IRINN — broadcast
20260806 213000 UTC
449 transcript segments
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:31] The President said on a television program that with the aim of eliminating
[00:00:35] rent-seeking and corruption, subsidies will be transferred from the beginning of the supply chain to
[00:00:38] the final consumer to establish justice. Mr. Pezeshkian added that the government is trying
[00:00:41] to increase purchasing power and support
[00:00:45] low-income people by implementing a
[00:00:48] progressive payment system. We are managing
[00:00:51] this process to prevent
[00:00:54] corruption, rent-seeking, and smuggling.
[00:00:57] No matter how many
[00:01:00] observers you assign to stop this,
[00:01:03] we've had these observers for 48 years. Why haven't we been able to solve
[00:01:07] it? As long as there is
[00:01:10] a breeding ground for corruption, you can't stop
[00:01:13] corruption. Once you eliminate the breeding ground, there will be
[00:01:17] no corruption. When I freed the dollar, anyone
[00:01:21] who received a government dollar had a rent, a privilege.
[00:01:24] Everyone had a privilege. As a result, they used to fight
[00:01:27] over who would get it. To get
[00:01:31] a signature, they would take bribes. To get
[00:01:34] a privilege, well, we broke all of that. Now, no signature is needed. They can
[00:01:38] easily go and bring it and sell it easily in the market. Both
[00:01:42] administrative signatures and administrative corruption have been eliminated. The problem
[00:01:45] in customs has also been eliminated. The market issues have been self-corrected.
[00:01:49] Of course, we have not yet
[00:01:52] reached the point we should have with these sanctions, but
[00:01:56] when you eliminate the breeding ground for corruption, then
[00:02:10] accept the realities and fulfill your commitments.
[00:02:14] The Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly wrote on his social media account
[00:02:17] in response to recent claims by US officials
[00:02:20] about their failed and repetitive performative
[00:02:24] diplomacy: "A big attack is coming. Wait.
[00:02:28] Forget them. They want to use
[00:02:36] intimidation, unfulfilled promises, and fake news
[00:02:40] as leverage for negotiations.
[00:02:42] This is a failed strategy. We don't need
[00:02:46] more shows."
[00:02:47] New revelations
[00:02:50] about the US Army's situation indicate a severe shortage
[00:02:54] in its air defense and offensive missile
[00:02:58] reserves. According to
[00:03:30] the current government, the situation where many
[00:03:33] reserves were depleted, and then they threatened to imprison
[00:03:37] those who leaked this shortage. Those
[00:03:41] who leak these meaningless words should be imprisoned.
[00:03:44] But there was no need to leak it, because
[00:03:48] the images of successive Iranian missile impacts and their destructive
[00:03:52] effects clearly showed the reality. The fact that the main US defenses,
[00:03:55] namely Patriot and THAAD, have been severely depleted
[00:03:59] after 5 months of war with Iran and also the 12-day war,
[00:04:02] and have now reached a critical point. Statistics released
[00:04:06] by the Center for Strategic and International Studies show
[00:04:10] that Patriot missiles have decreased from 2300 to about 800,
[00:04:13] and THAAD missiles have decreased from 450 to about
[00:04:16] 250. Wait,
[00:04:20] how is it possible that our Patriot missiles are running out?
[00:04:24] Didn't they say that Iranian military forces were destroyed?
[00:04:27] The situation became so critical that US commanders,
[00:04:31] in some cases, do not launch defenses at all
[00:04:35] in response to Iranian attacks to preserve ammunition reserves.
[00:04:38] And now it has become clear that the ammunition crisis is not only in the defense
[00:04:42] sector but also in the offensive sector of the US Army.
[00:04:45] According to a recent Reuters report,
[00:04:48] US long-range PrSM and ATACMS missile
[00:04:52] reserves have been almost depleted. These two types of missiles are long-range missiles
[00:04:55] whose application is to hit targets with high accuracy
[00:04:59] and range. Specifically, the PrSM missile, whose first use in
[00:05:03] battle was the massacre of the Lamerd girls' volleyball team.
[00:05:06] Reuters reported today, quoting
[00:05:09] three informed officials, that
[00:05:17] they were used during the 5-month war with Iran. The Reuters report also claims
[00:05:21] that the reason Trump backed down from continuing attacks
[00:05:24] against Iran was warnings from his commanders about ammunition
[00:05:27] shortages, although Trump later claimed he backed down
[00:05:31] due to requests from Persian Gulf Arab leaders.
[00:05:34] The reason for Trump's failure
[00:05:38] to launch a full-scale attack was this report about missile
[00:05:41] shortages, not false negotiations.
[00:05:57] Foreign media say that Iran will reopen
[00:06:01] the Strait of Hormuz if its
[00:06:04] goals in the Islamabad agreement
[00:06:06] are met. The latest
[00:06:10] field observations
[00:06:12] and images from the Strait of Hormuz confirm that traffic
[00:06:16] of vessels through these strategic waterways, if not zero,
[00:06:20] is limited. Regional media reports
[00:06:23] such as Al Jazeera also confirm this limitation.
[00:06:27] The daily passage of vessels through the Strait of Hormuz
[00:06:30] has not reached double digits in the past week. Normal
[00:06:34] traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, of course, with the exercise
[00:06:37] of Iranian sovereignty, requires the definition of a safe route,
[00:06:40] which will be finalized during talks between Iran
[00:06:44] and Oman. This is the latest statement
[00:06:47] from the Foreign Ministry spokesman. The Foreign Ministry also said
[00:06:51] that if a third country does not interfere in this process,
[00:06:54] it can be hoped that the path of Tehran-Muscat talks will reach
[00:06:58] its final station. Of course, even if
[00:07:02] a new management regime for the Strait of Hormuz is finalized,
[00:07:05] is not necessarily
[00:07:07] going to be immediately
[00:07:10] reopened. Tehran's message has been that if the siege
[00:07:13] against us is lifted and if the management of the Strait of Hormuz
[00:07:17] is recognized for us, we will cooperate in reopening the passage
[00:07:21] for the hundreds of oil tankers stranded in the region. In return for such an action,
[00:07:25] Iran expects financial benefits and concessions,
[00:07:28] but at the same time warns the US that if the necessary
[00:07:31] guarantees are not provided, if the naval blockade is not lifted,
[00:07:35] and if military threats continue, the Strait will not be reopened.
[00:07:38] Mearsheimer says that not succumbing to the conditions...
[00:07:53] The reality is that Trump foolishly started a war that was doomed to fail from the beginning. Many
[00:07:57] of his advisors knew very well that the strategy he had adopted
[00:08:01] was doomed to fail, and it ultimately failed.
[00:08:04] The global economy is in a very dangerous situation due to the blockage
[00:08:08] of the Strait of Hormuz, and if this war is not resolved
[00:08:12] soon, there is a real danger of a global recession.
[00:08:15] Therefore, we are in a situation where the United States
[00:08:19] has not only failed to achieve any of its stated
[00:08:22] goals, including the destruction of the Islamic Republic,
[00:08:26] but is now facing a bigger challenge. The occurrence
[00:08:29] of a major defeat for America, which Mearsheimer
[00:08:33] talks about, has various reasons, only one
[00:08:37] of which is Iran's superior geographical position.
[00:08:41] During his visit
[00:09:12] to the Soumar border, he said that the Soumar border
[00:09:16] will be approved at the first meeting of the Central Arbaeen
[00:09:19] Headquarters, and Soumar will receive a budget from this year. Mr. Pourjamshidian
[00:09:23] said that at least 100,000 pilgrims will cross
[00:09:26] the Soumar border next year, and this border
[00:09:29] will become one of the best Arbaeen borders
[00:09:32] in the country. The head of the Central Arbaeen
[00:09:35] Headquarters, during a field visit to the Soumar border
[00:09:39] in Gilan-e Gharb county, said that the Soumar border
[00:09:42] will be approved at the first meeting of the Central Arbaeen
[00:09:46] Headquarters. Soumar will receive a budget from this
[00:09:49] year. It was a desert until recently, and it was
[00:09:53] almost abandoned. They have built roads,
[00:09:56] built canopies, prepared the gates,
[00:09:59] and brought and activated all the agencies
[00:10:03] responsible at the border. Most importantly, the people
[00:10:06] of Gilan-e Gharb have also come here to serve.
[00:10:10] Dr. Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian, referring
[00:10:13] to the fact that the Soumar border will become one of the best
[00:10:17] Arbaeen borders in the country, said that
[00:10:20] the management of Kermanshah province in Soumar
[00:10:24] has performed exceptionally well and beyond expectations.
[00:10:27] He stated: "We predict that at least 100,000
[00:10:31] pilgrims will pass through this border during next year's Arbaeen."
[00:10:35] Proximity to Baghdad and Kadhimiya is one of the most
[00:10:38] important advantages of the Soumar border. To the next section.
[00:12:06] Today, we want to talk to a man whose entire
[00:12:09] experience has been focused on economic diplomacy.
[00:12:12] When I look at his background, from economic advisor
[00:12:16] in South Korea from '72 to '82, economic advisor
[00:12:19] in Italy from '78 to '91. After this,
[00:12:23] he was the head of the Economic Policy Department
[00:12:27] of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Deputy of the East Asia Department, Iran's representative
[00:12:30] to the OPEC Fund, Deputy Representative of Iran to the World
[00:12:34] Bank and Development Bank, Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Director,
[00:12:38] and President of the Organization for Investment and Economic
[00:12:42] Assistance, and many other responsibilities that he has held
[00:12:46] in various economic
[00:13:05] others who were our professors, always said that if
[00:13:09] China has this economic position today,
[00:13:12] we owe it to the policy of de-Maoization
[00:13:16] during a period that has passed
[00:13:19] from this, and if those doors had not been opened, it would not have reached this position today. This
[00:13:23] statement is accurate. It is not
[00:13:25] like that at all.
[00:13:28] You see, our de-Maoization
[00:13:31] was itself what actually pursued
[00:13:34] the open-door policy through the Foreign Minister
[00:13:38] when he was with Zhou Enlai.
[00:13:40] Through that, this policy of de-escalation
[00:13:44] was pursued. The first issue I mentioned was that the Chinese spoke of three
[00:13:48] opportunities. They said we appreciated three opportunities
[00:13:51] at the international level.
[00:13:53] Well, the first opportunity, what did they say? They said that
[00:13:57] America and the Soviet Union came to the conclusion
[00:14:00] that they couldn't overpower each other.
[00:14:03] That is, neither of the blocs could
[00:14:07] defeat the opposing bloc, and their retreat would mean
[00:14:11] their collapse. Well, the Americans at that time
[00:14:14] came to the conclusion that they should give concessions to China,
[00:14:18] which at that time was considered a second-rate or shadow power.
[00:14:22] On the other hand, the Soviet Union was also threatening
[00:14:25] China. That is, instead of going towards giving
[00:14:29] concessions to China, it was constantly
[00:14:33] threatening China, and now the Chinese, as
[00:14:36] Eastern imperialists, from the Soviets, yes,
[00:14:40] at the time of Khrushchev, Soviet threats against
[00:14:44] China were serious, even atomic missiles were aimed
[00:14:47] at China. That is, they were creating this rumor that we had
[00:14:50] a nuclear shelter in the embassy. Yes, yes, that's why.
[00:14:54] Of course, it was never used, but well,
[00:14:57] they had built such a thing at the time they had designed
[00:15:01] the embassy. Well, these
[00:15:04] missiles were aimed in that direction.
[00:15:07] The Chinese were able
[00:15:10] to, I can say,
[00:15:13] use the foolishness of the head of the Eastern
[00:15:16] Bloc in a managed way to establish
[00:15:20] their position as an effective
[00:15:24] player in the East who acts
[00:15:28] independently of the West. This has nothing to do with de-Maoization.
[00:15:31] Mao himself had started this path,
[00:15:35] and in a managed way,
[00:15:38] meaning they never allowed, the Chinese
[00:15:42] never allowed Americans
[00:15:45] or Westerners
[00:15:48] or now multinationals, whatever we want to call
[00:15:52] them, to rule
[00:15:54] over their destinies.
[00:16:11] If you are interested, because now these Western-leaning
[00:16:14] friends in academia always mock the Chinese
[00:16:18] model, like the elimination of sparrows,
[00:16:20] I don't know, the deaths of tens
[00:16:24] of thousands, and even hundreds of thousands, due to the food
[00:16:27] crisis in China and these events
[00:16:31] that happened in this way.
[00:16:33] And they narrate
[00:16:37] the progress of China in a Western
[00:16:40] way. You have also witnessed this. As a university professor,
[00:16:56] years later. Now, I will return to Italy and so on, but the topic of China
[00:17:00] is hot. Please tell me, how do
[00:17:02] the Chinese view Iran? Were they in a policy
[00:17:06] of foreign isolation, or not? How was their view
[00:17:10] of Iran? You see, Iran
[00:17:13] had an advantage that perhaps many countries have,
[00:17:17] and Iran still has this advantage,
[00:17:20] which perhaps fewer countries, at least in our region,
[00:17:24] have, and that is Iran's independence.
[00:17:27] That is, economic decisions, economic
[00:17:30] benefits and harms, I don't care if they are right
[00:17:34] or wrong, meaning how correct our decisions were.
[00:17:38] But both the Chinese and the rest of the world
[00:17:42] are sure that these decisions were made in Tehran,
[00:17:44] not elsewhere. This makes Iran very different.
[00:17:48] This was the most important value that
[00:17:52] so to speak, directed the type of relationship
[00:17:55] between Iran and China towards a strategic
[00:17:58] relationship. This was the most important
[00:18:02] feature they saw in Iran, that Iran
[00:18:05] is an independent country. It makes its
[00:18:09] own decisions based on its interests. Now, these
[00:18:12] interests can have various aspects, but based on its interests,
[00:18:16] it makes decisions in Tehran. Decisions regarding Iran's
[00:18:19] behavior towards, for example, China, or any other
[00:18:22] country, are not made in London
[00:18:26] or Washington or other capitals. They are made
[00:18:29] in Tehran regarding its foreign
[00:18:33] relations and its relationship with
[00:18:36] its other partners. This was Iran's
[00:18:39] most important value, in addition to the fact
[00:18:42] that Iran had a special position
[00:18:45] in the model
[00:18:49] of surface development or in fact, China's land
[00:18:52] development or China's continuous development. I saw
[00:18:56] this development after the Chinese completed
[00:18:59] their development stages from east to west.
[00:19:03] That is, sometimes I went to the province
[00:19:41] and for example, mosques and squares and so on,
[00:19:44] very rarely if you saw a Muslim,
[00:19:48] he was a student or a trader. Yes, yes, mostly Iranian,
[00:19:51] mostly from Iran. There are two cities,
[00:19:55] Kashgar and Khotan. Oh, Khotan, you must have heard
[00:19:59] of it in Persian literature. Well, these cities
[00:20:03] are in Xinjiang province, China. These two
[00:20:07] cities, I wanted to go from one to the other,
[00:20:10] from Kashgar to Khotan. The road was so bad
[00:20:14] that it took five hours to go to a smaller
[00:20:18] city between them, which was once the center
[00:20:21] of one of the empires of Central Asia, called Yarkand.
[00:20:25] It took five hours to get there because the road
[00:20:29] was so bad. Whereas, when you went
[00:20:32] to eastern China, in addition to the various
[00:20:36] highways, there were high-speed
[00:20:40] trains that allowed you to travel thousands
[00:20:44] of kilometers in a few hours. The distance between Kashgar
[00:20:47] and Khotan is about 400-422 kilometers.
[00:20:51] They started their development from the east and moved
[00:20:54] towards the west. And almost later,
[00:20:58] the second time I went to China, and the time
[00:21:01] I was with the investment organization, I went to
[00:21:05] Xinjiang province again. It had completely changed.
[00:21:08] The development, that is, it was conveying another
[00:21:12] message to an external observer, and that was
[00:21:15] that China should now move beyond
[00:21:18] its borders. Now, it can expand
[00:21:22] in two ways. It can go to different
[00:21:25] parts of the world and find economic
[00:21:29] partners for itself and develop its relationship
[00:21:32] with them. But more importantly, it is to be
[00:21:36] able to continue the path of development
[00:21:40] it knows from Central Asia and from Pakistan
[00:21:43] towards the West. For this reason,
[00:21:45] Iran has a special position in
[00:21:49] the Belt and Road Initiative, which
[00:21:52] started in 2013. This is the revival
[00:21:55] of the historical Silk Road. Yes,
[00:21:58] this is not actually a road. In Iran, they have a very
[00:22:02] different view on this
[00:22:05] issue. They think it means connecting a series of roads
[00:22:09] and paths. It is not like that at all. The Belt
[00:22:12] and Road is a development program.
[00:22:15] That is, we can jointly,
[00:22:19] we and China, we and Pakistan,
[00:22:22] China and Kazakhstan, China and Pakistan, can
[00:22:26] write joint development programs
[00:22:29] in various frameworks. Well, many people
[00:22:33] at that time were talking about a 25-year plan or
[00:22:36] a 25-year cooperation document between Iran and China.
[00:22:40] This was the main framework of the 25-year document. You yourself
[00:22:44] mentioned the 25-year document. What is its story?
[00:22:47] I mentioned that it is indeed
[00:22:50] a roadmap for how we
[00:22:53] can bring the development programs
[00:22:56] of China and Iran closer together. First, so
[00:23:00] our audience knows, China's biggest economic
[00:23:04] partner is America, and we are very far behind.
[00:23:07] Here a question arises: Do the Chinese
[00:23:11] sacrifice their significant and large trade
[00:23:14] with the Americans for their relationship
[00:23:17] with Iran or not? This is fundamentally
[00:23:20] wrong. Yes, it is not
[00:23:23] supposed that
[00:23:25] any two other countries would sacrifice
[00:23:29] their national interests. Yes, and also that a bilateral
[00:23:32] relationship with a country necessarily
[00:23:35] means confrontation with a third country.
[00:23:37] It is not necessarily so. Of
[00:23:41] course, it can be said that China, from the time
[00:23:45] I mentioned, when it reached the farthest
[00:23:48] east of itself, had no choice but to expand
[00:23:52] beyond its land borders. Well,
[00:23:56] it is natural that if the world, if the world
[00:23:59] economy cannot grow very large and grow,
[00:24:03] the growth of one will mean the decline of another.
[00:24:06] In this regard, the Americans are in
[00:24:09] conflict and competition, and now we can say
[00:24:13] that the world has reached a point where their
[00:24:16] competition has become fierce. They have not yet reached
[00:24:20] the Cold War stage between America and China, but
[00:24:24] they are in fierce competition. When fierce competition
[00:24:28] arises, this question you raised is not only
[00:24:31] about Iran. Does China's relationship with Uzbekistan,
[00:24:35] China's relationship with Kazakhstan, sacrifice its relationship with America?
[00:24:38] I say this question is fundamentally wrong. China has a relationship
[00:24:41] with, because the world is not one-sided. Yes, yes,
[00:24:45] that is, different countries try
[00:24:48] to cover their own interests
[00:24:52] and especially their common interests with each
[00:24:55] other. That is, we can say that if
[00:24:59] project 1, 2, 3 is implemented in Iran, it will help our
[00:25:03] development. The Chinese also reach the conclusion
[00:25:07] that this 1, 2, 3, now 4 and 5, we may go
[00:25:10] one way and they another, but these projects
[00:25:14] 1, 2, 3 of the Chinese also enable them to implement
[00:25:18] their regional development
[00:25:27] as an independent country where decisions are made
[00:25:30] in Tehran. I have a special view. But we also
[00:25:34] have a traditional view of these regional countries. During the Cold
[00:25:37] War, they said Pakistan was close to the Americans,
[00:25:40] India was close to the Eastern Bloc.
[00:25:44] But today, as we speak, the Chinese have seriously
[00:25:47] invested in Pakistan. And the ports of this
[00:25:51] country are considered rivals to our Chabahar port. On the other hand, in recent
[00:25:55] events in recent years, we have seen that
[00:25:59] in Saudi Arabia, with Saudi Arabia that reminded us of big
[00:26:03] American companies, the Chinese now have a serious foothold
[00:26:07] and are growing. Their outlook on Afghanistan is serious,
[00:26:10] and perhaps when we compare, especially in relation
[00:26:13] to our regional rivals, Turkey has a serious
[00:26:16] presence. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a smaller
[00:26:20] share. We, compared to Chinese investment and Chinese presence
[00:26:23] in the market, now everyone thinks China has swallowed our market
[00:26:27] and for example, we have become subordinate to China.
[00:26:30] Countries that also have very
[00:26:39] good relations with the West. The Chinese
[00:26:42] have always, it is true that we are independent,
[00:26:46] this is a special privilege for us. However,
[00:26:48] there are two questions that they always ask
[00:26:52] us. The Chinese have two specific questions.
[00:26:56] This is not only about the Chinese. If you
[00:26:59] want to establish a model of strategic relationship
[00:27:03] with any other country - by "you" I mean Iran or
[00:27:07] any two countries that want to form a strategic relationship -
[00:27:10] they must answer these questions. The first question:
[00:27:13] Do our decision-makers in the Islamic Republic
[00:27:17] within Iran have the mental
[00:27:21] image that our resources are sufficient for development
[00:27:24] and that we only need
[00:27:26] technology
[00:27:29] and in fact, management of implementation?
[00:27:32] Do we not need resources?
[00:27:35] Well, in Saudi Arabia, this question has been answered.
[00:27:38] In the Emirates, it has been answered. They say we don't need
[00:27:41] resources. Therefore, they go to China
[00:27:44] and place orders, just as they go to
[00:27:48] America and place orders. And they say,
[00:27:52] "We'll pay you to do these things for us."
[00:27:56] But can we do this in Iran too?
[00:27:59] That is, can we still continue
[00:28:03] our work as an oil-rich country and our foreign
[00:28:06] cooperation, or do we now need to act
[00:28:09] like Pakistan or Turkey,
[00:28:13] needing Chinese resources? They say our
[00:28:16] resources are not sufficient. In their
[00:28:19] relations, I have seen many times
[00:28:22] that one of the officials of the Pakistani
[00:28:26] embassy in China said that he is here
[00:28:29] to attract investment for his country,
[00:28:33] to bring money to the country.
[00:28:36] But our behavior does not show this. That is, we often
[00:28:39] go, because you raised an important question,
[00:28:42] why can't we be like them?
[00:28:46] I say because we have not yet reached
[00:28:49] an agreement on this issue. If
[00:28:52] you come to the conclusion that you need foreign
[00:28:56] resources like Pakistan and Turkey, then
[00:28:59] you should start thinking about how this
[00:29:06] development program aligns with China's development
[00:29:09] program and how they can complement each other.
[00:29:13] Then you can ask China to bring money.
[00:29:17] At one time, two cities in Iran had a railway.
[00:29:21] I was with the investment organization at that time.
[00:29:23] The esteemed representatives of those cities came
[00:29:27] and said that they are interested
[00:29:30] in the Chinese investing in the railway project
[00:29:34] of these two cities. You are probably talking
[00:29:37] about the years 2021-2024. Yes, yes.
[00:29:41] I told them, "Well, what benefit does China have
[00:29:44] here?" They said, "These two cities will be very prosperous
[00:29:48] if this happens." I said, "Well, what does that have to do with China?"
[00:29:50] That is, you see, every country pursues its own interests
[00:29:54] in its foreign relations. Now, sometimes you say that
[00:29:58] you have the money, like Saudi Arabia,
[00:30:00] the Saudi Arabian model. I have an investment
[00:30:04] fund where I collect oil money, and through
[00:30:08] this money, I self-finance the projects that
[00:30:11] I think are good. Now, I don't care
[00:30:15] about their current situation. I don't care about the situation
[00:30:18] of the Emirates and Saudi Arabia now. I am talking about that specific
[00:30:22] period. But if we want to be a model
[00:30:25] that is, then this is the first decision.
[00:30:28] We must clarify this. We must clarify
[00:30:32] which model we think is the model.
[00:30:35] I tried a lot during my time at the Ministry
[00:30:39] of Economy to make everyone understand that this work
[00:30:43] has requirements.
[00:30:43] Thank you very much.