IRINN — broadcast
20260808 230000 UTC
408 transcript segments
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[00:00:18] people on the streets, women, children, babies in their mothers' arms, all families. What is this for? So it shows that
[00:00:22] his unique characteristic is that from wherever he wants to leak it,
[00:00:25] it is the power of faith, it is his scientific power, it is
[00:00:28] his management power.
[00:00:34] To the Imam, to our martyr, thousands of praises must be said together
[00:00:38] that today a nation has been built that, by God, if I want to go
[00:00:41] to my own work, Ms. Qanaati, there are so many strange
[00:00:44] memories of his sensitivity, his behavior with people, with
[00:00:48] children, with adults, and I think this should,
[00:00:52] it doesn't fit in this conversation. God willing, there will be more
[00:00:55] programs, God willing. And what will you name your film? I don't know, I think what
[00:00:59] should I know, but.
[00:01:16] Humans are great because of their attachments. What do we
[00:01:19] know about Hafez? Hafez, his power of thought,
[00:01:22] his power of faith, his book,
[00:01:25] his poetry. We must preserve our Imam
[00:01:29] for what he loved. Our Imam
[00:01:32] was the founder of an anti-oppression revolution
[00:01:36] that God wanted. Through him, the great ones of the world
[00:01:40] gave their lives. If we want to love the Imam well,
[00:01:43] the ideals of the Imam, where the Imam loved, both Imam Rahmatollah
[00:01:47] Alayhi loved, and our martyr loved, and our dear
[00:01:50] leader, and other great people.
[00:01:54] They are a great nation. We must preserve
[00:01:57] the ideals of the leader very well. I think if we say
[00:02:25] the common thread of all good things
[00:02:28] is honesty. It is courage. These are what the Imam
[00:02:31] had, the leader had, and this is the value.
[00:02:35] Everywhere in the world, people love honest people. Now, the enemies cannot
[00:02:39] insult the leader. He was an honest man, a
[00:02:42] brave man. I think the common values of all of us
[00:02:46] are the same. God willing, we can all protect them well
[00:02:50] and preserve them, and definitely we will be the greatest preservers of
[00:02:53] the values of the revolution and our country, and the day will come when all of us
[00:02:57] are proud. We are truly proud. I say this from my own perspective.
[00:03:00] I see the whole world, I know many foreign friends who are
[00:03:04] calling and crying. Why should an American
[00:03:08] cry for you? Who are you? You
[00:03:11] have brought down the dominance of a beast and a monster. This
[00:03:14] is the reality. This would not have happened without the faith of the
[00:03:18] great people who raised us and our efforts and the efforts of our nation,
[00:03:21] which will hopefully endure. God willing, thank you very much.
[00:03:25] You're welcome, we used it, thank you very
[00:03:28] much.
[00:04:00] Find that Quran. See God in
[00:04:03] His greatness. It is "Nasr min
[00:04:07] Allah" and it is "in tanẓur Allah."
[00:04:10] Tell the one who is lost and
[00:04:13] terrified in this wilderness
[00:04:16] that the victory of faith is the
[00:04:19] definite promise of the Quran.
[00:04:22] Heydar.
[00:05:12] Hussein ibn Ali wore a shirt of
[00:05:16] humility and
[00:05:19] he also made the duty of the world
[00:05:22] clear. Hussein came so that
[00:05:26] hearts would be emptied of despair.
[00:05:29] He has divided the world into
[00:05:32] two rows, Hussein's followers
[00:05:35] and Yazid's followers. Heydar.
[00:05:39] Heydar.
[00:07:01] If the world supports you, we have
[00:07:05] the Five. If the world
[00:07:09] supports you, we have the Five.
[00:07:12] You have barrier breakers, we have
[00:07:16] Khaybar breakers. Heydar.
[00:07:19] Heydar.
[00:07:23] Heydar.
[00:07:27] Heydar.
[00:07:31] In that final storm, in that
[00:07:34] final storm, if
[00:07:37] you have read the Shahnameh,
[00:07:40] you know well the end
[00:07:42] of this story is the battle
[00:07:45] of Rostam and the Div. From
[00:07:49] now on, we have one goal, and that is
[00:07:52] the heart and Heydar.
[00:07:55] Heydar!
[00:07:59] Heydar!
[00:10:00] In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. I offer my greetings to you, dear ones. Well, Mr. Kazemi Qomi's interview,
[00:10:04] given his presence
[00:10:08] in various events in Iraq and
[00:10:11] his memories in one of the critical
[00:10:14] periods of that country, the negotiations and various events dragged on
[00:10:18] to a good
[00:10:20] conclusion. The previous session remained incomplete, meaning our discussion in the previous session remained
[00:10:24] incomplete. We greet Mr. Kazemi Qomi and continue
[00:10:27] the discussion. Hello, Sir. Peace be upon you. I also reciprocate the
[00:10:31] greetings to you and your esteemed colleagues and
[00:10:34] viewers who will hopefully benefit from your useful program,
[00:10:37] God willing, Mr. Qami, allow me to ask you a question.
[00:10:41] Let's not pass this important period. Some of our country's
[00:10:45] diplomats announced that they played a serious role
[00:10:48] in bringing the Americans to the conclusion that Saddam should be eliminated
[00:10:52] as an enemy of Iran and a regional rival. This
[00:10:56] is a precise statement. Is this true? The Islamic Republic supported
[00:10:59] the movement of the people, not the occupation
[00:11:03] and aggression of America. We must pay attention to this
[00:11:07] in recording history. Do not align us with America.
[00:11:10] I told you that
[00:11:14] when Saddam
[00:11:17] attacked Kuwait, some raised
[00:11:20] the issue that it was the best opportunity for revenge. The policy of the Islamic Republic
[00:11:25] was that we opposed this occupation, no matter what. Let alone that
[00:11:29] some currents also brought up the issue of Khalid ibn Walid
[00:11:33] and said that it should be
[00:11:37] supported. Both this view and that view were both
[00:11:40] outside the policies
[00:11:44] that the system
[00:11:45] had.
[00:11:52] We have reached a good point. You analyzed it from an international
[00:11:56] perspective. What was Tehran's message
[00:11:58] regarding this event? Was it that we should somehow
[00:12:02] not let the Americans have it easy in Iraq? I am explaining
[00:12:06] this situation so that later when we talk about the policy of the Islamic
[00:12:10] Republic of Iran, this policy
[00:12:13] was adopted in the wisdom of our martyred Imam.
[00:12:17] How wise it is, how
[00:12:20] honorable, how logical! Yes,
[00:12:23] how appropriate it is for the interests of the country.
[00:12:27] How appropriate
[00:12:30] it is for the regional arrangements in the field
[00:12:33] of defense, security, and development.
[00:12:37] And how much this policy is based on
[00:12:40] the idea that the occupier should not last here. These innovations that you
[00:12:44] mention, you say that the Americans should not be established
[00:12:47] in Iraq. How was this supposed to be achieved? Through the Quds Force. The second point
[00:12:51] is now.
[00:12:55] So, the adoption of this policy
[00:12:58] in such a field, psychological, foreign policy, that the Americans
[00:13:02] are announcing to the world
[00:13:06] that I will no longer refer to the Security Council,
[00:13:09] I am America, which today is taking global leadership.
[00:13:12] This decision is a courageous decision.
[00:13:16] This decision is a wise decision.
[00:13:19] Well, so this is one issue. The second issue
[00:13:21] is now.
[00:13:25] This American plan is not supposed
[00:13:28] to succeed. How? With what
[00:13:31] tools? With what tools?
[00:13:35] Is the Quds Force of the IRGC going to come? Is the Revolutionary Guard
[00:13:39] going to come? Is the Islamic Republic going to come
[00:13:42] and fight against the occupier? Which
[00:13:46] tools? The point
[00:13:49] of
[00:13:52] our disagreement with the front is
[00:13:55] here. The view of the Islamic Republic
[00:13:59] is a view of the national interests of countries
[00:14:03] What is the difference
[00:14:05] between us and America? The Islamic Republic
[00:14:09] has tied its own interests
[00:14:11] to the interests of nations. America's
[00:14:15] interests are against the nations.
[00:14:18] This is why after the victory of the revolution
[00:14:22] and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, America
[00:14:25] is failing. Why has the Iranian
[00:14:28] experience been a successful experience?
[00:14:30] The system is a religious
[00:14:33] system of popular sovereignty, and the people
[00:14:37] support the system. Well, when we have this recipe for ourselves
[00:14:40] and we have experienced that we succeeded, we will apply
[00:14:44] this experience in Iraq. So what will be our tool now? Our tool will be the people
[00:14:47] of Iraq, and the people of Iraq, I mean these
[00:14:51] global groups of the people of Iraq. Well, the people.
[00:15:09] One of the biggest things the Islamic Republic of Iran did
[00:15:13] was that
[00:15:16] occupation should not happen
[00:15:19] from Iraq's own path.
[00:15:22] Our role
[00:15:25] is an advisory
[00:15:27] role. It is a
[00:15:30] supportive role. It is about
[00:15:33] explaining to Iraq that this enemy is a
[00:15:37] hundred times more dangerous than Saddam.
[00:15:41] The people of Iraq were aware and
[00:15:45] understood. The religious authority also
[00:15:47] did.
[00:15:51] So instead of directly fighting
[00:15:54] the occupier, we
[00:15:57] invested in the people and the trust we had in
[00:16:01] the people. To what extent? Meaning training, support. How
[00:16:04] now? So we are saying that we moved from
[00:16:08] a classic military war,
[00:16:12] a direct war where Iran would come and get involved,
[00:16:15] to you coming and reviving
[00:16:18] Iraq's own capacity. What did we do
[00:16:22] against ISIS?
[00:16:25] The fatwa of the religious authority
[00:16:29] was issued, and we equipped the Hashd al-Shaabi.
[00:16:32] It was issued that every
[00:16:35] one killed fighting ISIS is a martyr.
[00:16:38] This commander,
[00:16:42] who,
[00:16:46] in the words of our martyred Imam, Hajj Qasem, this
[00:16:49] great man, this great commander, this
[00:16:53] great beloved
[00:16:55] one,
[00:17:00] as an international commander in the fight against
[00:17:03] terrorism, he came and organized
[00:17:08] Iraq's capacity. The army was
[00:17:11] there. As soon as the fatwa was issued
[00:17:15] by the religious authority, this popular movement and uprising
[00:17:18] began. Who was supposed to
[00:17:22] organize this? The Iraqi government
[00:17:25] asked us. Let me announce this.
[00:17:28] Wherever the Islamic Republic entered, it was at the request
[00:17:32] of the governments. Where there was
[00:17:36] a political system, it was the will of the people.
[00:17:39] Yes, it was the same in Syria, and it was the same
[00:17:42] in Iraq. You made a jump and went
[00:17:46] ahead. This period that I want to come back to, I will return there because
[00:17:49] there are many questions, and we should sit with you for 5 hours to talk and
[00:17:53] learn from you, but I wanted to give an example,
[00:17:56] as I said, about ISIS. Now, the fatwa of the religious authority came,
[00:17:59] and the Iraqi government asked us for a popular
[00:18:02] uprising. This
[00:18:05] brave commander of ours
[00:18:08] came and, with the help of the resistance leaders who were
[00:18:12] there at the time and are now central, like the martyred Hajj Abu Mahdi
[00:18:15] and Abu Hassan Ameri and many others,
[00:18:19] they came and organized these facilities, this mobilization, and this force.
[00:18:22] They provided
[00:18:25] and these became the complement
[00:18:29] to the army and the armed forces. You see,
[00:18:32] we paid attention to all the structures for the issue of
[00:18:36] confronting the Americans. This is it. For this revival
[00:18:39] of the people, first,
[00:18:40] we
[00:18:43] have three steps in your soft operation.
[00:18:46] We have psychological operations, we have narrative warfare,
[00:18:49] and we have the issue of cognitive
[00:18:53] warfare. Psychological operations
[00:18:57] are fast, cognitive warfare takes time. In these three areas,
[00:19:01] in order to know that the main enemy
[00:19:04] of the nations in the region is America. This
[00:19:08] one who has come and occupied. We succeeded in this.
[00:19:12] It was both our effort and the understanding of the Iraqis
[00:19:16] themselves, and also the poor
[00:19:19] performance of the Americans themselves.
[00:19:23] Wherever America comes, you know that in their teachings,
[00:19:26] it is this: we are a civilized nation, we go
[00:19:30] and civilize the savages. Then you see their aggressions
[00:19:34] against the girls of the region, what happens? What happens to the people?
[00:19:38] Disregarding cultural and social norms. Meaning this
[00:19:41] thing they did in Afghanistan, after 20 years they fled. Of course, it was planned
[00:19:45] for them to flee Afghanistan. Their military
[00:19:49] withdrew, but not their malice and
[00:19:52] their policies. The same happened in Iraq. The Islamic Republic came
[00:19:56] to the idea that the Iraqi nation itself must
[00:20:00] decide. Well, what did we do in the face of military
[00:20:03] occupation? We came. Now
[00:20:07] we took up arms. He said no, Saddam is gone.
[00:20:11] Very good. Now how should we deal
[00:20:14] with it? Today, Iraq must move
[00:20:18] towards establishing a new political
[00:20:22] system based on the will of the people.
[00:20:24] This was in a situation where the Americans
[00:20:27] were saying that until 2008, there should be no discussion
[00:20:30] of elections. They also brought
[00:20:33] Bremer. This understanding was created.
[00:20:38] When you look at it, it didn't take
[00:20:40] two months.
[00:20:43] Due to the poor performance of the Americans themselves,
[00:20:46] it didn't take two months for protests to start.
[00:20:51] Then the Americans came and what did they do? They saw
[00:20:54] that a military ruler was no longer possible, so they brought
[00:20:57] a civilian ruler. They came and said that we
[00:21:01] will form a consultative council, a constituent
[00:21:04] assembly. What was the message
[00:21:08] to the Iraqis? The Americans say that we
[00:21:11] ourselves want to be in power.
[00:21:15] And you come and advise us. What does this mean?
[00:21:18] It means that you are complicit
[00:21:22] in the crimes that America commits.
[00:21:24] You see, so what became our strategy?
[00:21:28] Our strategy became to repel
[00:21:32] the occupation not through
[00:21:36] weapons, but through a
[00:21:40] social, popular
[00:21:42] movement that would shape the political
[00:21:46] space. The first step resulted in
[00:21:50] this: if you went as a consultant, as I said, they had prepared 3,000 consultants,
[00:21:54] and 90 legal scholars had written the constitution.
[00:21:57] You would be complicit in every crime. At that time,
[00:22:01] the Iraqis backed down. Let me say here
[00:22:04] that the Iraqi leaders, the leaders of the T-shirts,
[00:22:08] and the religious authority also
[00:22:10] played a good role. The Islamic Republic
[00:22:13] also walked hand in hand with the people,
[00:22:17] the leaders of Iraq, and aligned
[00:22:20] with the religious authority, at the head of which is His Eminence Grand Ayatollah
[00:22:23] Sayyed Ali Sistani, may God preserve
[00:22:26] him. May God increase his blessings and his long
[00:22:30] and blessed life.
[00:22:32] God willing.
[00:22:35] So this point. We still haven't
[00:22:38] reached the negotiation. It will be over now. This political system
[00:22:41] must be formed. America didn't want to. What did it
[00:22:44] do? It was forced to, instead
[00:22:47] of forming a council,
[00:22:50] a consultative council. They came and
[00:22:54] established the Iraqi Governing Council, meaning a governing
[00:22:57] council. It was here that Bremer was told to be
[00:23:00] the civil administrator. Then the Iraqi leaders
[00:23:04] would come to this governing
[00:23:07] council. The governing council became
[00:23:10] different from a consultative one, so that each leader would come for about 2 months
[00:23:13] to do what? From
[00:23:16] here, you can see that then America's next step
[00:23:20] was to form a temporary government,
[00:23:23] then the next step was for a transitional government to be
[00:23:26] formed, and then a permanent government. The issue of elections,
[00:23:29] America did not want any of these. After
[00:23:33] that, it was forced, who forced
[00:23:36] it? This was a plan that was being implemented, but this
[00:23:39] popular demand reached a point
[00:23:42] where the Americans, in the year 83
[00:23:46] (2004), protests began,
[00:23:49] opposition began. You see, when the late
[00:23:53] Wasid Abdullah Hakim went to America as the head of the Governing Council,
[00:23:56] what were the demands he presented?
[00:23:59] At the same time, millions of demonstrations were taking
[00:24:03] place in the streets. These things happened.
[00:24:06] Meaning, instead
[00:24:08] of you coming and engaging in a coercive confrontation,
[00:24:12] you explained to the capacities of this nation that you have this
[00:24:16] powerful potential. If you want occupation,
[00:24:19] these coercive confrontations also had their place.
[00:24:22] Occupation occurred. Its requirement is that
[00:24:26] you form an Iraqi government
[00:24:30] based on the will of the people. For this reason, you may
[00:24:33] see that then the Americans
[00:24:37] strongly came and wrote a constitution.
[00:24:41] The Islamic Republic, as one of its valuable services,
[00:24:44] contributed its experience in the issue of the constitution.
[00:24:47] Then elections were held, a parliament was formed. And a permanent
[00:24:51] government was formed. So you moved from that occupation
[00:24:54] that took place and the military commander
[00:24:57] came to the point where a democratic
[00:25:01] system. And here again, just as you didn't
[00:25:04] want the Americans to be established there, the Americans also didn't want Iran to be established
[00:25:08] there. That's another discussion, that America didn't want Iran
[00:25:12] to be established. So that you wouldn't have
[00:25:15] a diplomat present. They raided
[00:25:17] Erbil.
[00:25:20] They arrested our diplomats. Erbil was one section.
[00:25:23] We had nearly 15
[00:25:26] attacks on the embassy. Attacks, for example, imagine a car
[00:25:29] came with about 500 kilograms
[00:25:33] of explosives, and it came and crashed into the
[00:25:37] entrance gate, resulting in 13 martyrs from the people
[00:25:40] and injured. Meaning, you had assassinations
[00:25:43] carried out. You yourself were shot at
[00:25:46] in your car. This was, for example, one of
[00:25:50] the incidents. We
[00:25:52] came to the
[00:25:55] back side of the embassy for
[00:25:59] our consular section. We came and
[00:26:33] a missile directly hit
[00:26:35] inside it.
[00:26:38] This is why our diplomats are walking on the street,
[00:26:41] and the Americans kidnap them
[00:26:45] and take them hostage without saying anything.
[00:26:48] You look around and see where they were taken. Suddenly, we follow up
[00:26:52] why they didn't come.
[00:26:55] We contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they say we don't know. We contact the Ministry of Interior, they say
[00:26:58] we don't know. We follow up with our friends.
[00:27:03] Suddenly, a voice comes out and says that
[00:27:06] your gray Mercedes, your Benz, now
[00:27:10] what time is it? It's 12
[00:27:13] o'clock midnight. Now
[00:27:15] it's in such and such a place with
[00:27:18] the Americans.
[00:27:20] So we quickly send a message through
[00:27:23] friends. I must mention
[00:27:27] our late great man, Mr.
[00:27:30] who truly served
[00:27:37] in the architecture of relations
[00:27:40] between the two countries in the new
[00:27:42] era. This late
[00:27:46] Dr. Ahmed Chalabi.
[00:27:49] The late Mr. Jalal Talabani, Sayyed
[00:27:52] Abdullah Hakim and others who are there. Through
[00:27:56] him, a message was sent to the American ambassador: this mistake
[00:27:59] that has been made, you have taken our children hostage.
[00:28:04] They didn't accept it, but we had the information. Meaning
[00:28:08] the cooperation of the Iraqis with us in these matters was serious.
[00:28:12] Dear viewers, I had many questions
[00:28:15] for Mr. Kazemi Qomi. Mr. Kazemi was also
[00:28:19] explaining sweetly and comprehensively. I still
[00:28:23] have questions. I hope you will record your memories
[00:28:26] comprehensively and completely. Unfortunately, he has only recorded a few sessions
[00:28:30] at the archives center. Meaning, his memories from these sensitive
[00:28:34] and decisive points in the diplomatic history
[00:28:37] of our country and the region have not yet been recorded. I hope
[00:28:41] the responsible institutions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and historical
[00:28:44] record-keeping institutions will pay attention to this matter. May God grant you a dignified life.
[00:28:48] May you be well. May God be your helper and protector.
[00:30:26] The head of the Central Bank said that in recent months, the overdraft of banks
[00:30:29] has not increased. According to Mr.
[00:30:33] The balance sheet control of banks to prevent money creation and inflation is being
[00:30:37] seriously pursued. We
[00:30:39] have controlled liquidity creation through quantitative control and serious
[00:30:43] quantitative control of the balance sheet,
[00:30:46] and we will deal seriously with them if they don't comply.
[00:30:49] Secondly, through,
[00:30:52] in fact, controlling overdrafts. We allowed
[00:30:56] overdrafts. Now, Bank Ayandeh is already.