CURRENTTIME — broadcast
20260806 140000 UTC
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[00:00:22] the improvement of the structure of the
[00:00:25] Ministry of Defense continues in connection
[00:00:28] with the needs and experience of special military operations.
[00:00:32] Personnel rotation of personnel. Putin announced
[00:00:35] the unification of the rear services of the Ministry of Defense. He
[00:00:39] seeks to improve, so to speak, the leadership of the war, but at the same time not
[00:00:43] to put forward any general who would look like
[00:00:46] his competitor. And about the change of the head of the UAV
[00:00:49] troops. The previous head was engaged in selling
[00:00:52] plumbing. At the same time, in Russia, attempts on the lives of
[00:00:55] heads of factories involved in the production of
[00:00:58] drones continue.
[00:01:04] Radio Svoboda speaks, Current Time TV channel shows.
[00:01:07] The program "Face to the Event" is on air. Hello. And today we will talk about
[00:01:11] reshuffles in the Russian army. Vladimir
[00:01:14] Putin personally announced them. In the public part of the meeting with the military, Putin
[00:01:18] spent as many as 7 minutes on this, judging by the video recording of the
[00:01:21] Kremlin press service. There are some interesting moments in these reshuffles, in
[00:01:25] particular, the appearance of a unified rear service
[00:01:27] of the Ministry of Defense. My colleague Andrey will tell
[00:01:30] more,
[00:01:36] large-scale reshuffles in the Ministry of Defense, the Russian president
[00:01:40] vaguely explained by the needs and experience of
[00:01:43] a special military operation, as the Kremlin calls the war with Ukraine. The previous major
[00:01:46] reorganization, or rather a purge, was in this sector 2 years ago, when
[00:01:50] after the change of the Minister of Defense, the entire management team
[00:01:54] and many colleagues of the former head of the department Shoigu were arrested, the current
[00:01:58] reshuffles are not so radical. rather, they are connected with the not so
[00:02:01] fast advance of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine. Official
[00:02:05] Russian media interpret the reshuffles as sending
[00:02:08] combat generals to repair the rear. Colonel General Valery
[00:02:12] Saladchuk moved from the post of commander of the troops of the Central Military District
[00:02:16] to the deputy minister of defense to organize logistical support
[00:02:19] for the troops. The Deputy Minister Colonel General Alexander
[00:02:23] Sanchik, who was previously responsible for material and technical support
[00:02:26] of the troops, is now in charge of organizing orders, weapons, equipment and
[00:02:29] technical support. Komsomolskaya Pravda describes it like this: everything that
[00:02:33] concerns weapons, is now in one hand,
[00:02:36] all rear services are also in one fist. Another
[00:02:40] Deputy Minister of Defense, Alexey Krivoruchko, has been redirected to the development of
[00:02:43] promising weapons and military special equipment.
[00:02:47] The story with especially promising equipment - drones received its
[00:02:51] continuation with the appointment of Colonel General Denis Lyamin
[00:02:54] as the head of the department of unmanned systems troops.
[00:02:57] Denis Igorevich, the new branch of troops is just
[00:03:01] being formed, catching up with Ukraine, which is more dynamic in this area,
[00:03:04] where the path from the first presidential decrees to the real
[00:03:07] creation of a branch of troops took the entire year 2024. Similar
[00:03:11] troops in Russia were presented by the Minister of Defense as an idea in
[00:03:14] December 2024, and their creation was planned to be completed in
[00:03:18] the third quarter of 2025. I want to express hope that
[00:03:21] you, and the Minister,
[00:03:25] the Chief of the General Staff believe so too,
[00:03:29] you... being one of the most qualified specialists,
[00:03:32] as I already said, will bring to
[00:03:35] completion the formation of this new
[00:03:39] branch of troops, unmanned systems, and lead it in the near
[00:03:43] future. In place of those promoted, Colonel General Andrey
[00:03:47] Ivanaev has been appointed the new commander of the troops of the Central Military
[00:03:50] District. He previously commanded the troops of the Eastern District.
[00:03:54] Colonel General Pyotr Bolgarev, who was his
[00:03:57] chief, has been appointed acting commander in his place. The reshuffles in
[00:04:01] the military top brass are commented on by pro-government and pro-military Telegram channels with
[00:04:05] optimism. The disruption of purchases and deliveries of drones to the front, which led to
[00:04:09] the de facto halt of further advance of troops, predetermined
[00:04:12] the latest personnel decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Marshal
[00:04:16] Zhukov's famous phrase "The rear is half the victory" became the main
[00:04:19] motive for the new personnel decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
[00:04:23] Putin's logic is extremely clear. Who else but combat
[00:04:26] commanders know best what the soldiers need right
[00:04:30] now. The details of what the soldiers need right now
[00:04:33] remained behind the scenes of the meeting with the Supreme
[00:04:35] Commander-in-Chief.
[00:04:38] The key difference between the current reshuffles, from those very de facto purges in
[00:04:41] the Ministry of Defense two years ago, which our correspondent mentioned, according
[00:04:45] to analysts at the American Institute for the Study of War, is that
[00:04:48] these are precisely reshuffles among active commanders,
[00:04:52] and not promotions of new ones. Well, who could change something, somehow inject
[00:04:56] fresh blood, so to speak, metaphorically. But the unified
[00:04:59] rear service is interesting, as noted by the Institute for the Study
[00:05:02] of War, against the backdrop of ongoing successful air attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. We
[00:05:06] have discussed many times in our broadcasts, our experts said that
[00:05:09] it is simply impossible to cover the entire Russia with air defense systems. Even if
[00:05:13] we take into account strictly important for the military-industrial complex and for the Russian army
[00:05:16] production, organizations, factories and so on, including therefore
[00:05:20] the Russian authorities are ready to give defense to those corporations who
[00:05:24] can afford it, while the task in the Kremlin, most
[00:05:28] likely, is not to over-organize with the appointment of self-confident
[00:05:31] bosses too high, too long, well, so that it
[00:05:35] does not escalate into political competition for Putin, so believes
[00:05:38] analyst Sergey Shelin, we talked to him before the start of our
[00:05:41] broadcast. We can hardly
[00:05:44] say whether he is gripped by panic or just his usual
[00:05:48] fear. Putin, in fact, lives in
[00:05:50] fear. So we can call it
[00:05:54] constant panic, we can not call it, but he is always afraid for his
[00:05:58] position as the ruler of Russia. Why
[00:06:01] is he changing generals now? Well, he is probably
[00:06:04] dissatisfied with the results of their work.
[00:06:08] Uh, this is understandable, in general, he has, he must have
[00:06:12] claims against them, but he must solve two tasks that
[00:06:15] are easily read: he seeks to improve, so to speak,
[00:06:19] the leadership of the war, but at the same time not to put forward any
[00:06:22] general who would look like his competitor, that is
[00:06:26] the most important task that he always set for
[00:06:29] himself, and even for some unpopular,
[00:06:32] for example, action, like the withdrawal of troops from Kherson, he put
[00:06:36] Surovikin, as we remember, immediately after that he removed him, because
[00:06:39] Surovikin looked not enough... such a
[00:06:43] pale figure, so I think that now it's approximately the same
[00:06:46] thing, Putin is trying to pick some simultaneously faceless, but
[00:06:50] at the same time, somehow better coping with the work
[00:06:53] generals. And with us live is military expert Nikolai
[00:06:56] Mitrokhin. Nikolai, hello,
[00:06:59] hello, I want to know first your impression, what in practice
[00:07:03] can change in the Russian army with these reshuffles, what would you
[00:07:06] pay attention to here first
[00:07:10] of all, it's the movement of the commander of the group.
[00:07:42] on the central section of the front, well, accordingly,
[00:07:45] as if the chief of this central
[00:07:48] group is being moved instead of him to start the commander of a successful
[00:07:51] group, will it help or not,
[00:07:55] so to speak, is an open question, I would say probably not, because
[00:07:58] the problem of the center group is not that
[00:08:02] there the command is not decisive enough,
[00:08:06] it's that they reached the Slavyansk-
[00:08:09] Kramatorsk fortified area, which was being prepared.
[00:08:19] At the same time, as it were, the Ukrainians managed to significantly
[00:08:21] reduce logistics during the end of
[00:08:25] July, early July, end of June, early
[00:08:28] July, and the group was left without additional, so to
[00:08:31] speak, without additional supplies, here,
[00:08:34] well, as it were, Putin knows better who he wants to see there as
[00:08:38] commander, well, what can be opposed?
[00:09:12] somewhere the current commander, conditionally speaking, who solves some of his
[00:09:16] tasks, releases some opportunities, because
[00:09:19] theoretically, as it were, it is possible to
[00:09:22] do something there, especially if the new commander
[00:09:25] receives additional resources for his
[00:09:29] task, which were not given to the previous one, because they did not
[00:09:32] believe in the previous one, that happens, but in general, of course,
[00:09:36] the situation on the front line will be stable,
[00:09:38] stable, including, as you rightly said, due to
[00:10:12] what Russia has, and
[00:10:16] Belousov, after his appointment, set the goal of at least
[00:10:19] achieving parity, and even surpassing Ukraine in terms of
[00:10:23] drones, and the first year after his appointment,
[00:10:27] the situation changed in this regard, but the last
[00:10:30] six months clearly showed
[00:10:33] stagnation, Russia again
[00:10:36] began to lose badly the drone race,
[00:10:40] production, that is, the main problem is the scale
[00:10:44] of production of these drones, and
[00:10:47] insiders, so to speak, Russian military, started talking about the
[00:10:50] fact that the same situation with
[00:10:53] corruption has occurred again.
[00:11:18] his candidacy and his position in these very troops, which, according to
[00:11:22] Putin, are being created again for the nth time. Still in the process, but
[00:11:26] if we go back to this clearly absent parity among
[00:11:29] drones on both sides, the advantage of Ukraine is obvious, we clearly see these
[00:11:32] consequences, these are clear signs of a fuel crisis, these are losses for Walberies,
[00:11:36] which, with a certain amount of audacity, could be called a quasi-state corporation,
[00:11:39] without five minutes to go, well, to what extent does this factor of drone attacks on
[00:11:43] the rear affect decisions in the Kremlin, if we judge these latest decisions on
[00:11:47] reappointments, and is it possible in this situation to assume that this
[00:11:50] clear demonstration of recognizing the problem, well, in one form or another, in which
[00:11:54] Putin, as a rule, can afford it?
[00:11:57] I wouldn't say that, because
[00:12:01] changes of commanders in the Russian army happen
[00:12:03] regularly, as you may have noticed, so to speak, most of the current
[00:12:07] commanders of directions are on average
[00:12:11] 10 years younger or less, right, so to speak,
[00:12:15] so there's enough fresh blood there,
[00:12:18] the question is really about the systemic
[00:12:21] consequences of technological development in war, and here.
[00:12:25] on the one hand, undoubtedly, the consequences of the Ukrainian blockade
[00:12:28] of the Russian rear are felt, the other
[00:12:31] question is that this blockade is not very consistent,
[00:12:35] so that is, on the one hand, the Russian military leadership
[00:12:38] strives to minimize it, in particular, large forces
[00:12:42] were directed to
[00:12:45] escort convoys of trucks in
[00:12:48] the occupied territories, that is, there are many
[00:12:52] of these mobile fire groups, they apparently
[00:12:55] shoot down some drones, as a result of which
[00:12:58] supplies actually recovered in the last, well, about
[00:13:02] a month, less than a month, in the last 3 weeks supplies to the rear generally
[00:13:06] resumed, despite some losses,
[00:13:10] but they are apparently not so significant as to stop all
[00:13:13] this movement, so here
[00:13:16] the situation depends on the actions of both sides, how consistent Ukraine will
[00:13:19] be, how many drones it will
[00:13:22] have, such medium-range ones
[00:13:26] for blocking roads, how
[00:13:29] Russia's leadership
[00:13:31] will develop and, most importantly, will be able to mass-
[00:13:35] produce some
[00:13:37] anti-drone measures, well, apparently,
[00:13:41] judging by the appointment of the commander of the
[00:13:44] unmanned systems forces, this will be
[00:13:48] a more experienced leader than before, including
[00:13:51] a military one, to what extent his management competencies will be enough to...
[00:13:55] to expand this bottleneck
[00:13:58] in the connection of drone manufacturers with
[00:14:01] army drone consumers, I don't know, only time
[00:14:04] will tell, and what do you think, by the way, about Putin's unwillingness to promote this or that chief too much,
[00:14:08] our interlocutor Sergey Shelin sees precisely such a strategy, so to speak, in
[00:14:11] the Kremlin? Well,
[00:14:15] honestly, I don't believe that a general
[00:14:19] capable of being politically competitive with
[00:14:22] Putin can appear in Russia, in
[00:14:25] principle, the entire Soviet, late Soviet,
[00:14:28] post-Soviet political machine
[00:14:32] was aimed at preventing such generals from appearing,
[00:14:34] so here in
[00:14:38] these changes I see more
[00:14:41] a desire to strengthen precisely the military potential,
[00:14:45] to find, as it were, normal, directly promoted
[00:14:49] from the field experienced
[00:14:52] commanders, that is, this is rather a response to...
[00:15:37] occupier Yuri Vaganov, whose appointment was never officially
[00:15:41] announced, but the Z-community actively knew about all this, commented,
[00:15:45] and now even rejoices about it, how it happened,
[00:15:48] where such a nickname came from, we will tell everything in our story:
[00:15:51] Vladimir Putin's reshuffles in the army affected unmanned
[00:15:55] systems troops. From the speech of the Russian president to the generals on August
[00:15:59] 5, it became clear that the new branch of troops, quote, is just
[00:16:03] being formed. Lieutenant General Denis Lyamin, appointed to manage
[00:16:07] drones, formally replaced businessman Yuri Vaganov,
[00:16:10] whose appointment was never officially
[00:16:13] announced. Before the war, Yuri Vaganov, a businessman from
[00:16:16] Elektrostal, had no connection to the army and was engaged in selling
[00:16:20] plumbing, which is why in the so-called Z-blogs he earned
[00:16:23] the nickname "Toilet." The problem is that he is a complete
[00:16:26] scammer who, before the start of the SVO, sold plumbing, which is where
[00:16:30] this nickname came from,
[00:16:33] after which he suddenly became, with the help of certain individuals. removed
[00:16:48] from office. 500 billion plus
[00:16:51] general technological lag from the enemy by a year, plus
[00:16:54] the lives of soldiers. If the rear services need a deputy for
[00:16:57] toilets, then the ministry knows one genius,
[00:17:01] whose call sign starts with G, in this matter I do not
[00:17:04] intend to dispute his competence. The Ministry of Defense launched
[00:17:07] a large-scale campaign to recruit
[00:17:10] drone operators for the new troops. In early
[00:17:13] 2026, advertisements greeted Russians on
[00:17:17] social networks and billboards. The troops invited drone operators,
[00:17:20] students, IT specialists, electronics and
[00:17:23] radio engineering specialists. In March 2026, the publication
[00:17:27] Important Stories, citing Ministry of Defense documents, reported on the department's plans
[00:17:31] to recruit almost 80,000 people for drone troops by
[00:17:34] the end of the year. The recruitment failed. Almost six months
[00:17:38] later, in July, at a meeting of the Ministry of Defense board, they reported on the training
[00:17:41] of a much smaller number of specialists. The trained
[00:17:44] unit is capable of independently performing tasks in individual operational
[00:17:48] and tactical directions. In total, during the past period, about
[00:17:52] 800 specialists were trained. According to the plan, among the 80
[00:17:55] thousand people were supposed to be, among others, students of civilian
[00:17:59] universities. In April, the publication Groza recorded at least
[00:18:02] 269 educational institutions in which students
[00:18:05] were urged to join the UAV troops. Students
[00:18:09] in various regions had their retake deadlines shortened, were threatened with
[00:18:13] academic problems, and were manipulated with expulsion. The Russian
[00:18:17] campaign to recruit for unmanned systems troops has been accompanied by
[00:18:20] several assassination attempts on public drone makers. In late July, in
[00:18:24] Tula, they tried to shoot Andrey Cherizov, head of
[00:18:27] the company Russian Laboratory of Air Transport. The company
[00:18:31] is engaged in the production of Okhotnik drones. Doctors currently assess his
[00:18:34] condition as stable. The commander not only founded the company,
[00:18:38] but also personally designed the first Okhotnik strike drones, then
[00:18:42] personally tested them on the front line, so the small Tula company
[00:18:45] Okhotnik became one of the leading manufacturers of combat
[00:18:49] drones in Russia with a worldwide reputation. On the evening of August 4,
[00:18:52] Vladimir Tkachuk, CEO of Ural-Drone-Zavod, survived an assassination
[00:18:56] attempt. Tkachuk's car was blown up by unknown persons not far
[00:18:59] from Yekaterinburg, his driver died, he himself is in critical
[00:19:03] condition. Vladimir Tkachuk is known for starting to produce
[00:19:06] Upyr drones. They are actively used by Russia on the front,
[00:19:10] his company's revenue for 2025 amounted to
[00:19:13] about 6 billion rubles. Meduza calls him the author of
[00:19:16] the Z-channel "War Obsessed." Tkachuk launched it on VK
[00:19:20] after the start of hostilities in southeastern
[00:19:23] Ukraine. We will continue the topic with military expert Nikolai
[00:19:26] Mitrokhin. Nikolai, well, in the community, estimates of a year of lag are heard,
[00:19:30] how would you assess this lag in drones between Russia and
[00:19:34] Ukraine, how far is this from the truth or vice versa, very close?
[00:19:38] I would say that it is necessary to evaluate by different
[00:19:41] groups of drones, for example, Ukraine
[00:19:45] does not have jet drones or , well, there is no industrial
[00:19:49] production. Russia began producing them, and for
[00:19:53] Ukraine it is a significant problem. As for
[00:19:56] FPV drones, I would say this,
[00:19:59] that it depends
[00:20:02] primarily, probably, on the scale of production in Russia. They are
[00:20:06] smaller, but in terms of technical characteristics they are similar, that is,
[00:20:09] today, for example, I watched Russian drones on
[00:20:13] fiber optics on a video, hunting
[00:20:16] people on the streets of Sumy, for example,
[00:20:19] well, to Sumy, after all, in a straight line to the front line, about 17
[00:20:23] km, taking into account the fact that operators do not
[00:20:26] sit directly on the front line, this means
[00:20:29] that somewhere drones with
[00:20:32] a fishing line, with a fiber optic cable for 25-30
[00:20:35] km -
[00:20:37] are now already terrorizing
[00:20:41] a large regional center, in which normal life is still going on,
[00:20:44] in general, or trying to go on, so
[00:20:48] in this regard, well, in terms of
[00:20:51] production volume, Russia
[00:20:54] is insufficient, in terms of technical characteristics, it is quite
[00:20:57] sufficient, in terms of advanced technologies, there is a
[00:21:00] competition, that is, there
[00:21:03] are systems that are advanced in Ukraine, for example,
[00:21:07] well, as for heavy, heavy drones,
[00:21:11] frontline ones, which perform tasks like
[00:21:13] "baba", Russia has
[00:21:16] a priority in drones like "Molniya", these are...
[00:21:20] let's say, medium-range drones, mainly
[00:21:24] with various technical adaptations for different
[00:21:27] tasks, so it is
[00:21:30] clear that first of all
[00:21:33] the Z-community talks about FPV drones
[00:21:37] and their shortcomings on the front,
[00:21:41] indeed, there are 10 Ukrainian drones for every
[00:21:44] Russian one, and most likely
[00:21:48] Russia will try to solve the problem of
[00:21:51] mass increase in mass production
[00:21:54] of such types of drones, to be honest, it's strange to me that
[00:21:57] Russia cannot do this,
[00:22:00] well, perhaps there are problems with
[00:22:03] equipment supplies, that is, sanctions are working,
[00:22:09] and Russia simply does not have enough equipment for such production, maybe
[00:22:13] the problem is corruption, this is also quite possible,
[00:22:17] this banquet of the
[00:22:20] head of the space forces showed that in
[00:22:23] general, the generals are feasting, and if the generals are feasting, then the money is not going where
[00:22:27] it should, well, thank goodness, let's say, you mentioned these
[00:22:31] videos of attacks on civilians, I want to expand the context a bit, there was information that, firstly, in the Russian army this is called
[00:22:34] human safari, and well,
[00:22:37] and another such very bloody, very bloody episode of this
[00:22:41] war itself, very telling in this context, but if we return
[00:22:45] to what to these realities with what is happening around
[00:22:48] UAV troops. What does the failure to recruit for these
[00:22:52] troops generally say, and maybe according to your information there are some data on
[00:22:55] personnel shortages in these very troops, it is clear that there was a campaign by human rights activists
[00:22:58] warning that contact with the Ministry of Defense does not guarantee
[00:23:02] getting into this branch of troops at all, how effective do you think this turned out to be as
[00:23:06] such an anti-measure, so to speak, for recruitment into the Russian
[00:23:09] army? It is quite difficult to assess how
[00:23:13] such campaigns work at the mass level, well, in
[00:23:16] the village in the city of Revda of the Sverdlovsk region, how much? Do they read, so
[00:23:20] to speak, emigrant human rights websites, I don't think
[00:23:24] very much, but a much greater effect
[00:23:27] was had by real cases, spread
[00:23:31] including in the patriotic Russian press, when
[00:23:34] really experienced drone operators
[00:23:38] were transferred to assault troops, and they died in the first
[00:23:41] attack, this is the case of "Puzik", which has already become
[00:23:45] a meme, and the fact that such "Puziks" did not bear
[00:23:49] any...
[00:24:27] that is, under the guise of specific units that are successful,
[00:24:31] effective, and guarantee indeed to their
[00:24:34] recruited employees, well,
[00:24:37] relative safety by the standards of this profession,
[00:24:39] you can recruit, I think, much
[00:24:42] more people than we would like
[00:24:45] here, so let's see what happens,
[00:24:50] but the appointment, conditionally speaking, of a tank general
[00:24:54] to recruit civilians for such a
[00:24:57] relatively intellectual military specialty, this is not, I think,
[00:25:00] the best choice, but we'll see how
[00:25:04] it goes, well, and separately I want to emphasize what we mentioned in our
[00:25:07] story, two consecutive assassination attempts
[00:25:11] on civilians, but clearly involved
[00:25:14] in the military-industrial complex of Russia, clearly the products
[00:25:18] were either intended for use or were already used at the front. Correct me if
[00:25:22] necessary, but there is a feeling that assassination attempts on those involved in the army
[00:25:25] and military-industrial complex have become wider in the sense that if before it only concerned Russian
[00:25:29] generals, which, by the way, forced them to take at least some additional
[00:25:33] security measures, now it also concerns
[00:25:36] civilian chiefs, to what extent
[00:25:40] does this pose such a task at all for the Russian army, for
[00:25:43] the Russian authorities, I would even say, to strengthen the protection for such
[00:25:46] chiefs,
[00:26:02] even more, so to speak, have survived assassination attempts in various forms, so this is
[00:26:06] nothing new, the other question is that there was a certain
[00:26:09] period, so to speak, from
[00:26:13] last September, rather until this
[00:26:16] spring, when the number of such assassination attempts
[00:26:19] decreased, possibly as a result,
[00:26:22] this became a result of the fact that after the assassinations of large
[00:26:26] generals, lieutenant generals and everything else, Russia conducted
[00:26:30] very... intense bombardments of Kyiv, so to speak, perhaps this also
[00:26:34] had an effect, or maybe the spirit of Anchorage, I don't know, but in any case, now
[00:26:37] indeed, the campaign of assassination attempts has sharply
[00:26:41] intensified. The other question is that these
[00:26:44] so-called DIY masters,
[00:26:47] leaders of relatively small
[00:26:49] projects, are still a relatively easy target for
[00:26:53] assassination attempts, but in
[00:26:56] the drone manufacturing industry,
[00:27:00] other enterprises dominate, in
[00:27:02] particular Alabuga, Kronshtadt, a very large
[00:27:06] complex, Kalashnikov produces its
[00:27:09] drones, and there, apparently, the leaders are better
[00:27:13] protected and it is harder to reach them,
[00:27:16] than these relatively small projects, because
[00:27:20] the same "Upiri" are used by the Dnipro group,
[00:27:23] I didn't see them being used in other areas,
[00:27:27] but in any case, Ukraine knows what it's doing and
[00:27:31] ... less
[00:27:48] likely that the Russian authorities will even think about protecting them, because they are supposed
[00:27:52] to measure risks, but it's not at all clear that they understand what
[00:27:55] this situation is about, and therefore, here the question is,
[00:27:59] the question is about greed, because this is the last
[00:28:03] citizen, with such turnovers, he could have provided himself with professional security with his
[00:28:07] money, if he didn't do that, he is either a very stupid
[00:28:11] person, or very greedy, or both
[00:28:13] together,
[00:28:15] well, and accordingly, I also mentioned today, I will ask very briefly, our
[00:28:19] broadcast time is gradually running out, I mentioned that partially air defense is given to
[00:28:22] private companies, and there was a specific law about it, that one can
[00:28:26] buy equipment, will this tactic continue
[00:28:29] further, or will Russia still have to expand the air defense zone, although... to companies
[00:28:33] that are extremely important for the country,
[00:28:36] Russia's air defense zone at the national
[00:28:39] level is not expanding, it is shrinking, that is,
[00:28:43] Moscow's defense is strengthening, all Pantsir
[00:28:46] installations are being brought there, there are fewer and fewer
[00:28:49] missiles, the percentage of Ukrainian drones breaking through
[00:29:23] The amazing story of Alexander Gabyshev, known as
[00:29:26] Sashaman, who is going from Yakutia to Moscow to
[00:29:29] overthrow the government, what does that mean? It means lightning and the wrath
[00:29:33] of God.
[00:29:36] One, two,
[00:29:38] three,
[00:29:41] I, I am not such a simple person, I am a heavenly person, a heavenly
[00:29:44] warrior, from now on Putin is not your decree, live
[00:29:48] freely, this is the law, please come out, what kind
[00:29:52] of cordon, and why, on what grounds is there
[00:29:54] a cordon here?
[00:30:02] We talked about unique places, unique people, but
[00:30:06] that was before,
[00:30:10] from February 2022, the war changed
[00:30:13] everything, we show the new
[00:30:17] history of Ukraine, about
[00:30:20] the incredible strength of spirit, about the struggle, no matter
[00:30:23] what.
[00:30:28] Watch the joint project of Radio Svoboda and the TV channel Nastoyaschee.
[00:30:32] time, what is really happening in Ukraine.
[00:30:49] Ukraine scales middle strikes, the Ukrainian army
[00:30:52] actively hits the operational rear of the Russian army, under attack
[00:30:56] air defense systems, deployment points.