IRINN — broadcast
20261011 160000 UTC
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[00:00:00] target the Persian Gulf, and this has horrific
[00:00:04] consequences for the global economy. This is a mild interpretation.
[00:00:07] So, I think given the tariff policy that has been proposed,
[00:00:11] the motivation is more towards not starting a war
[00:00:14] with Iran.
[00:00:17] Well, these are Mearsheimer's statements for April
[00:00:20] 2025. That means Farvardin
[00:00:24] 1404, which is the beginning of last
[00:00:27] year.
[00:00:30] The discussion is that if Iran is attacked, Iranians will
[00:00:33] prevent oil transit from the Persian Gulf.
[00:00:37] They will even attack the oil facilities of other countries. Now,
[00:00:40] in reality, what we are in now, even though
[00:00:44] maybe it didn't happen in the 120-day war, but it happened in the war
[00:00:47] we are in now. So, practically, what Mearsheimer
[00:00:51] said about the war is coming true. Look, we said something in the previous program
[00:00:55] when we talked about Mearsheimer himself and when we talked about Seyyed
[00:00:59] Valirezaei. We said, "Look, they say
[00:01:02] this will happen, Iranians will stop oil transit."
[00:01:06] This is what I want to say about this interview that we are going to air
[00:01:09] in this program. And honorable viewers and
[00:01:13] listeners will now see that this is throughout the interview.
[00:01:17] What is it? He has a framework of thought. He says,
[00:01:21] "In a rational analysis, if you want to analyze it rationally, from his perspective,
[00:01:24] I'm not evaluating it yet." Well, you have to do this, right? So,
[00:01:28] they are rational, so they will do this.
[00:01:31] Therefore, when he looks, he says, "You, as an Iranian,
[00:01:34] have a position, the Strait of Hormuz. When you are attacked, a superpower comes, what do you do?
[00:01:38] Well, you close Hormuz." That is, you will do this. In fact,
[00:01:42] what should we translate his words to? I said,
[00:01:45] "We should probably put it aside and say, 'Iranians will probably
[00:01:49] close the Strait of Hormuz. Iranians should probably close
[00:01:53] the Strait of Hormuz.'" If this is said,
[00:01:55] then it will not be damaged, because you
[00:01:59] are stating a proposition that is conditional
[00:02:03] on acting according to the rule, but he says it definitively.
[00:02:06] Where else can you say this? That is, he understood the point correctly,
[00:02:10] he completely understood the framework correctly, because he talked about other things about Islamabad before,
[00:02:14] and he talks about them in this interview as well. The issue is that, well, Iranians will
[00:02:18] do this. Americans will do this, which is an example in this interview,
[00:02:22] where you ask him about Trump, and he says, "Well, Trump, I say he will
[00:02:26] not do this." That is, if he wants to act rationally, but after all, he is Trump,
[00:02:29] right? He also had another prediction with BBC Persian. Mearsheimer spoke
[00:02:33] before the 12-day war, and
[00:02:37] in that video, he said that America will attack
[00:02:40] Iran. That is, he said that these two have reached a point where the issue can only
[00:02:43] be resolved with a military confrontation. And this prediction
[00:02:47] came true. Before the 40-day war, what did
[00:02:51] he say? He said that the Americans will not attack. That is, what exactly
[00:02:55] did he say? He said, "I don't see any reason why he would want to attack. Why would he attack?
[00:02:58] What would be the purpose?" Because the experience of the 12-day war, the
[00:03:01] 12-day war,
[00:03:04] he had also said that they would attack. Of course, at the same time, he had said a
[00:03:08] more precise point, because maybe some others also predicted the 12-day war.
[00:03:11] His more precise point was that the Israelis would attack Iran,
[00:03:14] but they would not succeed. They would not be able to create change in Iran.
[00:03:18] Yes, this is based on the fact that one of them came true, and one did not.
[00:03:22] What is it based on? He says, "It should logically be like this," and we will see this in tonight's interview.
[00:03:26] So, he has a framework of thought, the framework of thought of Iranians.
[00:03:30] They will do this. Americans will do this. All of this is based on what
[00:03:33] he is saying. In fact, it's such that we can say that if
[00:03:37] he were an advisor, his prescription would be, "I say you should do this." With
[00:03:41] this view, if we now watch his statements, in fact,
[00:03:44] we can extract Mearsheimer's prescriptions for Iran
[00:03:47] and Mearsheimer's prescriptions for America, which are being expressed
[00:03:51] in a descriptive tone, not a prescriptive tone.
[00:03:54] I think this is important. Now, let me say another point.
[00:03:58] If, for example, an analyst's statements were incorrect
[00:04:02] in one or two places, does this
[00:04:04] affect his analytical credibility or not?
[00:04:08] Yes, to some extent it does. Why?
[00:04:11] Because it stemmed from his framework and his presentation.
[00:04:15] That is, either his framework had flaws, or the facts
[00:04:18] he put into this framework, the data he put into this framework, were
[00:04:22] incorrect, or ultimately, he couldn't
[00:04:25] properly formulate it scientifically, and he said something would happen and it didn't.
[00:04:29] We can't say that there's no flaw in any of his points.
[00:04:33] Well, he said we either achieved a glorious victory,
[00:04:37] or it was a draw where we deserved to win, or it was a defeat that
[00:04:40] doesn't diminish our values. This can't be like that. Sometimes, the person also
[00:04:44] suffered a defeat. It's not that there's a flaw, but
[00:04:48] it must be judged in the overall process. That is, you have to sum up how many of a person's predictions
[00:04:51] were correct and how many were wrong. And again, more importantly, I say, even
[00:04:55] more important than a person's predictions is his framework of thought.
[00:04:59] Description. That is, can he explain events well
[00:05:02] or not? This is the most important interpretive data that
[00:05:06] we want from political science analysts. This is it. An event can happen
[00:05:09] in the world now, and his words interpret this event well.
[00:05:13] In other sciences, in physics, in chemistry, when
[00:05:17] theories and hypotheses come, it's based on this. He says, "I think
[00:05:21] this event can be explained in this way." Then,
[00:05:25] the path is reversed. Then, data is found for it, and to some extent,
[00:05:28] evidentiary data is found. You are talking about
[00:05:31] this story. The complete statements, the discussion is about
[00:05:34] different estimations. Look, Mearsheimer, for example, before the 40-day war,
[00:05:38] had a correct estimation. He said the Americans
[00:05:41] would not attack. Based on his own estimation, because he said it wouldn't
[00:05:44] work. On the other side, in Trump's team, with that
[00:05:48] speech we had in Mar-a-Lago, the stances Hekmat took in the early days,
[00:05:52] they had an estimation that Iran would collapse in
[00:05:55] 100 hours. Look, when there is a difference
[00:05:59] in estimation, naturally, the other side's decisions and this side's
[00:06:02] prescriptions don't align. This shouldn't be attributed
[00:06:05] to him being wrong, because this is exactly the point that Mr. Vali said, "He's not a fortune-teller,
[00:06:09] for example, predicting the future from strange things." He is analyzing
[00:06:13] from his own perspective. Well, one more point before we start
[00:06:17] broadcasting the interview itself.
[00:06:20] I was finally following up to be able to
[00:06:24] conduct an interview with Mr. Mearsheimer. Before we conducted this interview,
[00:06:28] we had a short chat for a few minutes before the interview started,
[00:06:31] and
[00:06:34] I said, "I expect this to be your first interview with an Iranian media outlet," and he confirmed
[00:06:37] that. And he said something
[00:06:41] about me having conversations with Iranian media
[00:06:45] and Russian media. Recently, Mearsheimer had a trip to Russia,
[00:06:48] and he also had extensive interviews with Russian media.
[00:06:52] I was following his own YouTube channel,
[00:06:55] and I knew it. He said, "But my conclusion was that we should
[00:06:59] talk to the media," and considering
[00:07:02] the atmosphere that exists within the United States of America. I'm saying this because we previously
[00:07:06] mentioned that the US government is imposing a very heavy
[00:07:10] atmosphere in the US
[00:07:13] media space, especially regarding those who are somehow involved with our official media,
[00:07:17] which is the Islamic Republic of Iran News Network. We are the official network of the country.
[00:07:21] Surely, if someone other than Mearsheimer were there, the margins
[00:07:25] would be more intolerable, but anyway, I said this to say that
[00:07:29] he himself clarified and said, "My conclusion was that we should
[00:07:32] also have a conversation," because I used to email before, and I didn't get
[00:07:36] a response, but apparently, the situation has certainly
[00:07:40] changed as a result of an analysis of the political atmosphere of the United States
[00:07:43] that they have. We
[00:07:46] truly hope that we can have this opportunity more often and also talk to other thinkers
[00:07:50] around the world, God willing. Let's start the interview. Let's watch the first part of the interview.
[00:07:54] We will be with Mr. Nima and Mr. Vahid for the analysis. Thank you
[00:07:58] for accepting the invitation
[00:08:03] of Iran News Network and being with us
[00:08:06] in this program. It's a pleasure.
[00:08:09] I think at least three of those
[00:09:12] seven conditions were new and
[00:09:16] were not included in the previous memorandum of understanding.
[00:09:19] بودن.
[00:09:22] Do you think Iran can realistically expect to get more
[00:09:25] concessions than what it achieved in Islamabad
[00:09:29] in the Islamabad agreement?
[00:09:30] بگیره
[00:09:34] Or is this not possible, and Iran should settle
[00:09:37] for that? What's your analysis?
[00:09:40] Well, I think the US will ultimately
[00:09:44] be forced to accept almost all the terms
[00:09:47] of the memorandum of understanding. It's impossible to say now
[00:09:50] what the final agreement will look like, if there even is
[00:09:54] an agreement and it is reached.
[00:09:57] That is, will the US agree to pay
[00:10:00] compensation? It's impossible to say.
[00:10:03] But if you look at the memorandum of understanding, it asked for
[00:10:07] the US to pay compensation. So, firstly, it's impossible
[00:10:10] to say exactly what the final agreement will look like, and
[00:10:14] it's impossible to say whether a final agreement will even
[00:10:18] be reached or not. But in my opinion,
[00:10:22] it's highly likely that the US will eventually be forced to accept that
[00:10:25] Iran has won this war, and the US will be forced
[00:10:28] to accept almost all the main demands raised
[00:10:31] in the June 17 memorandum of understanding.
[00:10:33] بپذیره
[00:10:37] From Iran's perspective, what is your suggestion?
[00:10:39] Do you think Iran
[00:10:42] is in a position to put more conditions on the table,
[00:10:46] or not? Or if Iran wants this aggression
[00:10:49] and war to end, it should return to that memorandum
[00:10:52] of understanding.
[00:11:09] The only thing that I think really changed was that Iranians
[00:11:13] insisted that many of the demands raised in the June 17
[00:11:17] memorandum of understanding be met before the start of negotiations.
[00:11:20] So, what changed was the timing,
[00:11:23] not the demands themselves.
[00:11:27] That is, if you look at the June 17 memorandum of understanding,
[00:11:30] it's practically a document of surrender for the US. It's truly
[00:11:34] a significant document because President Trump
[00:11:37] signed a memorandum of understanding that practically gives very
[00:11:40] big concessions to the Iranians. President Trump,
[00:11:44] by signing that document, was practically saying that the US had lost this war.
[00:11:48] That's why I'm not surprised that he eventually backed away
[00:11:51] from that document and genuinely believes.
[00:12:25] It wants to reach a final agreement that is very similar to that
[00:12:29] memorandum of understanding. As I said before,
[00:12:32] maybe Iran won't get all its demands,
[00:12:35] but if it's going
[00:12:38] to sign an agreement, it must ensure that almost all its demands
[00:12:41] are met.
[00:12:43] میشه
[00:12:46] Well, the first part is about the memorandum of understanding.
[00:12:50] Returning to the memorandum of understanding or the Islamabad Plus
[00:12:53] agreement. Something beyond that. Look, there were two points. One
[00:12:57] is that he refers to this important issue here, which is that the text of the memorandum of understanding
[00:13:01] in the US, pay attention again, from the perspective of an American who is also in the US and sees the statements,
[00:13:05] this was considered a document of Trump's surrender. This is the same thing that
[00:13:08] was said, that the text of the memorandum of understanding is good. That is, it benefits Iran.
[00:13:12] The proponents of the memorandum of understanding, both those who only defended the text
[00:13:16] and those who believed that the text was good and other things were also good,
[00:13:20] referred to the fact that this text was a document of surrender
[00:13:23] for the US. He confirms
[00:13:27] this. Of course, he mentions this point about compensation. Pay attention, in the text
[00:13:30] of the Islamabad agreement, there is no compensation. There is
[00:13:34] a mechanism of 300 billion that
[00:13:37] Iran wants to consider as compensation, but it is not compensation.
[00:13:41] In fact, the US did not agree to pay compensation. So, this is one point. Now,
[00:13:44] maybe he meant that, but Mr. Mearsheimer's interpretation
[00:13:48] was this. That is, again, I say, what they won, but after all, since I was
[00:13:52] talking about the word compensation, it was a discussion that the US should.
[00:14:29] Does that clause also contain concessions for Iran, or not?
[00:14:33] Yes, there are concessions for Iran, but it's something that, from its appearance, it's clear
[00:14:37] it won't be implemented. It's like saying, "Look, it's obvious you're not going to be implemented."
[00:14:40] This is different from saying this clause is not a concession.
[00:14:44] He even, the fact that he considered this compensation, again,
[00:14:47] this could be correct from an American perspective. What was said on this side?
[00:14:50] As you said, there were several clauses there that were weak, including the nuclear
[00:14:54] clause. And including this clause, which, if you remember, we talked
[00:14:57] about extensively for several programs.
[00:15:01] This had two flaws. That is, it was really something that was obvious would not
[00:15:04] be realized, apart from the fact that the frozen funds clause was also another clause that Iran had.
[00:15:08] For example, frozen funds are to Iran's benefit, right? We should give them to Iran,
[00:15:12] but since there is no mechanism, because it's contingent on something outside
[00:15:16] the agreement, etc., etc., it was not implemented, and it really was not
[00:15:19] implemented. Therefore, from Mearsheimer's perspective, from the American
[00:15:23] perspective, this was a document of surrender, and
[00:15:25] it really was. One day, Trump was pressured. Pay attention,
[00:15:28] Trump defended his victory in the war,
[00:15:31] and still defends it. He says, "I won." But he never
[00:15:35] defended the text of the memorandum,
[00:15:38] saying, "Look what I did to the Iranians in this memorandum." He neither defended it nor still defends it.
[00:15:42] He has completely removed it. It's not there at all. It's not there at all.
[00:15:45] Such a thing doesn't exist. Even when it was being implemented, around
[00:15:49] 22 days, if I'm not mistaken, those few days when
[00:15:52] the memorandum of understanding was being implemented, this means that there was no US naval blockade.
[00:15:56] What we mean by the implementation of the memorandum of understanding is that the US
[00:15:59] withdrew it until the day it brought it back.
[00:16:02] In this period, he also didn't defend the text. Why? Because according to him,
[00:16:05] the concessions were clear.
[00:16:09] More strategic and broader, the way Mearsheimer looks at it,
[00:16:13] which I think, now, with the knowledge I had
[00:16:16] before, having read books
[00:16:18] by him, I was following him, he is a person with a very
[00:16:22] broad and strategic view. That is, I don't think the details of the text
[00:16:25] are important to him. Basically, the fact that a
[00:16:29] superpower came and issued a statement, saying, "Everyone surrender, lay down your weapons,
[00:16:33] raise white flags, Iran's work will be done in four days."
[00:16:36] The plan must change, and
[00:16:39] and what was the conclusion? The country that was supposed to surrender,
[00:16:43] let's put aside love and hate. Country A, Country B. A
[00:16:47] attacked B, and also issued such a statement. In the end, B
[00:16:50] occupied something it didn't have, and A came and said,
[00:16:54] "I want to sign a contract with the same government." This means defeat.
[00:16:58] Now, we used to say this at that time, and some
[00:17:01] people laughed and said, "No one believes this." Well, now
[00:17:05] it's an example, right? That claim that the Islamic Republic of Iran
[00:17:08] makes, that "I won this war." The formulation
[00:17:12] you see from outside is this: the US was supposed
[00:17:15] to destroy us, and in the end, it signed a contract with the same government. Now, regardless of what
[00:17:19] the content of that contract is, whatever
[00:17:22] it is, the fact that that government was not supposed to exist anymore,
[00:17:26] in the end, you sat down with the same one, right? So far,
[00:17:29] he also says something about the memorandum of understanding,
[00:17:33] saying that, "In my opinion, there hasn't been a significant
[00:17:35] difference. Only the timings have changed."
[00:17:39] Do you agree with this? Yes, look, we don't have the text of the memorandum of understanding.
[00:17:43] That is, exactly, because regarding Islamabad, you remember
[00:17:46] those days when we didn't have the text yet, you remember how many drafts,
[00:17:49] not drafts, but alleged texts reached us, and then
[00:17:53] when we saw the final text, we saw that many of them were very different. Now,
[00:17:57] it could have changed in the process, it could have been completely false. Now, we can't
[00:18:01] understand that anymore. Therefore, until there is a text,
[00:18:04] it's really not credible. But to the extent that we understand, yes,
[00:18:08] to the extent that those who are supposed to prepare it, for example, the President
[00:18:12] and the Foreign Minister, almost say nothing specific. That is,
[00:18:15] they say what we wanted was in Islamabad, but they quickly ask, "What exactly
[00:18:19] do you mean? You want something that wasn't in Islamabad? For example, you want
[00:18:23] to get more?" Now, the President, in his interview with that Indian media,
[00:18:27] clearly talked about returning to Islamabad.
[00:18:30] Therefore, it's natural that in the framework, there won't be much
[00:18:34] more than timing, but until we have it.
[00:19:37] agreement. What is your analysis? This is important because
[00:19:41] if Iran is going to sign something with the Americans
[00:19:44] next round, what scenarios might
[00:19:47] unfold again?
[00:19:51] I want to know this. I
[00:19:53] think both arguments you just made are largely
[00:19:57] correct. Let me explain. I don't think
[00:20:00] President Trump was eager to sign the memorandum of understanding.
[00:20:04] I don't think when he signed it, he intended
[00:20:07] not to adhere to it. And I think
[00:20:10] he signed it because he had no choice. It's important here to know that
[00:20:14] the US has no way to defeat Iran.
[00:20:17] The US has no viable military option
[00:20:20] to force Iran to raise its hands
[00:20:24] and surrender. Even economic tools
[00:20:27] like blockade and the Scott Bessent strategy
[00:20:31] for suffocating Iran's economy also
[00:20:34] don't work.
[00:20:37] Let me first finish answering the first question, then I can talk about the Bessent strategy.
[00:20:41] But the main point is that Trump
[00:20:44] signed the memorandum of understanding on June 17
[00:20:47] because he concluded that he really had no choice. It wasn't
[00:20:51] that he had a strategy to win the war and could use it.
[00:20:55] He was in a situation where it was rational to agree to prevent further US losses and
[00:20:58] try to end the conflict. That's why he signed it, but with great
[00:21:02] hesitation. That's the main point. He signed it with great hesitation.
[00:21:06] Then, as you mentioned, I think what happened
[00:21:09] was that as soon as he signed it, various groups within the Trump administration and
[00:21:13] in the public sphere criticized him for signing the memorandum of understanding.
[00:21:17] That's why Trump backed down. The pressure became undoubtedly
[00:21:20] too much. Again, I say, from the very beginning, for obvious reasons, he was not eager
[00:21:24] for this memorandum of understanding. So, when he found an opportunity to
[00:21:27] withdraw from the agreement and take action regarding
[00:21:31] transit in the Strait of Hormuz, he violated the agreement.
[00:21:34] And when it became clear that the agreement was falling apart, he made
[00:21:38] no effort to save it. It's very important to understand this.
[00:21:41] There was clear evidence that the memorandum of understanding was falling apart due to the events in the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:21:45] where the US was trying to escort ships through the Sea of Oman.
[00:21:49] But did Trump
[00:21:53] make any effort to reach an agreement with the Iranians and resolve that issue
[00:21:56] so they could return to the memorandum of understanding? Obviously not.
[00:22:00] And that's why the agreement fell
[00:22:02] apart.
[00:22:06] Well, regarding how Islamabad
[00:22:09] ended. One point again in the previous section, let me ask this too.
[00:22:12] Under the memorandum of understanding of Islamabad, those 13
[00:22:16] or 14 clauses. After all, we had
[00:22:19] given commitments regarding the issue of diluting
[00:22:23] our commitments. Now, it's true that these
[00:22:26] had an order, and this went back to that timing
[00:22:29] after that 60-day period and the Jamu negotiations.
[00:22:33] After all, nuclear issues were also
[00:22:36] raised under the memorandum of understanding, which seemed to suggest
[00:22:40] that nuclear issues were not supposed to be raised at all.
[00:22:43] I think one of the fundamental differences between this current
[00:22:46] situation of Iran's seven conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz
[00:22:50] while preserving Iran's sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz
[00:22:53] is that there is basically no mention of nuclear issues. I think this can be considered
[00:22:57] one of the distinguishing points between that and this. It's not just a matter of
[00:23:01] sooner or later, precedence and temporal order for the realization of some
[00:23:04] matters. Look, again, if I don't have the text, I don't
[00:23:08] know. One narrative is that no, there is no nuclear discussion, and these seven
[00:23:11] points are only for reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Yes, I am saying this based on this narrative.
[00:23:15] Now, the issue is whether the Americans will accept it only on the condition that it's just about the Strait
[00:23:18] of Hormuz. The issue for the Americans now is
[00:23:22] that they say, "Even if it's nuclear, I won't accept anything from you about the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:23:26] The Strait of Hormuz is open." These recent days, that Iran is acting much better
[00:23:29] in the Strait of Hormuz, is based on making the Americans understand that the Strait of Hormuz is not
[00:23:33] open. So, let's talk about the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:23:37] There are two different perspectives. Now, the Iranian side's narrative
[00:23:41] for reopening the Strait of Hormuz is those seven conditions.
[00:23:44] Does this mean no other agreement? Look, I really don't
[00:23:48] In the past two months, the Americans approached
[00:24:01] us through three different channels, namely Pakistan, Qatar, and even
[00:24:05] Iraq, and asked us to present our proposals to them.
[00:24:08] About two weeks ago, we announced seven conditions
[00:24:11] to the Americans and explicitly stated that until these
[00:24:15] conditions are met, the Strait of Hormuz will not
[00:24:18] be open to them, and no negotiations will take place.
[00:24:22] The Americans have replied to us so far. In their response, they accepted
[00:24:26] some of our conditions, while others remain unclear. We are
[00:24:29] no longer in the process of responding to the Americans. They have
[00:24:33] responded to us, and we consider their response insufficient. They must
[00:24:37] clarify the issues that remain unclear to us.
[00:24:40] In my opinion, they also said in another part of their interview
[00:24:44] that we will not return to our previous diplomatic
[00:24:48] process. If these are
[00:24:50] has passed that stage and is now setting more conditions.
[00:24:59] But the way it looks, it seems
[00:25:02] that the Islamic Republic of Iran
[00:25:06] This is also natural. Look, Islamabad
[00:25:09] was the product of a war we had won.
[00:25:13] Besides us, the media of the Islamic Republic of Iran, people like Jeffrey
[00:25:16] Sachs and Mearsheimer and these also accept this rule.
[00:25:21] Well, and I would say that you reached Islamabad,
[00:25:24] and then, as Mearsheimer said, they never intended
[00:25:28] to implement it. I think in this very program,
[00:25:32] the day after we read the text, our guest was Mr. Samadzadeh,
[00:25:35] and Mr. Samadzadeh came and sat where you were sitting and said, "This text
[00:25:39] is a good text, it only has one flaw: it doesn't
[00:25:41] work."
[00:25:43] Well, his opinion is also the same. He says it doesn't work. And after
[00:25:47] that, they imposed another war on us. For 13 days, they attacked
[00:25:50] our southern borders, committed crimes, attacked
[00:25:54] weddings, and were defeated in that too.
[00:25:58] This is very natural, as a rational actor, that
[00:26:01] the Islamic Republic has also taken a step forward.
[00:26:05] Apparently, it seems that these seven conditions are for the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:26:08] and we have no diplomatic discussion
[00:26:12] about nuclear issues. Very well.
[00:26:15] Well, friends, let's put the next section. I think it's the scenario for the end of the war.
[00:26:19] I'll tell you that question and Mr. N here standing.
[00:26:22] One moment, friends. Look, we don't have diplomacy on nuclear issues,
[00:26:26] because I have a concern. Then, if something comes out tomorrow, we'll see if there's nuclear stuff in it,
[00:26:30] and people will feel like something was hidden from them.
[00:27:07] Looking from outside, the Americans now say, "I accepted your seven
[00:27:10] conditions for Hormuz
[00:27:13] to be open." After that, we'll see what we do. Last night I said
[00:27:17] if the Americans' commitments are firm, ours are objective, meaning
[00:27:20] unfortunately.
[00:27:22] Let's not even enter the next question. I want to say something else. They accepted
[00:27:26] our seven conditions, and Iran also said it would open the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:27:30] What happened to the nuclear issue?
[00:27:38] What happened to this? In my opinion, the absence of the nuclear issue completely is not feasible.
[00:27:42] It will be there. Now, sometimes we say our
[00:27:45] negotiating approach is this, because pay attention, from the news,
[00:27:49] he is currently unwilling to negotiate with the Americans,
[00:27:53] not that the nuclear issue should not be in any agreement with the Americans.
[00:27:56] My point is that we are in the middle of a war. Our issue is ending the war.
[00:28:00] This is it, this is it. And regarding
[00:28:03] ending the war, we don't have a nuclear discussion. We don't. Excellent. Now, I want to
[00:28:06] say that we are not making an ad hoc argument. We are talking about
[00:28:10] wartime conditions at any period and at any time. I think all our statements are related to the wartime
[00:28:14] situation. Regarding ending the war, according to my
[00:28:17] understanding of the system's overall decision-making, we do not have a nuclear discussion
[00:28:21] regarding ending the war. Let the war end.
[00:28:25] Then we'll decide what we want to do, which is to our detriment. That is, again, what Nima
[00:28:28] is saying, we must make tangible concessions.
[00:29:50] start involving
[00:29:53] the Russians and Chinese
[00:29:55] in this equation
[00:29:57] more seriously. Iran should move towards a kind of
[00:30:01] controlled escalation of tension
[00:30:05] to put more pressure on the Americans
[00:30:08] and force them
[00:30:10] to either leave the region
[00:30:14] and return to their country.
[00:30:18] Please clarify this issue for us. In your view, what is the most probable scenario
[00:30:21] سناریوی
[00:30:25] ahead of us for ending this aggression against Iran?
[00:30:29] What should we expect?
[00:30:34] Well, in my opinion, this is basically a war between the US
[00:30:37] and Iran. One could say this is a war between the US and Israel
[00:30:41] and Iran. And I think the key to Iran's
[00:30:44] success is to put a lot of pressure on the US.
[00:30:47] Pressure that is mostly economic
[00:30:50] and forces the US to agree to a deal that
[00:30:54] is favorable to Iran. I don't think Iran can solve this problem by getting
[00:30:58] help from Russia, China, Pakistan, or any.