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20260920 043000 UTC
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[00:00:00] other factions, for example, the Liberal Democratic Party in 2026,
[00:00:03] announced a mass nomination of candidates with the status
[00:00:07] of "Special Military Operation". The authorities need elections, but do the voters themselves
[00:00:10] need them? This is a report by a correspondent for Radio
[00:00:13] Svoboda.
[00:00:20] Every 5 years in Russia, parliamentary elections are held, and
[00:00:23] the results are always the same. This is already a custom.
[00:00:27] A tradition, I would say, a ritual.
[00:00:31] It seems that Russians are already tired of this movie. In 2026,
[00:00:35] half of those surveyed in VTsIOM don't even know when
[00:00:38] they will go to the elections. At the same time, the outcome of these elections is already known
[00:00:41] to almost everyone. 75% in the same
[00:00:44] VTsIOM poll expect that United Russia will win,
[00:00:48] although the mood in the banned social networks regarding the current
[00:00:52] and future leaders is unambiguous. Look at what they
[00:00:56] are doing, my hands are itching.
[00:01:00] to tear down that poster, in Russia, everyone has long
[00:01:03] only worried about their own asses, no one for
[00:01:07] our people, especially not our
[00:01:10] deputies do not care about their
[00:01:13] people, ass-holes. However,
[00:01:16] some things can be learned from search queries. According to Yandex
[00:01:20] Wordstat, Russians in September, on the eve of the elections, were concerned about three
[00:01:23] issues to roughly the same extent:
[00:01:26] mobilization, elections, plantings. Although, regarding
[00:01:30] plantings in the garden. Mobilization was searched 2
[00:01:33] million times, planting - 2.2 million, elections
[00:01:36] a little over 2.5 million. Everything is a little
[00:01:39] more complicated, because we have a
[00:01:43] state policy aimed at what is called
[00:01:47] "drying up turnout," that is, making sure that
[00:01:50] people who don't like something don't come to the election. At the same time, I
[00:01:54] mean they, the Russian authorities, mobilize those who are under
[00:01:58] their control. This is...
[00:02:30] candidates, when there is no one special to choose from, this reduces
[00:02:33] motivation. As for the polls in
[00:02:36] VTsIOM, FOM, or Levada Center. And here too there is something to
[00:02:40] be surprised about. VTsIOM assures that 54% of Russians
[00:02:44] will definitely go. More than half have already decided who they will
[00:02:47] vote for. But the Levada Center, which is recognized as a foreign agent
[00:02:51] in Russia, but is more trusted, paints a different
[00:02:54] picture. Only a third of those surveyed
[00:02:57] are aware of the election date, and willing to
[00:03:00] 25% don't plan to go at all, and
[00:03:03] 20% haven't decided at all. That is, according to some figures,
[00:03:07] Russians are eagerly rushing to the polls, and according to others,
[00:03:10] half the country doesn't even know that these polls are opening. To
[00:03:14] clarify, you can refer to public polls on
[00:03:17] the streets. Which party will you vote for in the elections? For no party, for
[00:03:21] that guy, we won't say. I'm for no one. United
[00:03:24] Russia. I'm for none. I don't vote anymore and I don't need to vote, I
[00:03:28] don't want to.
[00:03:42] still nothing will happen our way. Yabloko was not allowed, everyone was removed, there is no one to vote for, and it is sad, at the moment it seems to me that we are all in a rather depressive
[00:03:45] state and to expect some change
[00:03:48] by democratic means
[00:03:52] is not worth it. Well, in general, as practice shows, elections
[00:03:55] bring nothing, change nothing. Well, honestly, I wasn't going
[00:03:59] to go, I don't see the point. I think
[00:04:02] some general fatigue is affecting it. In
[00:04:05] general, few people believe that anything
[00:04:08] will change. After a too bright election
[00:04:11] campaign by the Yabloko party on social networks and the loud
[00:04:15] elimination of candidates, an Instagram
[00:04:18] gloom set in. There's no one left to vote for.
[00:04:21] Well, for example, I can choose the communists, simply
[00:04:25] because there's nothing else left. That is, it's like
[00:04:29] an alternative.
[00:05:03] What about citizens, even candidates don't come to
[00:05:07] debates. In the region, absolutely
[00:05:11] no one showed up for the debates. The Russia-1 studio was empty
[00:05:14] for 2 days in a row, and the presenter
[00:05:18] said goodbye to the viewers right after the opening
[00:05:21] remarks. Candidates did not appear in our studio,
[00:05:25] so I say goodbye to you. Next on air is an agitation
[00:05:28] block and thematic broadcasting. The debates were ignored
[00:05:31] by 11 incumbent governors, that is,
[00:05:35] these are precisely those whose fate will be decided on September 20.
[00:05:38] And the candidate from the Direct Democracy party, the only
[00:05:42] one who actually came to the studio. He answered the question about supporting large families
[00:05:46] in 25 seconds, then
[00:05:49] looked silently into the camera for half a minute, admitting that he had nothing more to say.
[00:05:53] Pasha, what if something comes to mind? No, nothing else will come to mind.
[00:06:17] If you start talking about the specifics, about gasoline,
[00:06:20] prices, lack of medicine and products, you might not just
[00:06:24] drop out of the election race, but go to prison for 10 years. Therefore,
[00:06:28] all substantive debates in the country, it seems,
[00:06:31] remain in the kitchen. But there are also those who are waiting for
[00:06:35] a miracle from the elections. For example, according to some Russians, gasoline
[00:06:38] disappeared specifically so that on the eve of the vote
[00:06:41] it would reappear: the savior returned fuel to gas stations and
[00:06:45] gained grateful voters. If you think that
[00:06:48] there is no gasoline at gas stations, then you are greatly mistaken.
[00:06:52] Now I will tell you why, and I will also tell you when gasoline will appear. When
[00:06:55] there are such queues, well, just think about it, if a person stands in line for
[00:06:58] 10-15-20 hours to fill up his car, he
[00:07:02] is irritated, he is angry at this whole situation.
[00:07:06] Then some report
[00:07:08] appears on the news about
[00:07:10] someone on TV saying that now we will punish
[00:07:14] everyone, oh-oh-oh, now we will punish everyone and gasoline will be everywhere,
[00:07:17] oh miracle, by the eighteenth, by
[00:07:21] the elections, gasoline will be at all gas stations.
[00:07:24] Let's discuss the meaninglessness and ruthlessness
[00:07:27] of the Russian electoral process with Stanislav
[00:07:30] Belkovsky. Good afternoon, Stanislav.
[00:07:33] Hello. What task is the Kremlin solving
[00:07:36] with these Duma elections?
[00:07:40] The Kremlin is solving several priority tasks. First, maintaining the ritual
[00:07:44] of power, since observing the ritual of power is
[00:07:47] an integral part of the stability of the entire power mechanism and
[00:07:51] organism. There is no need to cancel
[00:07:54] elections, as they always give the Kremlin the desired result. And
[00:07:58] Vladimir Putin is a deeply conservative inductivist, solving
[00:08:01] pragmatic tasks. From a pragmatic point of view, any
[00:08:04] encroachment on the already established election mechanism is
[00:08:07] counterproductive. Why, if the result is known
[00:08:11] to the Kremlin in advance and the elections.
[00:08:43] No, a fire is not scary to the dead. Elections are a pure
[00:08:46] fake. In any case, whether Yabloko participates in them or not, the scenario with
[00:08:50] Yabloko generally corresponds to what President Putin's administration has always
[00:08:54] done, roughly since 2007,
[00:08:57] when the political system of modern Russia became more or less
[00:09:00] Putin's and got rid of some excessive
[00:09:03] features of the previous historical period. The Kremlin
[00:09:07] always first creates some kind of buzz, that is,
[00:09:10] the illusion of competitiveness and that... something unpredictable participates
[00:09:14] in the elections. Fair Russia 2007, which was
[00:09:17] initially perceived as a real alternative to United Russia,
[00:09:21] was later deprived of such status during the election
[00:09:24] campaign itself. Mikhail Prokhorov, with his Right Cause, who was also removed from
[00:09:28] the elections in 2011, presidential candidate from
[00:09:31] the Communists Pavel Grudinin in 2017-18,
[00:09:34] who unexpectedly interested the electorate more
[00:09:37] than the traditional candidate from this party Gennady
[00:09:40] Zyuganov, and in all cases the Kremlin... backed down, realizing that
[00:09:44] the commotion was risky, it carried the threat that
[00:09:47] the result could not be fully controlled. The same happened with Yabloko
[00:09:51] this year. The Kremlin initially calculated that
[00:09:55] Yabloko would get its 1%, and thereby it would be shown
[00:09:58] how many people in Russia are against the war. In addition, the calculation
[00:10:02] was that all opposition members, including relocatees, would, of course,
[00:10:05] quarrel among themselves and not support Yabloko. It turned out
[00:10:09] somewhat the opposite. It turned out that all opposition members supported Yabloko, despite...
[00:10:13] the sharp contradictions within their circle, and the number of people wanting
[00:10:17] to vote not for Yabloko, but in the person of Yabloko against the war,
[00:10:20] is immeasurably more than 1%. At this moment, as before, in such
[00:10:24] situations, the Kremlin decided to backtrack and remove
[00:10:27] Yabloko from the elections. If the composition of the future Duma is largely
[00:10:30] predictable, why bother spending tens of billions
[00:10:34] of rubles on these elections? What does the Kremlin buy with this
[00:10:37] money? With this money, the Kremlin buys the observance
[00:10:41] of the ritual of power, which is a necessary part
[00:10:44] of the stability of this power. Of course, everything in life costs money,
[00:10:47] including the ritual of power. Well, the inauguration
[00:10:51] of the president costs money, you don't refuse it just because it's expensive.
[00:11:05] deputies, as it was in the USSR. Let me remind you that voters were offered a single list
[00:11:09] of candidates, approved by party bodies, and there was always
[00:11:12] exactly one candidate for one
[00:11:15] place on the ballot. Putin gives the opportunity
[00:11:19] to assert that his political system corresponds to
[00:11:22] the main democratic criteria of modernity.
[00:11:55] there is a full-fledged, full-blooded electoral democracy, and the fact that
[00:11:58] Putin is always ready to pass off the formal as the factual, for him
[00:12:02] follows in this sense Lenin's principle: correct in form, but
[00:12:05] in essence mockery, this we have known since the very beginning of his rule. Is this
[00:12:09] facade needed for the West, or for
[00:12:11] whom? It is needed in general, because there are general
[00:12:15] principles for building the legitimacy of this
[00:12:18] apophatic totalitarianism, and these
[00:12:21] principles include the formal holding of elections and the formation.
[00:12:55] just slightly corrected the old Yeltsin system and nothing more. Therefore,
[00:12:58] he does not destroy the established mechanisms of power, he simply
[00:13:01] emasculates their content, but he absolutely does not need
[00:13:05] to change them purely formally, because for himself and for, that
[00:13:08] is, in the universe in which he lives, where the formal is more important
[00:13:12] than the factual, it is very important that all the formal principles of building this
[00:13:15] electoral system are observed. Who
[00:13:18] will be replaced by war participants in the new Duma, who will be left
[00:13:22] out of parliament?
[00:13:25] I think that all five parties that are represented in the State Duma will remain. Only Fair
[00:13:29] Russia is balancing on the brink now, which objectively
[00:13:32] the Kremlin does not really need. It has outlived its usefulness and done its job. The other
[00:13:36] thing is that Putin loves stability, so maybe only for this reason he will still
[00:13:40] mercifully allow the SR and its outdated leader
[00:13:43] Mironov to remain there. As for the New People, it is clear why they are needed. This is
[00:13:47] a liberal facade, as we discussed, without which it is
[00:13:50] impossible – in relations with the West first and foremost, and also
[00:13:53] giving hope to the next...
[00:14:00] Somewhere in power, well- disguised
[00:14:03] liberals will be sitting there until then. War
[00:14:06] participants will not occupy any decisive positions either in this Duma, or even
[00:14:10] in power in general. Yes, of course, as a severance package, veterans of the so-called
[00:14:14] special military operation will be given a certain number of posts,
[00:14:18] but Vladimir Putin will not give them any real
[00:14:21] power. He is generally afraid of them, afraid of them as people
[00:14:25] with post-traumatic stress disorder, who know how to
[00:14:28] kill. He does not want a repeat of any Afghan syndrome and
[00:14:31] self-organization of war participants according to the principle of Afghan
[00:14:35] veterans. Therefore, he will rather additionally control
[00:14:37] and restrict them. Zhirinovsky repeatedly proposed an elective
[00:14:41] monarchy. The people, represented by the State Council, choose the ruler, who
[00:14:45] then appoints the rest himself. Why has Putin not yet followed
[00:14:48] this path? Well, Vladimir Vreovich had many
[00:14:52] eccentric ideas, not at all counting on their implementation.
[00:14:55] And Putin did not go for it, because it is pragmatically
[00:14:58] completely unnecessary. The currently existing system of fake
[00:15:02] democracy absolutely works for him and confirms his
[00:15:05] legitimacy, both within the country and on an international scale. Why change
[00:15:08] it? We know that theoretically Putin
[00:15:11] can lead Russia until 2036. Will he
[00:15:15] follow the path of succession, what do you think? This
[00:15:19] apophatic totalitarianism system that he built does not imply
[00:15:23] succession in principle.
[00:15:25] Because it informally operates under the slogan, expressed, however,
[00:15:29] formally too, no Putin, no Russia, therefore succession
[00:15:32] cannot even be discussed. The monarch
[00:15:35] is absolutely without alternative, this is the most important.
[00:15:40] The key element of this system. When there were two monarchs, Medvedev and Putin, from Putin's point of view, this was very harmful to the political system
[00:15:44] and ultimately led to Bolotnaya Square and Sakharov Avenue,
[00:15:47] which must not be repeated. Therefore, the main project that
[00:15:51] is being implemented in the Russian Federation today is the prolongation
[00:15:54] of Vladimir Putin's physical life, as we know. Therefore, even after
[00:15:58] 2036, he will try to remain in his post. And
[00:16:01] how? Well, we'll see. Tell me, how will Putin's life
[00:16:05] be extended after twenty- thirty-six?
[00:17:37] that you want the country to collapse or are you for
[00:17:41] special operation Z? If the question is put that way, maybe this special operation
[00:17:44] Z will turn out to be much more popular. In general, Putin is sure that, firstly,
[00:17:48] the people, the people support the war until
[00:17:51] the victorious end, even if not all of them. He has no anxiety about this. And secondly,
[00:17:55] regardless of what the people think about
[00:17:58] this, Putin, again, Putin's pre-election address
[00:18:02] to the people is part of the ritual of power. It must
[00:18:05] be heard. It contains what...
[00:18:37] will not differ much from the previous one, in it United
[00:18:41] Russia will dominate, but regardless of the ratio of the five
[00:18:44] Kremlin parties or four, if Fair Russia still falls out of
[00:18:48] the clip, which is still unclear, all
[00:18:51] this mechanism is strictly controlled from the Kremlin, it is not endowed with
[00:18:54] any independent will or subjectivity. A bright victory will give
[00:18:58] him the opportunity to conduct the second part
[00:19:00] of the mobilization. This has nothing to do with
[00:19:03] the other, that is, elections are not such.
[00:20:07] the Duma, the Kremlin continues to claim that there is no
[00:20:11] need for it, but the history of Vladimir
[00:20:14] Putin's public statements gives many reasons to return to what he said
[00:20:17] before and compare words with subsequent events.
[00:20:21] My colleague, Dmitry Novikov, on Putin's
[00:20:24] statements that millions of Russians remembered, and which then
[00:20:28] diverged from the facts. What of Putin's statements during
[00:20:32] a quarter century in power turned out to be lies,
[00:20:35] demagoguery, disinformation? Or an information
[00:20:38] special operation? Top 7 statements, promises,
[00:20:41] public confessions that stuck in the memory of millions
[00:20:45] of Russians. I emphasize, they are not participating
[00:20:48] in hostilities. Soldiers serving conscript service will
[00:20:52] not participate, and there will be no
[00:20:55] additional call-up of reservists from the reserves. In seventh place, if
[00:20:59] we reverse the chronology, is partial mobilization.
[00:21:02] No conscript soldiers there. The Kremlin on March 8,
[00:21:05] 2022, on the twelfth day of Russia's large-scale
[00:21:08] war against Ukraine, Putin says there will be no additional
[00:21:12] call-up of reservists, but on September 21, he announces
[00:21:16] mobilization, that is, precisely the call-up of citizens from the reserves.
[00:21:50] to bring such a claim against him for this. In sixth place is the statement
[00:21:53] that there will be no occupation. Let's recall his half-hour
[00:21:57] speech early in the morning on February 24th. "Our plans do not
[00:22:01] include the occupation of Ukrainian territories. We are not going to
[00:22:04] impose anything on anyone by force." In the autumn
[00:22:07] of 2022, the Kremlin not only declares the Donetsk,
[00:22:10] Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions of Ukraine to be Russian
[00:22:13] territories.
[00:22:34] playing with pleasure.
[00:22:37] Partly this is a consequence of his, I
[00:22:41] think, FSB past, partly, well, he, he is,
[00:22:44] in principle, a product of the Soviet
[00:22:47] Union, a product of the Soviet...
[00:22:54] He says what he deems
[00:22:57] necessary, and for him
[00:23:00] this is kind of a way of governing. He
[00:23:03] is a Chekist, he is a special services officer,
[00:23:06] he is constantly on assignment, he is constantly on a special operation, and
[00:23:10] the concepts of lie and truth are absolutely
[00:23:13] blurred for him, they do not have any ontological
[00:23:16] meaning. And therefore, well, for him to lie...
[00:23:20] is like breathing. In fifth conditional place are statements about
[00:23:23] military mercenaries. Professional killers from the Wagner group in Africa
[00:23:27] have no relation to the Russian authorities, is that so? Here
[00:23:30] is one statement by Putin: "The Russian state has nothing
[00:23:34] to do with this," he says quite responsibly,
[00:23:37] without any ulterior motives. And another one about
[00:23:41] the Wagner PMC, with a time difference of a year and a half.
[00:23:44] The maintenance of the entire Wagner
[00:23:47] group is completely...
[00:25:20] distributing. No, we are not considering it. His order for
[00:25:23] preparations for the occupation of Crimea had been in force for 9
[00:25:26] days already. He set certain
[00:25:27] tasks,
[00:25:30] said what and how we should do. As a conservative person,
[00:25:34] who loves the Soviet past, he
[00:25:37] partly lies with pleasure due to this
[00:25:40] Soviet background. Partly, I think, this is
[00:25:44] a consequence of that ...
[00:25:48] criminal gang subculture, in
[00:25:50] which he himself and
[00:25:54] a significant part of his entourage were once raised. Well, in terms of their
[00:25:58] mentality, they are, after all, members of organized crime groups,
[00:26:01] in essence. So, for this criminal
[00:26:05] subculture, it is also highly characteristic
[00:26:07] to have an absolutely indifferent
[00:26:11] and calm attitude regarding lies towards an external
[00:26:15] subject. That is, you cannot lie to your own people. If you are caught lying
[00:26:19] to your own, that's
[00:26:21] punishment. But to fool a sucker, so to speak, excuse me for
[00:26:25] the expression, well, that's a sacred thing. That's what we stand on.
[00:26:29] So, well, a whole set of reasons that...
[00:26:32] makes Putin a virtuoso
[00:26:36] of lies. So,
[00:26:38] that's why he - you know, as a Chekist, he
[00:26:42] essentially, I think, he formulates it differently. It's not that he lies, he
[00:26:46] uh, he simply organizes a cover
[00:26:50] operation, misinforms the enemy.
[00:26:53] Or, for example, the answer to the question, who seized Crimea? Go to
[00:26:57] a store, and you can buy any uniform there. Were these
[00:27:00] Russian soldiers or not? Were they?
[00:27:32] to the continuation of power, to the prolongation of power. The only goal
[00:27:36] named is the longest possible stay in
[00:27:39] power, yes, to the limit of his entire biological
[00:27:42] life, possibly even after his biological life. Everything he
[00:27:46] says and does serves only this goal,
[00:27:49] the satisfaction of his instinct for power.
[00:27:52] Well, now the satisfaction of some of his other
[00:27:56] natural needs, for example, now his natural need
[00:27:59] is war, yes, he likes it. He plays this
[00:28:03] war, it's his life's work, it will last as long
[00:28:07] as his life lasts. Well, in first place from the list of those
[00:28:10] quotes that could not but be remembered by millions
[00:28:13] of Russians: "I am
[00:28:16] against
[00:28:19] increasing the retirement
[00:28:22] age, until I am president, such a decision will not be made." What else did Putin declare during
[00:28:26] his time in power? "I do not intend to change
[00:28:29] the Constitution under any circumstances." Rewritten. In
[00:28:32] 2020, rates of basic taxes will no longer be
[00:28:35] adjusted, changed in 2019,
[00:28:39] 2021, in 2026. Or,
[00:28:42] for example, his words, "Restricting the internet is politically
[00:28:46] incorrect." Since 2022, military censorship has been introduced
[00:28:49] in Russia. Since 2025, mass disconnections
[00:28:52] of mobile internet have begun in the country.
[00:28:56] Dmitry Novikov, Nastoyashchee Vremya, Radio
[00:28:59] Svoboda. With that, we conclude the program "
[00:29:02] Results of the Week". I was Mumin Shakirov. Watch us on the TV channel
[00:29:06] Nastoyashchee Vremya on YouTube Radio Svoboda.
[00:29:09] We'll see you in a week.