IRINN — broadcast
20261012 010000 UTC
457 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
Data courtesy of The GDELT Project (https://www.gdeltproject.org/), from the Internet Archive TV News Archive.
Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:00] All Muslims Where should we go from here?
[00:00:02] I wasn't really into politics and stuff
[00:00:05] for a long time. I was against it, actually.
[00:00:09] It was a blessing or whatever it was. At some point,
[00:00:13] I came back. According to documents,
[00:00:17] according to rumors, according to many things, I saw something.
[00:00:19] That moment of martyrdom is enough for me.
[00:00:23] What happened and where it happened is enough for me. I changed.
[00:00:27] I'm trying to change. I'm going.
[00:00:30] I'm investigating. This was one of the strangest things
[00:00:34] I saw from a very close person. It's very
[00:00:37] hard.
[00:00:39] Hasten to Their absence is unbelievable.
[00:00:41] I still don't believe it. I can't
[00:00:45] Hasten to accept
[00:00:46] that they're not here.
[00:00:53] Although
[00:00:55] Hasten to their spirit will protect our country even more.
[00:00:58] After a few
[00:01:01] Hasten to salvation. years, we became eager, Imam Reza.
[00:01:03] You brought K.I. home. We
[00:01:07] have a proverb in Germany that understanding comes after death.
[00:01:11] I never believed that some people who weren't talking to him in previous years
[00:01:15] said after his martyrdom what mistakes we made.
[00:01:18] Among the young children, but good for them. In the end, they understood
[00:01:22] that this man was exceptional. I wish
[00:01:26] the time would not come when we would be heedless.
[00:01:31] I mean, I'm not just talking about the son of the Leader.
[00:01:35] In general, at any time,
[00:01:38] I wish we wouldn't be heedless so that a very bad
[00:01:42] thing would happen and we would say again, "Oh, I wish
[00:01:46] I had been more careful." We are no longer the Leader's
[00:01:49] soldier. We are his vanguard.
[00:01:52] We have said many times that we are the Leader's soldiers, but we couldn't
[00:01:56] give our lives for him. The Leader became our martyr.
[00:02:00] Now, God willing, may we have the honor to be
[00:02:03] the vanguard of the new Leader so that the Leader's
[00:02:07] shadow may not diminish from us. This blue color scheme
[00:02:10] that they have put here, we mostly saw it on TV. When the gentlemen
[00:02:14] come closer to here, you see this light
[00:02:18] and you realize it. From that very moment, a lump forms in your throat until you reach
[00:02:22] here. This is unconscious. Tears
[00:02:25] come. Now, if you want to pretend that "No, I don't want to cry. I
[00:02:29] want to be strong," they come.
[00:02:33] Tears come. It's not in your control, and it's a really strange
[00:02:36] feeling.
[00:02:41] It was a very painful issue,
[00:02:45] and accepting this issue is very difficult for us.
[00:02:58] RQ-170. There's a
[00:03:33] three years later, in 2014, Iran unveiled
[00:03:36] an aircraft as the result of reverse engineering work
[00:03:39] conducted on the American drone. Initially, a lot of Western analysts
[00:03:43] were skeptical, looking similar to an RQ-170 doesn't
[00:03:47] mean matching the RQ-170's actual
[00:03:49] abilities, but what happened afterward made the program much harder to
[00:03:53] dismiss. Iran didn't simply create one display model and move
[00:03:56] on. There were larger versions associated with the Shahed
[00:04:00] and smaller aircraft such as the Shahed 161 and
[00:04:03] Shahed 191 family. Iranian
[00:04:07] engineers experimented with different propulsion systems as well, and the
[00:04:10] important point wasn't whether any one of those aircraft was
[00:04:14] an exact technological duplicate of the Sentinel. It was that
[00:04:17] Iran had absorbed enough from the aircraft to start
[00:04:20] experimenting and even improving the drone's design. The
[00:04:23] American RQ-170 had been designed primarily to collect
[00:04:26] intelligence. Iranian lineage increasingly included
[00:04:30] aircraft built to attack things. Iran's military
[00:04:33] strategy has always been constrained by geography and
[00:04:37] conventional military weakness. The United States had bases throughout
[00:04:40] the region. Israel possessed a technologically advanced air force.
[00:04:44] Gulf states were buying enormous quantities of Western weapons.
[00:04:48] Iran had partners instead: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the
[00:04:52] Palestinian resistance in Gaza, Shia militias in
[00:04:55] Iraq, and Ansarullah in Yemen. Drones fit
[00:04:58] naturally into this network. They were relatively
[00:05:02] inexpensive compared with combat aircraft, easier to conceal,
[00:05:05] easier to move, and could allow armed groups without any real air
[00:05:09] force to suddenly possess a form of long-range air
[00:05:12] power. By the early 2020s, Iranian drones, designs
[00:05:16] or components had appeared across the Middle East. This is one of the most
[00:05:19] important transitions in our whole story. A militia that can never
[00:05:23] afford a fleet of modern combat aircraft, could now launch
[00:05:27] an unmanned system toward a military base, oil
[00:05:30] facility or naval asset, and no Iranian drone would demonstrate
[00:05:33] that idea more clearly than the Shahed 136.
[00:05:37] Shahed 136 isn't impressive because it's
[00:05:40] extraordinarily sophisticated. The importance comes from almost the
[00:05:44] opposite quality. It's just simple enough. A relatively
[00:05:48] small engine pushes an inexpensive airframe across
[00:05:51] a very long distance. The aircraft carries an explosive
[00:05:55] payload and it's not designed to return. That means there is no need
[00:05:58] to build an expensive recovery system because there
[00:06:02] will be no recovery. And that simplicity changes the economics
[00:06:05] of air warfare. Think about the problem from the defender's
[00:06:08] perspective: a cheap drone is approaching your airbase. You
[00:06:12] may know that it's relatively primitive. That doesn't mean you can ignore it,
[00:06:16] because if it hits a radar station, a fuel storage facility,
[00:06:19] electrical substation or even a parked aircraft, the damage will
[00:06:23] vastly exceed the price of the drone itself, so you have to stop it. Now
[00:06:27] imagine the missile used to stop it cost many more times than the attacking
[00:06:31] aircraft. You've successfully defended your target, but the
[00:06:34] attackers force you into an expensive exchange,
[00:06:37] then another drone appears, then another, and 20,
[00:06:41] 50, 300. Perhaps the drones are only the first
[00:06:44] wave of the attack, forcing radars and air defense crews to react
[00:06:48] before faster cruise missiles and eventually ballistic missiles
[00:06:51] arrive. The idea would soon be tested on an enormous
[00:06:55] scale in Europe. This drone has become part of an international
[00:06:58] feedback loop, and while this is happening, Iran itself is
[00:07:02] preparing to demonstrate what mass drone warfare looks like at
[00:07:06] their national level. On the night of April 13th,
[00:07:09] 2024, Iran had launched its first large directive attack
[00:07:12] against Israel from Iranian territory. The attack was
[00:07:16] unusual, not only because of its scale, but because of the way different
[00:07:20] weapons were combined. The drones were launched first. Cruise
[00:07:23] missiles then followed. Last came ballistic missiles traveling
[00:07:27] dramatically faster. The timing meant different kinds of weapons could
[00:07:30] converge on the defended area within a more concentrated
[00:07:34] period. Roughly 170 drones were involved in the initial
[00:07:37] attack, alongside dozens of cruise missiles and more than 100
[00:07:41] ballistic missiles. From the perspective of Iran's drone program, the
[00:07:45] event represented something extraordinary. The drone was no
[00:07:48] longer a substitute, used because Iran had run out of better
[00:07:51] options. It had become part of Iran's core way of fighting. In
[00:07:55] April 2026, US Central Command released footage showing
[00:07:58] a strike against an Iranian flying wing, UAV
[00:08:02] on the ground. Aviation analysts identified the aircraft as
[00:08:06] belonging to the family Iran had developed from the captured
[00:08:11] remarkable symmetry in that moment, but during the same conflict,
[00:08:14] an even stranger reversal was taking place. For
[00:08:18] decades, American drone development largely moved
[00:08:21] toward greater sophistication: advanced sensors, satellite
[00:08:25] communications, long endurance and increasingly expensive platforms.
[00:08:28] The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrated the value of cheap
[00:08:32] aircraft that could be lost in enormous numbers. That lesson
[00:08:35] spread rapidly through militaries around the world, and in
[00:08:38] 2025, the Pentagon unveiled the Low Cost Unmanned
[00:08:42] Combat Attack System, or LUCAS drone. By March
[00:08:45] 2026, Reuters reported that the US had already used LUCAS
[00:08:49] in combat against Iran, only months after the
[00:08:52] system was publicly unveiled. The aircraft cost roughly
[00:08:56] $35,000, and it belongs to the same category
[00:08:59] of long-range expendable drone popularized by the
[00:09:03] Shahed. The United States' LUCAS drone was developed after the
[00:09:07] US obtained an Iranian-designed Shahed 136 and
[00:09:10] reverse-engineered the aircraft, effectively taking Iran's own
[00:09:14] low-cost drone technology and turning it into an American weapon. Now
[00:09:18] the United States was doing something remarkably similar to what Iran had
[00:09:22] done with the RQ-170 15 years earlier:
[00:09:25] taking an adversary's aircraft, studying it,
[00:09:28] learning from it and building a version of its own. No one had a monopoly on the idea
[00:09:32] anymore. We shouldn't forget that the United States' own
[00:09:36] RQ-170 drone didn't create
[00:09:39] Iran's drone program. It accelerated it. By 2000
[00:09:42] 11, Iranian engineers had decades of drone development behind
[00:09:46] them. The Sentinel arrived at the exact moment when Iran had an industry
[00:09:49] mature enough to exploit it. By 2026, Iran's drones
[00:09:53] were no longer primarily interesting because they were
[00:09:56] Iranian. They were interesting because the ideas behind them had
[00:10:00] become global. Cheap drones were changing how militaries thought about air
[00:10:03] defense. Mass production was changing how commanders calculated
[00:10:07] the value of interceptors. Commercial electronics were changing
[00:10:11] who could build long-range weapons, and electronic warfare was changing
[00:10:14] how drones navigated. The cycle of copying, adapting and improving had
[00:10:18] become international, and all of this makes the scene in December of
[00:10:22] 2011 look very different in hindsight.
[00:10:25] Back in Nevada, the operators saw their feed disappear and understood that they had
[00:10:29] lost a drone. But in Iran, engineers looked at that same event
[00:10:33] and saw an opportunity. 15 years later, we're still watching
[00:10:37] the consequences fly.
[00:11:02] Sunday, July 18, 2026,
[00:11:04] news of the arrest of two French diplomats in
[00:11:08] Tehran is published. The French Foreign Minister called the arrest of two diplomatic
[00:11:12] staff members of their embassy in Tehran a clear
[00:11:15] violation of diplomatic immunity. France says two
[00:11:19] embassy employees in Tehran were arrested and interrogated for
[00:11:23] several hours. Jean-Noël Barrot also said that both diplomats are now safe
[00:11:27] and are expected to return to France within the next few
[00:11:30] hours. The French Foreign Ministry reacted to this news,
[00:11:34] and the matter was even taken to the European Union.
[00:11:37] It was immediately clear that both diplomats, who were released a few hours
[00:11:40] later, were operating under the guise of cultural
[00:11:44] responsibilities. The French Foreign Ministry described
[00:11:46] their mission in Iran as follows.
[00:11:50] The French Foreign Minister called this action
[00:11:53] shocking because these two officials are responsible for implementing
[00:11:57] French programs to support civil society, especially Iranian
[00:12:01] artists and scientists. The French are keen to associate
[00:12:05] themselves with culture and art and thereby create soft
[00:12:08] power and a position of influence for themselves. The story
[00:12:12] is that at some point in their eventful history, they came to the conclusion
[00:12:16] that in military matters, they
[00:12:19] cannot compete with their rivals and must stop
[00:12:22] their expansionist programs. As a result,
[00:12:26] they began trying to become a cultural and artistic
[00:12:29] power, but not an introverted
[00:12:33] or endogenous cultural power, but a power with an aggressive
[00:12:37] and colonial stance, and with the nature
[00:12:41] of aggression against the indigenous national cultures of other countries. This
[00:12:44] model of culture and art is to be promoted by the French in
[00:12:48] the world and form an important part of the hybrid
[00:12:51] wars against independent nations. Of course, this mission
[00:12:55] does not mean that the French do not play a role
[00:12:58] in the political, security, and even military projects of the bloc
[00:13:02] they are in, but their main priority in recent years
[00:13:06] has been cultural issues. Based on this program and approach,
[00:13:10] the cultural section of the French embassy in Tehran is considered
[00:13:13] the most active part of this embassy. The activities of the French
[00:13:17] embassy in these years have had four main pillars.
[00:13:21] The first pillar, the CILAF Center.
[00:13:24] Hello. This is Tehran. You see and hear my image
[00:13:27] and voice from the French Language Center. CILAF Center
[00:13:31] is an institution in Tehran without
[00:13:34] legal permits that annually provided specialized French
[00:13:38] language training to about 3,000 Iranians, and its main goal
[00:13:41] was to promote the French language as a cover
[00:13:45] for anti-security activities in Iran. All their planning
[00:13:49] and efforts in this regard can be summarized in one
[00:13:52] sentence: If someone speaks French,
[00:13:56] they will think French. Second pillar: Campus France,
[00:13:59] whose main mission is marketing for French
[00:14:03] universities and identifying and attracting students,
[00:14:06] but only in certain fields of humanities. It does not allow
[00:14:10] Iranian students to study advanced technologies
[00:14:13] and high-tech. Third
[00:14:15] pillar: the French school in Tehran. In common
[00:14:19] diplomatic practice, embassy schools are solely
[00:14:22] for the education of diplomats' children.
[00:14:29] The students of the French embassy school in Tehran were
[00:14:32] Iranians. A school with French language and culture that every year
[00:14:36] received 13,000 Euros from the parents of each
[00:14:39] Iranian student. Parents who were mostly from among personalities.
[00:15:00] Allahu Akbar, Allahu
[00:15:02] Akbar.
[00:15:04] Allahu Akbar,
[00:15:07] Allahu
[00:15:13] Akbar.
[00:15:15] I bear witness that there is no god but
[00:15:18] Allah.
[00:15:23] I bear witness that there is no god but
[00:15:26] Allah.
[00:15:33] I bear witness that Muhammad
[00:15:35] is the Messenger of Allah.
[00:15:41] I bear witness that Muhammad
[00:15:44] is the Messenger of
[00:15:47] Allah.
[00:15:53] I bear witness that Ali is the Guardian of
[00:15:57] Allah.
[00:16:02] I bear witness that Ali
[00:16:05] is the Proof of Allah.
[00:16:16] prayer.
[00:16:22] prayer.
[00:16:33] salvation.
[00:16:51] Hasten to
[00:16:55] the best
[00:16:56] of deeds.
[00:16:59] Hasten to
[00:17:03] the best
[00:17:04] of deeds.
[00:17:41] All these actions were, of course, a pretext for establishing direct
[00:17:45] communication with Iran's cultural and artistic elite and
[00:17:49] creating an effective network among them, and a kind of
[00:17:52] mental and cultural engineering that could later spread to other
[00:17:56] social strata. Now,
[00:17:59] give good food to customers,
[00:18:02] help his
[00:18:05] friends, no expenses.
[00:18:08] But he'll eventually get
[00:18:11] us to go to his house.
[00:18:14] The crazy house's president. Connecting with
[00:18:17] this class sometimes happened through financial support for their works,
[00:18:21] sometimes by creating
[00:18:25] conditions for their presence in a study period or
[00:18:29] participation in residencies and workshops in France, and
[00:18:33] sometimes by granting French national honors such
[00:18:36] as Chevalier and Soldier. One issue is
[00:18:40] Chevalier. I don't know why you emphasize this so
[00:18:44] much. If Shahram Nazeri alone is not enough,
[00:18:47] then we should always use the title
[00:18:51] Chevalier, which the French themselves laugh at us for giving
[00:18:55] to our best artist, to our great artist.
[00:18:58] Let's not say that this artist is from
[00:19:01] Kermanshah or Iranian. This is something
[00:19:04] that I very, very, perhaps because of this, I myself
[00:19:08] did not accept this title and this so-called
[00:19:11] honor because I want to remain Iranian, because I want to be Hossein Alizadeh.
[00:19:15] I don't want to be French. The French sometimes
[00:19:18] and for some people, they proceeded through the attraction
[00:19:21] of the Talent Visa, also known as the Talent Visa or the
[00:19:25] Schengen Visa, and of course, sometimes at
[00:19:28] the night parties of the diplomats of this embassy in Tehran,
[00:19:32] they pursued the project. But all these actions had
[00:19:35] an important flavor, promoting anti-ethical
[00:19:39] issues such as the culture of homosexuality in
[00:19:43] Iran or expanding underground and erotic
[00:19:45] dances. France has been so insistent
[00:19:49] on this that sometimes it even selected its own diplomats
[00:19:52] in Tehran from among homosexuals.
[00:19:55] But
[00:19:57] let's go back to the story of the arrest of two French
[00:20:00] diplomats. The French, who at some point realized
[00:20:04] the Iranian security apparatus's sensitivity to
[00:20:07] the extent and depth of the interventions of their high-flying
[00:20:11] individuals under the guise of cultural activities, designed a new
[00:20:15] project. Villazadig is a platform that was supposed to
[00:20:18] realize the goal of networking among the elite or intellectuals
[00:20:22] for the French as a virtual and completely hidden embassy,
[00:20:25] and its contract was signed with the letterhead of the
[00:20:29] illegal CILAF institution and with the signature of the former French
[00:20:32] ambassador to Tehran. The name of this project comes from the name of one of the anti-
[00:20:36] books.
[00:20:47] France sought to empower and ultimately network
[00:20:51] effectively among Iranian scientific, cultural,
[00:20:54] and artistic elites. This special mission was defined in a very
[00:20:58] diverse context. From cinema and theater to
[00:21:01] music, architecture, archaeology, visual and digital
[00:21:05] arts, and branches of humanities and even
[00:21:09] translation and publishing.
[00:21:11] Villazadik was supposed to place Iranian elites' connection with the French
[00:21:14] government under a comprehensive program and software of
[00:21:18] Francophilia to be an effective help to the plan of widespread
[00:21:22] social and cultural changes in Iran with special
[00:21:25] French sponsorship and with the ambition of realizing
[00:21:29] a revolution. The two
[00:21:31] delinquent French diplomats were caught in the trap of the unknown soldiers
[00:21:35] of Imam Zaman (may Allah hasten his reappearance). The Ministry of Intelligence warned the French
[00:21:39] government: You must be accountable for the interventions
[00:21:42] of your diplomats. The story of the arrest of the
[00:21:46] diplomat and his colleague is directly related to this issue.
[00:22:01] Two suspects linked to infiltration projects, two foreign individuals
[00:22:04] are also present at their personal residence, who, upon encountering
[00:22:08] Iranian security forces, declare that they are there to coordinate
[00:22:12] the implementation of a special plan by the French government.
[00:22:16] This special plan is the Villazadie project.
[00:22:20] Now, parts of the Ministry of Information's statement, which was released
[00:22:24] on August 15th, can be more accurately
[00:22:27] deciphered. The statement reads: The Ministry of Intelligence, in the
[00:22:31] process of investigating one of the important infiltration cases,
[00:22:35] while executing a judicial order to arrest two of the accused in the case,
[00:22:38] became aware of the illegal presence of two French diplomats
[00:22:42] at a secret meeting place. The illegal actions and behaviors of these two
[00:22:46] diplomats had, of course, been repeated before.
[00:22:50] The matter was announced to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the delinquent
[00:22:53] diplomats were handed over to the French ambassador to Iran with the presence
[00:22:56] of diplomatic police. They had planned to hold
[00:23:00] the official opening ceremony of Villazadik on September 3rd at the Paul
[00:23:04] Duchamp Hall in Paris with the presence of the French Foreign and Culture
[00:23:08] Ministers, and of course, guests from Iran, in an unofficial
[00:23:12] manner. This was a new and different phase of the Social
[00:23:16] Change project in Iran. Amidst
[00:23:20] the national resistance of Iranians against American
[00:23:23] aggression, however, the situation has changed.
[00:23:27] The French cannot expect the non-interference
[00:23:30] of foreign countries in internal affairs only for themselves
[00:23:34] and only be concerned about France's national
[00:23:37] security. Concerns that have manifested
[00:23:41] themselves in a law known as the PIF. The law to prevent
[00:23:44] foreign interference in France, which was approved in
[00:23:47] 2024.
[00:23:51] The explanations provided by Mr. Casalani are important.
[00:23:54] There is a difference between infiltration and intervention. In this
[00:23:58] case, we are dealing with infiltration in the case of those who agree
[00:24:01] to do their work, and after this
[00:24:05] work, they must transparently declare their goals to the authorities
[00:24:09] because they are present here representing a foreign
[00:24:12] power and have acted. In their case, within the first 15
[00:24:16] days and after that,
[00:24:20] within 3 months after their action, they will be given a certificate
[00:24:24] of no criminal record because they have
[00:24:27] accepted the transparency laws.
[00:24:30] Therefore, the goal is to be transparent in the face
[00:24:33] of public opinion.
[00:24:36] The French, who are apparently concerned about the reaction of some countries
[00:24:40] to their policies and actions, emphasize in this law:
[00:24:43] The threat against French interests is no longer
[00:24:47] limited to conventional warfare and traditional interventions
[00:24:50] such as espionage. Intervention is no longer only
[00:24:54] in the realm of intelligence services and has involved many
[00:24:58] actors. Political parties, universities, technology
[00:25:01] companies, and media are all targets
[00:25:04] of malevolent
[00:25:05] powers.
[00:25:12] Foreign interventions are a serious threat that France cannot
[00:25:16] take lightly. These interventions take forms such
[00:25:20] as cyber attacks, the dissemination of false information, and infiltration
[00:25:24] of universities. We do not want to be passive in the face
[00:25:27] of these attacks. For this reason, the Ecologist group
[00:25:30] agrees with the objective of this legal draft. It is necessary
[00:25:34] for Parliament to strengthen its powers in these sovereign
[00:25:38] areas more than ever before. Of course, this text alone
[00:25:41] will not be enough to protect us from all foreign
[00:25:45] interference. Special attention must be paid to the issue of
[00:25:48] multi-vocal media information and its independence.
[00:25:52] They
[00:25:57] claim that they passed this law to combat France's vulnerability
[00:26:01] to foreign influence, but they continue
[00:26:04] their illegal infiltration and interventions
[00:26:08] in the affairs of other countries.
[00:26:11] Other countries also have similar
[00:26:14] laws and implement them seriously.
[00:26:18] However, Iran, with a serious response to the
[00:26:21] Villazadik infiltration and networking project, by banning
[00:26:25] the two delinquent diplomats and also shutting down
[00:26:29] the illegal activities of the CILAF Center,
[00:26:32] by closing the Eiffel Tower and giving a serious warning
[00:26:36] to the French school in Tehran to operate only within
[00:26:39] conventional and legal frameworks, showed
[00:26:43] that it has entered a new era of policies.
[00:26:45] The implementation of anti-cultural
[00:26:49] schemes under the guise of the language
[00:26:53] training institution, the illegal center affiliated with the French
[00:26:56] embassy in Tehran, known as CILAF, was sealed
[00:26:59] by order of the Tehran Prosecutor's Office. It was
[00:27:03] operating without a license and, under the guise of language
[00:27:06] training, played a role in identifying elites and networking for
[00:27:09] their departure from the country. The judiciary, while emphasizing
[00:27:13] the need for foreign embassies to abide by the country's
[00:27:16] laws, stopped the activities of this
[00:27:19] center. The French Language Center of Tehran,
[00:27:23] in addition to holding language classes, is also considered
[00:27:26] part of France's cultural presence in
[00:27:29] Iran. The collective memory of Iranians has no
[00:27:32] fond memories of France, neither of its colonial
[00:27:36] and criminal history, nor of the Mirages
[00:27:39] and Super Etendards that bombed the people of Iran,
[00:27:43] nor of the Exocet missiles that were provided to Saddam,
[00:27:47] nor of the complex case of contaminated blood,
[00:27:51] nor of France's hosting and support for terrorists, and of course,
[00:27:54] their overt and covert interventions against Iran's independence
[00:27:58] and their support for the recent war.
[00:28:08] The French people probably do not want their government
[00:28:12] to add new problems to its accumulated difficulties.
[00:28:15] Paris has been grappling with the violent suppression of marginalized protests
[00:28:19] and the Yellow Vest movement, and the continuation of various
[00:28:23] socio-economic problems and the weakening of its soft
[00:28:26] power and influence. And since Operation Al-Aqsa Flood,
[00:28:30] it has been constantly busy creating.
[00:29:11] That country, that nation that can
[00:29:14] prove that it is ready for its independence,
[00:29:18] for the preservation of its identity, for its ideals,
[00:29:22] for its existence,
[00:29:24] to resist and defend manfully,
[00:29:28] that nation is honorable. Even their enemies
[00:29:32] acknowledge the honor of that nation
[00:29:36] deep within themselves, even if they are not
[00:29:39] willing to utter it. Today,
[00:29:41] your enemies also acknowledge your honor,
[00:29:45] and many even speak ill of it.
[00:30:14] The head of the Regulatory Organization of Radio and Television,
[00:30:18] referring to the inversion of the internet consumption pattern in Iran compared
[00:30:22] to the rest of the world, said: Globally, the majority
[00:30:25] of user communication traffic is carried by fixed-line telephone
[00:30:29] and fiber optics, while in Iran, we are witnessing the opposite
[00:30:33] situation. Mr. Fattahi said in a special news interview: The main burden of the country's communications
[00:30:37] has focused on the mobile network. In
[00:30:41] the world, there is this flexibility that, for example, 70 percent of communications
[00:30:44] are fixed for you, and the remaining 30% is either 80-20.