CURRENTTIME — broadcast
20260806 213000 UTC
240 transcript segments
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[00:00:00] Come on, come on, come on!
[00:00:04] In Ukraine, we always talked about unique places,
[00:00:07] unique people, but that was
[00:00:10] before. Since February
[00:00:13] 2022, everything has been changed
[00:00:16] by the war. We show a new
[00:00:20] history of Ukraine. About
[00:00:23] incredible strength of spirit, about fighting no matter
[00:00:26] what.
[00:00:31] Watch the joint project of Radio Svoboda and the TV channel "Current
[00:00:35] Time" about what is really happening in Ukraine.
[00:00:52] Ukraine is scaling up middle strikes. The Ukrainian army
[00:00:56] is actively hitting the operational rear of the Russian
[00:00:59] army. Under attack are air defense systems,
[00:01:02] deployment points, warehouses, and much more. Today,
[00:01:06] Donbas-Realii will show one of these operations of the first separate
[00:01:10] center of unmanned systems
[00:01:11] SBS.
[00:01:16] A bright flash a drone disappears in
[00:01:19] the night sky. This is beautiful work, the best work in
[00:01:22] the world. FP-2s take off one after another, each carrying
[00:01:26] over 100 kg of explosives. My crew.
[00:02:30] possess knowledge, minimal, at least in electronics, be able to
[00:02:33] solder, be able to simply carry out various minor
[00:02:36] field repairs, and most importantly - be stress-resistant and be
[00:02:40] ready for the fact that this is a service to which you give yourself, and
[00:02:43] you must give yourself completely.
[00:02:56] This is a very large mechanism, planning is a very large mechanism.
[00:04:30] that is, their mobile groups worked directly on us, when we were on
[00:04:34] approach to them, our guys hit the moving
[00:04:37] target without problems, yes, when we were on approach to
[00:04:40] them, and the guys hit the target
[00:04:43] without problems. Considering
[00:04:46] the results of the mid-strike in Ukraine, it was essentially possible to achieve
[00:04:50] the depletion of Russian air defense assets in
[00:04:53] certain areas. At the same time, Russia is trying to counteract
[00:04:57] Ukrainian strikes, particularly on logistics. Attempts are
[00:05:01] being made to patrol routes with anti-aircraft drones, as well as
[00:05:04] to increase the number of mobile fire groups, this is in addition to
[00:05:08] air defense directly near the front line. There is a
[00:05:11] layered defense, which
[00:05:13] is carried out by
[00:05:15] UAV interceptors, sometimes it is more
[00:05:19] successful, sometimes it is less
[00:05:22] successful. The effectiveness of detecting targets in the air
[00:05:25] is achieved by the presence of air control
[00:05:28] radars. These are air space control systems,
[00:05:32] a network of small radars, which are the size of Starlink, and which
[00:05:35] the Russians are deploying in different places, and the more of these
[00:05:38] radars there are, the better their interceptors can shoot down our drones.
[00:05:42] The fewer there are, the harder it is for them to do it. It's a fairly simple
[00:05:46] system, if you explain it like this,
[00:05:48] at some of the echelons, again, in different directions, at
[00:05:52] some of these echelons, classic
[00:05:55] SAMs are also present, such as Buk, Tor, Pantsir, and so on.
[00:05:59] also present are classical SAMs, such as
[00:06:02] Buk, Tor, Pantsir, and so
[00:06:04] on.
[00:06:07] uh, the fundamental difference between SAMs and... The fundamental
[00:06:10] difference between the SAM concept and the interceptor concept is that
[00:06:14] SAMs are much easier to detect by all possible methods,
[00:06:17] and once detected, they are much easier to destroy. Whereas
[00:06:21] interceptors are already a group of people consisting of several servicemen who
[00:06:25] hide in forest plantations, whom it is very difficult to
[00:06:29] detect visually, but again, methods of countering interceptors
[00:06:32] currently exist, they are being applied
[00:06:35] systematically in the main directions, so, as I
[00:06:38] said, thank God we have found an answer to this problem, which was very...
[00:07:22] establishing fire control over Donetsk airport, which the Russian
[00:07:26] army uses as a logistics hub and
[00:07:29] drone port, one of the tasks of this mission was to disrupt the launches
[00:07:33] of Shaheds in coordination with other platforms. We
[00:07:36] understand that if enemy drones
[00:07:40] fly, that... if enemy drones fly at
[00:07:44] a certain interval, and not simultaneously, then it is much easier
[00:07:47] for us to shoot them down, thus carrying out preventive asymmetrical
[00:07:51] fire impact, we disrupt their plans for a coordinated
[00:07:54] attack, and thus, this already facilitates the work of our
[00:07:58] defense force interceptor groups, at least, and at most,
[00:08:02] this generally reduces the enemy's ability to carry out
[00:08:05] operational-strategic defeats, carrying out
[00:08:08] operational-strategic strikes, during the operation, three levels
[00:08:12] of impact were carried out: destruction of launch groups, impact on
[00:08:16] enemy air defense, and strikes on airport infrastructure.
[00:08:19] Ukrainian military note that one should not underestimate
[00:08:23] the psychological effect. Understanding that you are launching these
[00:08:26] drones, and here at the airfield unidentified ones are flying. You understand that
[00:08:30] you are launching these drones, and here at the airfield
[00:08:33] unidentified ones are flying, which no one can shoot down properly, and you do not
[00:08:37] fully know whether they will try to hit you now or
[00:08:41] something else. It is clear that this is a very serious
[00:08:44] psychological impact, which directly affects the quality
[00:08:47] of task execution. In such operations, there are very interesting
[00:08:51] aspects of how the enemy reacts to this, always, when
[00:08:54] there is an opportunity to understand what the reaction was, it is very
[00:08:58] interesting: generalized enemy, we are talking about
[00:09:01] a specific unit, in this case we are not talking about some
[00:09:05] generalized enemy, we are talking about a specific unit, we all
[00:09:09] know that these are the launch units of Rubicon, which...
[00:10:26] the logic of war demands from us, the logic of war
[00:10:29] demands from us, and our situation demands from us that
[00:10:33] the apparatus must be massive, as cheap as possible, and
[00:10:36] simple. The latter requirement is dictated by the rules
[00:10:39] of the army, since we have different people coming from society,
[00:10:43] and the easier the apparatus, the easier it is to train a person, and the
[00:10:47] easier it is to fix a problem in the field, which sometimes
[00:10:49] happens?
[00:11:06] Each of the directions, which can even be divided by corps,
[00:11:10] has its own specificity in terms of targeting, which targets are
[00:11:13] priority, which are not, in terms of effect, you understand that
[00:11:17] if you systematically hit certain targets, such
[00:11:20] and such an effect will be achieved.
[00:11:24] exactly such...
[00:12:26] the conclusion is rather schematic, as not all operations
[00:12:29] are reported publicly, moreover, in this direction, the HUR,
[00:12:33] SBU, and other units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are working.
[00:12:36] However, according to official data, in May, the main
[00:12:39] targets of SBS middle strikes were Russian
[00:12:42] air defense systems, a significant part
[00:12:45] of the strikes were on deployment points and warehouses of the Russian army, among
[00:12:49] the affected targets were also aviation, fleet,
[00:12:52] energy and oil.
[00:13:05] if we start looking at the analytics for target destruction somewhere starting
[00:13:09] from last autumn, we will see that we systematically destroyed
[00:13:13] two targets, these are air defense systems,
[00:13:16] Tunguskas, Tors, Pantsirs, S-300s, S-400s, and
[00:13:19] also radar systems, without which they are simply blind and cannot
[00:13:23] work, radar systems, right? which without them are simply blind
[00:13:27] and cannot work, the paradox is that
[00:13:30] the paradox is that the existing infrastructure allows
[00:13:34] Russians to create up to 10 units in each of these segments
[00:13:37] each month, up to 10 units in total, and
[00:13:41] we eliminated much more, that is, 20, 30, up to
[00:13:45] 40 assets in one month, yes, so 20, 30, up to 40
[00:13:49] assets in one month, when we thus,
[00:13:52] when we thus cleared the way.
[00:15:02] This year, Ukraine has hit about ten of the most interesting enterprises of the Russian defense industry. Therefore, here
[00:15:06] I would say that certain supply chains of some
[00:15:09] components are now broken. Accordingly,
[00:15:13] we need to say now that Russia will now try
[00:15:16] to replace this by bypassing sanctions or by
[00:15:20] assistance from Chinese partners. What we saw is that Belarus
[00:15:23] actively helps the Russian Federation in creating some
[00:15:27] elements for cruise missiles, for
[00:15:29] interceptor missiles, therefore, accordingly, I would say
[00:15:33] that Russia still has opportunities, as there is
[00:15:36] a general...
[00:16:09] In addition to the deficit of interceptor missiles, only
[00:16:12] Ukrainian SBS destroyed or damaged 194 Russian
[00:16:16] air defense assets in half a year. At the same
[00:16:19] time, it is indicative that according to our estimates in June, compared to
[00:16:23] May, the ratio of targets for middle strikes of unmanned
[00:16:26] systems has changed somewhat, if the defeat
[00:16:29] of air defense elements remained virtually at the same level, then
[00:16:33] the number of strikes on energy and gas
[00:16:38] and oil infrastructure has significantly increased. Obviously, this fits into
[00:16:41] the strategy of deep strikes on oil refineries,
[00:16:44] which leads to a fuel crisis in
[00:16:47] Russia.
[00:16:51] New realities,
[00:16:54] gasoline is being drained, like this, this is what
[00:16:58] floats in gas tanks. Don't drive
[00:17:01] people to the brink. Yes, let's go all. Probably, people will also drive
[00:17:04] the service personnel to the brink now. You see. And you see,
[00:17:08] well, what are you, this is the last gasoline, listen,
[00:17:11] the car is new, don't stand with a gun near my car
[00:17:15] like that, I'll fill it up now, I'll douse it now, I'll
[00:17:18] douse it,
[00:17:20] it's possible
[00:17:22] people, damn it, there's gasoline, where the hell
[00:17:26] is your gasoline, what awaits Russia, Russia
[00:17:29] awaits, if this story continues, a very difficult period, what
[00:17:33] awaits Russia, Russia awaits, if this
[00:17:35] story continues.
[00:18:38] which means it can lead to the acceleration of the negotiation process and
[00:18:42] the cessation of hostilities, well, and the cessation of hostilities.
[00:18:45] There is a fourth option, Russia will start trying
[00:18:48] to stretch everything to everyone, well, then they might find themselves in
[00:18:52] a situation that Russian analysts themselves describe as: everything
[00:18:55] will crack for them then, then a completely different
[00:18:59] period awaits Russia, and then a completely different period
[00:19:03] awaits Russia. The authoritative publication Financial
[00:19:06] Times with...
[00:19:37] one must consider the enemy's expended resources, because the conditional
[00:19:41] operation of an air defense system, when Pantsir
[00:19:44] systems, missiles for Pantsir systems or, for example, the same
[00:19:48] S-300, S-400, are used, as there are facts of the use of precisely such
[00:19:51] missiles for our deep strikes, accordingly, this is also a depletion
[00:19:55] of resources. Regarding the quantity announced by
[00:19:58] the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation always lies, which
[00:20:01] means that it will significantly exaggerate the number of aerial
[00:20:04] attack means and report on the effectiveness of its own.
[00:20:37] Russia, for example, used its new Su-57
[00:20:40] aircraft, but this did not help. OSINT analysts,
[00:20:44] based on satellite images, record at
[00:20:47] least three or four hits.
[00:20:51] here our whole factory is burning, 12
[00:20:55] pieces, only one was grounded,
[00:20:58] 11
[00:21:00] hit,
[00:21:03] that's how it is, regarding middle strikes in
[00:21:06] the context of their impact on the situation at the front, then
[00:21:10] here, of course, in addition to the strikes we described, the destruction of Russian
[00:21:14] logistics in the occupied territories plays a big
[00:21:17] role, here is a map from French analyst
[00:21:21] Kliman Molina as of the end of June, using
[00:21:24] open data, he identified about 800 cases
[00:21:28] of damage to Russian transport on key
[00:21:31] highways. In the first week of July, the intensity
[00:21:34] of the company grew from twenty trucks a day in June to
[00:21:38] 34 every day now. These strikes
[00:21:41] are carried out not with FP-2s, which we showed,
[00:21:45] for example, but with Bepol hornet or Darts with a warhead not
[00:21:49] 100, but
[00:22:50] which are very interesting EW assets, by the way, besides that, they have very interesting EW assets
[00:22:53] that, by the way, are produced in temporarily occupied
[00:22:56] Crimea, they allow them to jam Starlink in an area of
[00:23:00] 20-25 km, all this
[00:23:03] will allow them to solve a certain problem on this route, so we still
[00:23:07] have a window of opportunity, somewhere else 3-4 months, there definitely is,
[00:23:11] it will be much worse later, 3-4
[00:23:14] months there definitely are, it will be much worse later, and this is absolutely
[00:23:17] normal, it has always worked like this on...
[00:24:20] army and already creates quite a few problems, especially since
[00:24:23] Russia did not expect such intensity of strikes on its
[00:24:27] territory. However, everything that is happening is a logical
[00:24:31] continuation of the war of attrition for both the army itself and
[00:24:35] economic resources, however, where the limit of this
[00:24:38] attrition is, it is unlikely to be
[00:24:41] predicted now. This was Donbas-Realii, I am Yaroslav
[00:24:44] Krechko, until
[00:24:45] next time.
[00:25:50] It's important to remember that this was actually the first time these systems
[00:25:53] interacted as a single
[00:25:55] whole.
[00:29:34] No measures of coercion, neither physical nor moral,
[00:29:38] should be applied to protected persons, in
[00:29:42] particular, for the purpose of obtaining information from them or from third parties.
[00:30:54] Kamaya 191, please,
[00:30:56] connection.