CANALCATORCE — broadcast
20260920 153000 UTC
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[00:00:00] civilian casualties and are tremendously expensive, being
[00:00:03] tremendously expensive, so
[00:00:06] it's also expensive to manufacture them, and many times that is the biggest problem, because well, the United
[00:00:10] States spending 40,000 million dollars would not
[00:00:13] be
[00:00:15] something like it would for a European country, right, which would mean almost ruin for us,
[00:00:19] but the problem is that they are very expensive to manufacture,
[00:00:23] right, they are very sophisticated, production lines cannot be increased
[00:00:27] too much, so,
[00:00:30] there the United States faces a bottleneck
[00:00:34] where practically the moment it exhausts its stocks, the capacity of American
[00:00:37] factories
[00:00:39] will return to to make up for that shortage in stocks is increasingly
[00:00:42] reduced. This is something that happens to all of us anyway, even
[00:00:45] with not so sophisticated materials. Perhaps you remember in the war in
[00:00:48] Ukraine, artillery shells at the beginning of the war were the critical
[00:00:52] material and Ukraine was asking for millions of artillery
[00:00:55] projectiles. Well, between the United States and Europe, we were
[00:00:59] not able to produce as much artillery ammunition as, for example,
[00:01:02] Russia is producing. Why? Well, probably because we have deactivated
[00:01:06] a large part of our war industry. We did not think that a large-scale war would occur,
[00:01:11] the challenge we have, and beyond perhaps more so in the United States, less so in Europe,
[00:01:13] and a large part of our capacity to expand
[00:01:17] our war production has been tremendously limited
[00:01:21] since the end of the Cold War. And I am going to take advantage of the fact that you brought up
[00:01:26] system that figure of 1 million dollars each month in
[00:01:28] Afghanistan in contrast to what
[00:01:30] capacity in these last months the Congressional Budget Office of the United States says, which states
[00:01:34] that the war in Iraq alone costs the United States between 2,000 million
[00:01:41] historical periods, but that in let's say, created a hole in and 3,000 million dollars each month. José Luis, you pointed out something very important, and that is the capacity of the
[00:01:45] war industry, and you spoke of European countries, and also the
[00:01:48] United States. I want to ask you about the specific case of the United States,
[00:01:52] which is what we are discussing in this program, and that is how much
[00:01:56] agreements, each for the capacity and how long it can take,
[00:01:59] only not because this goes beyond how much it can cost, but also
[00:02:01] how many months or years it can take the United States
[00:02:05] to have the quantity
[00:02:08] again, just to talk about air defense
[00:02:10] missiles, how long it can take to recover
[00:02:14] those projectiles that it has lost and that the Congress estimates it has lost between
[00:02:17] half and two-thirds of the projectiles it had to defend itself
[00:02:21] from air
[00:02:24] changes attacks. Well, it's hard to say, it depends on the
[00:02:27] effort that the American government can make
[00:02:30] to increase the production chains of the industries that produce this type of
[00:02:34] weapons, but it's not something easy and it's not something that can be done in the short
[00:02:38] term, and it's something we've seen in Ukraine when, for
[00:02:41] example, they've tried to increase the quantity of
[00:02:44] Patriot missiles, which is one of the key missiles in air defense, it has been
[00:02:48] seen that it's very difficult because even opening new
[00:02:51] factories, there has even been talk of opening them in Ukraine,
[00:02:55] well, it's something that takes months, no, probably years,
[00:02:58] so.
[00:03:00] refilling its arsenals, of course, would depend on the effort made by the United States,
[00:03:04] but I doubt they can do it
[00:03:08] in less than a year, many months, no,
[00:03:12] it is also very difficult
[00:03:14] couple of naval air groups to to make an exact calculation of this, no, but if the American
[00:03:17] government made a great effort, probably in months the
[00:03:20] arsenals could be replenished, if it doesn't make such a great
[00:03:24] effort, then we would be talking about years, the congress is even
[00:03:27] more skeptical, its budget office says that it could
[00:03:31] take up to 5 years to recover the amount
[00:03:34] of stock of air defense projectiles they had until before June
[00:03:39] every year they would 2025. Manuel, a question also along the same lines for you, how
[00:03:43] well-oiled is that war industry in
[00:03:46] the United States to be able to replenish
[00:03:50] arsenals as quickly
[00:03:51] as possible. Well, here,
[00:03:56] change is needed in I would like to comment
[00:03:59] that each war has its own, let's say, different way
[00:04:03] radical one, to abandon of conducting it. In other words, to be
[00:04:05] clear, after the Second World War, the United States
[00:04:09] prepared for a conventional war with
[00:04:13] reduce the another great power, which was the Soviet Union.
[00:04:16] Eh, the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia is not the Soviet
[00:04:19] Union, but it still poses a very serious
[00:04:23] threat to Europe and the rest of the world, but China
[00:04:26] does represent something similar, equivalent to
[00:04:32] would be three times more than the the strength of the United States. In other words, some type of munitions
[00:04:35] factory on the part of the United States
[00:04:39] has traditionally, at least in all my life and since
[00:04:42] 1945, 1945 onwards, been for
[00:04:45] the purpose of being able to defend
[00:04:49] and win a war
[00:04:51] against the Soviet Union or more recently in the last 20
[00:04:55] years, China. So, what if we continue with
[00:04:59] Well, I agree with the that type of philosophy of defending against those two
[00:05:03] types of threats? The fact that a war is coming against
[00:05:06] Iran, which is nothing, but nothing like those two powers,
[00:05:10] but it does have its way of... as they say, an asymmetric
[00:05:13] war in the sense that they have a
[00:05:17] capacity that is not what
[00:05:20] we are preparing for, meaning that we have,
[00:05:23] we have been manufacturing weapons
[00:05:26] that are not for this type of war and, as
[00:05:29] Colonel José Luis says, it can
[00:05:33] be replaced, that's for sure, and it depends on how long, but for
[00:05:37] what purpose? Because if it's to continue the war in Iran,
[00:05:41] it doesn't make, let's say, logical sense, and as we have seen
[00:05:45] in Ukraine, eh,
[00:05:47] every month, at least every two or three months,
[00:05:51] the way, strategy in which operations are
[00:05:55] conducted, the weapons, the types of drones,
[00:05:58] whether terrestrial, maritime, or aerial, change
[00:06:02] radically in a very short time, so
[00:06:06] even if the United States were to replace the
[00:06:09] missiles in a year or 5 years that have been...
[00:06:12] used, by 5 years or 3 years or
[00:06:16] even possibly a year, those
[00:06:18] weapons, in my opinion, will be obsolete even for a
[00:06:22] war against China. You raise a very interesting
[00:06:26] point, and that is the imbalance of weapons that the United States currently
[00:06:29] has to fight other weapons that are
[00:06:33] very cheap to produce. You have already mentioned drones, but I want to go back
[00:06:37] to that point that Manuel mentioned, and that is the kind of weaponry that
[00:06:41] the United States needs to defend itself from another
[00:06:44] country, and you brought up Manuel the case of
[00:06:47] China. Today, with the weapon situation and the
[00:06:51] arsenal and munitions that the United
[00:06:54] States has, how capable is it
[00:06:57] of defending itself against not just an attack from
[00:07:00] China, but beyond that, how much could it defend
[00:07:04] , for example, Taiwan in case China decided to attack this
[00:07:08] semi-autonomous territory, or how capable is the United States
[00:07:11] of... intervening in the Strait
[00:07:14] of Bab el-Mandeb in case the Houthis managed to control it completely?
[00:07:18] Well, let's start with the case
[00:07:21] of Taiwan. Defending
[00:07:24] Taiwan, let's say, from some kind of invasion by China.
[00:07:27] First of all, for now, the
[00:07:31] countries of South Korea, Japan,
[00:07:34] the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, and
[00:07:38] even India would be, and other countries, Singapore, and
[00:07:41] others. In other words, there are still alliances in
[00:07:44] that part of the world that recognize,
[00:07:47] although they may not have as much confidence in the United States as they used to,
[00:07:51] eh, if there were to be a war, an invasion, where
[00:07:55] the United States made the decision to defend Taiwan, I
[00:07:58] think it would not only be the United States. So that's the first
[00:08:02] point, that this war in Iran, obviously,
[00:08:05] the United States is alone, only with Israel. So
[00:08:09] there would be many more allies, first. Second,
[00:08:12] a maritime invasion by China towards Taiwan, for several
[00:08:16] reasons that this program is not meant to detail,
[00:08:19] would be much more complicated, much more complicated than
[00:08:23] playing defensively, because in that case, China would be on the
[00:08:26] offensive, and offense, especially when you have to
[00:08:29] cross a sea,
[00:08:33] it's much more difficult. So, and the third point
[00:08:37] is that China is also more or less in this
[00:08:40] era, more or less in the
[00:08:42] same situation or similar to the United States' situation in the
[00:08:46] sense that they still rely more than anything on
[00:08:50] traditional weapons, and that's why I'm talking about instruments from
[00:08:53] 5 years ago, and they still haven't,
[00:08:56] let's say, modernized in the way that the war in Ukraine
[00:08:59] has shown us what is
[00:09:03] needed. So I think that defending against an invasion by
[00:09:06] China would be much more easy, not that it's
[00:09:09] easy, but easier than, let's say,
[00:09:12] against, or forcing
[00:09:15] Iran to release control of the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:09:18] And I want to ask you about that same point, José Luis, but
[00:09:22] focusing on the war in Ukraine,
[00:09:25] how much did the supply, especially at the beginning of the war, that the
[00:09:29] United States gave to the Ukrainians, contribute to the shortage of
[00:09:33] arsenal that the American
[00:09:34] country currently faces?
[00:09:38] Well, it has evidently had an influence, especially on some
[00:09:42] materials, which are also materials that
[00:09:45] only the United States manufactures, and that we really
[00:09:49] still need the United States to provide to
[00:09:52] Ukraine: Patriot missiles and
[00:09:55] precision missiles for tactical attack like HIMARS
[00:09:59] ATACMS. So,
[00:10:03] it is true that all that kind of material has been given to Ukraine not in
[00:10:06] drips and drabs, but in limited quantities. That is to say, in
[00:10:09] comparison with what is being spent in the war against Iran, what has been given to Ukraine is
[00:10:13] still little. Ukraine has been given more conventional material,
[00:10:16] etcetera, but yes, in some way, the war in
[00:10:19] Ukraine demonstrated this problem that is now being seen in all its
[00:10:23] magnitude, which is that we face very complex and extremely expensive
[00:10:27] weapon systems against other systems that are much cheaper
[00:10:30] and can be manufactured in large quantities, in much larger
[00:10:33] quantities. So we are facing what we soldiers call a
[00:10:37] revolution in military affairs. That is to say, we probably have to start
[00:10:40] thinking about changing our arsenals, our systems,
[00:10:44] looking for those cheaper but also technologically
[00:10:47] advanced systems. The thing is that's not something that can be done in a few months
[00:10:50] or a year. Armies to change
[00:10:53] their materials, the doctrine with which they are used, etcetera, would
[00:10:57] probably need years. So,
[00:11:01] that's the problem we face. I repeat that Ukraine had its
[00:11:04] influence, although it really brought the problem
[00:11:08] to light, but the problem in all its
[00:11:11] seriousness is now being seen in the war against Iran. And both of you
[00:11:15] agree that one of the solutions is
[00:11:18] to change that quantity or that quality of arsenals for the better and
[00:11:22] modernize them to be on par with
[00:11:25] modern attacks that are currently happening, especially with those drones. But the
[00:11:29] specific question I want to ask Manuel is what kind
[00:11:33] of change should there be, that is, what should
[00:11:35] the war industry develop to combat a drone that is
[00:11:39] cheap to produce and difficult to
[00:11:42] capture?
[00:11:45] Let's start with the fact that the
[00:11:51] of the US military
[00:11:54] industry is an enormous
[00:11:57] industry, enormous and one that makes
[00:12:01] a lot of money, paid for by the citizens of the United
[00:12:04] States, and it is very, it takes a long time,
[00:12:08] the rules for procurement
[00:12:11] have increased a lot, I was not an
[00:12:14] expert on that type of topic, but what I mean is that
[00:12:18] it is a system of contracting, of
[00:12:21] making, let's say, requests for proposals,
[00:12:25] etcetera, that takes a very long time and requires
[00:12:29] a lot of money, simply to respond to what the
[00:12:32] government is asking for, while, for example, in Ukraine, out of
[00:12:36] necessity, it is a much, much more
[00:12:39] agile, fast, flexible, and cheap system
[00:12:43] to execute, and that is what allows those radical
[00:12:49] in the way that they are
[00:12:52] contracting and manufacturing new weapons that can, let's
[00:12:55] say, win. Every month it has to change here in
[00:12:59] the United States. One starts with an initial
[00:13:02] contracting process that lasts
[00:13:06] years before they start manufacturing the particular
[00:13:09] weapon. So that is a first, first phase
[00:13:13] is to create a much more efficient and agile system that
[00:13:17] can respond to today's needs and not to the
[00:13:21] needs that we have today but that are for
[00:13:24] the future. When they are ready, that reality will have
[00:13:27] changed, so I would start there and also
[00:13:30] work with other allies
[00:13:33] to
[00:13:35] combine the different experiences that have been
[00:13:39] found in different parts of the world with
[00:13:43] this change. We are no longer in the war of the Soviet
[00:13:46] Union or even a conventional
[00:13:49] war with another very
[00:13:52] powerful power like China.
[00:13:56] But I want to ask you a question along those same lines, Manuel, and that is, you
[00:13:59] say, money and time are needed to be able to renew
[00:14:03] the war industry. Is enough money being dedicated in the United
[00:14:06] States to it?
[00:14:10] No, first of all, if I were, let's
[00:14:13] say, someone advising the United States government, I would say,
[00:14:17] a radical
[00:14:21] the procurement process for the
[00:14:24] purchase of weapons, but a
[00:14:28] what was done before and make it much more flexible
[00:14:32] where someone who has a new,
[00:14:35] innovative idea that can be useful in the
[00:14:38] new battlefield can show them, "Look, I have this
[00:14:42] product, it's ready now, you contract
[00:14:45] me tomorrow and you can have
[00:14:48] these weapons on the battlefield in a matter of weeks
[00:14:52] or months, not years." So we have to
[00:14:56] start with that radical change of a military
[00:15:00] industry that has a lot of political
[00:15:03] power in this country and that it would be, I think, difficult, let's
[00:15:07] say, to achieve those changes that I think are
[00:15:10] necessary. And José Luis, what do you contribute or what
[00:15:14] do you add about how that modernization of weapons
[00:15:17] and also of
[00:15:19] ammunition could be?
[00:15:24] colonel, with Manuel, that many times the
[00:15:28] problem is not so much the
[00:15:31] modernization as the streamlining of the material acquisition processes, right?
[00:15:35] I always... I give an example, right now we are
[00:15:38] receiving armored vehicles that were designed for the wars in Iraq and
[00:15:42] Afghanistan, so they are very protected, they are very
[00:15:46] effective at withstanding the explosion of mines, of
[00:15:49] improvised explosive devices, but of course,
[00:15:53] that is no longer the type of war we are facing. Now we are facing drones
[00:15:56] that attack from angles
[00:15:59] and with completely different attack strategies, so we are receiving
[00:16:03] vehicles for the war of 15 years ago.
[00:16:06] So that is the problem, that it takes a very long time from when the product
[00:16:10] is designed until we receive it in the armies,
[00:16:14] right? Of course, this changes with wars, for example, the Ukrainians have adapted and
[00:16:18] they are producing new materials, new missiles, new
[00:16:21] systems from one year to the next. In the Second World
[00:16:24] War, new tanks were manufactured, I'm not going to say in
[00:16:28] months, but little more than a year, so of course when countries are at war, they
[00:16:32] are pressured to speed that up, but the challenge we have
[00:16:35] is to try to speed up those... processes so that it doesn't take
[00:16:39] us 10 or 15 years to receive new materials in peacetime, without
[00:16:42] needing to suffer the disaster of a war, right? And that is
[00:16:48] modernization, I also want to ask you how much it can
[00:16:52] serve the United States to use the forces and
[00:16:56] arsenal it currently has for other objectives, and I ask
[00:16:59] Manuel specifically about the case of Israel. Earlier I
[00:17:03] asked Colonel Calvo if the war in Ukraine had
[00:17:06] weakened the US armament capacity. I want to ask you
[00:17:09] if helping Israel has,
[00:17:15] the military capacity of the United States, and I ask you because every year
[00:17:19] the United States provides a base of
[00:17:22] 3.8 billion dollars in military
[00:17:25] assistance to Israel, and so far in
[00:17:28] 2026, they have signed at least two
[00:17:34] amount of 2.7 billion dollars and another 2.8
[00:17:37] billion dollars to give Israel
[00:17:41] more than 40,000 one-ton bombs. If
[00:17:44] this were to be relocated to leave the
[00:17:48] arsenals or these munitions within the United States, could it be
[00:17:52] an option? And looking at it from a broader
[00:17:55] perspective, does supporting Israel not open this gap
[00:17:59] in the US arsenal?
[00:18:01] Look, I don't have
[00:18:04] that, that's an excellent point and...
[00:18:07] question. I don't have the data in front of me, but
[00:18:10] I have no doubt that what has been
[00:18:13] spent by the United States, essentially giving away
[00:18:17] money, because to
[00:18:19] Israel compared to what has been sold
[00:18:23] to Ukraine in many cases and largely
[00:18:27] paid for by other NATO countries and
[00:18:30] Europe, is much more than what has been
[00:18:33] given to Ukraine. And to put
[00:18:36] this in, let's say, a historical context, what is
[00:18:40] given to Israel is essentially what they call foreign military
[00:18:44] financing, which is an amount. The numbers
[00:18:47] you used are that money the Congress
[00:18:50] every year since the, I mean, it was when
[00:18:53] Jimmy Carter was president
[00:18:57] and achieved peace between Egypt and
[00:19:00] Israel. I think it was around '72, '73,
[00:19:04] something like that, I don't remember exactly, but to
[00:19:07] achieve that agreement, the United States guaranteed Israel
[00:19:12] and also Egypt, although at a lower level, that
[00:19:17] receive a budget from the United
[00:19:20] States. And now it's not that they are giving money to
[00:19:23] Israel, the money is used by
[00:19:26] Israel and Egypt, both,
[00:19:29] to buy weapons from the American factories
[00:19:33] that are making these munitions. So it's like a
[00:19:36] vicious circle, that the Congress gives the
[00:19:40] money to Israel but doesn't give it, it only gives a credit that
[00:19:43] they can then use to buy these things, and in that, of course,
[00:19:47] it will obviously
[00:19:50] weapons that the
[00:19:53] US armed forces will have available. And those bombs you
[00:19:57] mentioned are 2
[00:20:00] tons each. If all
[00:20:04] those, I think it's 40,000 bombs or something like that,
[00:20:09] bombs, the power would be much more than what
[00:20:12] happened in the nuclear attacks during the Second
[00:20:16] World War against Japan. I have the updated data
[00:20:19] for what you are raising, that the US Congress gives
[00:20:23] about 80% of the foreign military funding that
[00:20:27] the legislature approves solely and exclusively for the
[00:20:30] Middle East, not just Israel, but for
[00:20:33] the entire sub-region. I want to ask José Luis,
[00:20:37] how to understand, let's say, this funding, or beyond that, what
[00:20:41] could happen now with Donald Trump's intention
[00:20:44] to finance other countries? He recently
[00:20:47] announced that he would allocate five
[00:20:52] 42 million dollars for Latin American countries that are supporting Trump's initiative
[00:20:56] to join the Shield of the Americas, specifically he said for
[00:20:59] Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia, 52 million
[00:21:03] versus the 3,800 million dollars that Israel
[00:21:07] receives annually. It is still a small
[00:21:10] amount, but how do you understand, above all, this decision that Donald Trump has
[00:21:14] decided to withdraw this money that was destined especially for
[00:21:18] European countries as well? Some in Asia and now
[00:21:21] to put it in Latin
[00:21:22] America.
[00:21:26] Yes, well, I when President
[00:21:28] Trump won the elections, we had a meeting with
[00:21:32] our, I was still working at the Spanish Ministry of Defense, we had a meeting with
[00:21:36] our American colleagues and they, commenting
[00:21:40] on what the strategy, what the new American administration's strategy was going to be,
[00:21:43] they said, "Don't think that the main objective is China
[00:21:46] or the main objective
[00:21:50] is Europe, as it has traditionally been, the main objective is Latin America." That is
[00:21:54] to say, the main objective of this new administration is going to be
[00:21:57] Latin America, and it's true, the United States is dedicating, in some
[00:22:01] way, it is recovering interest in Central and
[00:22:05] South America, and it is, although the amounts allocated and the
[00:22:09] troops deployed still cannot be compared to what is in the Middle East,
[00:22:12] logically, but it is true that there is a certain strategic
[00:22:16] interest, well, and the operation in Venezuela is a clear
[00:22:19] case. A renewed strategic interest
[00:22:22] of the United States in Central
[00:22:26] and South America. An interest that existed in other
[00:22:31] recent decades was really more reduced, but now it seems that
[00:22:34] it is returning, and I want to ask you your personal position, and forgive
[00:22:38] me for insisting on this, but how do you read this policy? Can it serve the United
[00:22:42] States, especially in the current geopolitical landscape? And I
[00:22:45] give you an example, it is not
[00:22:49] allocating money to the Middle East, but for example,
[00:22:52] one of the clear cases is what
[00:22:56] happened with the aircraft carrier George
[00:22:59] Washington. Once, the aircraft carrier Abraham
[00:23:02] Lincoln, after spending more than
[00:23:05] 10 months in the ocean fighting in different
[00:23:09] wars, is now returning to the United
[00:23:12] States, and the replacement for the Abraham Lincoln is
[00:23:16] the George Washington, which was in Asia, precisely
[00:23:19] to deter any attack on Taiwan. Can it
[00:23:23] serve the United States to move it, to move that aircraft carrier to
[00:23:26] the Middle East, and can it also serve to relocate
[00:23:29] military aid to Latin America, especially taking into account the current
[00:23:33] geopolitics?
[00:23:37] Yes, well, I think that anyway, a new aircraft carrier had been sent,
[00:23:40] I think it was the Carl Vinson to
[00:23:44] Asia to replace it, because I think the United States
[00:23:47] will always try to have at least one operational aircraft carrier group, not
[00:23:51] an aircraft carrier, but the naval air group
[00:23:54] that accompanies it, active in Asia. No, the thing is that
[00:23:57] now in the Middle East, well, they are,
[00:24:01] of course, putting pressure on it, and it needs at least a
[00:24:04] maintain the rakes when attacks occur, and
[00:24:08] so there is a certain regard
[00:24:11] to America, as I said before, indeed,
[00:24:15] there is a greater involvement, that also doesn't
[00:24:18] mean that the involvement apart from Venezuela, which is a special case
[00:24:22] and there has been a military operation,
[00:24:25] in the rest of the countries, what there is is simply an
[00:24:28] increase in US presence, it's not that they are also
[00:24:32] considered allies, Colombia, in Argentina,
[00:24:35] it's starting to be talked about in these countries that have regimes that
[00:24:39] can be considered very close to the
[00:24:42] American regime, to the current American government, well,
[00:24:45] it is increasing, it's a small increase yet, but it does
[00:24:49] show a greater interest, it's not
[00:24:52] something that will affect too much the capabilities of the United States in the Middle East
[00:24:56] or in the Pacific, because as I say, these are deployments
[00:24:59] and these are capabilities that are deployed in
[00:25:03] Latin America, reduced for now, I'm
[00:25:06] going to take advantage of you mentioning Argentina to mention
[00:25:09] the operations, the joint military exercises between the United
[00:25:12] States and Argentina that took place for most of September
[00:25:16] in Tierra del Fuego, in the south
[00:25:20] of that country, Manuel, I want to ask you how
[00:25:24] you see the United States moving its pieces in this international chess
[00:25:26] game, especially in military matters,
[00:25:30] where it is putting more force and where it is
[00:25:32] taking it away.
[00:25:36] Well, as Colonel José
[00:25:39] Luis said, the public strategy
[00:25:42] of the United States for this year of the
[00:25:46] Donald Trump administration
[00:25:49] is focused on America. It says it is focused on
[00:25:52] Latin America and they are doing much
[00:25:55] more, although it is relatively little globally, but they are doing much more than has
[00:25:59] been done, at least during my life,
[00:26:02] and certainly when I was in the Southern Command also in the Southern Army, in Panama,
[00:26:06] etcetera.
[00:26:09] The thing is, as I said before, a war against the
[00:26:13] Soviet Union, a war against Russia today or China is
[00:26:17] very different from what is happening today in the Middle
[00:26:19] East, with the defense or
[00:26:23] attempt to defend the Arab countries of the
[00:26:25] Gulf, that obviously the US bases
[00:26:29] also, we haven't talked about it, but let me say that they have suffered
[00:26:33] a lot, there has been a lot of destruction of those
[00:26:36] bases, and I doubt that the United States
[00:26:41] rebuild those bases that have been damaged
[00:26:45] in large part, I don't know what they will do, but I don't think
[00:26:49] they will go back to how they were before, because the Arab countries in
[00:26:53] many cases have already lost confidence that they will be able to be
[00:26:56] defended by the United States under these
[00:26:59] circumstances, so there I go to another part.
[00:27:02] Yes, excuse me for interrupting you, we ran out, we ran out of time,
[00:27:06] unfortunately we couldn't delve into the issue of the bases, which is undoubtedly of
[00:27:09] interest, but in 30 seconds I ask Manuel so that José Luis can then answer
[00:27:13] the same, given the scenario we are talking about, is the United
[00:27:17] States unprotected or is it alarmist to say
[00:27:20] this? I wouldn't say that
[00:27:24] it is, let's say, without defense,
[00:27:27] the United States still has a lot of defense, although it has lost a lot of
[00:27:33] of what it had before, that should not be confused with saying
[00:27:37] that it is not prepared
[00:27:40] for incapacity to defend itself, we also
[00:27:44] have the weapons that you just said we have in space, so that is
[00:27:48] another frontier of war, and José Luis, what is your answer to
[00:27:52] this?
[00:27:54] Yes, I agree, no, you cannot say that the United States is
[00:27:57] unprotected, yes you can say that perhaps its ability to
[00:28:00] influence some conflicts throughout
[00:28:04] the world has logically been reduced and the
[00:28:08] Iran war is stuck,
[00:28:10] so well, yes, if a big crisis arises, that's the problem, that a big
[00:28:14] crisis arises in the Strait of Taiwan, in the Middle East, a really
[00:28:18] big crisis that forces a large military deployment, then the United States could find itself
[00:28:21] a bit short of resources. Thanks to the retired colonels, José
[00:28:25] Luis Calvo and Manuel Superville for joining us and also
[00:28:29] thanks to the debate's editing chief Laura Garzón and the guests' chief
[00:28:33] Natalie Quiroga, you stay with
[00:28:34] us.
[00:29:40] The earthquake of September 19, 1985