:
[00:22:28] individuals can play a very important
[00:22:31] role in foreign policy issues, even in democratic
[00:22:35] countries. Mr. Netanyahu has been in power for years
[00:22:39] and has created a very powerful network
[00:22:41] of supporters and fans, and he has a type
[00:22:45] of personality that can handle many
[00:22:49] issues. Therefore, if he leaves,
[00:22:52] it will take a long time for Mr. Eisenkot
[00:22:55] to be able to have the same influence
[00:22:59] that Mr. Netanyahu had. But unlike
[00:23:02] many who think that there will be no change
[00:23:05] in Israel's policy, I think that
[00:23:08] if Eisenkot wins the elections,
[00:23:11] and if Eisenkot is asked
[00:23:14] to form a government and can form a government,
[00:23:18] and if Arab groups
[00:23:21] in Israel's foreign policy regarding Iran,
[00:23:25] we will see some good changes.
[00:23:28] Iran's government, you yourself mentioned
[00:23:31] it in this interview, is a government that a large part
[00:23:35] of the people currently have issues with, criticize it.
[00:23:38] They are interested in overthrowing it. You yourself have repeatedly said
[00:23:41] that you are against revolution, you believe
[00:23:45] that revolution does not yield the necessary result, and war apparently
[00:23:48] has not yielded the result that at least some people wanted.
[00:23:52] What do you think the solution can be for the Iranian people?
[00:23:55] Look, you are absolutely right. Revolutions usually,
[00:23:58] if you look at all these revolutions in the world, from the French Revolution
[00:24:02] to Russia to China and other revolutions,
[00:24:05] revolution is for people who think they can achieve very rapid progress,
[00:24:09] meaning, as they say, they can find a shortcut,
[00:24:13] and this usually does not happen. War
[00:24:15] is the same. War usually changes the nature of governments.
[00:24:19] The Iran-Iraq War changed the nature of the Islamic Republic.
[00:24:23] I think that what needs to happen in Iran,
[00:24:26] I don't know how much will happen, but
[00:24:30] for me, this is the most fundamental issue that Iran is facing.
[00:24:34] These policies of the Islamic Republic
[00:24:37] in these last 45 years, 50 years, have not
[00:24:40] reached where they wanted to. Therefore, there must be a kind
[00:24:44] of reconsideration, and this reconsideration must have three
[00:24:47] pillars. The first is that Iran's power
[00:24:51] and Iran's deterrence power must be increased.
[00:24:54] Second, the issue of development and the economic
[00:24:58] situation of the people must be the second
[00:25:01] pillar, and third, democracy. Ms. Ghazizadeh,
[00:25:05] for 150 years, from before
[00:25:08] the Constitutional Revolution until today, we have talked
[00:25:11] about modernity, we have talked about development.
[00:25:14] These three pillars that I mentioned, power
[00:25:17] and development and improved welfare,
[00:25:20] and democracy, all three must move forward
[00:25:24] together. And unfortunately, we have not moved this forward. Two years ago,
[00:25:27] around these days, I think it was, that Mr. Pezeshkian first came
[00:25:31] to New York, to that meeting where many prominent Iranian
[00:25:35] experts were present, and you were also there.
[00:25:38] Did you tell him these things? Did you give him such suggestions? What
[00:25:42] did he say? What did Iranian officials say in response to these words to people like
[00:25:46] you? Well, this meeting that took place,
[00:25:50] it was a meeting with about 12 or 13 Iranian
[00:25:54] professors, and each of us
[00:25:57] had no more than three or four minutes.
[00:26:00] We said very general things. To tell you the truth,
[00:26:04] I didn't take notes, but I'm sure if I said anything,
[00:26:07] it was about the fact that the issue of relations with
[00:26:11] the US must be normalized somehow, because
[00:26:15] this is my main theme. Because I believe that as long
[00:26:18] as Iran does not normalize its relations with the US
[00:26:21] or try to learn how to manage
[00:26:25] their differences, their differences
[00:26:29] economically.
[00:26:53] This war, these two wars woke
[00:26:57] up our nation, and now it will take
[00:27:00] some years, it may take some time to see what
[00:27:04] the positive changes will be. But the example
[00:27:07] I gave you, the ship of politics
[00:27:11] in Iran is gradually changing direction.
[00:27:15] Thank you very much. Thank you for this hopeful ending. Mohsen
[00:27:18] Milani, Professor of International Relations, thank you for being with us.
[00:28:30] videos like this over social media,
[00:28:34] easily produced, high volume, and often very
[00:28:37] weird. AI is making it easier to scam us. It was
[00:28:41] my voice, it was my phone number. on that day I hadn't
[00:28:45] spoken to her. In the age of artificial
[00:28:48] intelligence, Panorama asks, is
[00:28:52] seeing still
[00:28:53] believing?
[00:30:36] and now on BBC Persian TV,
[00:30:39] a documentary.
[00:30:42] What does a mobile phone do in the hands of small children? What effect
[00:30:46] does watching TV, computers, and mobile phones
[00:30:49] have on the psyche of children? Can you give a child a mobile phone
[00:30:53] whenever they cry to keep them entertained?
[00:30:57] In a world where screens are
[00:31:00] everywhere.