IRINN — broadcast
20261011 190000 UTC
395 transcript segments
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[00:00:00] And if a communications operator cannot fulfill their commitment,
[00:00:03] I would say that they will be subject
[00:00:07] to fines and the supervisory tools that we have in the
[00:00:11] Ministry of Communications and the Regulatory Organization. But now, regarding the internet that
[00:00:15] I use, there is always a complaint that our internet is expensive
[00:00:18] and of poor quality. This means that its speed
[00:00:21] and so on are not acceptable at all, and its cost is
[00:00:25] high. Well, these regulations and these supervisions
[00:00:28] already exist, but the people are not
[00:00:31] satisfied. What guarantee is there in fiber that this will not
[00:00:35] happen? Now, its speed is quality. In fact, it's about the technology.
[00:00:39] The main complaints of users that exist are focused on this
[00:00:42] quality. That is, at any rate, issues related to
[00:00:46] price and, I would say, costs, if they are
[00:00:49] proportional to the appropriate quality, users will definitely have the
[00:00:53] necessary satisfaction. That is, our principle in the
[00:00:56] systems, as I told you, our complaints systems and our systems with
[00:01:00] customers, both us and the communications operators, what is raised as
[00:01:04] a complaint today is related to quality, that they are buying it
[00:01:07] expensively. This quality will
[00:01:10] happen through this change, and it will
[00:01:13] happen through this change in infrastructure generation.
[00:01:17] Now, if you communicate with users who have
[00:01:20] fiber-based connections, have fiber optic connections at
[00:01:24] home, you will definitely see that they are satisfied
[00:01:27] and with a speed and, as I said, a quality that is several
[00:01:31] times, several tens of times, and in some places several hundred times higher than the
[00:01:35] speed. Is the cost high or is it relatively reasonable?
[00:01:39] Look, the cost is completely designed based on those
[00:01:43] indicators and the definitions that are, after all, made available to
[00:01:46] users are based on those indicators that if they previously
[00:01:50] had, for example, a
[00:01:51] as to why you could not access any of fixed connection, it is proportional to
[00:01:54] the increase in speed and quality that has occurred, it is proportional to
[00:01:57] that, and it will definitely consider the livelihood of the people
[00:02:01] and users. In this
[00:02:03] regard, the legislator of this field, which we are
[00:02:07] in the Regulatory Commission, we fully consider these,
[00:02:11] and if you look now,
[00:02:14] the field of increasing tariffs in the communications
[00:02:16] sector, especially, just make a comparison with
[00:02:20] other sectors that exist and other price increases that exist, after all,
[00:02:24] the principle of the percentage, I would say,
[00:02:27] of communication costs in the budget of users and livelihoods. Attention
[00:02:31] to this issue in all
[00:02:34] the definitions we have in the Ministry of Communications are
[00:02:37] fully at the top of our considerations. We have 3 minutes left.
[00:02:41] No, my question is that, look, due to the
[00:02:45] American public the scope of limitations we have in the internet in terms of price and
[00:02:48] quality, you mentioned that we consider incentives
[00:02:52] so that operators can bring more users to fiber optics every
[00:02:55] day. I say that when your quality is good and your price is
[00:02:58] acceptable compared to the quality,
[00:03:01] there is almost no
[00:03:03] need for incentives. People should actually be flooded with requests.
[00:03:06] The costs, as I said, the initial
[00:03:10] connection costs. A user today uses a simple modem in
[00:03:13] their home. Why should they pay, for example, an amount like 4 to 5 million Tomans
[00:03:17] or more to connect?
[00:03:21] I say, because their needs are being met. Why should they incur this cost so that
[00:03:25] , for example, their connection is based on fiber optics? For example, I mean,
[00:03:28] their needs are being met based on the previous one. Well, you can't categorize
[00:03:32] all users. Many users today,
[00:03:35] for example, have a simple need that
[00:03:39] is being met today based on these connections. Well, why
[00:03:42] should this happen? For example, there is at least an initial cost
[00:03:45] for , I would say, cabling
[00:03:49] in, for example, a home, there is an initial cost for purchasing a modem. Why should they do
[00:03:53] this? Here is the logic that I mentioned, the economy must
[00:03:56] come and take shape, and that's where we need to bring these
[00:04:00] resources to serve this issue so that we can achieve that goal. Now,
[00:04:03] is there a timetable for the completion
[00:04:07] and completion of this network? For the H that I mentioned,
[00:04:11] there are 20 million connection possibilities or coverage,
[00:04:14] which is the end of the Seventh Program, which we are trying to achieve, God willing,
[00:04:18] in the coming year. Of course, I should tell you that we had challenges and obstacles
[00:04:22] that now we only mentioned the issue of excavation permits.
[00:04:25] Anyway, the incidents that we had in the country,
[00:04:29] such as the issue of wars that we have gone
[00:04:32] through in the country, these are also, after all, because these are construction operations,
[00:04:36] excavation operations, the issues of, after all, economic fluctuations,
[00:04:39] the costs of project implementation, and the duties that
[00:04:43] other agencies have, the legal disputes that arise, these are all issues and challenges
[00:04:47] that our project faces. And one of them is this
[00:04:51] final cost for the end user. That is, this is also one of those challenges that I now
[00:04:55] say has at least doubled compared to, for example, last year.
[00:04:58] Therefore, what you say is that we are tasked until the end of the
[00:05:02] Seventh Program to create 20 million coverages, and then in
[00:05:06] parallel, our approach is to increase the
[00:05:09] connection. Regarding the migration project, where copper will be completely
[00:05:13] collected and instead we will have fiber optics throughout the country,
[00:05:16] Iran Communications Company has also given a plan that , God willing, by the year
[00:05:19] 1408, this project will be brought
[00:05:22] to a reasonably acceptable completion. Almost
[00:05:26] from 148 onwards, we will no
[00:05:28] longer have a copper network. I had the
[00:05:32] statistics and reports to give you about the
[00:05:35] progress. In just a few seconds, the progress
[00:05:39] of the project in connecting schools. We had more than 1200 growth.
[00:05:43] In connecting health centers, in connecting, I would say,
[00:05:46] the country's banking network, these are based on, meaning these are separate from
[00:05:50] the businesses and home connections. These have been
[00:05:53] specifically addressed, and we have had these significant growths that today, as I say,
[00:05:57] more than 10,000 schools in the country are connected to fiber optics.
[00:06:00] Banks, administrative and governmental organizations, and health
[00:06:04] centers, and incidentally, these two cases, schools and, I would say,
[00:06:07] the health network, are very much emphasized
[00:06:11] by Mr. Raeisi himself,
[00:06:13] and he follows up on how the health network, health centers, medical
[00:06:17] universities, and also universities and schools have been
[00:06:20] connected. Thank you very much, Mr.
[00:06:24] Fattahi, the honorable Deputy Minister of Communications and the Head of the
[00:06:27] Regulatory and Radio Communications Organization, for your presence in tonight's
[00:06:30] special news interview. Be healthy. Thank you for giving us this time. Be healthy.
[00:06:34] Thank you, and thank you for watching. Good night.
[00:06:37] بخیر.
[00:07:14] Imagine you're sitting in a control room somewhere in the Nevada Desert in
[00:07:18] 2011. The room is dim, the air conditioning is
[00:07:21] humming, and the screens in front of you are connected to an aircraft
[00:07:25] thousands of miles away. It's called the RQ-170
[00:07:28] Sentinel and at the time, it's one of the most secret unmanned
[00:07:32] aircraft in the American Arsenal. The CIA uses it for missions
[00:07:36] where simply being detected could create an international incident.
[00:07:39] Earlier that same year, an RQ-170 has been used
[00:07:43] in the surveillance efforts surrounding Osama bin Laden's
[00:07:46] compound in Pakistan. Now, the same type of aircraft is being used
[00:07:50] to watch another extremely sensitive target, Iran.
[00:07:54] The Washington Post later reported that one of the early
[00:07:57] RQ-170 missions penetrated more than 600
[00:08:01] miles into Iran and observed the secret nuclear
[00:08:04] facility near Colme without provoking any obvious response
[00:08:08] from Iranian defenses. More missions followed. Thousands of
[00:08:11] sites were. and hundreds of surveillance passes were
[00:08:14] reportedly conducted. Eventually, something that once seed
[00:08:18] incredibly dangerous started to feel almost routine.
[00:08:22] Americans send their drones into Iran, they watch, they
[00:08:25] leave until one night the drone doesn't come
[00:08:28] back. Several days, the United States doesn't even
[00:08:32] know what's become of one of its most sensitive intelligence
[00:08:35] systems, then Iranian television provides the
[00:08:38] answer. The sentinel appears beneath bright lights.
[00:08:42] remarkably intact, surrounded by Iranian
[00:08:45] military personnel. For the United States, this is already an
[00:08:49] intelligence disaster for Iran, it's an opportunity
[00:08:52] that almost nobody could have planned. President Barack Obama
[00:08:56] even publicly begged Iran for the aircraft back.
[00:08:59] As is already been
[00:09:00] indicated,
[00:09:04] we have asked for it back, we'll
[00:09:07] see how the Iranians respond. Iran refused to
[00:09:11] understand why that... mattered so much though, we actually need to leave
[00:09:14] 2011 behind for moment and go back almost 30
[00:09:18] years, because the real beginning of Oran's drone story doesn't
[00:09:21] involve an American stealth aircraft at all, begins with
[00:09:25] a war Iran was struggling to see. I'm Jackson Hinkel from
[00:09:29] legitimate Targets and you're watching the story of how Iran
[00:09:32] became the world's drone
[00:09:34] superpower.
[00:09:38] Modern armies are surrounded by satellites, drones,
[00:09:42] digital maps and live video feeds, but in the early
[00:09:46] 1980s, battlefield reconnaissance often meant putting
[00:09:49] human beings inside aircraft and sending them over enemy
[00:09:53] territory. in the early years of the
[00:09:56] Iran-Iraq war, Iran relied heavily on
[00:09:59] RF-4 Phantom Reconnaissance aircraft.
[00:10:03] These were valuable machines flown by trained crews
[00:10:06] and early in the war they provided critical aerial imagery of
[00:10:10] Iraqi positions, but Iraq's air... defenses
[00:10:13] improved, radar coverage expanded and eventually an
[00:10:16] Iranian reconnaissance aircraft was shot down. Every
[00:10:20] mission now carried the possibility of losing not
[00:10:23] only an expensive aircraft. but also pilots that
[00:10:27] Iran couldn't easily replace. Under the
[00:10:30] Shah, Iran had been one of America's most important allies in
[00:10:33] the Middle East, and one of the largest customers for
[00:10:37] American military equipment. Its air force had
[00:10:40] been built around American technology. Then the
[00:10:43] 1979 Islamic Revolution overturned that
[00:10:47] relationship almost overnight. The new Islamic
[00:10:50] Republic inherited F4 Phantoms, F5 Fighters,
[00:10:54] F4. tomcats and enormous quantities of
[00:10:58] sophisticated equipment, but the country
[00:11:00] that had sold around those weapons was now one of its greatest
[00:11:04] enemies. spare parts became difficult to obtain,
[00:11:07] sanctions tightened, Iran's military couldn't afford to keep losing
[00:11:11] reconnaissance aircraft. so a group of students and
[00:11:14] engineers from Isfahan university began working
[00:11:18] on another idea. what if you could just put camera
[00:11:21] an aircraft without putting the pilot in it? that's exactly... they
[00:11:25] did. The first Iranian drones were primitive compared to what would
[00:11:29] come later. Medical IV bags were used as improvised fuel
[00:11:32] containers, propellers were made from wood, launching equipment
[00:11:36] was assembled by hand. These early machines had limited range
[00:11:40] and could struggle badly in windy conditions, sometimes even
[00:11:43] forcing operators to use parachutes and search for them
[00:11:46] after missions, but they worked. Iran's early
[00:11:50] UAV effort surveyed nearly 14,000 square
[00:11:54] kilometers. produce more than 5,000 reconnaissance frames
[00:11:57] during the Iran-Iraq war, our country fighting
[00:12:01] much better supplied Iraq, while increasingly isolated from
[00:12:04] western technology, lesson was powerful, a crude,
[00:12:08] unmanned aerial aircraft did not need to be better than the fighter
[00:12:12] jet, it just needed to solve a problem that the fighter jet was too
[00:12:15] valuable to solve, and that idea would stay with Iran for
[00:12:19] decades.
[00:12:24] After the war, Iran could have treated these primitive drones
[00:12:27] as emergency experiment and simply moved on. Instead, the
[00:12:31] country began institutionalizing them.
[00:12:33] Organizations such as Kuds, aviation worked on
[00:12:37] increasingly capable unmanned systems, while
[00:12:40] aircraft from the Mohajer and Ababil families gradually
[00:12:44] improved range, reliability and
[00:12:47] usefulness. Engineers learned about autopilots,
[00:12:50] communication systems,
[00:12:53] airframes. Military command. learned what unmanned aircraft
[00:12:57] could and could not do, factories learned how to produce and repair
[00:13:00] them, huurament networks learned which foren components could be
[00:13:04] acquired and which had to be replaced domestically, and
[00:13:07] sanctions shaped the entire process. if the preferred engine
[00:13:10] was unavailable, another engine had to be adapted. if specialized
[00:13:14] electronics were restricted, they had to be sourced through intermediaries,
[00:13:18] reverse engineered or replaced with civilian components. the
[00:13:22] question wasn't always, what's the best possible? system, instead it was
[00:13:26] often, what can we actually built? once you understand that
[00:13:29] mindset, Iran's later obsession with captured foreign
[00:13:33] equipment starts making a whole lot more sense, because every foreign
[00:13:36] system that fell into Iranian hands represented something
[00:13:40] sanctions had made incredibly difficult to obtain
[00:13:43] access. around the end of the 1990s,
[00:13:46] shahead aviation industries which primarily focus on
[00:13:50] creating helicopters began moving seriously into drone development.
[00:13:54] one important of this development involved examining foreign
[00:13:57] unmanned aircraft, including the Israeli Armez family.
[00:14:01] By 2007, the organization had produced the shothead
[00:14:04] 123, while work soon moved toward the much more
[00:14:08] ambitious Shothead 129, designed not
[00:14:11] simply to observe, but eventually to conduct combat
[00:14:14] missions as well. So by 2011, Ron's drone
[00:14:17] industry was no longer a collection of students building improvised
[00:14:21] aircraft with wooden propellers. It had decades
[00:14:24] of. experience, it had organizations dedicated to
[00:14:27] drone development, it had already learned to examine foreign technology
[00:14:31] and incorporate useful ideas and it was beginning to move from
[00:14:35] basic reconnaissance toward armed long-range
[00:14:38] aircraft, then almost unbelievably one of America's
[00:14:42] most sophisticated unmann aircraft landed in its
[00:14:46] lap.
[00:14:49] Iran already knew American drones were operating near its borders, but the
[00:14:53] United States is... 170 was different from
[00:14:56] everything Iran had previously obtained. This aircraft came
[00:15:00] from Malackied Martin's Skunkworks. Organization
[00:15:03] associated with some of America's most secret aviation
[00:15:07] projects. The US Air Force publicly described the Sentinel
[00:15:10] only as a low-observable unmanned
[00:15:13] aircraft system. Even its existence had only been officially
[00:15:17] acknowledged in 2009 after aviation enthusiasts
[00:15:21] began spotting a mysterious aircraft around the Kandahar.
[00:15:25] airfield in Afghanistan, they nicknamed it the Beast of
[00:15:28] Kandahar, but what happened in December 2011 was
[00:15:32] that one of those aircraft stopped being something Iran could only watch from the
[00:15:35] ground, it became some... thing that Iranian technicians
[00:15:39] could actually touch. United States never publicly released the
[00:15:43] classified telemetry and attributed the loss to a
[00:15:46] malfunction, so the complete technical sequence remains
[00:15:49] unknown outside the participants, but the
[00:15:51] operational result is undeniable. The CIA
[00:15:55] lost the RQ-170 inside Iran and Iran
[00:15:59] recovered the aircraft an unusually intact
[00:16:01] condition. This was the turning point that accelerated Iran's
[00:16:05] existing drone programs. Iran. now had something in
[00:16:08] their hands that years of espionage might not have
[00:16:11] produced, physical access to an actual advance American
[00:16:15] drone. American officials had already recognized the broader
[00:16:19] danger. December 2011, then Air Force chief
[00:16:22] of staff, general Norton Schwarzs acknowledged publicly
[00:16:26] that there was clearly potential for reverse
[00:16:28] engineering.
[00:21:08] Governance is not just about commanding
[00:21:11] and ruling.
[00:21:17] Governance is about being in people's hearts.
[00:22:00] Every war or military alliance needs an excuse. A
[00:22:04] great threat that the whole world believes.
[00:22:08] But if there was no
[00:22:09] excuse,
[00:22:18] they make one. With a false flag
[00:22:21] operation or a threat in the name of
[00:22:24] the enemy, large enough to make the punishment of
[00:22:28] the accused seem mandatory for everyone. For 70
[00:22:31] years, this tactic has led to wars and great punishments.
[00:22:35] There is no doubt that the Zionist regime has a long history
[00:22:39] of designing and implementing so-called false flag
[00:22:42] operations. A very clear case is the
[00:22:45] incident known as the
[00:22:48] Lavon affair. In 1954,
[00:22:51] in
[00:22:54] Cairo, Egypt, (1954)
[00:22:58] explosions in cinemas and American centers. The blame falls on
[00:23:02] the Egyptians, and two people are
[00:23:05] executed. Years later, the official archives of the Israeli
[00:23:08] Ministry of Defense explicitly state: these bombings
[00:23:11] were the work of Israeli spies,
[00:23:14] and 51 years later, they themselves officially
[00:23:17] honored those same agents.
[00:23:25] Bombings in cafes and Jewish neighborhoods resulted in
[00:23:28] the migration of hundreds of thousands
[00:23:32] of Iraqi Jews to Israel.
[00:23:36] And later it became clear that this was the work of the Israelis
[00:23:39] themselves. The Mediterranean
[00:23:43] Sea, 1967. The peak of the Six-Day War.
[00:23:46] The American reconnaissance ship Liberty, because.
[00:24:09] And this pattern is repeated many, many times. Assassinations and
[00:24:12] operations in different parts of the world, and of course,
[00:24:16] the most important of them are the false narratives about
[00:24:20] October 7th.
[00:24:23] February 28th, 2026.
[00:24:27] War is imposed on Iran for 40 days and
[00:24:30] nights. The origin of many of the attacks are American
[00:24:34] bases in the Persian Gulf countries. Iran
[00:24:38] also targets those same bases in return.
[00:24:40] گیرد.
[00:24:45] But in these 40 days, the same pattern is repeated
[00:24:49] again. Attacks from an unknown source on
[00:24:52] regional countries, and the accusation is always
[00:24:55] in the name of Iran.
[00:25:00] And Tehran gives an ironclad answer every
[00:25:02] time. Even if it's a lie.
[00:25:06] Day three of the war: Aramco refineries in
[00:25:09] flames. The accusation is fired
[00:25:13] in the first hour. Iran.
[00:25:16] But the drones were intercepted. And the media from
[00:25:50] going to war against Iran.
[00:25:52] Tehran officially denies both. But the climax of
[00:25:56] the story is after the ceasefire. On August
[00:25:59] 17th, at midnight, two suicide drones
[00:26:02] targeted Masrour Barzani's office in Erbil,
[00:26:06] and again the finger of accusation points
[00:26:08] towards
[00:26:11] Iran. But Tehran's response is the key to the puzzle.
[00:26:15] All of Iran's operations are officially and explicitly announced.
[00:26:18] شوند.
[00:26:21] Every attack, an accusation. Every
[00:26:23] accusation, a fake narrative.
[00:26:27] 40 days of war, and the list of false flags
[00:26:31] is longer than ever before. And this
[00:26:34] pattern has no end. England, three suspicious
[00:26:38] vehicles near Fairford base, no bombs,
[00:26:42] no evidence, and once again an accusation
[00:26:45] in the name of
[00:26:46] Iran.
[00:26:52] A few days later, another claim, a co-pilot with
[00:26:56] a knife on a flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv,
[00:26:59] and the rescuer of the story, an Israeli passenger. No
[00:27:03] clear motive, no evidence, and it is clear that
[00:27:06] this is another conspiracy. From
[00:27:10] Cairo to the Persian Gulf, from
[00:27:13] 1954
[00:27:15] to today. For 70 years, the false flag
[00:27:19] remains a weapon to create a narrative,
[00:27:22] a terror, and finally justify
[00:27:25] subsequent illegal
[00:27:27] actions.
[00:27:50] What reason were you given
[00:27:53] these military facilities, which by the way, we've heard from reporting and even the former
[00:27:57] director of the CIA are now rendered
[00:28:00] inoperable.
[00:28:02] Yeah, the reason was made up, the reason was that it wasn't safe to bring
[00:28:06] me to base, but that's just not true. Uh, the fact the
[00:28:10] matter is, I've been in the Iraq war during
[00:28:13] the height of the surge. I was brought to forward operating
[00:28:17] bases in Afghanistan when the Taliban was actively targeting our
[00:28:20] troops. Um, this was not a question of safety, this is
[00:28:24] a question of cover-up, um, because in addition to not being able to get on
[00:28:27] those bases, as you mentioned, I simply asked for the department of defense leadership
[00:28:31] in the... region to come brief me at the embassy
[00:28:35] and they refused even come talk to me, that's proof positive that
[00:28:39] this is about a broader effort to try
[00:28:42] to cover up, try to hide from members of congress and the
[00:28:47] the damage. did get to see the damage to the US embassy because the state
[00:28:51] department did support my trip there and it was
[00:28:54] extensive um the attack on the US embassy happened at night, had it
[00:28:58] happened during the day, there would have been lots of Americans
[00:29:01] killed and It's just a sign of how
[00:29:05] unprepared Trump was for this war. It's inexcusable that he left our bases
[00:29:08] and our embassies so vulnerable, and he doesn't want us
[00:29:12] to see the damage, because if we did, um, and we could explain it to people
[00:29:16] back home, I think they'd be even matter that Trump started this war without a
[00:29:19] real plan.
[00:30:32] news from our news network. Follow us.
[00:30:36] Collision of a second supertanker with a naval
[00:30:39] mine in the Strait of Hormuz. The Public Relations Department of the Islamic
[00:30:42] Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy announced that a
[00:30:46] rogue supertanker collided with a naval mine in
[00:30:49] the southern part of the Strait of Hormuz and suffered an explosion and fire
[00:30:53] in its engine room. This ship, carrying
[00:30:57] crude oil, intended to leave the Strait of Hormuz.