IRINN — broadcast
20260914 170000 UTC
394 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:08] The anti-Iranian resolution adopted by the Board of Governors is technically
[00:00:12] baseless, entirely political, and unacceptable. It clearly
[00:00:15] bears the fingerprint of American and
[00:00:18] Zionist pressures. Politicized and destructive actions
[00:00:21] by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will push countries towards
[00:00:24] withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
[00:00:28] Mr. Najafi, these stances we are seeing
[00:00:32] from officials, do they indicate a
[00:00:36] serious will within the country before we delve into
[00:00:40] how you analyze it? Should we or should we not?
[00:00:44] How far should we go? You
[00:00:56] these stances that our officials have taken regarding
[00:01:00] the NPT issue and the change
[00:01:03] in nuclear doctrine, which this term is less
[00:01:07] used, more often, the stances revolve around
[00:01:11] withdrawal or non-withdrawal or revision in the NPT.
[00:01:14] We had this before. Before the 12-day war, we had it.
[00:01:18] After the 12-day war, we had it. Martyr Larijani brought it up. Martyr
[00:01:21] Kharrazi brought it up. It's not the first time. This is not the
[00:01:25] first time, but
[00:01:29] in reality, it was more hasty. Now it has
[00:01:32] increased. More officials are talking about it. There is
[00:01:36] more frankness, I think. It has
[00:01:39] become more widespread, because, I think,
[00:01:42] more demand is forming around this.
[00:01:46] In reality, in 2019, I wrote a
[00:01:49] note that had no relation to these current developments,
[00:01:53] and I argued that we should move towards nuclear deterrence.
[00:01:56] This is a historical discussion related to Dr.
[00:02:02] from Qajar to the current situation,
[00:02:05] and that is that, in any case, a state and
[00:02:08] an entity called Iran faces an issue called
[00:02:12] survival. This is not a matter of courtesy.
[00:02:15] Why are we facing survival? Look,
[00:02:18] throughout history, no country has been
[00:02:22] attacked as much as Iran. That is, the most
[00:02:25] foreign aggressions in the world were carried out against
[00:02:30] an entity called Iran. More than 400
[00:02:33] attacks, of which approximately 50 were large and devastating
[00:02:37] attacks. You are talking about this historical basis. I haven't
[00:02:41] counted. Look, and within this framework, our political elites
[00:02:45] and governments in Iran
[00:02:49] — and this is not just related to the Islamic Republic — have always faced
[00:02:52] the issue of how to
[00:02:56] maintain survival. Unfortunately, the
[00:02:59] governments before the Islamic Republic of
[00:03:02] Iran , for various reasons,
[00:03:06] could not secure this survival. For example, during the
[00:03:10] Qajar period, twice the current size of Iran was separated from Iran.
[00:03:13] Or during the Pahlavi period, we gave away
[00:03:17] part of the country's territory.
[00:03:20] And it seems that, perhaps, Pahlavi had started that nuclear project
[00:03:24] towards the end of his reign.
[00:03:27] According to the available documents, according to
[00:03:43] because we have several models
[00:03:47] of maintaining survival or ensuring national security. Either
[00:03:51] you go towards balancing great powers,
[00:03:54] which was perhaps the Qajar model,
[00:03:58] where the country became a buffer zone.
[00:04:01] Or you go towards strategic reliance
[00:04:04] on a great power, which was the Pahlavi model, and this was
[00:04:08] not successful either. Our model was strategic self-reliance.
[00:04:12] That is, let's go,
[00:04:16] which was also based on conventional tools like missiles and
[00:04:20] drones and asymmetrical regional tools.
[00:04:23] In the note I wrote, I said that this
[00:04:27] doesn't work, in reality. That is, it cannot
[00:04:31] create complete deterrence for us,
[00:04:33] and eventually leads to a military attack on the country.
[00:04:37] Given
[00:04:40] this particular geopolitics that we have, which I don't want to elaborate
[00:04:43] on, it doesn't help, or it cannot, in my opinion, address the issue of survival.
[00:04:47] That is, the issue of survival also means
[00:04:50] that gradually, if you enter a war, the tools
[00:04:53] of deterrence will erode and be depleted,
[00:04:56] and it will challenge your existence.
[00:05:00] What has happened
[00:05:04] now, in our opinion, is that we have been at war for eight months. Have
[00:05:08] our military deterrence tools depreciated
[00:05:11] or developed? Look, we have added some
[00:05:15] geopolitical levers to our deterrence
[00:05:19] tools, but the reality is
[00:05:23] that, in any case, we are facing a great
[00:05:25] power and two nuclear
[00:05:28] powers, and we are dealing with them.
[00:05:32] You are naturally in a strategic
[00:05:36] imbalance with them. It's true that they couldn't
[00:05:40] defeat you
[00:05:46] existence, but this strategic imbalance and strategy exist. What's the difference? or destroy your
[00:05:49] Besides conventional military
[00:05:52] tools, there are unconventional
[00:05:55] and nuclear deterrence tools, and in any case,
[00:05:59] the nuclear tool and the nuclear threat
[00:06:02] that they have, we don't have nuclear bombs.
[00:06:05] Yes. Look,
[00:06:09] before the 12-day war, given the perception we had, we
[00:06:13] used to say that they wouldn't attack us, and even if they did,
[00:06:16] we would change our nuclear doctrine. Martyr Larijani
[00:06:20] stated this very clearly, and Martyr Kharrazi
[00:06:23] did the same. But we were subjected to a military attack.
[00:06:27] All our efforts in these 20-30 years, these 20 years, two decades
[00:06:30] that we negotiated, were sanctioned, agreed,
[00:06:34] negotiated again, sanctioned. And this vicious
[00:06:37] cycle of negotiation, sanctions, agreement, then
[00:06:41] sanctions and threats continued.
[00:06:44] What was our goal? Our goal was not to enter a military confrontation.
[00:06:48] That is, through these negotiations and
[00:06:51] agreements, we aimed to prevent a military attack on the country. But
[00:06:55] it happened. 23 years. Yes, 23
[00:06:58] years, and the country entered a war. That is,
[00:07:02] in addition to sanctions, it also entered a war. Nuclear facilities
[00:07:06] were targeted, and after the 12-day
[00:07:09] war, you faced a snapback. After the 12-day war,
[00:07:13] you again faced a new
[00:07:16] war. With what goal? With the goal
[00:07:20] of destroying your existence
[00:07:23] and putting it at risk. After
[00:07:25] all these things that happened, we must ask ourselves
[00:07:29] a question beyond the NPT issue,
[00:07:32] because the NPT is one of the aspects of changing
[00:07:36] our nuclear doctrine. The question is,
[00:07:39] do we want to continue our nuclear
[00:07:43] doctrine according to the same previous routine?
[00:07:47] If the answer to this question is positive and we want to
[00:07:51] continue this on the same previous routine,
[00:07:55] another question arises: What was the result of that strategy?
[00:07:58] The result of that strategy was nothing but
[00:08:02] a military attack on the country.
[00:08:05] It wasn't. And the question now,
[00:08:08] the important question that arises, is: Should
[00:08:14] we move towards changing our nuclear doctrine or
[00:08:17] not? Well, now, and if
[00:08:20] we do, what strategic consequences and
[00:08:23] advantages can this have for us? Now,
[00:08:27] again, we face two issues. One issue is
[00:08:30] the possibility of changing our nuclear doctrine, whether
[00:08:34] it's technically possible or not, and whether there's political will
[00:08:38] or not. The other is that, in any case, if it's
[00:08:42] possible, in what framework do we want to change
[00:08:45] the doctrine? Because again, two issues arise.
[00:08:49] Some friends suggest that we can achieve
[00:08:52] nuclear deterrence through nuclear ambiguity,
[00:08:56] which I think is a very dangerous assumption. Let's pause
[00:08:59] before getting there. There are two questions. The first question is, do
[00:09:03] we want to prevent an attack? Do
[00:09:06] we want to prevent an attack on our country,
[00:09:09] or do we want to preserve
[00:09:11] our survival? If you say we
[00:09:15] want to prevent an attack, critics who have moved towards
[00:09:19] weapons say, what do they say? They say,
[00:09:23] Russia, a nuclear country, couldn't prevent an attack. It can't. Now,
[00:09:26] the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is between a completely nuclear
[00:09:30] country with a very large arsenal and a non-nuclear
[00:09:34] country. But Russia cannot prevent attacks.
[00:09:37] This is the first point. The second point is, they say, if you are concerned about
[00:09:41] survival, a nuclear power has also not been able to
[00:09:45] jeopardize your survival. Despite fighting, attacking,
[00:09:49] and leaving, it has achieved no result. From these two
[00:09:52] propositions, what do they infer? They say, whatever our purpose,
[00:09:56] we don't need nuclear weapons.
[00:09:59] So why pursue something that becomes a burden
[00:10:02] and makes our situation harder, and so on? What is your answer?
[00:10:06] Look, we need to see
[00:10:09] what
[00:10:12] objective a country pursues from acquiring
[00:10:15] nuclear weapons, and
[00:10:19] what results nuclear deterrence can
[00:10:22] have for a country, according to experience.
[00:10:26] Look, the most important issue is
[00:10:29] not that if you have nuclear
[00:10:33] weapons, you won't be militarily attacked.
[00:10:36] The most important issue is that they won't
[00:10:39] threaten your existence. That is the difference between these
[00:10:43] two. Look, when
[00:10:46] I have a question: If Russia didn't have nuclear
[00:10:49] weapons, would Europe and America have acted
[00:10:53] in the Ukraine war in this manner? Would they not have
[00:10:57] intervened more directly? Would they not have threatened Russia
[00:11:00] with nuclear weapons? Why? I think they would have. If Pakistan, in my opinion,
[00:11:04] now Ni'ma is not an expert in this field, but if Pakistan and
[00:11:08] India did not have nuclear weapons, meaning this strategic balance
[00:11:11] and balance of terror between them did not exist, would
[00:11:15] their war have ended at that point? No, it wouldn't have continued.
[00:11:19] Someone would have come to destroy it. The
[00:11:22] difference is this: If we,
[00:11:26] the next point is North Korea, and
[00:11:29] again I refer to the statements of Trump and
[00:11:32] Rubio.
[00:11:34] North Korea, which has nuclear weapons, America
[00:11:38] dealt with North Korea in the same way it dealt
[00:11:41] with us? Very differently. And
[00:11:44] they respect it. As Trump says, if they had
[00:11:48] nuclear weapons, I would have to
[00:11:51] call and talk to them differently.
[00:11:57] During a trip to Israel before the war,
[00:12:01] he said something important.
[00:12:04] He said nuclear Iran
[00:12:07] would be immune from any
[00:12:10] threats and pressures. So we shouldn't allow
[00:12:14] it. It can almost be said
[00:12:17] that,
[00:12:20] academically and experimentally, scientifically
[00:12:23] and experimentally, no one should doubt
[00:12:27] that if we had nuclear weapons,
[00:12:31] we would not be facing foreign
[00:12:34] aggression in this way, where
[00:12:38] all our political and military
[00:12:41] leaders are targeted for assassination. Our
[00:12:45] infrastructure would be easily attacked. Our existence
[00:12:48] would be threatened. And therefore,
[00:12:52] and the next point is that those who believe in
[00:12:55] nuclear ambiguity, meaning staying in this
[00:12:58] ambiguous situation of 60%
[00:13:00] enrichment,
[00:13:03] which we have, now, for example, to remain, what to do with it? Give
[00:13:07] it or not give it? But there's no middle ground in reality. Either you
[00:13:10] have to shut down your nuclear program, or you have
[00:13:14] to turn it into a lever that can
[00:13:18] help you in strategic equations.
[00:13:21] That is, in the international system,
[00:13:24] actors are self-reliant, especially for a country
[00:13:27] like ours that is not dependent on any of the blocs.
[00:13:31] This
[00:13:32] issue of strategic ambiguity,
[00:13:35] ambiguity in nuclear doctrine, in my opinion, does
[00:13:38] not work. And those who now believe that we should continue
[00:13:42] this doctrine of ambiguity and that this can
[00:13:46] create deterrence for the country, in my opinion, are making a big
[00:13:50] analytical mistake that can have serious consequences for the country. Eid or Nima.
[00:13:53] Nima.
[00:14:55] The video confirmed Mr. Najafi's words. He said exactly the same thing.
[00:14:58] We are fighting with two nuclear countries,
[00:15:01] and we are, and they are, in fact, very
[00:15:05] wild, but they are different from other nuclear countries. For example, if you look
[00:15:09] at China, China has enacted a law in its House of Representatives,
[00:15:12] it's a law in China, that we will not launch any pre-emptive
[00:15:16] nuclear attack on anyone, but we will certainly respond to nuclear attacks
[00:15:20] with several times more nuclear power after
[00:15:24] the war. The 40-day North Korean experience
[00:15:27] adopted our war experience and quickly turned it into a tactic,
[00:15:31] a strategy. It said that if my leader is assassinated
[00:15:34] by another country, I will first launch a nuclear attack on that country, and
[00:15:38] then I will think about continuing the war. This is now law.
[00:15:41] And
[00:15:43] you are dealing with two people who have no rules or laws, and this should not
[00:15:46] be reduced to two people, Trump and Netanyahu. No, America and
[00:15:50] Israel are like this.
[00:15:53] The argument you mentioned, that critics of weapons say
[00:15:57] that it doesn't prevent conventional war, so it's useless. No, that's not precise.
[00:16:01] Even someone like me, who has never been a critic of weapons in my life,
[00:16:04] says this. This is the reality. That is, conventional war
[00:16:08] is conventional, just as India and Pakistan fight each other, and
[00:16:11] the Russian war is different.
[00:16:15] Well, it doesn't prevent war. No one who supported weapons and said
[00:16:18] they were good recommended them. He didn't say that this is good, but you can
[00:16:22] regulate some things. For example, assassinations can be brought under this attack on
[00:16:26] our nuclear facilities, which has happened twice in two wars.
[00:16:29] This is a very dangerous thing. So far, God has
[00:16:33] mercy on us that we haven't had nuclear contamination in this country. We
[00:16:45] all have to ask ourselves. Look, critics,
[00:16:49] strict critics of weapons, have a premise, which is that
[00:16:52] nuclear weapons are not for use. I just have
[00:16:56] a question for all of us to ask ourselves and think about. Now, we are a television
[00:16:59] program, not decision-makers, but who says they won't
[00:17:02] be used? This is a serious question. The one
[00:17:06] who has weapons is like China, which passed that law.
[00:17:10] They have an answer for me. But
[00:17:13] you don't have them, and you're dealing with two completely
[00:17:16] lawless entities. The question is,
[00:17:20] who said they won't be used? Hitler is very similar
[00:17:23] to these people. He has a saying: Armies are made not for
[00:17:26] show, but to fight, and weapons are made to be used.
[00:17:30] Well, I am quoting Hitler,
[00:17:34] not saying he was a good person. His personality also matches these people.
[00:17:37] The main question is this. Look, now in some
[00:17:41] media and political circles in America,
[00:17:44] they are slowly starting to talk about using
[00:17:47] tactical nuclear weapons. Nuclear
[00:17:51] weapons are a bit more compact. Nuclear weapons are a bit more compact
[00:17:55] that they are talking about. Most of them are larger than the Hiroshima bomb. The
[00:17:58] Hiroshima bomb, if it were around now, would be nothing.
[00:18:01] It's not even a number.
[00:18:04] Well, the question we all have to think about
[00:18:08] is: Who says they won't be used? I want to add this,
[00:18:11] and the terrorist network Iran International, in the
[00:18:14] most despicable way, shows Tehran and
[00:18:18] speculates about what would happen if a nuclear explosion occurred there. How many
[00:18:21] kilometers would be destroyed, how much would be engulfed in
[00:18:25] fire, how much would be contaminated with radioactive materials. Then
[00:18:29] that same criminal and conscience-less person
[00:18:32] explains that the new bombs are not dirty bombs anymore, and
[00:18:35] their contamination is not that much.
[00:18:43] One thing, and this is my own life experience, they always talk about it first.
[00:18:46] First, they gauge reactions in the world. Second,
[00:18:49] they try to prepare their own public opinion
[00:18:53] that, well, it was necessary.
[00:18:56] A reporter asked Trump the same question. Although he said it's not
[00:19:00] on our agenda and so on, I think it's in line with this normalization. There's another
[00:19:03] important point that I've seen in the last two or three days in
[00:19:08] the country's media space, which is very strange to me.
[00:19:12] That is, some say, don't talk about
[00:19:16] this issue of changing the nuclear doctrine. This will create a consensus
[00:19:20] against us, and these stories.
[00:19:23] My real question is, a consensus for what
[00:19:27] would form against us? Now, let it form. Excuse me, time for a consensus
[00:19:31] for a military attack on the country. It has already happened. A consensus
[00:19:34] after 20 years, again, the country's nuclear file.
[00:19:38] From the Board of Governors, it went to the Security Council. Again, that
[00:19:42] happened. There's a lot to discuss. The decision-making process for this issue,
[00:19:46] this analytical discussion we are having, naturally, first and foremost, the Supreme Leader
[00:19:49] and the apparatus under his command. That's where decisions are made. We are having an analytical
[00:19:53] discussion. Thank you very much, viewers. This was the "Iran's Time" program. Thank you, Mr. Najafi,
[00:19:57] Agha Vahid, Agha Nima. Every night after the 7 PM news, we
[00:20:00] will be with you on Khabar Network. Long live Iran. Goodbye from
[00:20:04] peace.
[00:20:38] Everyone ready for battle. In the name of the Lord of the
[00:20:42] Highest Throne. Raise the Iranian
[00:20:45] flag high. With the help of the Sultan
[00:20:48] of Najaf. Towards the heart
[00:20:51] of the target. With the help of the Sultan
[00:20:54] of Najaf. Towards the heart of the
[00:20:57] target. We attack the enemy
[00:21:01] by chanting "Ya Abolfazl". We
[00:21:05] are each an army, by
[00:21:08] chanting "Ya Abolfazl".
[00:21:10] Haidar, Haidar, Ya Haidar, Hai
[00:21:13] dar.
[00:21:38] The final war is
[00:21:40] coming. Our battlefield is Allah.
[00:21:44] Our work is in the hands of the Master. Their plans
[00:21:47] are shattered. Their tricks
[00:21:50] will be nullified. Our victory
[00:21:53] will be complete. Our glory is
[00:21:57] in our unity. The logic of the battlefield
[00:22:00] is our power. Our glory is in our unity.
[00:22:03] The logic of the battlefield is our power.
[00:22:07] The statements of the Leader are the
[00:22:11] basis of our understanding. The guarantee
[00:22:14] of the future is only the faith
[00:22:17] of our people.
[00:23:20] We will crush the East and West
[00:23:23] of the world. Eventually, the White
[00:23:26] House, Oh Haidar,
[00:23:29] Haidar, Ya Haidar, Haidar,
[00:23:32] Haidar, Ya Haidar, Haidar,
[00:23:35] Haidar, Ya Haidar, Haidar,
[00:23:38] Haidar, Ya Haidar, Haidar,
[00:23:41] Haidar, Ya Haidar, Haidar,
[00:23:44] Haidar, Ya Haidar, Haidar,
[00:23:47] Haidar, Ya Haidar. Activities
[00:25:00] are formed based on trust between
[00:25:03] the parties. Therefore, this trust must be controlled
[00:25:07] and guaranteed by formal mechanisms. From company
[00:25:10] accreditation and checking their records and financial
[00:25:14] capacity to receiving sufficient
[00:25:17] guarantees, contract control, and continuous
[00:25:21] monitoring of the flow of foreign currency, the operating
[00:25:24] banks and the Central Bank play an important role
[00:25:27] in monitoring the entry and exit of foreign exchange
[00:25:31] resources, controlling accounts, matching
[00:25:34] documents, and ensuring the return of resources
[00:25:38] from exports. Supervisory bodies must also continuously
[00:25:42] review the performance of trustee companies, how commitments
[00:25:45] are implemented, and the possibility of deviation or misuse
[00:25:49] of resources. Of course,
[00:25:52] supervision does not mean creating obstacles in the way of these
[00:25:56] networks' activities. The goal of supervision is to create a balance
[00:26:00] between maintaining the efficiency of the trustee mechanism
[00:26:03] and preventing corruption and deviation. Ultimately, with
[00:26:07] intensified sanctions, the existence of trustees
[00:26:10] becomes essential. Supervision must also be more professional,
[00:26:13] smarter, and more precise. Because maintaining this
[00:26:17] mechanism without control is risky,
[00:26:20] and control without understanding its necessity can also
[00:26:23] lead to disruption in the country's foreign trade. Go
[00:26:27] for it.
[00:28:02] Leader, go for broke! Grab the sea
[00:28:06] by its mouth, grab me, don't
[00:28:09] let go. Grab the stone
[00:28:13] firmly. Manage the straits.
[00:28:16] Take our absolute right.
[00:28:19] Take it.
[00:28:22] The streets are in our hands, in our hands,
[00:28:25] in God's hands. Our enemy is shameless.
[00:28:28] Don't underestimate your enemy.
[00:30:35] Livelihood support for the people and addressing the demands of
[00:30:38] retirees are on the government's agenda. The President said that the
[00:30:41] value of commodity coupons will soon
[00:30:43] increase.
[00:30:47] We will increase the prices of commodity coupons
[00:30:50] and their money. With empathy and cooperation
[00:30:53] with you and all the people of Iran, we will solve our
[00:30:57] problems and we will not bow down to them, by
[00:31:01] the grace of God.