CURRENTTIME — broadcast
20260807 043000 UTC
254 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
Data courtesy of The GDELT Project (https://www.gdeltproject.org/), from the Internet Archive TV News Archive.
Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:04] In Ukraine, we have always talked about unique places
[00:00:07] and unique people, but that was
[00:00:10] before. Since February
[00:00:14] 2022, the war has changed everything.
[00:00:17] We are showing a new
[00:00:20] history of Ukraine. About
[00:00:23] incredible strength of spirit, about fighting despite
[00:00:26] everything.
[00:00:32] Watch the joint project of Radio Svoboda and the Current Time TV channel,
[00:00:35] what is really happening in Ukraine.
[00:00:52] Ukraine scales up middle strikes, the Ukrainian army
[00:00:56] actively hits the operational rear of the Russian army.
[00:04:00] our equipment, they, just like us, adapt, constantly increase
[00:04:04] the kill zone, increase the number
[00:04:06] of means. Statistics are kept on how many aircraft
[00:04:10] reached the target, specifically for my crews,
[00:04:13] 86%. This is a very, very
[00:04:16] high coefficient. The vehicle itself, it can be
[00:04:18] retrofitted, re-equipped with something, change the warhead, this is a very
[00:04:22] cool platform. Many targets were hit in
[00:04:25] motion, Tor, Buk were hit at the moment when they
[00:04:29] were fleeing.
[00:05:00] attempts are being made to patrol routes with anti-aircraft
[00:05:03] drones, as well as to increase the number of mobile fire
[00:05:07] groups, this is in addition to air defense directly near the front
[00:05:10] line. There is a tiered defense, which
[00:05:13] is carried out.
[00:05:15] There is a tiered defense that is carried out by
[00:05:18] UAV interceptors, sometimes it is more successful, sometimes it is less
[00:05:22] successful. The effectiveness of detecting targets in the air
[00:05:25] is ensured by the presence of
[00:05:28] air traffic control radars. These are air traffic control systems,
[00:05:32] a network of small radars that are the size of Starlink, and which
[00:05:35] the Russians deploy in different places, and the more of these
[00:05:38] radars there are, the better their interceptors can shoot down our drones.
[00:05:42] The fewer there are, the harder it is for them to do it. It's a fairly simple
[00:05:46] system, if you explain it like that, at some echelon,
[00:05:50] again, in different directions, at some of
[00:05:53] these echelons there are also classic air defense systems, such
[00:05:56] as Buk, Tor, Pantsir, and so on. there are also
[00:06:00] classic air defense systems, such as Buk, Tor, Pantsir and so
[00:06:04] on.
[00:06:07] the fundamental difference between air defense systems and
[00:06:10] the fundamental difference in the concept of air defense systems. the concept of interceptors is that
[00:06:14] air defense systems are much easier to detect by all possible methods
[00:06:18] and, once detected, are much easier to destroy. Whereas
[00:06:21] interceptors are a group of people consisting of several servicemen who
[00:06:25] hide in forest plantations, whom it is very difficult to detect
[00:06:29] visually, but again, methods of countering interceptors currently
[00:06:33] exist, they are systematically applied
[00:06:36] in the main directions, so, as I said, thank God, we found
[00:06:40] a solution to this problem that existed. operations
[00:07:12] of the first
[00:07:21] separate center - establishing fire control over Donetsk
[00:07:25] airport, which the Russian army uses as a
[00:07:28] logistics hub and drone port. One of the tasks
[00:07:31] of this mission was to disrupt the launches of Shaheds in coordination with other
[00:07:35] platforms. We understand that
[00:07:38] if enemy UAVs fly
[00:07:41] from the specified. that if enemy UAVs fly at a certain
[00:07:44] interval, and not simultaneously, then it is much easier for us
[00:07:48] to shoot them down, thus carrying out a preventive
[00:07:51] asymmetrical fire impact, we disrupt their plans for a coordinated
[00:07:54] attack, and thus, this already facilitates the work of our
[00:07:58] interceptor groups of the defense forces, at least, and at most,
[00:08:02] this generally reduces the enemy's ability to carry out
[00:08:06] operational-strategic defeats, carrying out
[00:08:09] operational-strategic defeats, during the operation, three levels of impact were carried out:
[00:08:12] destruction of launch groups, impact on enemy air defense and
[00:08:15] strikes on airport infrastructure. Ukrainian military
[00:08:18] note that one should not underestimate the psychological
[00:08:22] effect. Understanding that you are launching these drones,
[00:08:25] unidentified ones are flying around the airfield. You understand that you are launching these drones,
[00:08:29] unidentified ones are flying around the airfield that no one can shoot down
[00:08:32] properly, and you don't know if they
[00:08:35] will try to hit you now or something else.
[00:08:39] Obviously, this is a very serious
[00:08:43] psychological impact that directly affects the quality
[00:08:46] of task execution. In such operations, there are very interesting
[00:08:49] aspects of how the enemy reacts to this. And whenever
[00:08:52] there is an opportunity to understand what the reaction was, it is very
[00:08:56] interesting. Of the generalized enemy, we are talking about
[00:09:00] a specific unit, in this case, we are not talking about some
[00:09:03] generalized enemy. We are talking about a specific unit. We all
[00:09:07] know that these are the launch units of Rubicon, which.
[00:09:10] in the context of the enemy's armed forces is one of the most
[00:09:14] outstanding in terms of UAVs. And we were interested
[00:09:17] to see their reaction. It was interesting again to see
[00:09:21] how quickly they would implement some
[00:09:24] countermeasures.
[00:09:25] контрмеры.
[00:09:32] At the same time, the night launches of FP-2, witnessed by
[00:09:35] Donbas.Realii, are complete. Already in the morning, another result
[00:09:39] of the work of Ukrainian forces will be publicly available.
[00:09:43] any target is important, but of course the most important thing is
[00:09:47] when you hit some target, any target is important, but of course,
[00:09:50] the most important thing is when you hit a target that gives an operational
[00:09:54] or tactical advantage over the enemy, this is, for example,
[00:09:57] hitting enemy communications, hitting some expensive
[00:10:01] air system, or the same hitting of air defense, which
[00:10:05] allows other aircraft to continue working, including
[00:10:08] ours, to hit more and more targets.
[00:10:26] the logic of war requires us, the logic of war
[00:10:30] requires of us, and our situation requires of us that
[00:10:33] the apparatus must be massive, as cheap as possible and
[00:10:36] simple, the last requirement is dictated by the rules
[00:10:39] of the army, since we have different people coming from society,
[00:10:43] and the lighter the apparatus, the easier it is to train a person, and the
[00:10:47] easier it is to fix a problem in the field, which sometimes happens, well,
[00:10:51] sometimes it happens.
[00:11:06] Each of the directions, which can even be divided
[00:11:09] by corps, each of the directions, which can even be divided
[00:11:13] by corps, has its own specifics in terms of targeting, which
[00:11:16] targets are priority, which are not, in terms of effect, you
[00:11:20] understand that if you systematically hit such and such targets,
[00:11:23] it will be carried out precisely.
[00:12:25] pilot systems, the conclusion is rather schematic, as not all
[00:12:29] operations are publicly reported. In addition, the HUR, SBU and other
[00:12:32] units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are working in this direction.
[00:12:36] However, according to official data, in May, the main
[00:12:40] targets of the SBS's mid-strikes were Russian
[00:12:43] air defense assets. A significant part
[00:12:46] of the strikes were on deployment points and warehouses of the Russian army. Among
[00:12:49] the hit targets were also aviation, fleet,
[00:12:52] energy and oil.
[00:13:25] without which they are simply blind and cannot work.
[00:13:28] The paradox is that the existing infrastructure base allows
[00:13:32] Russians to create up to 10 units in each of these segments
[00:13:36] every month. Up to
[00:13:39] ten units in total, and we shot down
[00:13:42] much more, that is, 20-30, 40
[00:13:46] means in one month, so 20-30, 40 means
[00:13:49] in one month. When we thus.
[00:13:51] чином.
[00:15:37] the backbone of production facilities, which is about
[00:15:41] 1,600 enterprises, which are key to
[00:15:45] Russia's ability to continue fighting, but at the same time,
[00:15:48] we should not forget that, in principle, we see a furious shortage, a deficit
[00:15:51] of missiles, and accordingly, statements even among those same
[00:15:55] Russian military bloggers who confirm that
[00:15:59] there is a shortage of missiles, and moreover, Russia is trying
[00:16:02] to use missiles that were decommissioned because
[00:16:06] they were defective.
[00:16:09] In addition to the shortage of interceptor missiles, Ukrainian
[00:16:12] SBS alone destroyed or damaged
[00:16:16] 194 Russian air defense systems in six months. At the same
[00:16:19] time, it is indicative that, according to our calculations, in June, compared to
[00:16:23] May, the ratio of targets for mid-strikes by unmanned
[00:16:26] system forces changed somewhat: if
[00:16:29] the destruction of air defense elements remained practically at the same
[00:16:32] level, then the number of strikes on energy
[00:16:36] and oil infrastructure
[00:16:40] significantly increased. Obviously, this fits into the strategy of deep-strikes on
[00:16:43] oil refineries, which leads to a fuel
[00:16:46] crisis in
[00:16:47] Russia.
[00:16:51] New realities, gasoline is drained,
[00:16:55] that's it, that's what
[00:16:58] melts gas tanks. Don't drive
[00:17:01] people to the edge. Yes, let's go now, probably, people will also
[00:17:04] get to the edge.
[00:17:10] And you look, well, what are you doing, this is the last gasoline, listen, the car is new, don't do that with a pistol near my
[00:17:14] car, I'll fill it up now, if I want, I'll water it, to hell
[00:17:18] with it
[00:17:20] you can,
[00:17:22] people, damn, there is gasoline, where the hell
[00:17:26] is your gasoline, what awaits Russia, Russia awaits, if
[00:17:30] this story continues for a very simple period, what awaits Russia,
[00:17:34] Russia awaits, if this story continues.
[00:17:46] in the harvest, which begins in late July, early August, they will
[00:17:50] face a dilemma: these remaining gasoline and diesel, what to do with them,
[00:17:53] for
[00:17:56] that, or give them to the army in order to carry out further
[00:17:59] offensive actions, if they are not given, then
[00:18:03] where should they be given, for harvest or given to people for
[00:18:06] gasoline.
[00:19:07] reported that US intelligence services are helping
[00:19:11] Ukraine to lay out routes and bypass Russian air defenses
[00:19:14] to strike oil refineries. The publication writes
[00:19:17] about a significant increase in the number of attacks and cites data
[00:19:20] from the Russian Ministry of Defense that in June, Russia shot down almost
[00:19:24] 18,000 Ukrainian UAVs, three times more
[00:19:28] than in February. When we count, for example, when we count,
[00:19:32] for example, the number of air attack assets, we should not count only
[00:19:35] hit objects.
[00:20:07] its air defense. At the same time, it must be said that in reality we are significantly
[00:20:11] increasing our capabilities to strike at enemy territory, but this
[00:20:15] is more about the technical characteristics of the means, because
[00:20:18] the recent hits in Omsk show that we have significantly increased
[00:20:22] the distance at which we can
[00:20:24] operate.
[00:20:27] The Omsk oil refinery, located at a distance of more than
[00:20:29] 2,500 km from Ukraine, has become the most
[00:20:33] distant target of Ukrainian UAVs so far. For repelling.
[00:20:37] Russia, for example, deployed its new Su-57
[00:20:40] aircraft, but this did not help. OSINT analysts,
[00:20:44] based on satellite images, record at
[00:20:47] least three or four hits.
[00:20:51] here's our whole factory is burning,
[00:20:55] 12 pieces, only one
[00:20:58] was shot down, 11
[00:21:00] hit,
[00:21:03] so, as for mid-strikes in
[00:21:06] the context of their impact on the situation at the front, then
[00:21:10] here, of course, in addition to the strikes we described, the destruction of Russian
[00:21:14] logistics in the occupied territories plays a large
[00:21:17] role. Here is a map from French analyst
[00:21:21] Clément Molin as of the end of June, using
[00:21:24] open data, he identified about 800 cases
[00:21:28] of damage to Russian transport on key
[00:21:31] roads. In the first week of July,
[00:21:33] the intensity of the campaign increased from 20 trucks a
[00:21:37] day in June to 34 every
[00:21:40] day now. These strikes are not carried out using
[00:21:43] FP-2s, which we showed, for example, but using Hornet
[00:21:47] or Darts UAVs with a warhead not of 100 kg, but about 5
[00:21:50] kg, they are cheaper and accordingly, more
[00:21:54] massive. In general, Clément Molin notes that the Ukrainian
[00:21:57] mid-strike campaign is focused on railway
[00:22:01] infrastructure, bridges and the isolation
[00:22:04] of Crimea. Strategic impact, this will not have yet.
[00:22:08] Strategic impact, this will not have yet. It
[00:22:11] has an operational impact, specifically for the southern
[00:22:14] grouping. Moreover, the Russians, whoever they are, are not
[00:22:17] idiots. We can blame them.
[00:22:50] they have very interesting electronic warfare equipment, by the way, in addition, they have very interesting
[00:22:53] electronic warfare equipment, which, by the way, is manufactured in temporarily occupied
[00:22:56] Crimea, they allow to jam Starlink in a square of
[00:23:00] 20-25 km, this will all
[00:23:03] allow them to solve a certain problem along this route, so we
[00:23:07] have a window of opportunity, another 3-4 months, for sure,
[00:23:11] then it will be much worse, three or four
[00:23:14] months for sure, then it will be much worse, and this is absolutely normal, it
[00:23:18] has always happened.
[00:23:21] this is absolutely normal, it has always happened in war, we invented
[00:23:24] the sword, they invented the shield of new technology, we invented
[00:23:28] another technology, so the chase, so to speak,
[00:23:31] began, for now we are ahead, let's talk about it in
[00:23:35] 4 months, the main thing is that we also do not stop at this and
[00:23:39] involve new means for striking,
[00:23:42] means for inflicting
[00:23:43] strikes.
[00:24:20] the Russian army and is already creating quite a few problems, especially since
[00:24:23] Russia did not expect such an intensity of strikes on its
[00:24:27] territory. However, everything that is happening is a logical
[00:24:31] continuation of the war of attrition, both of the army itself and of
[00:24:35] economic resources, however, where the limit of this
[00:24:38] attrition is, it is hardly possible to
[00:24:41] predict now. These were Donbas.Realii. I am Yaroslav
[00:24:45] Krechko, see
[00:24:46] you.
[00:29:35] Women will be specially protected from all attempts
[00:29:38] against their honor, in particular from rape, forced
[00:29:42] prostitution or any other indecent assaults.