IRINN — broadcast
20260914 163000 UTC
516 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:00] he marches and considers and
[00:00:03] takes a stand. Let's hear your point on the issue of blocking if you have a point to make.
[00:00:07] Look, we have a temporal and tactical
[00:00:10] priority, and we have a strategic
[00:00:12] priority. At the strategic
[00:00:15] level, what is important to us in this
[00:00:19] war equation at the moment is that
[00:00:21] we can and are fighting for it, and
[00:00:25] our most important leverage is to
[00:00:28] stabilize these Iranian arrangements in the Persian Gulf
[00:00:31] and have them accepted.
[00:00:35] In this path, you
[00:00:38] have a series of tactical and temporal priorities as well. You say, "Shouldn't we
[00:00:42] have gone to the Oman meeting and participated? We should
[00:00:46] have waited for another time for this to
[00:00:50] happen." But the reality is that sometimes
[00:00:53] you have to, after all, because of those strategic goals, your
[00:00:57] strategic priorities. Yes, in some cases, you
[00:01:00] shouldn't do something, but because of your strategic prioritization and
[00:01:04] because of those strategic considerations, you have to do it. Besides,
[00:01:08] if we take this as a measure that we shouldn't have done this
[00:01:11] at this time, why? Because the pressure on America
[00:01:15] is gradually decreasing. Well, why are the Americans against this? That is, why
[00:01:19] are the Americans opposing this, and behind the scenes, they
[00:01:22] are making great efforts to disrupt this? Besides,
[00:01:26] the Iranian decision-maker, I think,
[00:01:30] at the same time as he is
[00:01:34] entering a meeting regarding the Strait of Hormuz, which was canceled,
[00:01:37] and he is negotiating, and
[00:01:41] within the framework of those bilateral
[00:01:44] or regional arrangements, as I mentioned to you, the Americans say,
[00:01:48] "We must have a serious role in this doubt." Iran says, "No, I do not accept your role.
[00:01:52] These arrangements must be either bilateral between me and Iran and
[00:01:56] Oman, or finally between me and the countries of the region," which
[00:02:00] was also within this framework that he wanted to
[00:02:03] enter that meeting. Besides, the Iranian decision-maker,
[00:02:06] in addition
[00:02:08] to advancing these negotiations,
[00:02:12] anyway, in the framework of the resistance
[00:02:15] front, the issue of Yemen also becomes active, and
[00:02:19] that also had its effect, which was a serious and important effect, in my opinion.
[00:02:23] That is, it was an important card that
[00:02:25] took shape in this current
[00:02:29] war game. That is, events that occurred in Yemen occurred in Bab el-Mandeb,
[00:02:32] occurred in the incident of, after all, hitting
[00:02:36] that east-west pipeline of
[00:02:40] Saudi Arabia, and today also a center
[00:02:43] and another one. This does not mean
[00:02:46] that Iran or the resistance front
[00:02:49] has retreated or that it has ignored temporal priority.
[00:02:53] No, on the other side, at the same time as we are trying
[00:02:57] to stabilize our arrangements in the Persian Gulf. But
[00:03:00] tension is also increasing there, which is also,
[00:03:04] in my opinion, based on the assessments and analyses
[00:03:07] that the decision-maker has
[00:03:11] regarding the fact that
[00:03:14] the Americans probably decided to increase
[00:03:17] tension, just as we have seen its signs in the past few
[00:03:21] days, both the position that Netanyahu had and the position that Trump had, and also that
[00:03:25] resolution of the Board of Governors referring Iran's file to the Security Council. All
[00:03:29] of these were signs of a situation of escalating tension, and
[00:03:33] I think the events that occurred in Yemen regarding the
[00:03:37] Saudi pipeline may
[00:03:40] have affected their calculations,
[00:03:43] but regarding that issue, I think
[00:03:46] that the Americans
[00:03:50] were not happy with what happened regarding, that is, what was supposed to happen
[00:03:54] regarding the Strait of Hormuz, and for this reason, they tried
[00:03:57] to prevent it from happening. Why? Because at a macro
[00:04:01] and strategic level and in the long run, this is definitely
[00:04:04] against America's security, political, and economic interests in the region.
[00:04:08] Clause five of the agreement, you might
[00:04:11] say, it's an entry.
[00:04:14] I'm not waiting for a checkpoint anymore. Clause five of the agreement
[00:04:18] may have a vote. By signing this memorandum of understanding, the late
[00:04:21] agreement, the late Islam, by signing a memorandum of understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran
[00:04:25] will make arrangements with its maximum effort for commercial ships without
[00:04:29] cost, only for 60% from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman
[00:04:32] and vice versa. The movement of commercial ships will start immediately, and
[00:04:36] considering the need to remove technical and military
[00:04:39] obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, it will be established
[00:04:43] within 30 days. Now, from here
[00:04:46] on, we have work to do. The Islamic Republic of Iran will discuss
[00:04:50] with the Sultanate of Oman to determine the future administration
[00:04:54] and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in accordance with applicable
[00:04:56] international law and the sovereign rights of the coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:05:00] It will also exchange views with other
[00:05:03] coastal states of the Persian Gulf. One
[00:05:07] narrative, one assumption, is that what is happening
[00:05:10] is that the Oman meeting
[00:05:14] was a continuation of the implementation of a memorandum of understanding
[00:05:17] that at least now one side says
[00:05:20] is dead. At least one side, which is the American
[00:05:23] side, says it's dead.
[00:05:26] And in such a state,
[00:05:29] for us to say, "Well, let other countries also come and talk to each other," I only
[00:05:33] understand this from it. Otherwise, the officials of the Islamic Republic, if
[00:05:37] even the officials of the Islamic Republic are not there, anyone else who knows
[00:05:41] geography will say that the Strait of Hormuz is a waterway between two countries, Iran and Oman.
[00:05:44] It's very clear. Therefore, who should decide about it? Iran
[00:05:48] and Oman. Just like about the Suez Canal, which is a natural
[00:05:52] waterway, that is a man-made waterway, but it doesn't matter. It
[00:05:55] passes through the geography of Egypt. Now, no one argues that it reaches
[00:05:58] Greece at the top, and at the bottom, it goes to
[00:06:02] Saudi Arabia and Sudan. What do you have to do with them?
[00:06:06] Suez Egypt, and here Iran and Oman, and Iran has said this
[00:06:10] 200 times. Now, if we say that we have security arrangements
[00:06:13] with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
[00:06:15] Bahrain, Iraq, and, let me tell you,
[00:06:19] Qatar, and all of them, should they give their opinion about it? Why should we even ask
[00:06:22] for their opinion? It's a question. Maybe there's a logical reason, I don't know. I really
[00:06:26] put my ignorance under my feet, and my head reaches the sun, but I don't know. I don't
[00:06:30] know. This is also one of them.
[00:06:33] Why should we ask for Saudi Arabia's opinion? Why should I ask
[00:06:37] Kuwait's opinion on how I should manage the Strait of Hormuz? This is one
[00:06:40] point. The second point is
[00:06:43] that, you see, the assumption is that this meeting that was supposed to be held
[00:06:47] was going to, you are assuming Veda was going
[00:06:50] to come and give Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's opinion on, for example, the waterway.
[00:06:53] If
[00:06:56] it wasn't supposed to, then this is your point. Now, what is the reason for this?
[00:06:59] The reason for this is that the agreement that
[00:07:02] was made between Iran and Oman, which is
[00:07:06] currently in place but has not
[00:07:07] yet been announced,
[00:07:10] its provisions
[00:07:15] should be communicated to these
[00:07:18] countries, as countries that are, after all, concerned
[00:07:21] about this issue. For example, they
[00:07:24] should legitimize this agreement.
[00:07:28] This is one point. The second point is that,
[00:07:31] you see, one side of this issue is us, and the other
[00:07:35] side is Oman. The Omanis, who have
[00:07:39] so far, two or three times, regarding the agreement,
[00:07:45] one of those who wants these countries in the region
[00:07:48] to have at least a minimal role in these arrangements
[00:07:52] is not as
[00:07:55] a guarantor, not as someone who wants their opinion to be heard, but as
[00:07:58] someone who can give
[00:08:01] Oman the courage to sign this agreement.
[00:08:04] After all, Oman has so far, two or three times, under American
[00:08:08] and Trump's threats, and because of the sabotage of actors like Imam. At least
[00:08:15] its advantage is that Oman gains
[00:08:19] more courage to sign this agreement. But
[00:08:23] it is not supposed that their considerations
[00:08:26] will be included in the text of the agreement, and they have not been.
[00:08:29] Saudi Arabia was one of the opponents of this meeting.
[00:08:32] So I think here, the further it goes, the worse
[00:08:35] it gets.
[00:08:36] Look,
[00:08:40] Islam has tied our hands.
[00:08:57] It's true in its own way. We said before, "Sir, the arrangements of this region
[00:09:01] are not going to change their geography in 500 years.
[00:09:05] They are the same." They are the same. So we
[00:09:08] should think for ourselves. This is very clear. And we,
[00:09:12] whatever we are, whoever we are, let's talk to Iran. No, we
[00:09:16] have no problem talking to any of our neighbors. No, we have no problem talking to Oman.
[00:09:20] What does it mean to sit and talk to Iran about this, for example, waterway corridor? That not
[00:09:23] only has no problem, but you should also talk to others.
[00:09:26] Then you don't say, "Sir, this is clause 5." Why are
[00:09:30] you blind to clause 5?
[00:09:33] I say, above it, when there is no agreement,
[00:09:36] that consultation, exchange of views, they had put
[00:09:40] it there. Now that it's not there, it's consultation. Now something.
[00:09:57] Were we supposed to sit and talk about security arrangements there, or did Oman say, "Haji, I'm scared, let's go together two or three
[00:10:01] times to this, for example, dark warehouse that has no light. You be there too so I won't be scared."
[00:10:04] I said, "Okay, you come too." This wasn't it. Which one is it after all? This is something
[00:10:08] that we understand. These two are a bit mixed up. Not in His Holiness's statement.
[00:10:12] Or generally, from places where people talk, officials,
[00:10:16] well, let's not say where, officials in some places, in some planets,
[00:10:19] for example, people talk, there they don't understand what was supposed to be talked about.
[00:10:22] Here, I'm completely Axios and
[00:10:36] I say that a security agreement, which is a strategic issue, has two possibilities. Either it was
[00:10:40] supposed to be concluded here now, and America would receive
[00:10:43] a strategic slap in the face. It's not a problem. The oil price
[00:10:47] and other indicators will drop by $5, but it will have a serious effect. We
[00:10:51] had thought so. This is serious. Look, you sometimes said in issues
[00:10:55] that we seriously thought the other side would do such and such, and then we saw
[00:10:59] that decisions were made based on this. Now we have to ask
[00:11:02] again. After all these serious events, we thought that in the
[00:11:06] Oman meeting, regional security arrangements would be concluded.
[00:11:09] No, nothing was said. Now, if this
[00:11:12] is not the case, let me present a simple process.
[00:11:16] Security arrangements that we should talk about are very
[00:11:19] complex, very
[00:11:23] complex. Firstly, it starts
[00:11:26] with informal security channels.
[00:11:30] Secondly, it starts bilaterally, then it reaches
[00:11:33] public diplomatic channels, bilaterally, and finally it comes
[00:11:37] here. A simple reason for this, besides all this, is that
[00:11:41] Qatar has a dispute with the UAE.
[00:11:44] The UAE has a dispute with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has a dispute with Kuwait.
[00:11:48] Kuwait has a dispute with Iraq. They have the least dispute with us.
[00:11:51] It's really like this, that among them, Iran should be the mediator. That is,
[00:11:55] Iran should say, "I will participate in Oman, and I will reconcile you." That would be more natural. But
[00:11:58] they all agree on us. No, it's not like that. Among
[00:12:02] themselves, regarding, in this war, I want to say, their position towards
[00:12:06] is not the same. Can we say that in a spectrum,
[00:12:09] yes, they all fall on that side? Of course,
[00:12:13] all of them, for example, Iraq was also supposed to be here. No, Iraq doesn't fall on that side.
[00:12:17] And for example, Oman itself, we can't say
[00:12:20] it's completely on that side. They understand this, but they have differences
[00:12:24] with each other. A regional arrangement has been a strategic issue,
[00:12:27] so let's overlook tactical issues. In my opinion, in war,
[00:12:31] when you reach 10 kilometers from Khorramshahr,
[00:12:35] Mr. Akbar Khani is really an expert, and the details of the history
[00:12:38] of the war are in his grasp.
[00:12:41] Operation Beit-ol-Moqaddas, which
[00:12:44] had three phases, two phases of which were successful, and the third phase was the liberation of Khorramshahr,
[00:12:48] and it wasn't. Is that right, Mr. Akbar Khani? That is, it was May,
[00:12:52] and it was almost over, and they hadn't reached Khorramshahr yet. They said, "Now, this is tactical."
[00:12:55] You had gone all this way to liberate Khorramshahr, and if you hadn't,
[00:12:59] everyone would have said that the operation was not successful, although it was a very successful operation, and in the first two phases,
[00:13:03] we had taken prisoners and hit the combat organization. So,
[00:13:06] a tactical issue has a strategic effect in many places. Now, in this situation,
[00:13:10] giving a signal of weakness, which, by the way, is not a signal of weakness, I emphasize
[00:13:14] this, I'm speaking generally. Giving a signal of weakness is a kind of signal that Trump
[00:13:18] writes. They are looking for a deal.
[00:13:21] He cannot just say something like that. He documents
[00:13:25] something to it. He's lying, but with
[00:13:29] his own interpretation. Very much with this
[00:13:33] part. If there are even security arrangements,
[00:13:36] then it seems it didn't happen. If it was
[00:13:40] for the Strait of Hormuz, then it becomes even more wrong. Why? Because there were two
[00:13:43] possibilities. Either we thought Oman would accept it if they
[00:13:46] came, which you yourself are saying. I don't assume that
[00:13:50] Oman would accept such a thing without America's permission. Or
[00:13:54] we thought Oman, which wouldn't accept it, would
[00:13:57] come and tell Bahrain to help Oman accept to sign an anti-American
[00:14:01] thing. This is really strange. And it didn't happen in reality. First,
[00:14:05] Bahrain said, "I'm not coming." The UAE said, "I'm not coming either." Saudi Arabia said,
[00:14:08] "Why did Ansarullah come there and do what? I'm not
[00:14:12] coming either." I just told you that we are not talking about you. Someone
[00:14:16] else has opponents. The first of them are the Americans
[00:14:19] themselves. My point
[00:14:23] is not that
[00:14:25] if this agreement, if this meeting were held, and if that
[00:14:29] agreement were announced, all the political, economic,
[00:14:32] and security arrangements of the region would be transformed.
[00:14:36] No, but a change would occur. It has been announced
[00:14:40] without that meeting. What's wrong with that? Didn't we sign with Trump?
[00:14:43] Pezeshkian was in Tehran, he was in Paris.
[00:14:46] I explained the reasons, I explained why, after all,
[00:14:49] this meeting, which I think
[00:14:52] if it were held, and the agreement were announced
[00:14:55] in this meeting, it would definitely be in our favor.
[00:14:59] That's my opinion. I have another question. I'll ask you this too. Now, I don't know what our time
[00:15:03] allows. You see, my question is
[00:15:07] that, like the very issue of the memorandum
[00:15:09] of understanding between us and America, where we said that if this
[00:15:13] memorandum of understanding had happened, it would have been good. Is
[00:15:17] there not a criticism that the reason
[00:15:20] for the failure of this Salalah
[00:15:23] meeting in Oman was that it wouldn't be held, just as it wasn't
[00:15:27] held? That is, if it were held, that is, you were fundamentally dealing
[00:15:30] with countries that wouldn't hold it.
[00:15:34] They haven't held it now either. Or if they do, they will shape
[00:15:37] that meeting in another way. That is, they won't yield to your game, at least in
[00:15:41] this current stage. We still have time to pass
[00:15:45] until we can bring the countries of the region into our game. Yes, I
[00:15:49] completely agree with this statement. That is, in any case, for
[00:15:53] this reason, I was very surprised
[00:15:56] in the past few days about how this meeting
[00:16:00] was going to be held and whether it would be held
[00:16:03] at all. Yes, I had serious doubts from this perspective that,
[00:16:08] after all, I knew that it had serious opponents. Besides, that's
[00:16:12] why I say, if it were held, it would be in our favor. That is,
[00:16:15] it would definitely be in our favor, and an agreement would come out of it. The Iran-Oman
[00:16:19] agreement. The fact that it hasn't
[00:16:22] been held and, after all, has serious opponents,
[00:16:26] this is an issue that I myself mentioned at the beginning of the program,
[00:16:29] that, after all, both the Americans are against it and the Emiratis are against it.
[00:16:32] The Emiratis made a very extensive lobby to prevent this agreement
[00:16:36] from being announced. Just as last
[00:16:39] time, after the
[00:16:42] conversation that the ruler of the UAE had with Trump,
[00:16:46] that threat against Oman was made, that if you make this agreement and
[00:16:49] if you do something outside of America's considerations, we will
[00:16:53] bomb you. Therefore, these are two issues. That is, two very
[00:16:56] separate issues, in my opinion, and
[00:16:59] after all, these must be analyzed separately.
[00:17:02] Nima, look, what is happening is
[00:17:05] that we,
[00:17:07] at least in our country, don't see the conditions as warlike. That is,
[00:17:11] if you look at history, in
[00:17:14] warlike conditions, things become a bit different.
[00:17:16] Most of these international orders that you see
[00:17:20] established, actually, not through agreement, but through war. They emerge
[00:17:24] from within war. And when there is
[00:17:27] war, this discussion I'm having is completely historical. First,
[00:17:31] that order is established. One person completely dominates,
[00:17:35] and then everyone accepts it and signs.
[00:17:38] So that from that date onwards, that order
[00:17:41] is not enforced by gun, but by a contract that other
[00:17:45] countries also have a percentage of interest in. It should be established,
[00:17:48] it shouldn't be by gun. It has a difference with a gun. As long as it's by
[00:17:52] gun, the one who established that order by gun gives nothing
[00:17:56] to others. He gives a small percentage.
[00:17:59] The gun itself becomes easier, and they also get something.
[00:18:03] This is how it is. Look, what was happening was that we had
[00:18:20] The case is this: you wrote something that is good, but the problem is that
[00:18:24] it doesn't work. Which agreement? The MOU
[00:18:27] itself.
[00:18:30] No, no, I'm giving them an example. That
[00:18:34] some senior officials talk about it every day.
[00:18:42] It was just that. Suppose I'm saying a hypothetical
[00:18:45] issue, so that based on this assumption, we have an analysis. Suppose
[00:18:49] this didn't happen. The Omanis came and signed with us. Do you
[00:18:53] think America would have stopped putting pressure on the southern corridor from tomorrow?
[00:18:56] No. That is, still no. First, the order
[00:19:00] must be established, then you go and sign.
[00:19:04] The order is not fully established. The one
[00:19:07] who should give in in the middle are the Americans,
[00:19:10] the Emiratis, Bahrain, which had been cursing
[00:19:14] us since yesterday afternoon. Finally, these need to be sorted out,
[00:19:17] and they need to get off this devil's horse they are riding.
[00:19:20] Then you can sign something
[00:19:24] with them. Why was there a possibility of signing?
[00:19:27] I really thought it would be signed, unlike you. I think they will hold
[00:19:30] the meeting and it will be signed, and they will bring down 110
[00:19:34] dollar oil to 70 and 80 again. Then
[00:19:38] it won't work. Exactly the game that you saw happened
[00:19:42] with the MOU. That bad economic situation came down,
[00:19:45] but no special change happened. Mr. Khazab came here and
[00:19:49] counted several times on this wall for several people,
[00:19:53] that they didn't give you your money. The issue of the axis
[00:19:56] of resistance in the region, our allies,
[00:19:59] has not been resolved. I don't know, they didn't accept the Iranian order
[00:20:03] in the Strait of Hormuz. None of these events, none of them. Yesterday,
[00:20:06] Mr. Kharatian also brought up something interesting. Mr. Irvani
[00:20:10] even wrote a letter to the United Nations, listing
[00:20:13] the violations.
[00:20:15] I think the problem is this: we need to take
[00:20:19] an approach, a look at history. The post-war international
[00:20:23] orders are like this:
[00:20:26] first, it is established, then they make an exchange
[00:20:29] for putting down their guns. They sign something together. First,
[00:20:33] the winner and loser are determined. And there, it is in that
[00:20:37] situation where tension is high, it is to the detriment of the enemy. Let's not do anything that
[00:20:40] can allow them to win. I said this is strategic and tactical. Look,
[00:20:44] after all, this order has pillars.
[00:20:47] I'm not saying that if that agreement
[00:20:50] in Hormuz happens, all these pillars will be established. No, Hormuz is one
[00:20:54] of these pillars. I say it has been done. What do we have to do with
[00:20:57] gathering everyone to sign together?
[00:21:00] Who has a problem? Well, there's also an atmosphere, Mr. Najafi. That is, for example, when something
[00:21:04] happens, for example, we talk about the Emiratis
[00:21:07] like this. That is, it's not just
[00:21:11] one agreement. There's a specific discussion related to that
[00:21:14] event, which is not there, and then there's a lot of
[00:21:17] peripheral issues. So when we, with the UAE,
[00:21:21] to use Mr. Nima's words, fought against us, meaning a fighter
[00:21:25] is the only country that openly, with Mirage aircraft,
[00:21:28] only they have it, came and bombed
[00:21:31] you with the flag of the UAE. It's very
[00:21:34] important. Look, there should be no unfairness. We didn't
[00:21:37] hit the UAE. You see a picture, for example, we laid
[00:21:41] down two missiles on the ground. We didn't do it.
[00:21:44] If we had, I wouldn't be sad. I would say they hit us, and they got hit. The UAE
[00:21:48] is not the same UAE as before. That is, the UAE that before the war constantly invited
[00:21:52] great powers and issued joint statements about the three islands. Well,
[00:21:55] these
[00:21:58] issues are actually the result of force. Yes,
[00:22:00] the result
[00:22:02] of, for example, but one point is also that these countries in the region
[00:22:06] are caught in a strange security
[00:22:09] dilemma. We agree. Do we really think that with the Oman
[00:22:12] meeting, Baghdad, Dubai, wherever, I don't care, it will be resolved?
[00:22:15] Does it even take shape?
[00:22:19] I don't want to. I want to know how that security dilemma,
[00:22:22] this statement from all of them, I want to know
[00:22:25] what effect this meeting has on that. Look,
[00:22:29] let me say it dramatically. When
[00:22:32] does it become right? When does this understanding with Oman work?
[00:22:35] We took time from the network. While thanking Khabar Network for broadcasting,
[00:22:39] we have time, I think 15 minutes, to bring the discussion to a conclusion. Now,
[00:22:43] you state your point. This bilateral understanding works. When all of them
[00:22:46] come and sit in Tehran, that's right. Well,
[00:22:50] then it's clear who the winner and loser are.
[00:22:54] What order is going to be established? Oman, I don't think
[00:22:57] even claims to determine the order of, for example, the Strait of
[00:23:01] Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, and the Sea. Anyway, Oman is one side of this issue,
[00:23:05] and we also need to bring Oman into
[00:23:08] the agenda and arrangements that we
[00:23:11] want. If
[00:23:14] I'm not mistaken, this has already happened. If we were able to reach
[00:23:18] an agreement with the Omanis regarding
[00:23:22] I said why America opposed it. Let me present a hypothesis.
[00:23:26] Yes, it might be a correct statement. It was in America's
[00:23:29] favor. So why did America oppose it? Why do I say America
[00:23:32] opposed it? The sign of America's opposition is that Bahrain,
[00:23:36] UAE, Saudi Arabia say, "We're not coming." This is a sign of America's opposition. But
[00:23:40] America is later. Ruhollah ضرب says that some are really
[00:23:44] like a donkey waiting for a sign. That is, if America points,
[00:23:47] it's over for some of these countries. Now, now, these small
[00:23:51] countries. Since we are not official authorities, we can speak
[00:23:54] freely. These people really killed our children. Let's not forget
[00:23:58] who we are talking about. But now, here,
[00:24:02] America still had an assumption that it was going to
[00:24:05] open the Strait of Hormuz agreement as well. Let's not forget that this very
[00:24:09] thing that was written and its clause is really good, we
[00:24:13] repeatedly said that this clause is a masterpiece. We also said
[00:24:16] this honestly. The fact that it said, "Well, so be it," means the Strait of
[00:24:20] Hormuz will open with my arrangements. It didn't happen again.
[00:24:24] Yes, now again, the assumption was that the Oman
[00:24:27] meeting was based on what? The opening of the Strait
[00:24:31] of Hormuz. Therefore, up to this point. Otherwise, did you
[00:24:34] think Busaidi, for example, said, "Don't tell Trump. Let's hold a meeting
[00:24:38] and invite others"? Before he even answered
[00:24:41] Mr. Araghchi's call, he would call Trump and ask, "May I
[00:24:45] answer their calls or not?" Seriously, what I'm saying is not a joke.
[00:24:49] It's the reality of the diplomatic scene of this country. Well, for
[00:24:52] Iran and for America, as
[00:24:55] I told you, the issue is fundamentally strategic.
[00:24:58] That is, no, they thought the Strait of Hormuz would open, and then they saw Iranian
[00:25:02] officials give very good interviews. Even Mr. Araghchi also said in an interview that, no, this
[00:25:06] agreement that has been signed is not an opening. After this
[00:25:09] interview, everything, all positions changed.
[00:25:12] Suddenly, that is, in their understanding, I'm not saying
[00:25:16] they were promised something. No, no, their
[00:25:20] understanding was that, "Well, here too, the Strait of Hormuz will also open through this middle
[00:25:23] corridor." Then they saw no, it won't open. Suddenly, they backed
[00:25:27] out. Bahrain said, "I'm not in." Yes, I will now tell you that analysis regarding Yemen
[00:25:31] and all that. You said, "Perhaps the Saudis wanted Iran
[00:25:35] to put pressure on the Yemen front to allow this strait." Yes, I think
[00:25:39] it's one of, because this coincided exactly with this meeting and the issue
[00:25:42] of Yemen and the hitting of that east-west pipeline
[00:25:45] of Saudi Arabia. In my opinion, this can be one of the hypotheses
[00:25:49] that the Saudis put pressure. This is separate from that
[00:25:52] American issue and the Americans' opposition, that
[00:25:56] the Saudis intend to, in any
[00:26:00] case, by delaying this issue and creating disruption
[00:26:03] in the Iran-Oman agreement,
[00:26:06] gain a concession from Iran in the
[00:26:09] Yemen domain. That is, I think this is one of the cases that the Saudis
[00:26:13] will probably pursue. Well,
[00:26:16] if you agree, let's move on to the NPT discussion as well.
[00:26:19] We have two positions, the sweet NPT discussion. Yes, let's
[00:26:23] have the NPT discussion too. I wanted to tell you
[00:26:26] that yes, I don't know, Mr.
[00:26:30] Dr. Baghaei also had a position. I had put it there. If friends
[00:26:33] also put
[00:26:36] this, I think it's not bad, because
[00:26:40] now, given the recent meeting that was held
[00:26:43] by the Board of Governors, well, friends, please put this part
[00:26:47] of Mr. Dr. Baghaei's speech, the respected spokesman of the Ministry.
[00:26:49] Yes,
[00:26:58] this is from Mr. Baghaei's recent interview, press conference, and other things, part of the contradiction
[00:27:02] and
[00:27:06] audacity of the opposing sides. From one
[00:27:10] On their own behalf, they are doing something that questions the
[00:27:14] existential
[00:27:16] philosophy of the NPT regime,
[00:27:18] and
[00:27:21] on the other hand, they complain that why do countries fundamentally
[00:27:24] talk about deterrence-related
[00:27:27] and nuclear issues?
[00:27:30] The
[00:27:33] primary reason for such discussions
[00:27:37] are those who are rendering the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ineffective
[00:27:40] in all its parts.
[00:27:43] The NPT has three
[00:27:47] fundamental principles: nuclear disarmament, prevention
[00:27:50] of the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
[00:27:54] and the part that is very important to us is the peaceful
[00:27:58] use of nuclear energy. Well, neither in the field of disarmament,
[00:28:05] the spread of nuclear weapons, nor in
[00:28:07] connection with non-proliferation have they been successful. They allowed
[00:28:11] their friends to have
[00:28:14] nuclear weapons, including the Zionist regime, and regarding
[00:28:17] the benefit of countries, including developing countries, from
[00:28:21] nuclear energy, see how they obstruct.
[00:28:24] They have used every tool, especially in relation to
[00:28:27] the Islamic Republic of Iran.
[00:28:29] Therefore,
[00:28:32] self-restraint is not a solution for us. Well, the policy of the system
[00:28:36] is clear. Surely, as a country with
[00:28:40] a civil society, our parliamentary
[00:28:43] representatives discuss various issues.
[00:28:46] We cannot prevent
[00:28:49] dialogue and debate
[00:28:53] on various issues that relate to the country's national security.
[00:28:56] Let's not forget that Iran is the only
[00:29:00] country whose nuclear facilities have been attacked several
[00:29:03] times over the past year and a half. Let's not
[00:29:07] forget that our nuclear scientists have been assassinated. Over
[00:29:10] these few decades, sabotage has occurred
[00:29:13] in Iran's nuclear facilities under circumstances where all
[00:29:17] these nuclear facilities were under the supervision of the agency, and Iran has been fully committed
[00:29:21] to its safeguards
[00:29:23] obligations under the NPT.
[00:29:26] Therefore,
[00:29:28] in such a context and environment,
[00:29:31] it is not
[00:29:35] strange for
[00:29:39] those who have a position in media
[00:29:42] and political discussions
[00:29:46] to talk about these issues, I don't think
[00:29:49] it's strange.
[00:29:51] Well, Dr. Mohsen Rezaei also has a stance, Major General
[00:29:55] Mohsen Rezaei also has one. Let's also consider the stance he took on his
[00:29:59] X page in English. Friends should also have that. It was about the NPT. That is also
[00:30:02] important, in my opinion. The
[00:30:06] anti-Iranian resolution adopted by the Board of Governors is illegal, technically
[00:30:10] unfounded, completely political, and unacceptable, and clearly bears
[00:30:12] the fingerprint of American
[00:30:16] and Zionist pressures. The political and destructive actions
[00:30:19] of the International Atomic Energy Agency will push countries towards
[00:30:22] withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT.
[00:30:26] Mr. Najafi, do these statements
[00:30:30] we are seeing from officials indicate
[00:30:32] a serious will within the country?
[00:30:36] Before we even get into how you analyze it, should we or shouldn't we,
[00:30:39] how far should we go
[00:30:52] the country's nuclear issue, now these stances that our officials have taken
[00:30:56] regarding the NPT issue.