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20260920 123000 UTC
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[00:00:00] in France to live on France 24.
[00:00:12] Hello, almost 3 years after the October 7th attacks, Israel
[00:00:16] is in an electoral campaign in
[00:00:19] unprecedented, and a marked presence of a context where war and regional threats are more relevant than ever. This is also
[00:00:23] Benjamin Netanyahu's main argument to voters,
[00:00:26] but also to all his opponents who accuse the Prime Minister of seeking to remain
[00:00:30] in power to avoid being held accountable. What is the reality of the
[00:00:33] danger, and also the political dimension in all of this? To help us see things
[00:00:37] more clearly, the co-founder of the Atlantic Middle East Forum is with
[00:00:41] us, David Calfa, co-director of the Observatory of the
[00:00:44] Middle East at the Jean Jaurès Foundation. But
[00:00:47] let's first go back to the latest revelations,
[00:00:50] on less than 40% of those from the newspaper ART. The Israeli daily claims that
[00:00:52] Benjamin Netanyahu had been warned of the imminent attack in
[00:00:56] preparation just a few days before October 7, 2023.
[00:01:02] The Israeli daily Arets published an investigation that directly implicates
[00:01:05] Benjamin Netanyahu. According to the newspaper's information, the Prime Minister
[00:01:09] had been alerted by the President of the United Arab Emirates 10 days
[00:01:13] before October 7. The Emirati leader reportedly warned that Hamas
[00:01:17] was preparing a large-scale attack from Gaza, information that he
[00:01:21] allegedly did not pass on to his security services. Benjamin Netanyahu's cabinet
[00:01:24] called these revelations an absolute lie, even denying
[00:01:28] having exchanged with Mohamed Benzaï. During this period, in the midst
[00:01:32] of the election campaign, the opponents of the outgoing coalition seize
[00:01:35] upon the matter, like Gadi Ezencott, former Chief
[00:01:39] impunity, sometimes under the eyes of of Staff. What did Netanyahu know? When did he know it?
[00:01:42] Why did he not inform the security apparatus and why did he not
[00:01:46] act to protect the citizens of Israel? There is no longer
[00:01:49] any room for excuses, denials and concealments.
[00:01:51] We commit to the citizens of Israel. As soon as the
[00:01:55] 38th government is established under our leadership, we
[00:01:59] will establish a national commission of inquiry. Other candidates
[00:02:03] often been brought up for prime minister demand a commission of inquiry. 3 years after
[00:02:06] the massacres of October 7, 2023, their consequences
[00:02:09] continue to weigh on the Israeli public debate. On that day, Hamas
[00:02:13] militants killed nearly 1,200 people and took
[00:02:16] 250 others hostage. The military
[00:02:19] response of the Hebrew state in Gaza has, to
[00:02:23] tone on the part of date, resulted in over 7,000 Palestinian deaths.
[00:02:26] David Calfa, this type of accusation against Netanyahu is not new,
[00:02:30] except that Arets gives details that are all the more credible
[00:02:34] as the information would have come a priori from the United Arab Emirates. Yes, that's it, in fact there has been
[00:02:37] a whole succession these last months, these last weeks of
[00:02:41] revelations from the Israeli press, especially we know that
[00:02:45] uh very probably the the former head of the Egyptian
[00:02:48] intelligence services, so military in this case, would
[00:02:51] also have warned Netanyahu, uh in
[00:02:55] fact this is new evidence for the opposition
[00:02:58] because it contributes to... if you
[00:03:01] point of view, but also, like, to again polarize the debate in Israel on the question of Netanyahu's responsibility in
[00:03:05] uh this strange defeat that was October 7th because
[00:03:09] for him uh if you like his strategy from the start
[00:03:13] has been to try to shift the center of gravity of the electoral
[00:03:16] debate towards the consequences of this October and especially what he
[00:03:20] considers to be his military successes on the six successive
[00:03:23] fronts and particularly obviously with regard to the
[00:03:26] Iranian threat. But here it brings back to
[00:03:31] the center of Israeli news, which is not good for him, this question of his
[00:03:34] political, institutional, strategic and moral responsibility.
[00:03:38] He is suing Arets to clear his name in the eyes of public opinion,
[00:03:42] yes well we must not forget that Netanyahu is
[00:03:46] a, shall we say, a shrewd politician so he knows full well that in fact the judicial
[00:03:49] time is not the political time so this lawsuit primarily
[00:03:53] aims to cement his electoral base a little, to show that he is
[00:03:57] not retreating, that he is on the offensive, while in fact it puts
[00:04:01] him in a rather uncomfortable situation and
[00:04:03] why do I say that because the strictly, we could
[00:04:07] say, almost socio-political stake of this
[00:04:10] electoral cycle is the question of what we
[00:04:14] call turncoats, so he has roughly 40% which is considerable
[00:04:17] so 40% of the Likud electorate who say they are
[00:04:21] ready to vote for one of the parties of the opposition bloc
[00:04:24] so this floating electorate can very clearly determine
[00:04:28] the outcome of the next elections. What is the electorate's view, depending on whether
[00:04:32] one is Likud
[00:04:35] of disruption by Hisencott in the or center-left, on these revelations? Oh, we need to refer to a well-known concept in sociology,
[00:04:39] differential politicization, meaning that in fact, when you are on the right
[00:04:42] and pro-Netanyahu, it won't change much because the
[00:04:46] emotional attachment to the leader means that
[00:04:50] you will interpret this information through a very particular prism
[00:04:54] which basically consists of accusing the opposition of
[00:04:58] wanting to weaken Netanyahu again while we are 4 weeks before the elections,
[00:05:02] whereas obviously for the opposition, the opposite interpretation is
[00:05:05] made of the same fact, namely these revelations, and consists
[00:05:09] precisely in again holding Netanyahu accountable
[00:05:12] for his failures and overwhelming responsibility in
[00:05:16] this historic failure. Is this the effect of these revelations? In any case, the
[00:05:19] partners of the ruling coalition each play their part
[00:05:23] in a clear form of one-upmanship by Hamel.
[00:05:27] Benjamin Netanyahu officially launched the campaign Thursday evening
[00:05:30] at his Likud headquarters. So he has two key
[00:05:34] points for the Israeli right: first, Benjamin Netanyahu intends
[00:05:37] to address undecided voters as well as those who
[00:05:41] might vote for center or center-right parties
[00:05:44] aligned with the opposition. Benjamin Netanyahu needs
[00:05:47] these votes to ensure the possibility of forming a
[00:05:51] coalition and thus having 61 deputies, which allows him to
[00:05:55] govern Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu, who delivered a speech
[00:05:58] entirely dedicated to the theme of security, thus clearly addressing
[00:06:02] these undecided Israelis, while at the same time
[00:06:05] his far-right allies say they still want to play a
[00:06:09] key role in this campaign and in these elections. Itamarben. Vir of
[00:06:12] the Jewish Power party, which is at its lowest in the polls, credited
[00:06:16] with six seats by several Israeli polling institutes,
[00:06:20] the far-right hopes to be able to remain in a coalition
[00:06:23] with the right and the Likud party of Benjamin Netanyahu.
[00:06:27] At the same time, the Israeli opposition is rallying
[00:06:31] around the figure of Gaddy Eisencott with one slogan, that of bringing
[00:06:34] down Benjamin Netanyahu on October 27th.
[00:06:38] next. David Kelfa, we've just seen that there's
[00:06:42] competition between right-wing parties, as is customary in
[00:06:46] a democracy that elects its parliament
[00:06:49] according to proportional suffrage. Is this competition harmful
[00:06:52] or, on the contrary, can it be beneficial like a sweep car, almost, to
[00:06:56] rally votes towards Netanyahu? It's too early to tell, in fact, at this
[00:07:00] stage, the figures we have show that it's putting Netanyahu
[00:07:03] in a difficult position because, fundamentally, Israeli political life is structured
[00:07:07] no longer around the opposition between right and
[00:07:11] left, but primarily around the opposition between what I would call the pro-Netanyahu camp and the anti-Netanyahu
[00:07:14] camp, an illiberal, anti-liberal, nationalist, secular and religious
[00:07:18] right on the one hand and a collection of heterogeneous
[00:07:22] parties ranging from the nationalist but secular and liberal right to the
[00:07:26] social-democratic left, and what we can say is that in fact there is
[00:07:29] an intra-bloc competition, that is, within the
[00:07:33] pro-Netanyahu bloc itself, which is actually much more fragmented than
[00:07:37] we think, and when we look today at the electoral
[00:07:40] dynamics, the weakening of his far-right partners is good news for
[00:07:43] Netanyahu in the short term because it allows him to bring back a certain number
[00:07:46] of voters and hope to come out on top in the next elections
[00:07:50] and thus form a new coalition. The problem is that at the same time, objectively, it
[00:07:54] shrinks his electoral base and makes him objectively
[00:07:58] incapable of forming a coalition
[00:08:01] beyond what one might imagine to be a
[00:08:04] right-wing and far-right government that would inevitably
[00:08:07] be, today, when we look again at these minority dynamics.
[00:08:11] In opposition, the anti-Netanyahu camp, as you just described it,
[00:08:15] we talk about the center-left, but it's rather a heterogeneous assembly of opponents to the person
[00:08:19] of Benjamin Netanyahu, isn't it? It's not really a center-left assembly,
[00:08:22] well, it's actually a, let's say, a very
[00:08:26] composite bloc that
[00:08:28] diverges on absolutely fundamental issues, the Palestinian
[00:08:32] question, the socio-economic question, in fact the
[00:08:36] cement is really the hostility to Netanyahu, the need,
[00:08:39] the desire to turn a new page and to draw
[00:08:43] strategic lessons from these 4 years of Netanyahu's
[00:08:47] governance and his Mephistophelian alliance with the Israeli
[00:08:50] far-right, so we are in a largely centrist
[00:08:54] bloc and again whose lowest common denominator
[00:08:58] is really this desire to put an end to
[00:09:01] this hegemony of the pro-Netanyahu bloc in Israel
[00:09:04] uh a bloc finally a coalition that speaks with
[00:09:08] several voices with at the center the chief of staff, the former chief of staff
[00:09:11] Gad. code favorite if we are to believe the polls, but he also has personalities
[00:09:15] who were considered, not long ago, to replace Benjamin Netanyahu, as we just
[00:09:19] saw, Naftali Bennett. Yes, that's it, so what's exciting is that
[00:09:23] when you look at this Israeli political landscape, which is very, very
[00:09:26] fragmented, uh Eisencott, who is a military man,
[00:09:29] the former chief of staff, uh his party is barely
[00:09:33] 1 year old, so he's a novice in politics and barely
[00:09:37] a few months ago it was more the duo Eisenc, the Lapid
[00:09:40] Bennet, sorry, who was leading the polls. So there was
[00:09:44] really a kind
[00:09:47] Israeli political landscape and today he is considered
[00:09:51] to be de facto the leader of the opposition, except that
[00:09:54] the problem with the opposition, as I just said, is that it is heterogeneous and
[00:09:58] there is no agreement, at least at this stage, on who will be supposed
[00:10:02] to take the reins after the elections to form a
[00:10:05] coalition, and that is a weakness because it contributes, if you like, to
[00:10:09] weakening this posture of Izenkoat, who really presents
[00:10:12] himself as a figure capable of ending
[00:10:16] this hegemony of Netanyahu and his alliance with the far-right and
[00:10:19] the ultra-Orthodox, and moreover, the same
[00:10:22] Eisencott spoke publicly yesterday
[00:10:25] to scold his, let's
[00:10:28] say, allies of the opposition bloc by reproaching them
[00:10:32] for playing into the hands of Netanyahu and his
[00:10:35] allies. by an excess of embodiment in a certain way, this
[00:10:38] campaign is taking place, as we said, in a context of an all-out war, a bit
[00:10:44] the Israeli army in Gaza and the West Bank by Dalila La Gomerie. Ah yes, this
[00:10:47] election campaign, as you said, takes place in this
[00:10:51] context of war in Gaza, despite the ceasefire.
[00:10:54] Benjamin Netanyahu was in Gaza a few days ago, trying
[00:10:57] to reassure Israelis by telling them that
[00:11:01] they controlled the situation, that they continued to target Hamas members,
[00:11:05] and above all that they were at home in Gaza. We see
[00:11:08] on this map that
[00:11:11] Palestinians now live
[00:11:15] the area of Gaza, and
[00:11:18] Benjamin Netanyahu's ministers, like Itamar Bengvir, Israel Katz, or
[00:11:22] Bezalel Smotrich, propose
[00:11:25] to empty Gaza of its inhabitants or even to extend
[00:11:29] the measure to the West Bank. These
[00:11:32] proposals elicit reactions, notably from Gady
[00:11:35] Eisencot, former Chief of Staff, whom we just
[00:11:38] mentioned. He is Netanyahu's main rival, Benjamin
[00:11:42] Netanyahu. He accuses Benjamin Netanyahu of having
[00:11:46] no political strategy in Gaza and of getting bogged down in
[00:11:50] the West Bank, the West Bank which is the other Palestinian front where
[00:11:53] the Israeli army remains mobilized and where
[00:11:57] settlers attack, intimidate, dispossess, or even
[00:12:00] kill Palestinians with complete
[00:12:04] the Israeli army, which lets them do so. Villages are besieged
[00:12:08] like that of Cousra, which has been much talked about these last
[00:12:11] days, so much so that this Israeli NGO
[00:12:15] B'Tselem speaks of apartheid, I quote, with the
[00:12:18] aim of eliminating Palestinians from the occupied
[00:12:21] West Bank. David Calfa, the fate of the West Bank depends
[00:12:25] on the outcome of these elections with this large construction project E1 which threatens
[00:12:29] in fact to break the territorial continuity of the Palestinian
[00:12:33] territory. Most certainly, in fact, when we look at the policy of the outgoing
[00:12:36] coalition, it is very clear, it is a desire to annex
[00:12:39] de facto the Jordan uh
[00:12:43] in fact what could change in a very concrete way is both a change of
[00:12:48] the next coalition if, again, Ezenkot
[00:12:52] were to win the elections, uh uh so less
[00:12:56] polarization, less populist overbidding
[00:12:59] practiced abundantly by Netanyahu's far-right allies, and especially on the political
[00:13:03] level, what will change is a freeze on what we call
[00:13:06] E1, which would in fact bury, if this policy
[00:13:09] were carried out to its end by the outgoing coalition, the two-state
[00:13:13] solution, and also, above all, the question of the violence of
[00:13:17] certain radicalized settlers who
[00:13:20] constitute a threat to Israel's image first
[00:13:23] internationally from the opposition's
[00:13:26] moreover, the question of the very authority of the state
[00:13:30] uh and notably the monopoly of legitimate physical violence, so there
[00:13:33] is an absolutely major issue here and on which the army general staff is trying
[00:13:37] to, let's say, alert the outgoing
[00:13:40] coalition, the problem is that
[00:13:43] uh you have more and more soldiers who are
[00:13:47] somewhat freelancing and that's also somewhat the effect of
[00:13:50] October 7th, very clearly, uh sometimes the orders given by the general staff
[00:13:54] when they descend to the most tactical, most
[00:13:58] operational level, are not necessarily followed, and so that's an issue
[00:14:01] that will be on the table of the next prime minister, if it's the leader of the opposition, that is,
[00:14:05] Asencote, I think that
[00:14:09] we will see mass arrests of settlers
[00:14:12] and he has committed to it and it will not be a small matter because, again, we see that
[00:14:16] the army has all the difficulties in fact
[00:14:19] in imposing at its lowest level
[00:14:22] obedience, quite simply, to orders and respect for commitments. An army
[00:14:26] itself questioned in Israel, even in Gaza,
[00:14:29] through a documentary that won the special jury prize at the Venice Film Festival
[00:14:33] last Saturday, and which looks back at the civilian deaths in the Palestinian enclave,
[00:14:36] accusing the Israeli army of resorting to
[00:14:40] deliberate targeting, that's the whole question via computers,
[00:14:43] Benjamin Netanyahu's great anger, the Prime Minister intends
[00:14:47] to strip the two directors of their nationality. Explanation by Victor
[00:14:51] Fobert for more than an hour and through...
[00:15:27] the two directors, already Oscar winners for their previous
[00:15:29] film Noozerland in 2024, state
[00:15:33] that they want to highlight a system of killing that relies on the
[00:15:36] surveillance of...
[00:16:16] are they deliberately targeted
[00:16:18] or considered, if one can say so, as
[00:16:22] collateral damage when it comes to killing
[00:16:26] members of Hamas, that's the whole question posed by this documentary, that's the whole
[00:16:29] ambiguity of the film. So I was able to attend a screening the day before yesterday and for
[00:16:33] me, if you like, there are two things, there's first the reaction of the current
[00:16:37] coalition, which is grotesque and extravagant,
[00:16:40] I mean, it goes so far as to threaten to strip them of their citizenship
[00:16:44] when it's not some far-right thugs simply trying to kill
[00:16:48] them, uh and so that says something about a
[00:16:51] real drift of this pro-Netanyahu right
[00:16:55] uh which has been in power for 4 years, and then there's the film itself.
[00:16:58] So I think it has several weaknesses and notably this ambiguity on which, in my opinion,
[00:17:02] it plays, uh because I note a shift between the beginning of the film where there's a somewhat
[00:17:06] serious discussion about urban warfare with
[00:17:10] difficulty precisely in evaluating what we call collateral
[00:17:13] damage to civilians who are simply exposed
[00:17:16] to crossfire between belligerents
[00:17:20] and who endure this daily war with
[00:17:24] ratios that vary depending on the theaters of operation, we saw it in Raqqa, Mosul,
[00:17:27] Fallujah and obviously in Gaza, and
[00:17:30] then suddenly, in fact, what I noticed was that Hamas
[00:17:34] completely disappeared from the discussion, and then the
[00:17:37] accusation that had
[00:17:40] was really a deliberate, intentional policy that
[00:17:44] aimed not to destroy Hamas but really to
[00:17:47] annihilate the Gazan population, so from that point of view, there is a weakness,
[00:17:51] there is a methodological weakness, it is based on 24 testimonies, so
[00:17:54] to preserve, of course, the safety of
[00:17:57] those who testify because what they say is very serious, but the problem is that you have no
[00:18:01] way to verify the information, to cross-reference it, we don't know their names,
[00:18:05] we don't know their ranks, their functions, the precise role
[00:18:09] and the specific elements and events to which they refer,
[00:18:12] and above all, I think there is an absolutely major confusion for those who know a little
[00:18:16] about the subject, and it is true that it is a subject that requires a bit of sophistication,
[00:18:19] it is a very complex subject between what we call the thresholds
[00:18:23] of authorization, that is, for example, for a strike, if
[00:18:26] you have an intermediate level Hamas commander or or subordinate,
[00:18:30] uh the civilian to combatant ratio for an army can
[00:18:33] vary from 1 to 5, from 1 to 10, from 10 to 15, from 15 to...
[00:18:37] 20, so you are told one combatant killed for 10
[00:18:40] 15 acceptable civilian casualties, so to speak, but that doesn't mean you have
[00:18:44] authorization to kill, that means that in the system you
[00:18:48] have this axiom of 1 for 10, 1 for
[00:18:51] 15, 1 for 20, uh that means that this is the first
[00:18:54] step, that is the question is do you have
[00:18:58] authorization to give the order to fire,
[00:19:01] and this ratio evolves according to the context
[00:19:05] and so a threshold of authorization is not an operational threshold, that is
[00:19:08] to say that when you have this figure, it does not mean again that you have the
[00:19:12] right to kill 15, 20,
[00:19:15] 35, 100, that's the figure that was put forward by one of the
[00:19:18] witnesses, it's even 500, which still seems very, very
[00:19:22] debatable to me, which does not call into question the disaster that
[00:19:26] this war constitutes, the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, and very probable
[00:19:29] war crimes that were committed during this Israeli
[00:19:32] response, but I think we need to have a serious
[00:19:36] discussion about the dilemmas of a
[00:19:39] regular war in a confined urban environment facing
[00:19:43] militiamen who, for their part, have no limits because they do not impose
[00:19:47] the limits of international law, and also because the question of intentionality arises
[00:19:51] in this debate around genocide, whether or not there is
[00:19:54] an intention to exterminate the Gazan population.
[00:19:58] Israel, which sees itself as a besieged country, it must be said that the country is engaged on
[00:20:02] many fronts. Dalila Laghmari Israel occupies more than 1000
[00:20:05] km2 of seized territory since October 7,
[00:20:08] this is what the Financial Times tells us, this
[00:20:12] is the case of Lebanon, even if Israel has managed to weaken
[00:20:16] Hezbollah, annihilate its operational capabilities,
[00:20:18] the Shiite paramilitary
[00:20:21] group is far from giving up
[00:20:25] and rejects any agreement with Israel,
[00:20:28] nevertheless the Hebrew state occupies a part of Lebanon here
[00:20:32] in the south that we see hatched and in
[00:20:35] orange and also benefits. It also benefits from the fact that Lebanon does not
[00:20:39] have the means to get bogged down in the war in Syria where Israel
[00:20:43] is not officially at war, well the Israeli
[00:20:46] army regularly conducts incursions,
[00:20:49] its army is also deployed here along the Golan
[00:20:53] and makes advances here and there, it makes incursions before
[00:20:57] its pioneers on the Golan side, all this in total violation of the
[00:21:01] sovereignty of Syria, finally Benjamin Netanyahu,
[00:21:04] who is campaigning, constantly hammers that he will also
[00:21:07] defeat Iran, he boasts of having in these last two
[00:21:11] years also managed to avert the existential
[00:21:14] threat that hung over his country,
[00:21:18] notably by paralyzing the capabilities and the Iranian
[00:21:22] nuclear program, and among these fronts, you just told us, Dalila, is
[00:21:25] Lebanon. So what is the situation, how is it experienced on the ground in Beirut, Serge
[00:21:29] Berberry? Well, you know, in Lebanon, the war
[00:21:32] hasn't really ended, it has mostly changed
[00:21:36] forms. Uh, on the ground, Israel still
[00:21:39] occupies a strip of about 10 km inside Lebanese
[00:21:43] territory, so in southern Lebanon, uh and in recent
[00:21:46] weeks Israel has further strengthened its positions in the... area
[00:21:50] uh on the Thaal ridge, Thaal
[00:21:53] claims to have destroyed a vast Hezbollah tunnel network, and
[00:21:56] by the way, the Israeli position is unwavering, no question
[00:22:00] of leaving as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed, and
[00:22:04] that's where everything is blocked. Uh, Lebanese President
[00:22:07] Joseph Aoun says that Hezbollah will have to be
[00:22:10] disarmed but without internal confrontation,
[00:22:14] and at the same time, the Lebanese President pushes for
[00:22:17] negotiation with Israel, uh even talks about
[00:22:21] a security agreement with uh Israel, an agreement that could
[00:22:24] eventually pave the way for peace, but you know this
[00:22:28] Israeli presence in southern Lebanon remains
[00:22:31] extremely sensitive, uh a presence that revives
[00:22:35] the memory of the Israeli occupation that ended
[00:22:38] in 2000, and today everyone
[00:22:42] is waiting for the other to move first, Israel wants
[00:22:45] Hezbollah disarmed before leaving, and Beirut
[00:22:48] wants Israel's departure before being able
[00:22:52] to regain control of southern Lebanon. David
[00:22:55] Calfa, Israel has an interest in remaining in Lebanon for the long term. This opinion
[00:22:59] is widely shared today within the Israeli political
[00:23:02] class. Yes, this new security paradigm is indeed quite
[00:23:06] consensual after October 7th, for a very simple reason,
[00:23:10] which is that, fundamentally, with the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in
[00:23:13] 2005, on the armistice lines
[00:23:16] of the Six-Day War, 67, you
[00:23:19] have. The problem for a country of Lilliputian size like
[00:23:23] Israel is what is called the absence of strategic depth, that is, the distance between the front
[00:23:26] line and the vital centers of the country, so there is a will
[00:23:30] on the Israeli side, both the majority and the opposition, to gain strategic
[00:23:34] depth to protect border
[00:23:37] populations, to also gain alert time because
[00:23:41] what was also missing on October 7th was the distance between Gaza and the
[00:23:45] first kibbutzim in southern Israel. By car it's only a few minutes, it's very
[00:23:48] easy to cross. It was very easy to cross the border, so
[00:23:52] the question of the alert system is also an absolutely fundamental fact.
[00:23:56] So, as much as it is rational on the military level, politically and
[00:24:00] strategically, it seems to me limited because in the
[00:24:03] medium to long term, because the risk is to recreate the political
[00:24:07] and societal conditions for an adverse mobilization concerning
[00:24:10] Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in Lebanon, which
[00:24:14] has a good argument to say that it defends the sovereignty of
[00:24:17] Lebanon, even if in fact this is not true since each time it
[00:24:20] has contributed to bringing war back to the land of the
[00:24:24] cedar on several occasions, and even if today there is a real
[00:24:28] political will on the part of the Lebanese state to restore its sovereignty over its entire
[00:24:31] territory, we are witnessing this kind of dilemma,
[00:24:35] there is really a specter haunting Israelis today, it is
[00:24:39] a kind of repetition of October 7th, a repetition of this nightmarish
[00:24:42] scenario of a massive attack with a border crossing. I
[00:24:46] remind you that in the document signed by Yerkiessinoire,
[00:24:50] in addition to the very precise instructions given to Hamas
[00:24:53] militiamen to commit massacres and desecrate bodies, there was
[00:24:57] also a rather sustained dialogue with the Iranian regime and with
[00:25:01] Hezbollah with the hope that the October 7th attack would provoke a land
[00:25:04] invasion from northern Israel by Hezbollah militiamen. So this
[00:25:08] threat is taken very seriously, but the problem once again is that
[00:25:12] we are not in a situation where there is no strategy from this point of view, because this will
[00:25:16] create a military occupation, so from a tactical point of view for Israeli
[00:25:20] soldiers, there is a moment when the risk of an insurrection arises, so the
[00:25:23] scenario of the 80s basically repeats itself, and
[00:25:27] above all, the question is what is the way out of the crisis? Can we deal with
[00:25:31] threats only from a military point of view? So,
[00:25:34] and this militarization of Israeli national security,
[00:25:37] we see its limits as long as it does not propose a security architecture and
[00:25:41] a new, lasting and desirable political order, we risk finding
[00:25:44] ourselves in these blockages and this dilemma that has been perfectly described, which is found in
[00:25:48] Gaza. Hamas also in Gaza
[00:25:50] conditions its disarmament on the withdrawal of the Israeli army.
[00:25:53] Conversely, Israel conditions its withdrawal on the disarmament of Hamas, so we are in a situation of
[00:25:57] almost absolute deadlock, and we see indeed the complexity of the
[00:26:01] stakes at... a little more than a month now from these legislative
[00:26:04] elections. Thank you for being with us, David Calfa. This is the
[00:26:08] end of this program. Thank you for following it. You can find us on our website france24.com.
[00:30:10] newscast, here are the headlines: Moscow and Kyiv continue to strike back and
[00:30:14] forth, last night was deadly on both
[00:30:16] sides, two people were killed in the Moscow region, in the
[00:30:20] outskirts of Kyiv there are at least four dead, including three
[00:30:23] children.
[00:30:26] Voting again this Sunday in Germany, legislative elections in
[00:30:29] two Länder, that of Berlin and that of... Mecklenburg, Western
[00:30:33] Pomerania, a high-risk election for Chancellor Frederic
[00:30:36] Schmers, more unpopular than
[00:30:39] ever.
[00:30:42] And then the Heritage Days, an opportunity to discover sites often
[00:30:45] inaccessible normally, but since it's allowed for a weekend, we will take you to
[00:30:49] visit the secret galleries of the mythical Fort Boyard, which you
[00:30:53] see images of on
[00:30:55] the screen.