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20260807 190000 UTC
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[00:00:30] Good afternoon, this is Radio Svoboda, you are watching the Present Time TV channel,
[00:00:34] this is the Archeology program, in the studio Sergey
[00:00:36] Medvedev. 86 years ago, in the summer
[00:00:40] of 1940, the USSR occupied and then
[00:00:43] annexed the three Baltic countries. Since then, they
[00:00:46] have regained their independence, strengthened their sovereignty, and joined the
[00:00:50] EU and NATO. However, today Moscow is again threatening these
[00:00:53] countries. Is a new Russian
[00:00:56] attack possible? What is the position of the Russian-speaking residents of the Baltics?
[00:01:00] And what is the future of small countries in the era of global wars?
[00:01:04] We will talk about this in our program today in Anton
[00:01:07] Sergienko's report.
[00:01:11] In the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union annexed
[00:01:15] Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Half a century later, these
[00:01:18] countries regained independence, joined NATO and the European
[00:01:21] Union, becoming an important part of the Western security
[00:01:24] system. But after the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, the Baltic
[00:01:28] countries once again found themselves at the center of discussions about a possible Russian
[00:01:32] threat. Today, Moscow regularly accuses the Baltic countries of
[00:01:35] Russophobia and militarization. And
[00:01:38] Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are actively strengthening their borders,
[00:01:41] increasing military spending, and hosting additional
[00:01:45] NATO forces on their territory. Most analysts believe that
[00:01:49] a direct Russian attack on a member country of the alliance
[00:01:52] would mean the risk of war with the entire bloc or with the so-called
[00:01:56] coalition of the willing, which makes such a scenario extremely dangerous.
[00:02:08] The issue of security is not an abstract topic, but the basis of
[00:02:12] state policy. Today, the future of the Baltic countries depends not
[00:02:15] only on their own decisions, but also on the outcome of Russia's war
[00:02:19] against Ukraine, and with it the entire architecture of European
[00:02:23] security.
[00:02:27] That was a report by Anton Sergienko. Joining us via
[00:02:30] Zoom is political scientist and former Minister of
[00:02:34] Defense of Latvia from 2023-2026, and
[00:02:37] now a member of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, Andris
[00:02:50] of Minister of Defense, did you feel a growing
[00:02:54] threat of attack from Russia and how is this
[00:02:57] perceived in Latvia today?
[00:03:01] Russia has always posed a constant threat,
[00:03:05] a constant danger. After 2022, after the
[00:03:09] aggression against Ukraine, Russia became the main threat to
[00:03:12] its neighbors, including Latvia. Therefore, of course,
[00:03:16] there was no time to think in terms of fear, about what could
[00:03:20] happen if we were not ready. So, of course,
[00:03:23] the most important task was to prepare together with our NATO and EU
[00:03:27] allies, but at the same time we had to.
[00:06:23] That is why the airspace is not completely closed, units are deployed
[00:06:27] at the border, however, there are certain
[00:06:30] restrictions. Drone incidents serve
[00:06:33] as another reminder of the importance of continuously working on
[00:06:37] the development of technologies, both of the drones themselves and of the means
[00:06:40] to counter them.
[00:09:12] However, the most important thing is the presence of NATO troops and equipment,
[00:09:16] as well as the existence of plans that allow for the rapid deployment
[00:09:19] of additional forces from other countries. This is about creating
[00:09:23] a holistic defense architecture, from battalions of brigades to divisions and
[00:09:26] corps. This is precisely what is crucial, and this
[00:09:30] work is currently underway. Regional defense plans are quite
[00:09:34] feasible and implementable, but of course, at the heart of it all lies the main
[00:09:38] principle: security guarantees must always be in effect, and confidence
[00:09:42] in them -
[00:10:31] There are different levels here. On the one hand, NATO is an alliance of thirty-
[00:10:35] two states where Article five on mutual support in case of
[00:10:39] aggression applies. This is the most important basis of the alliance and the defense
[00:10:42] system, including for Latvia. At the same time,
[00:10:45] there are also countries in the region that share similar views. You
[00:10:48] mentioned the Nordic countries: the Baltics, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands,
[00:10:52] the United Kingdom, and also Canada, the country leading the brigade
[00:10:56] here in Latvia. Therefore, regional rapprochement
[00:10:59] and joint activities in the region, including with the participation of
[00:11:03] Ukraine, should certainly be encouraged and supported. Ukraine has
[00:11:06] extremely important experience, knowledge, and fighters who have gone through
[00:11:09] real battles. That is why, while serving as minister, I
[00:11:13] firmly believe in the need for active cooperation with the Ukrainian
[00:11:16] side. We need to learn from their experience in countering
[00:11:19] drones, and also to master and implement technologies and
[00:11:22] the culture of their use. states,
[00:11:34] but we supplement
[00:11:37] it with various regional initiatives and cooperation
[00:11:39] formats, including, as you noted, with the participation of
[00:11:43] Ukraine, for example, within the framework of the activities
[00:11:46] of the Joint Expeditionary Force,
[00:11:49] led by the United Kingdom. For us, this is an opportunity to expand the existing
[00:11:52] format.
[00:11:58] Do you think Ukraine should be given the opportunity
[00:12:01] for early accession
[00:12:03] to NATO?
[00:12:07] I am personally convinced, and this conviction is firmly shared here in Latvia,
[00:12:11] that Ukraine should become the thirty-third member of NATO, and as soon as
[00:12:14] possible. At the same time, we respect the formula adopted at
[00:12:18] the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023.
[00:12:21] Ukraine will become a member of the alliance when the allies reach an agreement
[00:12:25] and circumstances allow. At the moment, there is no agreement among all
[00:12:28] participants.
[00:12:29] no.
[00:12:33] Do you think it is possible to overcome such regional and
[00:12:37] pan-European differences between NATO members, because,
[00:12:41] as I already mentioned, on the one hand we see the eastern and northern
[00:12:44] flanks, and on the other hand, the Mediterranean flank.
[00:12:48] Is it possible to establish mutual understanding between
[00:12:51] the Mediterranean and northern flanks of NATO?
[00:12:56] In general, yes, the approach that provides for the protection of every member
[00:12:59] of the alliance, every inch of NATO territory, the so-called
[00:13:03] 360° approach, is a completely obvious
[00:13:06] thing. This principle is clearly enshrined in NATO's strategic concept
[00:13:10] and is consistently reflected in the final declarations of all
[00:13:13] alliance summits. Russia poses the main threat to
[00:13:17] NATO allies and partners. At the same time, discussions are undoubtedly
[00:13:20] taking place within the alliance, which are not always
[00:13:24] smooth. And sometimes they are quite difficult. It is known that there have been
[00:13:28] disagreements between Greece and Turkey for several
[00:13:31] decades. Therefore, of course, one cannot ignore the complexity
[00:13:34] of the union's structure, which unites 32
[00:13:37] states. But still, I am convinced that the common goal is to create
[00:13:41] NATO 3.0, as it is sometimes called, including in the context
[00:13:44] of increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP.
[00:13:47] It is to make the alliance more combat-ready
[00:13:51] and resilient. In addition, now is the best time for...
[00:14:56] I would not like to go into details, as regional plans are not
[00:14:59] public documents, however, the very fact
[00:15:02] of their existence confirms that NATO develops such plans taking into
[00:15:05] account various scenarios. In addition,
[00:15:08] Latvia has its own national defense plan, which provides
[00:15:12] for specific procedures in case of the implementation of certain
[00:15:15] scenarios. I repeat, the most rigid
[00:15:19] scenario would be a full-scale invasion of the Baltic countries.
[00:15:22] The minimum we are already facing is hybrid threats,
[00:15:26] they are constantly present. That is
[00:15:29] why there are various plans to respond to different
[00:15:31] scenarios. We must be ready for all the options
[00:15:35] you mentioned. whether it's Suwalki, Daugavpils
[00:15:39] or Narva. Of course, these are critically important and risky
[00:15:43] directions that must be taken into account. I want to emphasize
[00:15:46] once again: Narva, Daugavpils, Suwalki, and
[00:15:49] other similar places, this is not just Latvia or Estonia,
[00:15:53] this is NATO territory. The situation is different from
[00:15:56] Ukraine, despite all the difficulties Russia is facing in
[00:16:00] Ukraine, it is Ukraine that is fighting Russia with the support of NATO,
[00:16:03] the European Union, and Latvia. In the case of Latvia, any. mines,
[00:17:23] so now we can use them legally.
[00:17:27] Five states, Finland, three Baltic countries and Poland, withdrew
[00:17:31] from the Ottawa Convention, because we are convinced that to protect our
[00:17:35] citizens, everything possible must be done. "We must have
[00:17:38] all the necessary means in case one of those negative
[00:17:42] scenarios is realized, which we must take into account and prepare
[00:17:46] for. Preparation for defense serves as a deterrent,
[00:17:48] the aggressor will simply break his teeth if he really
[00:17:52] decides on any actions. That is why
[00:17:55] it is so important not only to build defensive lines on the ground,
[00:17:58] but also, as you already mentioned, to ensure air defense
[00:18:01] in the airspace. The creation of air defense
[00:18:04] systems is one of the top priorities for.
[00:19:37] danger, says military expert Yuri
[00:19:40] Fedorov.
[00:19:44] Yes, as long as the war is going on in Ukraine, no
[00:19:47] war, well, at least a war of the classical type, and even
[00:19:50] a neo-classical one, that is, with widespread
[00:19:54] use of drones and so
[00:19:57] on, simply cannot happen, there will not be enough
[00:20:01] forces, there will not be enough capabilities, including
[00:20:04] material capabilities, maybe there will be enough people.
[00:20:07] But there will hardly be enough iron. Another
[00:20:11] question is that in the conditions of the war with Ukraine,
[00:20:14] Russia may resort to a number of
[00:20:18] hybrid actions, well, for example, constant
[00:20:21] threats, all sorts of attempts at
[00:20:25] political destabilization,
[00:20:29] such demonstrative semi-strikes,
[00:20:32] incomplete strikes with the help of or
[00:20:36] by means of missiles or
[00:20:39] drones, well, for example, what happened in
[00:20:42] Poland, you see, a missile flies,
[00:20:45] right, it didn't kill anyone, it didn't damage anything.
[00:20:49] nothing.
[00:21:20] level of full-scale
[00:21:23] war, that's what I would say, so to speak, if we talk
[00:21:27] about attempts at internal political destabilization
[00:21:31] using all sorts
[00:21:33] of proxy groups, but this is most likely, if we talk
[00:21:37] about Estonia, Narva and some adjacent
[00:21:41] areas, but at the same time, we need to understand
[00:21:45] that the authorities in Estonia, as I understand, well, I
[00:21:49] hope that they are ready to
[00:21:52] suppress, and quite decisively, any
[00:21:55] attempts at destabilization, well,
[00:21:58] something like what happened in
[00:22:02] Donbas or in Donbas in 2014-2015.
[00:22:05] In Latvia, this is most likely
[00:22:09] the Daugavpils region, there is indeed
[00:22:13] a demographic situation there, rather
[00:22:16] with a predominance, well, I can't say a predominance, but with... with
[00:22:20] a large percentage
[00:22:23] of ethnic Russian minority,
[00:22:26] but again, it very much depends on how
[00:22:29] local authorities will react,
[00:22:33] the same Suwalki corridor, but you see, it's even more complicated here, because
[00:22:37] in order to try,
[00:22:41] then in some way
[00:22:43] to seize this corridor, you need, you need
[00:22:46] Minsk's consent, you need Belarus's consent.
[00:23:23] That was Yuri Fedorov in the report of our correspondent Anton
[00:23:26] Sergienko. And joining us via Zoom is political scientist,
[00:23:29] professor at the University of
[00:23:38] of Narva, Narva Ivangorod, Narva
[00:23:41] fortress, that very Narva bridge, which,
[00:23:45] our acquaintance journalist Arkady
[00:23:48] Babchenko advises to destroy, right, to
[00:23:52] separate Russia from Estonia. I know that you have spent a lot of
[00:23:55] time in Narva and have been to this city many times, I want to
[00:23:59] ask you, as a person who knows the situation on the ground,
[00:24:02] how much of a conflict point is this really? All these talks about the Narva
[00:24:06] Republic, about the Narva Russians, about all this
[00:24:09] Eastern Estonia? I am afraid that I will not be able to answer this
[00:24:13] question briefly, but I will start by saying that this is a very polemical
[00:24:16] topic. And
[00:24:20] I think that if we look a little
[00:24:23] deeper into modern history,
[00:24:27] then this conflict tension began not in 2022,
[00:24:31] but much earlier, because
[00:24:34] if we look, for example, at the annual reports of the Estonian security police
[00:24:37] KaPo, it was also obvious from the late 1990s
[00:24:41] that Russia is perceived, unlike most other
[00:24:44] European countries, in Estonia, not so much as a partner or just
[00:24:48] a neighbor, but rather...
[00:25:50] that such discussions are inappropriate
[00:25:53] in this context, and moreover, they play into the hands
[00:25:57] of Kremlin propaganda, I say this to show
[00:26:00] that even between allies... I mean Ukraine and Estonia,
[00:26:04] there is a different perception of
[00:26:07] the issue we are discussing
[00:26:09] now. What is this first logic based on, that
[00:26:13] in fact there are some
[00:26:15] analogies, some parallels, one needs to be very careful about them, I think
[00:26:19] that there are several factors of Estonia's
[00:26:21] vulnerability, many of them are of a, shall we say, global,
[00:26:25] structural nature, well, for example, now
[00:26:28] it is becoming completely obvious that aggression.
[00:27:32] only with the partnership of Finnish
[00:27:34] colleagues, well, that's from the point of view of, so to speak, hard
[00:27:38] security, this hardvera, from the point of view of
[00:27:41] software, to what extent is
[00:27:44] the soil in the very east of Narva,
[00:27:48] Kohtla-Järve, Narva,
[00:27:52] to what extent can this be compared with the situation in Donbas and
[00:27:54] the population, say, exposed to Russian
[00:27:58] propaganda, to what extent are they ready for such a...
[00:28:01] not very big, I'll explain why I'm talking about the distance, because there are several such
[00:29:24] polarizing points
[00:29:27] each year that provide
[00:29:30] fertile ground for discussion on this topic, of course, May
[00:29:34] 9th is the most famous of them,
[00:29:38] I was in Narva this May
[00:29:41] 9th, and I saw what
[00:29:45] the phenomenon I call sound
[00:29:48] aggression means, you can call it some kind of visual diplomacy, in
[00:29:52] quotes, musical diplomacy, but it is actually
[00:29:55] a special operation
[00:29:59] for uh for...
[00:30:32] noted May 9 as Victory Day, and
[00:30:36] quantitatively, the number of people who came to the shore
[00:30:40] to watch what was
[00:30:43] happening at this so-called patriotic concert in
[00:30:46] Ivangorod was, in my observation, still
[00:30:50] more than the number
[00:30:53] of people celebrating May 9 as Europe Day, and this
[00:30:56] is certainly a factor that acts regularly, this is not the first.