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20260808 160000 UTC
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[00:00:06] So that our coast remains safe, so that the soil of our country remains safe,
[00:00:09] so that our island remains safe, our tactical movements
[00:00:13] are offensive movements. In the name of God, greetings and
[00:01:43] good evening to our dear and
[00:01:46] respected viewers of the Iran Time program.
[00:01:50] We are very happy to be with you
[00:01:52] for another program today, Saturday, the seventeenth of
[00:01:56] Mordad, on the 162nd day of the third
[00:02:00] war, 52 days after the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the presidents of
[00:02:04] Iran and America. We are at your service with another program.
[00:02:08] Wherever you are, I hope you are well and healthy. With me
[00:02:12] in the studio for tonight's program are Dr. Mehdi Khanalizadeh,
[00:02:15] university professor, Mr. Vahid Khaza, and Mr. Nima Akbar Khani.
[00:02:19] Greetings to you, Mr. Khanalizadeh. You are very kind.
[00:02:23] In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Greetings to you and dear viewers. I am at your service.
[00:02:27] May you be successful. In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. I also greet you,
[00:02:30] Mr. Roula, and dear Mr. Mehdi. I am very happy to have the honor
[00:02:33] of being with them today, as well as Mr. Nima and all
[00:02:37] respected viewers. And I am at your service. In the name of
[00:02:40] God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. I greet you, Mr. Seyyed, and also you, Mr. Khanalizadeh.
[00:02:43] It is a great honor to be at your service, as well as
[00:02:47] you, Mr. Khaza. I also greet all our dear and
[00:02:51] respected viewers. As
[00:02:54] in their field. Well, if I every night, we ask for many prayers first for the mujahideen and
[00:02:56] fighters, and second for all the Iranian nation, so that
[00:03:00] by the blessing of these prayers, we can successfully overcome these decisive and
[00:03:04] war-torn days. Yes, by sending
[00:03:07] the number 333 to the number 3015, you
[00:03:11] can become a member of the Iran Time program's messenger channel. The audio file
[00:03:15] of the program, especially for those who follow the audio file of the program,
[00:03:18] I receive multiple feedbacks from those who listen to
[00:03:21] the program, and we are also trying to make the program as understandable
[00:03:25] as possible for those who are our listeners,
[00:03:28] and not ambiguous.
[00:03:54] This is the first time we have the opportunity to be at your service
[00:03:57] with the Iran Time program. We are in the third
[00:04:35] imposed war. We are in this war countdown, which of course
[00:04:39] had many battles, it had the Ramadan battle, it had the
[00:04:42] Hormuz battle. We still see the situation as warlike, and
[00:04:45] I think everyone has the same view. We are still in the middle
[00:04:48] of the war for various reasons. Where do you
[00:04:52] see the beginning of this war? Why did we essentially
[00:04:56] enter this third imposed war? Sir.
[00:05:00] Look, if we want to say it very quickly and clearly,
[00:05:03] it was a representation of Iran's weakness. That is, history shows
[00:05:07] that when there was a plan, after the wars in
[00:05:10] Afghanistan and Iraq, they were supposed
[00:05:14] to come and continue this domino effect to reach Iran. Despite
[00:05:17] the fact that Iran at that time was weaker than it is now,
[00:05:21] the war did not happen. Why? Because at that time,
[00:05:24] the representation of Iran's power and the actions Iran took disrupted
[00:05:28] that game. Unfortunately, events
[00:05:31] happened after the Al-Aqsa storm that
[00:05:35] the event itself was a very important, correct, and influential event, and it
[00:05:39] could have paved the way for consolidating Iran's power
[00:05:42] in the region, but perhaps an inappropriate
[00:05:45] acting that took place narrated a representation of weakness
[00:05:48] from Iran. So Iran was not weak,
[00:05:52] it had a representation of weakness, which made them think
[00:05:55] that the plan Netanyahu presented on February 11th in the situation room
[00:05:58] of the White House, saying, "We will assassinate the Iranian leader, strike
[00:06:02] the commanders, the streets will be chaotic in four days, the Iranian government will be destroyed,"
[00:06:06] this representation paved the way for
[00:06:09] war. So. This proposition
[00:06:13] that we say we did something that caused
[00:06:16] the war or we did nothing that caused
[00:06:20] the war. On February 26th, we were having nuclear negotiations,
[00:06:23] according to many experts, including
[00:06:27] the political figure, Mr. Busaydi, the Foreign Minister
[00:06:30] of Oman, Iran had agreed to make unprecedented concessions,
[00:06:34] and it had been accepted, but two days later, the war begins.
[00:06:38] Why? Because that wasn't the issue at all. So, in summary,
[00:06:41] your answer. The image that was created
[00:06:45] of Iran between the 12-day war and the beginning
[00:06:49] of the 40-day war was a representation of weakness. The events that
[00:06:52] happened paved the way for war against
[00:06:56] Iran. Now, since some people connect this
[00:06:59] to the events, that is, it is accepted that a series of events
[00:07:03] after the Al-Aqsa storm occurred, but they say, why exactly
[00:07:07] on this specific day and time, at this juncture, after
[00:07:10] the Al-Aqsa storm? Well, they say, for example, do you want to
[00:07:14] say that our operations in response to Israel's aggressions
[00:07:18] against us, the operations, for example, were not as they should have been
[00:07:21] or anything of that nature, but in the end, they say
[00:07:25] that those passed, a significant
[00:07:28] period of time also passed since then, leading to the events of the eighteenth and nineteenth
[00:07:32] and the internal conditions of the country, and finally, it was here that the
[00:07:35] enemy thought that now I will come and deliver the final blow,
[00:07:39] meaning they might believe that it wasn't necessarily related
[00:07:42] to our representation of weakness, it was a series of events.
[00:07:45] Look, the assassination of Haniyeh in
[00:07:48] Tehran, the assassination of Sayyed Hassan
[00:07:52] Nasrallah, the fall of Syria, all these
[00:07:54] events happened, and Iran did not take any action that would show
[00:07:58] that it saw this as a danger to itself, or that it would react to it, which we will
[00:08:02] talk about its model later. It did not. This
[00:08:06] inaction was not interpreted as interaction
[00:08:09] and diplomacy; it was translated as:
[00:08:24] It intensified after the
[00:08:26] 12-day war, meaning when the 12-day war in Iran happened,
[00:08:30] Iran won the war, Israel could not achieve its desired result.
[00:08:34] Again, the process went, the processes of the diplomatic apparatus or
[00:08:38] Iran's foreign policy actions went in a direction that again
[00:08:41] represented weakness. Again,
[00:08:44] this paved the way for them to say that Iran
[00:08:47] could be defeated. I will give an example because at that time
[00:08:51] we were involved in the matter because my discussion
[00:08:54] is about the process and conditions of the diplomatic apparatus's understanding
[00:08:57] of diplomacy in Iran.
[00:09:01] One of the events that
[00:09:04] paved the way for one of the events, let's not say the matter,
[00:09:08] for the war against Iran was the Venezuela issue.
[00:09:12] If at that time, our diplomatic
[00:09:15] apparatus, our foreign policy structure, had done
[00:09:19] something, 1% of that operation would have been harder to carry
[00:09:23] out. It has been mentioned many times, both Trump and Netanyahu said in that
[00:09:27] leaked briefing session, they explicitly said, "Look how easy Venezuela was, we can do this with Iran too." If
[00:09:30] Iran had played a more active role there, that's why I say if our approach
[00:09:34] had been different, our reaction to the fall of Syria
[00:09:38] had been different, our reaction to the assassination
[00:09:43] had been different, our reaction to the fall
[00:09:46] of the Venezuelan government and the kidnapping of its president
[00:09:49] had been different, certainly more
[00:09:52] obstacles would have been created in the path of military
[00:09:56] action against us. This is not something we need to debate
[00:10:00] about; it is an obvious thing that exists
[00:10:03] and is based on documents they themselves published.
[00:10:06] Therefore, no, that side says it was a wrong
[00:10:10] inference by that side that considered Iran's power
[00:10:13] so weak that you agree that now when it came to
[00:10:17] the battlefield and attacked us, it saw that it could not. You repeated
[00:10:21] my words. Iran was not weak; it had a representation of weakness.
[00:10:39] The current that was creating an image of Iran in the West had nothing to do with us,
[00:10:43] meaning that current that was rebuilding the image of Iran's opposition
[00:10:46] to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the West was not created by me. In
[00:10:50] 2003, it was a domino effect.
[00:10:53] 2001 Afghanistan, 2003 Iraq, then Iran. They had simply
[00:10:56] announced it. What prevented the war with Iran?
[00:11:00] Look at Trump's speech after the assassination of Martyr
[00:11:04] Soleimani. He says, "This man gave us hell in Iraq. He is the
[00:11:08] father of roadside bombs. How many Americans did he kill and so on?" Iran
[00:11:11] took action against the side that wanted to bring the war to
[00:11:14] Iran. It took action even though Iran was weaker
[00:11:18] than it is now, but it took action that produced a representation
[00:11:21] of power. That's why the war did not enter Iran. We
[00:11:25] did nothing in this regard.
[00:11:28] In Tehran, the political leader of Hamas
[00:11:32] is assassinated. The President himself
[00:11:36] said that we trusted that the Americans said, "Don't react, we will end the
[00:11:39] Gaza war." Then they reneged.
[00:11:43] The Secretary-General of Hezbollah was assassinated. No proportionate action
[00:11:46] was taken. Syria fell. Nothing happened
[00:11:50] from Iran's side. All of these became
[00:11:53] one of the main pillars of that representation
[00:11:57] that came alongside the narrative of the other side that Iran is vulnerable,
[00:12:00] and when they came and engaged and saw
[00:12:04] that it was not the case,
[00:12:06] they were surprised and retreated, which now leads to
[00:12:10] subsequent discussions that in fact, when you have now
[00:12:13] established power, you should not again show a representation
[00:12:16] of weakness, meaning the same reason that started the war
[00:12:20] can bring war again.
[00:12:23] This, in my opinion, is a very crucial issue.
[00:12:27] Look, in general, are you criticizing the diplomatic apparatus
[00:12:31] or the Islamic Republic's government? Which
[00:12:34] part is it? The prevailing view in Iran's
[00:12:37] diplomacy is that because its expert apparatus is the
[00:12:41] diplomatic apparatus, it is derived from it. Now,
[00:12:44] other individuals and other apparatuses also come,
[00:12:48] but the core of the diplomatic apparatus is diplomacy. For example,
[00:12:52] we carried out Operation True Promise 2 in a specific way. Is this the fault of the diplomatic
[00:12:55] apparatus? No, that was one matter. What
[00:12:58] happened? You say Haniyeh, it's the season, right? No,
[00:13:01] all events, well, the fall of Syria hasn't happened yet. On the
[00:13:05] fourth or fifth day, they held the Astana meeting in Doha. One
[00:13:09] of the regional experts showed the picture and said, "This is not
[00:13:13] a picture of people making decisions about a country whose three important cities
[00:13:17] have fallen in two days. They are laughing and having tea and so on,"
[00:13:20] which later became clear that they had already decided everything and left.
[00:13:25] And then the diplomatic apparatus came out
[00:13:29] and said that we had made some promises. We said that this view is not consistent with the current
[00:13:32] situation, I mean, tomorrow
[00:13:35] is the beginning of the Syrian war, the internal crisis
[00:13:38] in Syria. The then president, who had a completely different
[00:13:42] political view from, for example, the current government, was he not against
[00:13:46] it at that time? Wasn't he against Iran's intervention? In general, his view on the issue of Western
[00:13:50] awakening was something else. Yes, yes. Now he called it Islamic awakening, but he
[00:13:53] called it human awakening. The same view from a different angle.
[00:13:57] الانم تو یه زاویه دیگه پس من اینو میگم مغز
[00:14:00] of Iran's foreign policy, a significant part of which
[00:14:04] is the diplomatic apparatus, essentially does not
[00:14:07] understand the world, essentially does not
[00:14:11] understand international relations, and does not understand international
[00:14:15] developments, and the result is damage to our national interests.
[00:14:18] For the discussion to move forward, the title of the program you chose
[00:14:22] is very correct, very attractive. Are we moving towards
[00:14:25] a second agreement? If we move in this direction,
[00:14:29] it means America has advanced,
[00:14:32] meaning America has come and imposed its achievements
[00:14:35] on us, which we can talk about later, although I'm certainly against it, but now about
[00:14:38] whether what Mehdi and I were talking about
[00:14:42] before the program, let me reveal the secrets to our
[00:14:45] viewers. Our issue was this:
[00:14:49] I might agree with a general criticism that he is making, and I do agree.
[00:14:53] That is, I have no criticism on this. Such
[00:14:56] a criticism is indeed directed at the diplomatic apparatus, but a part of this criticism, we say, is a
[00:15:00] criticism of the diplomatic apparatus. Well, if it's good in all cases, then in
[00:15:04] all of the Islamic Republic, there might be a flaw somewhere. Well, yes,
[00:15:07] there's no problem in addressing it, but to say that this is only the diplomatic apparatus
[00:15:11] and other parts... Look, if a mistake happens in Iran Time,
[00:15:15] we say it's the fault of IRIB.
[00:15:18] Exactly. Well done! Is it related to Naseri Nastaghi?
[00:15:21] No. If you make a mistake, if I make a mistake,
[00:15:25] the diplomatic apparatus in the Syrian issue, Mr. Araghchi doesn't want to let Syria
[00:15:29] fall. What should he do? No, an expert, for instance,
[00:15:32] I'm saying Mr. Ahmadinejad
[00:15:36] was against the presence. That is,
[00:16:27] you are bringing up an argument here, and then you say, the diplomatic apparatus.
[00:16:30] Where did the Syrian war end? The first war, the civil war, Mr. Khan, two
[00:16:34] flaws, two flaws. One flaw is that,
[00:16:42] first of all, you place
[00:16:44] the entire burden of what you
[00:16:48] consider wrong in decision-making solely on the diplomatic
[00:16:51] apparatus. Secondly, in criticizing the diplomatic
[00:16:55] apparatus, there are statements like, "Our diplomatic apparatus
[00:16:58] doesn't understand the world at all." These are all-or-nothing
[00:17:02] statements about the diplomatic apparatus. You can say, "Our diplomatic
[00:17:05] apparatus was wrong on such-and-such an issue."
[00:17:15] Everything that is perhaps the product of a set of correct or wrong
[00:17:18] views of the system, which he refers to, he only attributes to the diplomatic
[00:17:22] apparatus. He says, "I am an expert in this field only.
[00:17:26] I can only comment on this," which some say, in our opinion, some
[00:17:30] of them are not wrong either. I say, assuming that action was wrong
[00:17:33] or that something could have been done, which His Holiness has also spoken about Syria.
[00:17:36] I have nothing to say about these, but if it could have been done, only to the diplomatic
[00:17:40] apparatus. In my opinion, let's not enter Syria, because one of the
[00:17:43] biggest criticisms is that everyone in Iran talks about everything.
[00:17:47] If you ask me about economics, I don't know, I don't. I'm talking about
[00:17:50] my own field. So the first proposition is correct that
[00:17:54] I should talk about my own field. Whether the military, economic, and political fields
[00:17:58] have acted correctly or not, it's not my place to talk. I'm talking about the decision-making
[00:18:02] and influential decision-making bodies in the field of
[00:18:05] international relations. Well. He protested
[00:18:31] and went to the field, or did he take the bus and get off? Or should we
[00:18:34] enter Syria? Book.
[00:19:07] Let me conclude. Dr. Hadian, who was your guest, is one of the most
[00:19:11] knowledgeable figures in the field of international
[00:19:14] relations. He is one of a kind. He is
[00:19:16] intelligent. He is a knowledgeable,
[00:19:19] educated, informed, and
[00:19:23] influential figure on the diplomatic apparatus. Dr.
[00:19:26] Zarif is an influential figure on our diplomatic apparatus,
[00:19:29] and the statements made by Mr. Alaghe, the proposition
[00:19:33] he put forward here and is dominant in the diplomatic apparatus
[00:19:37] is: Without enmity with
[00:19:40] America, without enmity with America,
[00:19:44] one cannot achieve development. This
[00:19:47] proposition is both factually wrong and inherently wrong.
[00:19:51] Factually, what does it mean? We have not engaged in enmity.
[00:19:54] From the beginning of the revolution until now, we have signed at least two written agreements with the Americans.
[00:19:58] The Algiers Accords, the JCPOA. America has reneged on both
[00:20:01] of them. And now America has started a war against us.
[00:20:05] So we have not engaged in enmity. Let's give an example. The reason there are no American
[00:20:09] cars in the streets of Tehran is Iran or
[00:20:13] America? America. The primary sanctions
[00:20:15] are American sanctions. America does not allow the import of goods. Now,
[00:20:19] this is a brand, a well-known American
[00:20:23] mobile phone brand. The fact that it doesn't have an official
[00:20:26] store, is it Tehran's fault or Washington's? The primary
[00:20:30] sanctions are Washington's primary sanctions. So, first of all, let's reject
[00:20:34] this proposition that we think we should do something
[00:20:38] for America to abandon its enmity. Second,
[00:20:41] the world has changed. The era in which through interaction
[00:20:45] with America, through giving concessions to America, a country could
[00:20:48] develop, is over. The transitional
[00:20:52] period of the international system in Iran has not been understood.
[00:20:55] You see, Foreign Policy,
[00:20:59] its appearance is a media outlet, but it is a think tank
[00:21:03] that influences politics. It says,
[00:21:07] "The end of many events, the alliance
[00:21:09] of Israel and America, neoliberalism, I don't know, transatlanticism."
[00:21:13] These have not been understood yet in our diplomatic apparatus.
[00:21:17] I interact with friends. Look, when I say,
[00:21:20] "the dominant spirit and dominant thought," I'm not talking about individuals.
[00:21:23] There are very capable experts in our diplomatic apparatus,
[00:21:27] but the process that is going on leads to a point where
[00:21:30] you say, "Unless you give concessions to America,
[00:21:33] you cannot develop, you cannot advance
[00:21:37] your own work." This is instead of many events. From
[00:21:40] the beginning of the war until now, the diplomatic
[00:21:44] apparatus says, "We cannot collect tolls
[00:21:47] from the Strait of Hormuz." What can we
[00:21:50] collect? We can collect tolls. Friends, please
[00:21:53] show that Financial Times image.
[00:21:56] This clearly shows they haven't understood
[00:22:00] the world. Can the US government
[00:22:03] kidnap the president of another country?
[00:22:06] No. The diplomatic apparatus's
[00:22:09] answer is no, but what is the reality on the ground?
[00:22:13] It's sophistry. Wait, wait, let me explain the sophistry that can be refuted.
[00:22:16] The diplomatic apparatus says, "Oh, now." It says,
[00:22:20] "Territorial integrity is correct. Can the Iranian army,
[00:22:24] the IRGC, be in the territory of another country?" What does the
[00:22:27] diplomatic apparatus say? "No, territorial integrity." These
[00:22:31] are correct. What is the Turkish army doing in northern Iraq?
[00:22:34] Occupation. We have occupied. Securing national interests,
[00:22:38] securing national interests. What
[00:22:41] happened in Syria?
[00:22:44] Is Golan a terrorist or not? Yes,
[00:22:47] that's correct, that's correct. Now, Qatar and Turkey
[00:22:51] and Qatar and so on say, "Are we meeting with a terrorist
[00:22:55] or a head of state?" Have your national interests been harmed
[00:22:58] or not? Now, because we should not intervene, the country should
[00:23:02] respect Syria's territorial integrity. Who says this? This is not understanding
[00:23:06] the international world. Our diplomatic apparatus,
[00:23:09] our diplomatic apparatus, let me finish this. Our diplomatic
[00:23:12] apparatus thinks, along with Vahid
[00:23:16] Khazab, that it does not understand international discourse.
[00:23:20] Why do we understand each other now? People understand what
[00:23:23] we are saying because we are speaking in Persian, with the Persian alphabet. If
[00:23:27] we speak Chinese, if I speak French,
[00:23:30] many people might not understand, you won't understand. If you speak Arabic,
[00:23:34] I might not understand. In the world, if you
[00:23:37] say, "Hello, President Trump, please let's be friends,"
[00:23:40] "I'll give you this concession," he doesn't understand
[00:23:43] it. What does he understand? The discourse of the international
[00:23:46] system is power.
[00:24:24] Why did they name their operation "Special Military
[00:24:26] Operation?" Well, well, it's just a name, right?
[00:24:30] So it's a fight over a name. Sometimes, I mean, sometimes it seems like, for example,
[00:24:34] our diplomatic apparatus. Look, sometimes the diplomatic apparatus says, "I
[00:24:37] cannot and should not collect any financial revenues
[00:24:41] from the Strait of Hormuz." Amen. Mr. Khanalizadeh's statement is correct. Yes. Sometimes
[00:24:44] the diplomatic apparatus says, "Please, let's not mention the name
[00:24:48] 'toll' because the costs
[00:25:50] of tolls cannot be collected. Are you saying that, or is the foreign ministry saying that it cannot be done
[00:25:54] from here? The fact that it says "according to international law"
[00:25:57] means it hasn't understood the world. Now, let me tell you two things. The foreign
[00:26:01] ministry says this. Then let's compare it with
[00:26:04] America. The foreign ministry says, "According to my statement,
[00:26:07] the US president also, according to international laws, has no right
[00:26:11] to kidnap the president of another country." Now you say, in
[00:26:14] reality, the US president goes and kidnaps the president of another country,
[00:26:18] and then he says, "In reality, I also do what I want in the Strait of Hormuz."
[00:26:22] Let's ignore the fact that that action is bad and this action is good.
[00:26:25] That action is truly criminal, this action is correct, but I want
[00:26:28] to say the fallacy here is that the foreign ministry has a proposition
[00:26:32] that says, "According to international law, this is it," and the foreign ministry has a hypothesis
[00:26:36] that kidnapping the president of another country is criminal because
[00:26:40] it is an interference in something that the people of that country should decide. They have decided. We say,
[00:26:44] "You did it to yourself. I have to do something." Now, let me finish my sentence. No, now let
[00:26:47] me finish my sentence. This statement that we come and say, "The foreign
[00:26:51] ministry has these criticisms, one, two, three," "You don't understand these parts of the world." Well, it's a correct statement. I'm also
[00:26:55] saying this. But if we come and say that this part of the foreign ministry's statement
[00:26:59] also has flaws, for example, if we say, "So-and-so is a person who does this bad thing, this bad thing,
[00:27:02] and this bad thing," for example, "he also prays Fajr." Well, what do you have to do with that?
[00:27:06] Focus on his bad deeds, so that we say, for example, I say, "Muhyi,"
[00:27:10] because if we say, "I have criticisms about four
[00:27:14] decisions of the foreign ministry," no, no,
[00:27:17] we say, "I also have criticisms about its core software, I have criticisms about a macro
[00:27:20] prevailing view," but to say, "He understands nothing of
[00:27:24] the world," no, no, I didn't say that. I said,
[00:27:27] "at least," well, two, "we haven't understood international
[00:27:31] developments." Look, can the world
[00:27:35] after 2008 and before 2008 be compared?
[00:27:38] If someone analyzes 2006
[00:27:41] and 2016 with thought and knowledge,
[00:27:44] they would say they haven't noticed that change. Well, then you are talking about
[00:27:47] a turning point in the international world and around us.
[00:27:51] Our diplomatic apparatus is
[00:27:54] stuck in the post-Cold
[00:27:57] War era, especially at the peak of American hegemonic supremacy.
[00:28:01] It is frozen. It has remained frozen.
[00:28:04] That's why when you read Dr. Zarif's notes
[00:28:08] and Dr. Hadian's speeches, I was a student of
[00:28:11] Dr. Hadian. I believe he is one of the few
[00:28:15] knowledgeable professors. I have been a student of very knowledgeable professors
[00:28:18] at the university, but because they haven't understood
[00:28:21] this change, they are still living in that world. Yes,
[00:28:25] that's why the solution they are proposing is like,
[00:28:29] well, everyone says we have a common part, and you are focusing on
[00:28:33] a part that has no flaws. Wait a minute,
[00:28:36] let me say this amicably. This makes me criticize you. I think there are three criticisms
[00:28:40] that apply. If I tell you, and you look at yourself, or Nima, who is watching
[00:28:43] from outside, says, "Yes, it applies," and I tell you a fourth one that doesn't apply at all, you will also put your hand
[00:28:47] on that and say, "Look, it applies for these reasons." Look, I am an expert.
[00:28:51] From my perspective, it applies. Maybe someone like your cameramen are very professional
[00:28:56] now come and criticize their cinematography, they will say, "I'm an expert, you
[00:29:00] are not." From my perspective, as an expert
[00:29:02] in international relations, when we have gatherings, we chat, we discuss, we talk with international
[00:29:06] experts, we communicate, in our opinion, the flaw is present.
[00:29:10] This is not a bad thing, and stating it is not a bad thing either. If
[00:29:13] our statement is also bad, that's a flaw. But when I say, "Look, this
[00:29:16] statement of such-and-such a foreign minister, this action
[00:29:20] of such-and-such," we gave an example, right? The Astana meeting
[00:29:23] during those 10-15 days leading up to the fall of Syria
[00:29:26] was wrong. The behavior, the action
[00:29:29] was wrong. This, in my opinion. I will open the question about
[00:29:38] America and the issue of development a bit more. Look, what is the claim?
[00:29:41] It says, if you come and enter into a hostile
[00:29:45] and abnormal relationship with America,
[00:29:49] you cannot develop. Excuse me, let me just say this. One
[00:29:52] of the propositions was: The flaws of the world, a trap.
[00:29:55] The war from the beginning before the war. Let me
[00:29:59] complete my question. Mr. says, if I enter into enmity with
[00:30:03] America, I can no longer develop. This is the claim, meaning
[00:30:07] people like Dr. Hadian and others, one perspective is that they say, "If you don't
[00:30:11] normalize your relationship with America, you won't
[00:30:14] develop." Do you pay
[00:30:16] attention? He doesn't say that if you have a friendly relationship
[00:30:20] with America, you will definitely develop. He says,
[00:30:24] "The necessary condition for development is
[00:30:27] not hostility with America." China is an example. He says China
[00:30:31] will not enter into a normal relationship with you because of the much larger relationships it
[00:30:34] has with America, and when it wants to sit with you, it always considers its reservations about what
[00:30:38] to do with the sanctions and so on. This statement is wrong.
[00:30:42] You. One. 1979.
[00:30:46] Iran, Egypt. They chose two paths. Yes.
[00:30:49] Confrontation with America. As friends say, Camp David.
[00:30:53] Cooperation with America. 47 years have passed. Where is Iran? Where
[00:30:57] is Egypt? Yes.