IRINN — broadcast
20260914 160000 UTC
494 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:38] It just gets more dramatic here. Meaning, the one who fell like this,
[00:00:41] this person, after that fall and probably the injuries he says,
[00:00:45] has climbed up 7,000 feet. If you convert it, it's
[00:00:48] 2100 meters. 2100 meters, look, this person is a
[00:00:51] military man, and everyone who has climbed has climbed a little.
[00:00:55] This thing about climbing 2100 meters
[00:00:59] is not like this. Now, I don't know if this is in our footage or not, because I haven't
[00:01:02] seen the cut footage. He says,
[00:01:05] he says because of the problem that happened and I fell, the seat
[00:01:09] exploded, but I didn't explode.
[00:01:12] My food was gone, I had very little water with me.
[00:01:15] I had nothing. We've shown his fractures and all that, now we'll see. Now
[00:01:19] he also says, after all this, this gentleman
[00:01:23] has climbed
[00:01:25] off. It took a 20 to an altitude of 2100 meters.
[00:01:27] This also doesn't add up. And these things,
[00:01:31] when a pilot says them, we are enemies with this person,
[00:01:34] and we are very sorry that he is alive. But our agreement in this
[00:01:38] program was to analyze with a cool head. These don't
[00:01:42] add up. This person is not uneducated, nor is he overexcited.
[00:01:46] They gave him a script, and the script is again pleasing to the Maga audience, you see. He says
[00:01:49] you should never give in to circumstances. You can,
[00:01:53] you will, and you go. Now let's
[00:02:01] did you have food and water on you?
[00:02:04] typically a survival kit which is included in the
[00:02:08] seat uh has food, water, additional survival
[00:02:11] equipment, some medical uh kit, but due to the damage of my seat
[00:02:15] i did not have one of those with me. did have a
[00:02:18] survival vest which we all wear, so wearing what i you see
[00:02:22] before you plus a harness and and uh
[00:02:26] g- suuit things to help me in the flying aspect, then..."
[00:02:30] top of that as a survival vest that includes some basic
[00:02:33] signaling equipment, communication equipment, very minimal amount
[00:02:36] of water uh and a couple of other tools to help me survive. how did
[00:02:40] you deal with your injuries?
[00:02:43] did my best given the things that we had,
[00:02:47] so the internal ones there's not much to do uh
[00:02:50] about other than make allowances for them as moved, the
[00:02:54] external ones that
[00:02:56] did my best to stop the bleeding once there was an opportunity to do so.
[00:03:01] Well, he says, what about food? He says, I didn't have food,
[00:03:04] I had a little water. What about wounds and such? There were some internal wounds
[00:03:08] that he couldn't do anything about. Most of the wounds were external, which he
[00:03:11] took care of so they wouldn't bleed. He also says, for internal wounds, for example,
[00:03:15] let's say due to this impact, his spine was affected or
[00:03:18] for example, his stomach was bleeding. For example, I was careful while
[00:03:22] moving. Now, exactly, while moving, how can you be careful about your stomach
[00:03:25] bleeding? What do you think you're going to do?
[00:03:28] Your resistance. Meaning, they completely take
[00:03:31] the external stuff to the Islamic Republic's television.
[00:03:35] Actually, this part where he said internal wounds and
[00:03:38] I was careful about them, I really didn't understand it.
[00:03:42] I mean, the first thing he said was that he couldn't do anything about it, which is more logical. Sir, for example, my stomach was bleeding,
[00:03:46] for example, nothing could be done. My lung was also damaged
[00:03:49] due to, for example, air pressure and change. What
[00:03:53] did you do about it? He says, I was careful
[00:03:55] about them.
[00:03:58] This part he is saying is correct. He says all military pilots, because they
[00:04:02] have a device called ejection from the plane in emergency
[00:04:05] situations, are trained in survival and hiding and getting
[00:04:09] themselves to a location where they can carry out extraction operations
[00:04:12] for them. This is completely correct.
[00:04:16] Under their seats, they have some essential equipment for where they
[00:04:20] are going. The seats all have a boat, which of course here
[00:04:23] was on land. They also have a self-inflating boat, meaning it inflates itself.
[00:04:27] They have a limited food
[00:04:31] ration. They have a weapon. A passport for the country they are going
[00:04:34] to bomb. They design fake identification
[00:04:37] documents for him there. He has money from that place, he has
[00:04:41] some dollars or other foreign currencies that might be useful for
[00:04:44] his rescue, because they can't determine where he will fall.
[00:04:48] He has those. This is correct, but
[00:04:52] they were out of his reach. Yes, because the
[00:04:55] seat exploded. Then, let me tell you, he is
[00:04:59] explaining this. And he started that climb,
[00:05:02] and apparently, from what I understood, he also had some bleeding.
[00:05:06] He tried to stop that blood from the external wounds, in addition
[00:05:09] to having fractures.
[00:05:12] He also had bleeding. He says he climbed
[00:05:15] 2100 meters.
[00:05:26] search and rescue planes and landed a makeshift desert air
[00:05:29] strip, they then unloaded small little bird
[00:05:32] helicopters capable of reaching bravo on the ridg
[00:05:36] line several miles away. this is
[00:05:39] Bravo on the ridg line waiting to be picked up.
[00:05:42] The Pentagon declassified this video of the
[00:05:45] rescue. The two service members on either side of
[00:05:49] Bravo were Elite Air Force Para rescue
[00:05:52] operators known in the military as
[00:05:55] PJs. The moment a PJ showed up to me on
[00:05:59] that ridge line was one of the greatest moments of my life, and
[00:06:02] I don't know how to say it anymore clearly thank
[00:06:05] you for all that they did. What did your
[00:06:09] rescuer say when they got to you? The specific conversation. and I think
[00:06:13] I'll leave for another time as I don't want to release anything that's not
[00:06:16] just my story to tell. What did you say to
[00:06:20] them? Let's go.
[00:06:23] Bravo was in American hands, but not out of
[00:06:27] danger. Back at the Makeshift Air Strip, the rescue
[00:06:30] plane's landing gear was stuck in the desert sand
[00:06:34] and the planes could not take
[00:06:37] clandestine unit of the US Air Force to get
[00:06:41] Bravo and the night.
[00:07:12] took him, and then they bombed. This is the last
[00:07:16] video. So, we didn't have
[00:07:19] the injuries. He says I had fractures in my
[00:07:23] lower back, in my shoulder, and fractures in my cervical vertebrae.
[00:07:26] We said before, ejecting from the plane, jumping out, is generally a
[00:07:30] damaging act. Today, because we wanted to come, I
[00:07:33] did a Google search. 30%
[00:07:37] of pilots who have been announced worldwide and
[00:07:40] whose medical condition after ejecting from the plane
[00:07:44] had fractures in their back. That means it's a
[00:07:48] very damaging process.
[00:07:51] And how he had all these and also had bleeding, he stopped his bleeding, then
[00:07:55] climbed 2100 meters. I really have no opinion on
[00:07:58] these. According to the estimate, he says it took 50 hours to reach a
[00:08:01] safe place. In the end, he
[00:08:04] connects it to that strange operation. These are in Dasht-e
[00:08:08] Mohayyar and he tries to color
[00:08:11] the Pentagon's own narrative that this was a search and rescue
[00:08:15] operation, an extraction operation of the pilot.
[00:08:18] Apparently, the operation, with the information we have gathered so far,
[00:08:22] the documentaries produced, the information we have collected from here and there,
[00:08:26] at least my understanding is that it's not like this. There were some
[00:08:29] people there whose presence is
[00:08:32] somewhat problematic. For example, we showed a visa
[00:08:36] from a lady right here in this program. Let the guys
[00:08:39] show Amanda's visa, yes.
[00:08:43] She and, for example, her whole team, with a visa, look,
[00:08:47] she even had enough time to go to Israel. Their base was in Israel,
[00:08:50] so she got a visa. That's it. We had given this before. This is
[00:08:53] the State of Israel Control.
[00:08:56] Israeli border control, which had a B2
[00:09:00] State Permit until
[00:09:02] 286 to
[00:09:05] 20626,
[00:09:07] which back then, when we calculated it, would have been a 60-day visa, effectively. Am I right?
[00:09:11] Yes, the entry time that occurred was actually
[00:09:14] yes. The fact that we explained back then that when she came
[00:09:18] and got a visa like this and entered as a US military force, it means the US
[00:09:22] didn't enter. Americans didn't want to share their special
[00:09:26] operations military intelligence with the Israelis. They didn't want it to be obvious.
[00:09:29] She came as a private person to the US.
[00:09:33] The second part is that they had entered Israel much earlier
[00:09:37] for special operations work. If it's a campaign, if it's a campaign against
[00:09:41] Iran that was entirely based on aerial bombardment,
[00:09:44] there's no need to deploy special forces there.
[00:09:48] Second, the amount of equipment they
[00:09:50] brought, the estimates are clear. They brought this many Little Bird
[00:09:54] helicopters, this many
[00:09:57] other helicopters, this many people came and tried to command an
[00:10:00] area. From the remnants we have
[00:10:04] now, we are certain that they had brought
[00:10:06] some of these four-wheeled off-road
[00:10:10] vehicles.
[00:10:12] And there is more information, but it has not been released yet.
[00:10:15] Apparently, there was a station
[00:10:18] there for refueling and carrying out an
[00:10:22] operation. Then,
[00:10:26] after that, they got stuck right at
[00:10:29] the beginning when their planes landed.
[00:10:33] Contrary to this narrative, this narrative says it happened when they were taking off. At the very
[00:10:37] moment they landed, well,
[00:10:40] at that very moment, this operation was canceled, and
[00:10:43] quickly, all they did there was return.
[00:10:46] This CBS narrative, again, this is my analysis, as far as I understand.
[00:10:50] Maybe there was another reason. Maybe others have other opinions.
[00:10:54] It has two functions.
[00:11:21] The second thing I understand is that now, finally, the time has come when the pressure, really the economic
[00:11:25] pressure in America,
[00:11:28] is coming and affecting the core of Maga in America itself.
[00:11:32] This is the first time. We had a video, I couldn't find it. A truck
[00:11:35] driver took a video of himself,
[00:11:38] he says, "Trump, I voted for you, and I still support
[00:11:42] you, but this Iran issue..." he curses a few times, "Stop it. I, for example,
[00:11:45] it's gotten to a point where it's not worth working.
[00:11:49] I can't move my truck." This is the first
[00:11:52] time the pressures are really affecting American society.
[00:11:56] And this is a part of their psychological operation
[00:11:59] to organize the Maga mindset
[00:12:03] that we are doing something meaningful in Iran.
[00:12:06] And this is a war where we are very strong, we are doing a lot of
[00:12:10] work. He is trying to theorize this for
[00:12:14] them, so to speak. It's a psychological operation. In my opinion, it had no other
[00:12:17] function, and certainly, if this person is
[00:12:21] a pilot, if he really is a pilot, because look, they fully
[00:12:28] showed his face. I really don't understand this. They showed his face, but didn't say his name.
[00:12:31] And if he is a pilot, what he said wasn't like what
[00:12:35] a pilot would say, "I crashed at 160 kilometers per hour,
[00:12:39] I exploded, then I climbed 2100 meters,
[00:12:42] I sat for 50 hours with internal and external bleeding and
[00:12:46] everything because I had the will, and
[00:12:50] yes, a miracle happened, and I was
[00:12:52] rescued." This, in my opinion, is not something a pilot would say,
[00:12:56] even if a miracle happened to him. As a scientific person,
[00:13:00] he tries to keep it to himself, and come and tell
[00:13:03] the physical narrative of the matter. I didn't see that in him. I think
[00:13:07] it has its own function, and the Dasht-e Mohayyar operation needs to be
[00:13:10] covered up somehow. Very good. Mr.
[00:13:19] about the Oman meeting, and we still are, but
[00:13:23] the conditions at the end of the Oman meeting seem...
[00:13:49] In this situation where we are witnessing fluctuations and rising oil prices, why should we
[00:13:53] have gone to the Oman meeting?
[00:13:56] And participated in this
[00:13:58] initiative? Look, in my opinion, I don't
[00:14:02] really agree with this narrative. The reason is
[00:14:05] that
[00:14:08] this Oman meeting
[00:14:10] could have been a
[00:14:13] cornerstone for the beginning
[00:14:17] of a process of change in the political
[00:14:20] and security order of the Persian Gulf.
[00:14:22] Why? And if it had been held, in my opinion, it would have been
[00:14:26] an unprecedented event
[00:14:30] in the past five decades. Meaning,
[00:14:33] in the various crises we have had in these 5 decades, since the Islamic Revolution
[00:14:37] until now, the security
[00:14:40] and political order in the Persian Gulf was an American security
[00:14:44] and political order, in reality. Meaning, the Americans, based
[00:14:48] on the security guarantees they had
[00:14:51] given to the Persian Gulf countries and the
[00:14:55] large number of military bases they had in this region, which is perhaps
[00:14:59] rare in other parts of the
[00:15:02] world, determined
[00:15:06] the agenda, actions, and arrangements of the region's political and security
[00:15:10] order.
[00:15:11] The
[00:15:14] 40-day war created a change.
[00:15:18] I used a term, well, it's a term from Fareed
[00:15:22] Zakaria regarding the order.
[00:15:27] However, in my opinion, before the war, the order of the Persian Gulf
[00:15:31] was, one could say, an American order, commensurate with the fact that
[00:15:34] the countries of the region were heavily dependent,
[00:15:38] consumers in terms of security,
[00:15:41] and heavily dependent on the US and US security guarantees.
[00:15:44] I used the term "American order"
[00:15:48] and "post-American order" in the Persian Gulf because
[00:15:51] after the war, meaning after the attack on Iran and
[00:15:54] the 40-day war, a
[00:15:58] perceptual and strategic gap
[00:16:02] arose among the countries of the region.
[00:16:06] And that was that the Americans
[00:16:09] cannot guarantee our
[00:16:12] security. Well, not only could the Americans
[00:16:15] not protect the interests of these countries
[00:16:19] against attacks, but the Americans
[00:16:22] couldn't even protect their own bases in these countries.
[00:16:25] نتونستن از پایگاه های خودشون توی این کشورها به هر
[00:16:29] صورت مراقبت بکنن و حفاظت
[00:16:30] This does not mean that these countries are reducing
[00:16:34] their dependence on the US,
[00:16:40] or want to reduce their security dependence on the US. Rather, its main meaning is
[00:16:44] that the countries bordering the Persian Gulf and the countries
[00:16:48] of the region have come to the conclusion that they can no longer rely on the US as
[00:16:51] a reliable security guarantor.
[00:16:55] The Mecca agreement can also be evaluated
[00:16:59] within this framework. For the first time, in my opinion,
[00:17:02] if this Oman meeting had been held,
[00:17:06] a political and security taboo in the region
[00:17:10] would have been broken.
[00:17:12] And that was the taboo of the dependence
[00:17:16] of the region's countries on
[00:17:18] American arrangements. The Amman meeting was supposed to be held
[00:17:22] about what? About
[00:17:26] the agreement between Iran and Oman
[00:17:29] for the management of the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:17:33] That is, the Iranian order in the Strait
[00:17:36] of Hormuz. Well, the Omanis
[00:17:39] before this were trying to reach a bilateral
[00:17:43] agreement with us and announce
[00:17:46] it.
[00:17:48] Which met with strong opposition both within Arab countries,
[00:17:52] especially the UAE, and even
[00:17:54] Saudi Arabia, and from the Americans themselves
[00:17:58] to this bilateral agreement.
[00:18:01] And many behind-the-scenes efforts were made
[00:18:04] to disrupt this,
[00:18:08] which ultimately led to Oman's withdrawal
[00:18:12] from the agreement with Iran. Now the Omanis have backed
[00:18:15] down. I'm talking about the first time for this meeting, after the war. You also
[00:18:18] say what exactly happened now. So, what
[00:18:21] exactly is the current status of the meeting? Now, apparently, the meeting
[00:18:24] has been canceled due to a lack of consensus,
[00:18:28] as the Omani Foreign Minister tweeted. But in my opinion,
[00:18:31] the issue goes beyond the discussion.
[00:18:34] The Saudis opposed this due to
[00:18:40] developments in Yemen.
[00:18:42] But the reality is, we must look at this
[00:18:46] within the broader picture. Neither is it desirable for the Americans
[00:18:49] that an agreement between Iran and Oman be signed
[00:18:52] and announced, nor is it desirable for the Saudis,
[00:18:56] in my opinion, nor for the Emiratis. This
[00:19:00] issue of the Oman meeting and the agreement between Iran and Oman
[00:19:04] regarding the Strait of Hormuz still
[00:19:06] has new opponents. Even within the Gulf Cooperation
[00:19:10] Council, there are
[00:19:14] anyway many differences regarding this. The Emiratis are
[00:19:17] strongly against this. One reality that exists is that
[00:19:21] they have an understanding, which is that if we
[00:19:25] accept these Iranian arrangements over the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:19:29] because both at the entrance and exit, it can almost
[00:19:32] be said that Iranian sovereignty and arrangements over
[00:19:35] the Strait of Hormuz and the entry and exit routes were almost
[00:19:39] recognized, and this agreement was reached between Iran
[00:19:43] and Oman. If this were accepted,
[00:19:46] and if this meeting were held,
[00:19:50] it would mean implicitly accepting that Iranian order in the Strait of Hormuz, in my opinion,
[00:19:54] and this is not at all desirable for the Americans either. Meaning,
[00:19:57] if this action were taken, if this agreement were concluded and announced
[00:20:01] in a regional meeting, then the Americans would say, "Where are we
[00:20:04] in this?" In addition to
[00:20:07] the issue that the Americans had before this in negotiations
[00:20:11] with us before the war, after the war, excuse me, meaning
[00:20:15] in the interim, yes, was that, "Hey, forget about these
[00:20:19] Arabs, come with us and reach an agreement
[00:20:22] regarding the Strait of Hormuz. Let's manage this together."
[00:20:26] Yesterday, Trump also reacted and said
[00:20:29] that it's none of his business, and it's not an important
[00:20:33] issue for him either. It's their own business. But the reality
[00:20:36] is that the future
[00:20:39] of the Strait of Hormuz and the arrangements
[00:20:42] made here, and the
[00:20:45] political and security order that will
[00:20:49] prevail over the Persian Gulf. Because the reality is that the previous
[00:20:53] order in the Persian Gulf has collapsed. That is, the American order in the Persian Gulf
[00:20:57] has collapsed. New arrangements and
[00:21:00] new provisions must be established in this region,
[00:21:03] and if this were announced at the Oman meeting as
[00:21:07] its cornerstone, as its foundation,
[00:21:10] this agreement between Iran and Oman, with the support of the regional countries,
[00:21:14] were announced, it would create a serious challenge
[00:21:16] to the presence and to the
[00:21:20] interests and considerations of American security, political, and even
[00:21:23] economic influence in the Persian Gulf.
[00:21:26] Therefore, in my opinion, if this Oman
[00:21:29] meeting had been held, and on the other hand, why were the Omanis
[00:21:33] pursuing this issue? The Omanis had experienced
[00:21:36] pressure, opposition, and threats from the US. That is, Trump openly
[00:21:40] stated that "we will bomb you" to
[00:21:44] the Omanis, and the Omanis backed down after this incident.
[00:21:47] And anyway, they cancelled
[00:21:51] that agreement they had with us,
[00:21:53] although we also, in any case, made changes
[00:21:56] in the diplomatic process with Oman,
[00:22:00] so that the Omanis eventually agreed
[00:22:03] to some issues and some
[00:22:07] of the considerations we had. However,
[00:22:10] Oman was also trying to gather the regional countries around
[00:22:14] itself to reduce the pressure from the US
[00:22:17] and from the UAE, as two main opponents.
[00:22:21] But it didn't work again. And this pressure from the US
[00:22:25] and some Arab players like the UAE, and also
[00:22:29] Saudi Arabia, given that
[00:22:32] in my opinion, one of the reasons why the Saudis pressured
[00:22:35] for the Oman
[00:22:37] meeting
[00:22:39] not to be held is that they intend to gain concessions
[00:22:43] from Iran on the Yemen issue, and tie
[00:22:53] But up to this point, Mr. Najafi has a narrative about the very
[00:22:56] holding of this meeting. He says that this meeting was exactly where this created vacuum
[00:23:00] could be filled by Iran's proactive role.
[00:23:03] And that's why it was completely correct that it should
[00:23:07] be held. We agree
[00:23:10] with Mr. Najafi on thousands of issues,
[00:23:14] but on this matter, I think we will have a 100%
[00:23:17] difference in analysis. Well, not
[00:23:21] 100%, but a lot. Let me mention a few points.
[00:23:23] First,
[00:23:26] the principle of regional arrangements, the principle of multilateral
[00:23:29] participation. The very discussion of participating in Salalah, Oman, a
[00:23:33] meeting between the foreign ministers all around
[00:23:37] the Persian Gulf, all of them, the North Shore, the South
[00:23:40] Shore, everyone together having a meeting, is one
[00:23:44] issue. Its timing is another issue.
[00:23:48] A part of the matter is entirely about timing. So,
[00:23:52] for a moment, let's put all the criticisms about the content
[00:23:55] aside, or the praises, let's just put them aside and not talk
[00:23:59] about whether it was good at this time or not. We are only saying this from
[00:24:02] an analytical perspective. We said we are not the decision-makers,
[00:24:05] they know better. There are a thousand and one hidden
[00:24:09] points in the matter. They see them. We can only analyze to some extent
[00:24:13] based on the explicit information we have.
[00:24:16] Timing is our issue. In the program that Mr.
[00:24:20] Kharatian was coincidentally present at last night, the central
[00:24:24] point of last night's program was exactly the timing.
[00:24:27] It's not just about oil,
[00:24:31] that we just have a Brent price and just say Brent went up.
[00:24:35] We've said this many times in our program. Mr. Qarati
[00:24:39] has completely broken down what indicators,
[00:24:42] what is the X index, what is the MOVE index, what
[00:24:46] are the bond yields, how is the interest rate in Japan?
[00:24:49] What is the US strategic petroleum reserve?
[00:24:53] And several other indicators. What is the geopolitical risk index?
[00:24:56] And where is it now, what are its trends? All these
[00:25:00] indicators together actually come to tell the audience
[00:25:03] what they do. Issues that generally
[00:25:07] say whether the situation is good or bad are presented
[00:25:11] as data,
[00:25:13] sometimes visually so that it's easy to see.
[00:25:17] So, scientifically speaking, it's very simple. They say, "Is the situation good?"
[00:25:20] They say if this chart is low, it's this, if it's high, it's that.
[00:25:24] And these can also be compared on this chart. It makes it very simple.
[00:25:28] Only for this, for this reason. Therefore, a chart
[00:25:31] in one word wants to tell you if the situation is good or bad.
[00:25:34] The combination of these charts becomes the things we say,
[00:25:38] for example, that the per capita income in a country
[00:25:41] is high, for example, a country that sells a lot of
[00:25:44] oil. Then they say, "No, there's another indicator, a
[00:25:48] Gini coefficient, which shows how this money earned is distributed among these people."
[00:25:52] If, for example, 10% of society, 20% of society,
[00:25:55] 95% of that money, then on paper, the per capita
[00:25:59] income is high, but in reality, it's different. Those indicators
[00:26:02] quantify for you whether the situation is good or bad. Well,
[00:26:06] now we have a situation. We are in conflict with America. In what
[00:26:09] situation are we? Of course, Dr. Baqaei's statement was correct that we are not in a no-war, no-peace
[00:26:13] situation, we are in a state of war, in its precise
[00:26:16] meaning. If we want to look at it, that statement is correct. But
[00:26:19] the no-war, no-peace situation, in terms of political
[00:26:23] data, applies to this situation to some extent. So it's not
[00:26:26] wrong to say no-war, no-peace. What does it mean? It means we don't have
[00:26:30] military conflict, but the situation is not
[00:26:32] stable. Meaning, an investor says, "Should I invest now or not?" I, on the other hand, for example,
[00:26:36] cannot export my oil. What should I import? That
[00:26:39] thing, its currency allocation has a problem. The other thing, what about it? These are the
[00:26:43] situations, and it's not peace either. Well, in this situation
[00:26:47] we are in, where do we want to get to? Something that was also raised
[00:26:50] in last night's program was, let's get to a point where
[00:26:53] at least the situation returns
[00:26:56] to the pre-war conditions. I'm saying the absolute
[00:26:59] minimum. Meaning, we must return to February 27th.
[00:27:05] What existed for us on February 27th? A
[00:27:09] shadow of war threat. Meaning, he said he would strike, and he did the next day. That
[00:27:12] must be removed. Third,
[00:27:15] we had economic problems that had foreign origins. We have economic problems
[00:27:19] that have domestic origins. We have economic problems that have foreign origins.
[00:27:22] With certain tools, on that very day, February 27th, we were
[00:27:26] negotiating for him to remove sanctions and so on. He wasn't
[00:27:30] removing them. We said, "Well, let's have a tool." Even
[00:27:34] if we want to continue that process, now some people doubt if it's good or not, but
[00:27:37] now let's have a new tool. So, let's summarize,
[00:27:41] where do we want to get to? Return to the pre-war conditions.
[00:27:45] Second, the possibility of economic reconstruction should be
[00:27:48] provided, and the threat of war removed. Well, they say that to achieve these three
[00:27:52] goals, returning to pre-war means the normalization
[00:27:55] of conditions in terms of war and moving towards a state of peace. Let me also
[00:27:59] explain this.
[00:28:01] In this situation we want to reach, they say, "The enemy came and attacked,
[00:28:05] killed your people, destroyed your infrastructure, and is still
[00:28:09] besieging you. He's not going to fix it for God's sake.
[00:28:12] You have to put pressure on him to accept
[00:28:15] your conditions." Very simply, who accepts
[00:28:19] it? The one who is under serious pressure. That is very clear. Can pressure be
[00:28:23] created in one day? No. That is, even if you, for example, have an atomic
[00:28:26] bomb and drop it on someone, it still doesn't solve
[00:28:30] everything in one day. Well, there are
[00:28:33] processes that must... Well, in these current conditions...
[00:28:37] Where is the situation of America, what do those indicators show? It has reached a point where
[00:28:41] it either has to do something or
[00:28:44] hit harder. Yes, this is an option. Is it feasible? The reasons
[00:28:48] show no, this is one of the options on paper, not practical
[00:28:51] options. Two, start giving concessions. Well,
[00:28:55] if we did something in this situation, even temporarily, the pressure on
[00:28:59] America was reduced, hit. It's in our own interest, even if this action
[00:29:03] is positive in other ways.
[00:29:06] This is regarding its timing, but about
[00:29:09] seven points that no, in terms of
[00:29:13] content, there might be criticisms
[00:29:16] raised, which right now, Trump has a new stance.
[00:29:20] Let's put Trump, I think this discussion will also return to this. Right now, the guys are talking to each other. Guys,
[00:29:24] put Trump's new stance on
[00:29:26] the wall. He said, what about
[00:29:30] Iran's decline, eager to
[00:29:34] do it quickly and under any circumstances. I will decide whether
[00:29:37] the United States will engage or not. This is an issue that
[00:29:41] we are open to. Thank you for your attention
[00:29:44] to this matter. This, perhaps, Mr. Najafi, is one of
[00:29:48] the interpretations of time, meaning Trump is
[00:29:51] taking a stance on this situation right now, observing
[00:29:54] our actions in our relationship with our southern neighbors
[00:29:58] on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf and with himself.
[00:30:17] What is important for us in this war equation is
[00:30:20] that we can and
[00:30:23] are fighting for it, and our most important leverage is
[00:30:27] to establish these Iranian arrangements
[00:30:30] in the Persian Gulf. We need to do this.
[00:30:33] It needs to be accepted. In this path,
[00:30:37] well, you have some tactical and temporal priorities.
[00:30:40] Sir, we shouldn't have gone to
[00:30:44] the Oman meeting. We should have
[00:30:46] let it happen at another time,
[00:30:50] but the reality is that sometimes
[00:30:53] you have to, after all, for those strategic goals, advance
[00:30:57] priorities.