IRINN — broadcast
20261011 170000 UTC
419 transcript segments
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[00:00:00] do whatever they can. For example, I think the war
[00:00:03] that recently started between Ansar Allah and the Saudis, where
[00:00:07] Ansar Allah attacks
[00:00:10] energy infrastructures inside Saudi Arabia,
[00:00:13] restricting the flow of Saudi oil to
[00:00:17] global markets, is good news for Iran. I'm not saying
[00:00:21] Iran told Ansar Allah to start
[00:00:24] this conflict, because I don't believe such a thing happened.
[00:00:27] But nevertheless,
[00:00:30] the conflict between Ansar Allah and the Saudis is in Iran's favor
[00:00:33] because it puts more economic pressure on the global economy.
[00:00:37] In fact, it puts more pressure on President Trump.
[00:00:40] So, the more problems there are in the Middle East, or the Persian
[00:00:43] Gulf region, and the Red Sea region, the more
[00:00:47] it benefits Iran, because Iran's leverage
[00:00:51] is now basically economic. And of course, America's
[00:00:54] leverage against Iran is also mainly economic
[00:00:58] now. There's no military option here.
[00:01:51] If you look at the result, like the 40-day war, you see that despite
[00:01:54] it appearing to be a mistake, their assessment was correct.
[00:01:58] What did they say before the 40-day war? They said there won't be a war because
[00:02:02] a war won't achieve what they want.
[00:02:05] But I said, what was the difference between Trump and that person?
[00:02:08] That person's assessment was that war would achieve that.
[00:02:12] Ultimately, who predicted correctly? Mearsheimer.
[00:02:16] Now he's still considering Trump a very
[00:02:20] reasonable person. He sees himself in Trump.
[00:02:23] Well, of course, that's not
[00:02:27] the case. And he says that Americans
[00:02:30] will not attack, neither before the mid-term elections nor after the mid-term elections, at least
[00:02:34] in the short term, until there's a technological leap in military matters
[00:02:38] that would significantly increase America's capabilities.
[00:02:42] He says they won't attack. Why? Because
[00:02:45] they did everything they could
[00:02:49] in the 40-day war, and because
[00:02:53] the situation worsened, as he says in the first part of this conversation,
[00:02:56] because the situation worsened, they came to an agreement with the Iranians.
[00:03:00] In fact, the content of the agreement wasn't very important to him. He wanted to sign
[00:03:04] something to finish it, and his plan was not
[00:03:07] to act on it. What he's saying is
[00:03:10] that he would sign anything because he didn't want to act on it. The content wasn't
[00:03:14] very important to him, but he wanted the signature for this
[00:03:18] to end. Now, his prediction and logic is this:
[00:03:21] what will happen now, we'll have to see. Excuse me, just one
[00:03:25] sentence. He's considering an optimal point. He says, not before the elections, not close
[00:03:29] to the elections, not after. You have to put pressure to a point where
[00:03:33] he gives the concessions you want. That's the point of maximum pressure. Reach that maximum point and don't worry
[00:03:36] about the other time. And based on what happened, exactly at this
[00:03:40] sensitive time in Yemen and in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab, we have this very
[00:03:44] important energy event. Yes, well, let's go to the sixth
[00:03:47] part of the conversation. This is it, that now the Russia issue, which Trump
[00:03:51] is trying a little bit, because it doesn't have a very amazing
[00:03:55] effect on the US energy discussion. We should talk about it separately, but even that little bit
[00:03:59] is still
[00:04:26] a decision or decisions
[00:04:28] that Tehran might make
[00:04:32] that would lead to
[00:04:35] an aggressive attack by the US on Iran.
[00:04:37] happen.
[00:04:43] What wrong decisions might Tehran make that would
[00:04:47] lead to another
[00:04:49] attack on itself?
[00:04:53] See, the first question I ask myself when I think about another
[00:04:57] possible attack from the US is whether
[00:05:00] the Israelis will also be involved and what targets
[00:05:04] inside Iran they will hit. You should know that the Americans
[00:05:07] and Israelis together carried out a 40-day strategic bombing operation
[00:05:10] from February 28th to
[00:05:14] April 8th, but it failed to force
[00:05:17] the Iranians to surrender. In fact, the Americans
[00:05:20] and Israelis were forced to end that
[00:05:24] 40-day operation because their valuable
[00:05:27] ammunition was running out.
[00:05:31] It's very important to know that since April 8th, the US has not carried out
[00:05:34] any widespread air operations against
[00:05:37] Iran. We had two periods of retaliatory
[00:05:41] attacks, during which Iranians and Americans carried out limited attacks on each other,
[00:05:44] and each period lasted about two weeks. These were
[00:05:48] retaliatory attacks, not a strategic bombing operation, limited bombings
[00:05:52] by Iran and the US. The Americans stopped
[00:05:55] those retaliatory attacks because, firstly, we couldn't use more
[00:05:59] weapons. We wanted to save our valuable weapons.
[00:06:03] Secondly, these attacks were not yielding results. So, the question you should
[00:06:06] ask yourself is, what will we do next time that will work? Our
[00:06:10] weapons are still limited. Even if we involve Israel,
[00:06:14] they didn't help much last time. Why should they help
[00:06:17] a lot this time? So, I think the only possible explanation for what's
[00:06:21] different this time is that this time we're going to hit Iran's oil and gas
[00:06:25] infrastructure. We're going to hit refineries,
[00:06:28] transportation networks, and port facilities. Power plants,
[00:06:32] yes, yes, exactly. Well, there's no doubt that the US and Israel
[00:06:36] can do that, but the problem from the US perspective is that Iran has
[00:06:39] retaliatory capabilities, and Iranians can hit countries on the Persian Gulf
[00:06:43] and Israel itself. They can disable oil facilities and desalination
[00:06:47] plants in places like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iranians can
[00:06:51] cause a lot of damage in those countries and
[00:06:55] also inside Israel, and this has disastrous
[00:06:59] consequences for the global economy. You could say this ends up benefiting Iran.
[00:07:03] Of course, the destruction within Iran would be terrible. I don't want to downplay
[00:07:06] that. But if these back-and-forth air attacks
[00:07:10] ultimately destroy oil facilities throughout the Persian Gulf
[00:07:14] and cause severe damage to the Persian Gulf countries and Israel itself,
[00:07:17] then in my opinion, this is not a winning strategy.
[00:07:21] I don't believe anyone in the Trump administration thinks that going
[00:07:25] down this path will lead to victory. In fact, it will only
[00:07:28] make a bad situation worse. Furthermore, the reason why we, I mean the Americans,
[00:07:31] haven't attacked Iran's oil facilities and energy
[00:07:35] infrastructure so far is because we know it won't work. This
[00:07:38] is not a smart strategy today. It
[00:07:41] wasn't a smart strategy in the past, and it won't be a smart strategy
[00:07:45] after the November elections either. Now, this doesn't mean that President
[00:07:49] Trump won't do it, because who knows for sure what Trump will do?
[00:07:52] But the only thing I'm telling you is that you yourselves
[00:07:56] surely know that strategically, it's not logical for the US
[00:07:59] to target Iran's oil, gas, and energy infrastructure
[00:08:02] inside Iran. Again, what I mean by all of this is that I don't
[00:08:06] think we have a military
[00:08:08] option.
[00:08:11] Again, I ask, what shouldn't Tehran do
[00:08:14] to avoid this potential attack on itself?
[00:08:17] If you want to talk about what Iran
[00:08:21] should or shouldn't do to prevent another
[00:08:24] round of these attacks,
[00:08:27] and keep the pressure on the American side, forcing it
[00:08:31] to make an agreement, what is that proposal? What are the
[00:08:34] wrong policies that Tehran might adopt?
[00:08:38] It's very hard to say. I mean, Tehran must be prepared to retaliate
[00:08:42] if the US attacks its oil and energy infrastructure.
[00:08:45] I think the Iranians must make it clear
[00:08:48] to the US. Of course, I think they have already done so. Iranian leaders have very
[00:08:52] clearly stated that if the US and Israel, or even the US alone, attacks
[00:08:55] Iran and targets its oil energy
[00:08:59] infrastructure, Iran will retaliate. Iran
[00:09:02] will respond powerfully, and I think it's very much in Iran's
[00:09:05] interest to make this clear, as it has
[00:09:08] done. I don't think it's in Iran's interest
[00:09:11] to initiate a widespread attack on the oil
[00:09:15] energy infrastructure and desalination facilities in any of
[00:09:19] the Persian Gulf countries. I think
[00:09:22] Iran should have this as an option for retaliation,
[00:09:26] but it's not logical to start a conflict now with a preemptive attack on the oil infrastructure
[00:09:30] of the Persian Gulf countries.
[00:09:33] I think what the Iranians want and are doing
[00:09:36] is constantly looking for smart solutions
[00:09:40] until then.
[00:09:56] If you look at the bond yields in
[00:09:59] the world, you know I'm not an economist,
[00:10:03] so I don't specialize in these matters, but all
[00:10:06] the economists and business people I know say that
[00:10:10] rising bond yields are very important.
[00:10:25] The market will continue to soar and cause serious damage to the global economy.
[00:10:28] Again, I say, any bad event for the global
[00:10:32] economy is certainly not good for the US or most countries
[00:10:36] in the world, but the paradox is that it's good for Iran because it gains
[00:10:40] its leverage from this, and of course, the Iranians have done everything
[00:10:43] they can to put pressure on the global economy and at the same time minimize
[00:10:47] the pressure inside Iran.
[00:10:48] برسونند
[00:10:53] I played with the question a bit and tried to ask it in a way that
[00:10:57] also brings up that different perspective. I think it was very clear. I elaborated
[00:11:01] on Trump's mental health. He said, "I don't know either." That
[00:11:05] point we made, he also said, "I'm saying
[00:11:08] this as a logical option, he shouldn't
[00:11:12] do this, but who knows what this lunatic is capable
[00:11:16] of?" Yes, in the economic discussion, he still emphasizes that
[00:11:19] any action that Iran takes to pressure the global economy, and of course,
[00:11:23] he emphasizes again, he says, "We have mentioned this many times in Vahid's
[00:11:26] program, Nima mentioned it, what has caused
[00:11:30] the enemy not to attack our infrastructure
[00:11:33] is that it knows we will respond very strongly to the region's
[00:11:37] and Israel's infrastructure." You can respond because it knows
[00:11:40] you have power. If we didn't,
[00:11:44] I've said this many times, they make no distinction between us and the people of Gaza.
[00:11:48] They can do it there. Here
[00:11:50] the cost is high. Here they have to pay the price. That's
[00:11:54] why they don't do it. See, and of course, he rejects a preemptive attack.
[00:11:58] He says Iran shouldn't do this preemptive attack on infrastructure, a widespread attack on infrastructure
[00:12:01] that would lead to a response. That is, exactly, see, the same point that
[00:12:05] he won't hit the infrastructure. You, as a threat, keep the Sword
[00:12:09] of Damocles hanging there, but put pressure on
[00:12:12] the economy. Iran is saying Iran must increase economic pressure. Naturally,
[00:12:16] that means controlling Hormuz. The simplest is that Emirati
[00:12:19] ships, the route should really be the Omani route. Oman should
[00:12:23] really be out of it.
[00:12:26] This Emirati route is closed. I really mean in the past few
[00:12:30] nights, Iran is really showing a stronger approach.
[00:12:33] It was strong, it's showing a stronger one, that leak in the Strait of Hormuz that we mentioned.
[00:12:36] It's called a leak, but it's a very big leak. It should really
[00:12:40] be completely blocked, Insha'Allah. This is the same pressure, without touching the infrastructure of other countries.
[00:12:43] This itself is an important point. The last question, UAE,
[00:12:47] it also concerns the UAE. Let's hear our last question and return
[00:12:51] to the studio for the final part of the analysis.
[00:13:25] and joined Israel, because the others had only provided their bases
[00:13:28] to them, or Iran was attacked from their territory and airspace,
[00:13:32] but the Emiratis even attacked Iranian territory
[00:13:36] with their own Mirage fighters and dropped bombs
[00:13:39] on Iran. Of course,
[00:13:42] the Iranians also retaliated by attacking
[00:13:46] the Emiratis. Here's a question: some people
[00:13:49] believe that since the UAE has normalized
[00:13:52] its relations with Israel and is Iran's neighbor,
[00:13:58] it has a very significant impact on Iran's economy.
[00:14:01] The UAE has historically facilitated
[00:14:04] Iran's economic activities through Dubai, meaning the UAE played a very important role in
[00:14:08] Iran's economy. Some believe that the economic problems
[00:14:11] Iran is facing also have their roots in
[00:14:14] the UAE. Some believe Iran can
[00:14:17] draw the UAE towards itself and separate it
[00:14:21] from Israel. Others say no, this is not possible.
[00:14:25] The UAE will not prefer Iran over
[00:14:27] Israel. How do you analyze the UAE's role
[00:14:31] in this region, and also in this war and aggression?
[00:14:34] Well, I think there's no doubt that your description of the UAE and its relationship
[00:14:38] with Israel and the US, and with Iran, is correct. I think
[00:14:41] the main issue is what happens next. Now, a lot
[00:14:45] depends on how you see
[00:14:48] the future of US bases and
[00:14:52] the future of the US security umbrella in the Gulf.
[00:14:55] As we know, on February 7th,
[00:14:58] the US had many very important
[00:15:02] military facilities in the Persian Gulf.
[00:15:05] At that time, it seemed that its security umbrella
[00:15:09] was completely over all the Persian Gulf countries
[00:15:12] and the US, with all those bases,
[00:15:16] was in a very good position to ensure the security of countries like
[00:15:19] the UAE. Now, we know that's no
[00:15:23] longer the case. The Iranians have almost
[00:15:25] severely damaged or destroyed
[00:15:28] all US military facilities in the Persian Gulf. In fact,
[00:15:32] as you know, we have transferred a large part of our military equipment
[00:15:36] to Jordan and Israel.
[00:15:43] From now on, it's not clear if the US can effectively
[00:15:47] ensure the security of the UAE or other Persian Gulf countries,
[00:15:50] and in my opinion, this means that from now on, it's in the interest of the Persian
[00:15:54] Gulf countries to reach some kind of agreement
[00:15:57] for coexistence with Iran. It's not very
[00:16:01] logical for a country like Saudi Arabia or the UAE to have
[00:16:04] hostile relations with Iran.
[00:16:07] The idea that the US can protect them, because as we've seen since February 8th,
[00:16:11] the US can not only not protect these countries,
[00:16:15] but it has also caused a war that has inflicted immense damage
[00:16:18] on these countries. So, the US has shown that it's more of a nuisance than
[00:16:22] a help. All of this means that the UAE's
[00:16:25] calculations from now on are different from what they were before February
[00:16:29] 8th, and even from the past few months. The UAE must seriously
[00:16:33] consider how it wants to interact with Iran in the future.
[00:16:37] And in my opinion, from a purely strategic and
[00:16:40] calculating perspective, the UAE has a significant interest
[00:16:44] in changing its policy towards Iran, just like
[00:16:48] the other Persian Gulf countries. It's also
[00:16:51] in their interest to improve their relations with Iran. This was
[00:16:55] my first main point. My second main point
[00:16:58] is that it's completely clear that Iran now
[00:17:02] has a truly powerful arsenal of ballistic
[00:17:05] missiles, missiles that can
[00:17:11] cause immense damage to the UAE, among others. And I imagine
[00:17:15] that from now on, what will happen is that Iran's arsenal
[00:17:18] will become larger and more lethal, and this is a very
[00:17:22] big problem for the UAE. The UAE will become very vulnerable
[00:17:26] to Iranian attacks, and in my opinion, the Iranians will make it clear
[00:17:29] to them that if they cause
[00:17:33] trouble, they will have to pay a heavy
[00:17:36] price. And as we both know,
[00:17:40] the Iranians are capable of inflicting a very heavy
[00:17:43] blow on the UAE. So, the UAE will be in a situation where
[00:17:47] there are serious limitations on the amount of trouble it can cause
[00:17:51] for Iran, because the balance of power is clearly in favor
[00:17:54] of the Iranians. If you put Iran and the UAE face-to-face in a battle,
[00:17:57] it's like Bambi against Godzilla. Iran is Godzilla
[00:18:01] and the UAE is Bambi. In short, if we go back to my first point, I think it's in the UAE's
[00:18:05] interest to improve its relations with Iran and not get into a conflict.
[00:18:09] This doesn't mean that the UAE should have hostile relations with the US
[00:18:12] or even hostile relations with Israel.
[00:18:16] I think from the UAE's perspective, it might be very logical to try
[00:18:19] to significantly improve its relations with Iran, but at the same time, also have good
[00:18:23] relations with the US and Israel. In short, I don't think
[00:18:26] the UAE will cause significant trouble for Iran from now on.
[00:18:30] In fact, I don't think any country in the Persian Gulf will be a serious
[00:18:33] threat to Iran from now on, because Iran is much more powerful.
[00:18:42] Thank you very much, Professor John Mearsheimer,
[00:18:46] for being with us. Thank you for accepting our invitation and giving us your time.
[00:18:50] You're welcome. It's a pleasure to be on your program.
[00:18:53] Thank you. Well, this is the last part. I think
[00:18:57] we have about 67 minutes of the program. What is your
[00:19:00] opinion on the UAE? How do you see his perspective, and
[00:19:04] are there signs of a change in behavior?
[00:19:34] And people who, after all, benefit from these economic
[00:19:38] relationships. In terms of military power, he's absolutely right. He says
[00:19:42] Iran has shown itself at a level where no country
[00:19:45] in this region should essentially challenge it
[00:19:48] anymore. But, again,
[00:19:52] my understanding is that the UAE has made its decision,
[00:19:55] and he's really right. It's not
[00:19:58] in the UAE's interest to get into a conflict.
[00:20:02] Bambi fighting Godzilla is to Bambi's detriment.
[00:20:05] But I say, again, my understanding is that
[00:20:09] the UAE has made its decision. Netanyahu's visit to the UAE just a few
[00:20:13] days ago should be carefully considered. For example, they didn't
[00:20:17] think, "Oh, he suddenly went there." They were put on the spot,
[00:20:20] for example, they didn't know what to say, so they said, "Well,
[00:20:24] he's a guest now, he came, let's have some tea," and so on. These
[00:20:27] thoughts must be discarded. We need to look
[00:20:31] more carefully. But these
[00:20:34] thoughts, which are actually good, are thoughts that believe that the UAE's Crown Prince
[00:20:38] is anti-Israeli and under pressure. For example, he keeps saying,
[00:20:41] "Please don't come to my house." Then he suddenly lands his plane there,
[00:20:45] and this one says, "He's God's guest, he must come in."
[00:20:48] خداست باید بیاد تو.
[00:21:38] UAE, look, all the countries in the southern Persian Gulf, in their hostility
[00:21:41] towards Iran, all of them were hostile. Yes,
[00:21:45] the good ones, as mentioned, had American bases there. Let's not
[00:21:49] forget that.
[00:21:54] But they have all lost something at present. There was only one
[00:21:58] country that had invested in the future,
[00:22:01] and it lost that future, and that was the UAE. Look, if
[00:22:05] investment security is compromised anywhere,
[00:22:08] then all countries are harmed. But there was only one
[00:22:11] that, if investment security doesn't exist, has nothing
[00:22:15] at all. It is, after all, an oil and gas producer, but it is
[00:22:18] a very small part. All
[00:22:21] of these, for example, have a tourism industry,
[00:22:25] the issue of airlines, all of them have them to some extent, but there's one
[00:22:29] whose airline industry, its aviation industry in the world,
[00:22:33] is its own. That one is the UAE. All of them have worked
[00:22:36] in the AI field. All of them, more or less, but
[00:22:40] one of them has gone into it massively. This is that same
[00:22:43] investment in the future. The UAE only
[00:22:47] has one that has a territorial problem with Iran.
[00:22:50] That is, it has a territorial claim against our territorial
[00:22:53] integrity. Well, this is the UAE. Therefore, it is saying I have no
[00:22:57] choice but for Iran to lose this war. Now, some people in
[00:23:01] our country think that if the UAE
[00:23:04] says, "Well, for example, your prisoners were here for 10 years.
[00:23:07] Oh, I didn't know you had prisoners. Why didn't you say sooner?"
[00:23:11] "Let's take the prisoners, release them." If the UAE is so
[00:23:15] good, why didn't it release them sooner? Why the punches
[00:23:18] and kicks during this time?
[00:23:28] It's completely going the other way. What's the point? It's standing on the other side.
[00:23:32] It has already made its decision. It has done its work. The idea that I would go
[00:23:36] and talk with Bin Zayed and pull him out of Netanyahu's arms
[00:23:39] and attract him. Attract him to what? What do we
[00:23:42] want him to be attracted to? No, now Mearsheimer says, "Doesn't this person have any sense?
[00:23:46] The person sitting in Abu Dhabi and Dubai doesn't see that, well,
[00:23:50] with America, which was America, it's like a certain animal stuck
[00:23:53] in a herd. What should I say in the middle of this?" I mean, I want to say,
[00:23:57] does it not have worldly wisdom, calculated thinking? Does it not
[00:24:00] do geopolitical analysis? The region is not like Mr. Mehr is analyzing
[00:24:04] it. Israel's incompatibility with its neighbors is like a foreign body
[00:24:08] that is stuck in someone's body after surgery. It simply cannot
[00:24:11] be connected. Well, the UAE has brought itself to such a situation
[00:24:15] with all its surrounding countries over the past 30 years,
[00:24:18] and even beyond the region, in Sudan, in Libya, and in other places,
[00:24:22] it has done the same. Therefore, it has no choice
[00:24:25] but to follow this path, because if it wants to abandon the sources of power
[00:24:29] it has defined for itself, it must abandon them. The UAE thrives
[00:24:33] on confrontation, because of all this Israel. That is, Israel simply cannot
[00:24:36] make peace. If it wants to make peace, it shouldn't exist. That's why
[00:24:39] the UAE and Israel's logic becomes one, and that means
[00:24:43] Israel becomes the UAE's Israel, or the UAE becomes
[00:24:47] Israel's second. It doesn't really matter. That's why these two
[00:24:50] cannot. Mearsheimer is saying that a country, for example, regarding Kuwait, he can say, "Kuwait is good
[00:24:54] to be friends with both the US and Iran." Well, Kuwait, not the UAE. If
[00:24:58] it actually wants, if I'm not
[00:25:01] mistaken, you ultimately say, "Well, if it eventually gets
[00:25:04] hit by reality and understands it, or wakes up from
[00:25:08] this state of perhaps numbness and unconsciousness,
[00:25:12] it's not unlikely to reach this point. So for the short term,
[00:25:15] we are awake. You know, we also hit the UAE hard
[00:25:19] during the 40-day war. Well, the issue is, this
[00:25:22] person has made his decision to go to that side.
[00:25:25] The war will eventually end with Iran in a position of superiority.
[00:25:29] Will the UAE change its stance? In your opinion, no.
[00:25:32] See, it's political life. See, something you should consider about the UAE
[00:25:36] is the emirs themselves and their rivalry, which I think would require two or three
[00:25:40] separate programs to explain. Well, first of all,
[00:25:44] Abu Dhabi is not the same as Sharjah or Dubai.
[00:25:47] ابوظبی با شارجه با دبی اینا یکی نیست.
[00:26:39] Ya Ali, get a rhythm with Iranians,
[00:26:42] get a continuous rhythm,
[00:26:45] get a continuous passion,
[00:26:48] hold the flag, hold the flag,
[00:26:52] hold the strait firmly.
[00:26:54] بگیریدا.
[00:27:32] Hold the strait firmly, control the strait,
[00:27:36] it's our undeniable right,
[00:27:39] let's take it. The streets
[00:27:42] are ours, our hand is
[00:27:45] God's hand. Our enemy is
[00:27:48] shameless, don't underestimate
[00:27:52] the enemy.
[00:27:52] کمگی.
[00:28:32] Get a rhythm, control the strait,
[00:28:36] it's our undeniable right,
[00:28:39] take the strait. The streets
[00:28:43] are ours, our hand is God's
[00:28:46] hand. Our enemy is shameless, don't
[00:28:49] underestimate the enemy. Hold the strait firmly,
[00:28:52] hold the strait firmly.
[00:28:54] بگیریم.
[00:29:08] Turn the sea red with blood, capture the spirit of Muharram.
[00:29:11] Hold it firmly.
[00:29:14] Attention, attention! We are
[00:29:17] always vigilant. No one can
[00:29:20] repeat it. Hold the strait firmly,
[00:29:24] hold the strait firmly. Don't
[00:29:26] let go. Hold the strait firmly,
[00:29:30] control the strait.
[00:30:25] Greetings. Top news:
[00:30:27] Domestic unity
[00:30:30] and cohesion are the key to Iran's firmness
[00:30:33] against threats. The President states that with national unity,
[00:30:37] no enemy is capable of defeating the Iranian nation.
[00:30:39] نیست.
[00:30:44] We are powerful together. Let's all support each other.
[00:30:47] Then we will build an Iran
[00:30:51] that is powerful, steadfast, and growing in
[00:30:55] all
[00:30:56] fields.
[00:30:59] Warning from the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.