IRINN — broadcast
20261012 160000 UTC
461 transcript segments
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:00] In this regard, we had previously shown an image, I think, in this
[00:00:03] program from the 90s, at a time when Saddam attacked
[00:00:06] Kuwait. We all know who Saddam was and what kind of
[00:00:10] person he was, may God curse him. But
[00:00:14] they had drawn his picture with the same quality as old posters, riding an elephant
[00:00:18] and coming to destroy God's house. Saudi Arabia always uses this issue
[00:00:21] as a tool and for propaganda.
[00:00:24] The Yemeni strategy is siege for siege.
[00:00:28] Sea blockade for sea blockade. Sea and air for
[00:00:31] air. The Yemeni capability is to target
[00:00:34] air terminals, deep inside Saudi
[00:00:38] Arabia. When they say
[00:00:41] do not travel to this airport,
[00:00:44] it means it's under my strike. And Saudi Arabia, after
[00:00:48] the bombings that the regime carried out in that issue of the front of documents,
[00:00:51] which the Yemenis had entered in favor of the people of Gaza, came
[00:00:55] and destroyed Yemeni passenger
[00:00:58] planes on the ground. Saudi Arabia was hiding behind this propaganda
[00:01:02] that there is no air blockade, these people just don't have
[00:01:05] planes. And well, Yemen is a small country, and there are no
[00:01:08] major economic interests in it. Saudi Arabia could, with a lobby
[00:01:12] and a very small cost compared to the money that Saudi Arabia
[00:01:16] has, work to prevent others from flying to it. The Islamic Republic of Iran
[00:01:19] was, after all, considering the conditions even for Saudi Arabia to some extent.
[00:01:23] But the time came when it was necessary to fly.
[00:01:27] After all, they are our allies, the political delegation. He wants to come
[00:01:30] to Iran to participate in the ceremony of our martyred leader. In addition
[00:01:34] to that, from the demands of the Yemenis, let's also say
[00:01:38] this for sure, that when there was no
[00:01:41] siege, Yemenis were sent for medical treatment. One
[00:01:44] of the places they were sent to was Iran, and a large
[00:01:48] number of Yemenis were literally stranded
[00:01:52] in our country. And the returning flight
[00:01:55] brought them with it, meaning it went from Tehran
[00:01:59] to Sanaa. It also took some of these servants of God, including a child
[00:02:03] who went very viral. Yes, he was crying.
[00:02:06] Yes, it was one of the children who had been stuck for one or two years without his parents, for example.
[00:02:10] And what the Yemenis are saying
[00:02:14] is exactly this: look, the equation
[00:02:17] is very simple, remove the siege and it's over.
[00:02:20] میشه
[00:02:22] It's the same propaganda model that Israel used. They said that on October
[00:02:25] 7th, the Palestinians attacked us, as if history
[00:02:29] started on October 7th. Now, Saudi Arabia
[00:02:32] is constantly saying that these people attacked our airports,
[00:02:36] as if before that, these things weren't happening and they were just
[00:02:39] praying. There is an image for the Yemenis, if they show the image. The famous slogan of the Yemenis
[00:02:43] in their gatherings
[00:02:46] is "siege for siege, airport
[00:02:49] for airport." Airport against airport, siege against
[00:02:52] siege. Please, friends, show this image. An image that became very
[00:02:55] symbolic, very symbolic and very meaningful.
[00:02:58] Yes. Well, please narrate it. Yes,
[00:03:01] yes. Well, this image is of Sanaa Airport
[00:03:05] in 2015, when on the left
[00:03:08] when Saudi fighters
[00:03:11] come and bomb during that Operation Decisive
[00:03:14] Storm, they bomb the airport, planes, runway, and almost
[00:03:18] everything there, and destroy it. And 11
[00:03:22] years later, it's Ansar Allah that manages to target
[00:03:25] Riyadh Airport. Almost the same image is created, and
[00:03:29] the same
[00:04:12] terminal is hit, and the plane on the runway is hit, and
[00:04:15] well, this image is a very symbolic image. That a
[00:04:18] nation, 11 years after being under the
[00:04:21] most severe strikes, is under
[00:04:25] siege, is engaged in a conflict with a coalition of several
[00:04:28] countries. It stands on its own feet, and ultimately,
[00:04:32] it has progressed, meaning now we have to say that
[00:04:36] Saudi Arabia has taken a step back, and it is Ansar Allah
[00:04:39] and the Yemeni people who have moved forward and can create
[00:04:43] such images.
[00:04:46] Currently, in the past few days, Ansar Allah has brought
[00:04:50] the airports of Abha, Riyadh,
[00:04:53] and Dammam under attack. These are
[00:04:57] now news that even Saudi media have confirmed
[00:05:00] these strikes. Flights at Riyadh
[00:05:04] airport
[00:05:07] have been disrupted for 3 days, meaning it's been almost 3 days that
[00:05:09] they say it has been disrupted and under.
[00:05:23] Abha, which we heard its name a lot during the past war and
[00:05:26] before, well, that started before
[00:05:29] everything and was actually
[00:05:32] shut down. And in fact, we can say,
[00:05:36] yes, this is our dear Iran, the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:05:39] this is Yemen, and this is.
[00:05:51] This image itself shows the long arm of Ansar Allah, reaching
[00:05:55] even the furthest points of Saudi Arabia and being able
[00:05:58] to threaten Saudi interests, and
[00:06:01] the meaningful targeting pattern,
[00:06:04] especially in Dammam. Well, Dammam is one of
[00:06:07] the centers of Saudi oil industry. There are American experts
[00:06:10] and forces there.
[00:06:25] A good thing that
[00:06:28] Ansar Allah did is that by entering
[00:06:32] this issue of air
[00:06:34] blockade, it changed something that the
[00:06:38] Saudis were very serious about, which was to cut off the image of
[00:06:42] the Yemen crisis, as Mr. Nima said,
[00:06:45] and to report from the middle,
[00:06:48] to correct this image. That is, Ansar Allah, with
[00:06:51] these actions, again corrected this image of
[00:06:54] the siege, saying that the issue of Yemen is not the operational issue
[00:06:58] that happened in Bab al-Mandab, it's not the advance of Ansar Allah.
[00:07:02] The issue of Yemen has been the siege from the beginning, and it was the siege that caused
[00:07:05] operations at sea to begin, operations in the heights overlooking
[00:07:09] the sea to begin, air operations to begin. And as long as the story
[00:07:13] of the siege continues, we will have the same old story. That is, now the Yemeni people are
[00:07:16] in a position to be able to impose their own interests.
[00:07:19] The same first question that we raised many times about the story of
[00:07:23] Lebanon and
[00:07:26] sometimes it was debated
[00:07:29] was that we said that Lebanon entered the war for Iran.
[00:07:33] We had a discussion, we said that
[00:07:36] Lebanon at one time had coordination
[00:07:39] and cooperation. In that day, it was certainly
[00:07:42] revenge for the martyr. But the conditions were such that
[00:07:46] that action was completely focused on itself. That is, this alignment of the resistance
[00:07:50] front makes sense here. In the case of Yemen, Yemen has entered,
[00:07:54] and its timing is completely having a positive effect
[00:07:58] on our war front. Yes, but
[00:08:01] it's the Yemeni equation. In fact, what we are saying many times is that the Yemenis are saying,
[00:08:04] "This siege is against us, and you are getting its answer." This was
[00:08:08] Mearsheimer's words yesterday, right? Mr. Mearsheimer
[00:08:11] had said, "Well, this Yemen war, I don't
[00:08:14] say it's the Iranians' doing, but it's
[00:08:17] in favor of this front. The economic pressure that Iran is facing
[00:08:21] is in its favor, and through it, it can put pressure on the global economy
[00:08:25] and on the Americans and end the war. It's working in our favor." It's completely reciprocal, as I mentioned
[00:08:29] before. The situation of the Strait of Hormuz
[00:08:32] has also made the lever of the Bab
[00:08:35] al-Mandab Strait more effective and has caused
[00:08:38] this lever to exert more pressure. And for Yemen,
[00:08:43] we have an advantage for Yemen, and Yemen has an advantage for us in this war.
[00:08:46] It's a reciprocal advantage that neither side
[00:08:50] can deny.
[00:08:54] But fundamentally, the process of ground operations was also what
[00:08:58] was imposed on Ansar Allah. Look, Ansar Allah's
[00:09:01] whole position was siege for siege. Then they cooked
[00:09:05] something up for it, designed it, and carried
[00:09:09] out a two-front operation. Well,
[00:09:11] Ansar Allah was not born yesterday and thought about these things before.
[00:09:15] Every operation it had, it had field readiness, it's not aggression.
[00:09:18] Even this is my analysis. Now, later, when the documents come
[00:09:22] out, I really think that the Ma'rib front, which they opened
[00:09:26] in the first days of the operation, was a secondary front to fragment
[00:09:30] Ansar Allah's forces. Ansar Allah did not take
[00:09:33] the bait that was laid for it to fall into the trap,
[00:09:37] and came exactly to the south. Now it has besieged Taiz,
[00:09:40] and has occupied the coast.
[00:09:51] In my opinion, it didn't fall for this deception and came down.
[00:09:55] What it did, who did this?
[00:09:57] Look, as soon as it said, for example, "I want to put pressure
[00:10:01] on Saudi Arabia with a naval blockade to lift my blockade,"
[00:10:04] those who were Saudi payroll in Yemen suddenly,
[00:10:08] well, what do they say, tightened their belts.
[00:10:12] They attacked. Well, the fact that it was able to hit them too
[00:10:15] doesn't mean that we can say, for example,
[00:10:18] Ansar Allah has launched an offensive operation.
[00:10:22] No, it wants to lift its blockade, and this image was clear,
[00:10:25] right? 2011 2026 2011
[00:10:29] 2015, sorry, 11 years. Yes.
[00:10:32] It has recorded enough, right? I think 11 years is enough.
[00:10:36] That is, you can't condemn it.
[00:10:40] Why are you doing this now? Why are you insisting that I lift your blockade?
[00:10:43] Because the conclusion is that they will not stop politely,
[00:10:47] and at least my understanding is that his analysis is correct.
[00:10:51] They have negotiated many times, signed an agreement once, and
[00:11:55] and destroy, and this shows that. Yes, yes, completely
[00:11:59] purposeful. Yes, and what's the point? How do you respond
[00:12:02] to this if a viewer says, "Well, pilgrims are coming from everywhere
[00:12:06] for Umrah, and Ansar Allah is hitting the airport. Well, what
[00:12:10] is he doing? Why is he hitting the airport?"
[00:12:13] Well, Ansar Allah had announced it.
[00:12:17] Before that, in four stages, I think, it had officially announced in its statements
[00:12:20] that the Saudi airspace
[00:12:23] is closed, airports must be evacuated, and we will not allow
[00:12:27] companies to operate and perform flights.
[00:12:31] That is, in fact, the ones who should be held accountable
[00:12:35] are the Saudis themselves. Mr. Saudi, you who have introduced this airport as a credible
[00:12:38] and safe airport, its name is Medina Munawwarah. Yes, yes.
[00:12:41] Medina, well, those who
[00:12:45] have visited Medina, it has a good, large airport. Now
[00:12:49] it's not the Hajj Tamattu' season. No, it's not Hajj Tamattu'. These are Umrah
[00:12:52] pilgrims who go throughout the year.
[00:12:55] It's not even Rajab, which is the peak of Umrah. Yes, it's not the peak
[00:12:59] either. But anyway, Saudi Arabia has a significant
[00:13:02] portion of flights throughout the year to this
[00:13:05] country, which are pilgrimage flights. That is, they generally go
[00:13:09] for pilgrimage flights. And
[00:13:12] of course, apart from the discussion of Umrah, apart from the discussion of Tamattu', Umrah is a
[00:13:15] significant part of Saudi Arabia's economy
[00:13:19] as well. It's completely very seriously dependent
[00:13:22] on it, and the fact that Saudi Arabia still keeps it open
[00:13:25] is because it didn't really want to take
[00:13:29] this threat seriously or didn't perceive it or didn't believe that this threat
[00:13:32] would happen in this way. Yes, and of course,
[00:13:36] in the previous program, I mentioned a list of several days
[00:13:39] that has continued of strikes
[00:13:42] that the Saudis are inflicting on civilian infrastructure
[00:13:46] and non-military infrastructure in Yemen, from
[00:13:49] hitting schools and hitting residential homes and hitting communication infrastructure
[00:13:53] and water sources. And this trend continues, meaning Ansar Allah
[00:13:57] did not start hitting non-military infrastructure, but
[00:14:00] when one side is hitting your civilian infrastructure, you
[00:14:04] have no choice but to respond with an equivalent threat and an equivalent
[00:14:07] action. And almost I think almost
[00:14:11] all of Saudi Arabia's airports throughout the year,
[00:14:14] anywhere you reach out to, there will be an airport that has
[00:14:18] pilgrims in it. Ultimately, an international airport where pilgrims
[00:14:22] enter. It has a multitude of
[00:14:25] CCTV cameras. This is very natural, for example, our own country has it, everywhere
[00:14:28] in the world it's like this. Or this image, these
[00:14:32] are not what Saudi Arabia uses. Saudi Arabia has latched onto this clip
[00:14:36] and Arab channels are broadcasting it 24/7, as if
[00:14:40] it hasn't been doing this for 11 years. The other side has issued at least four official
[00:14:44] statements, which I have seen, telling them to evacuate and
[00:14:48] to move their traffic to Medina. I want to hit it. You see,
[00:14:51] he said it so much that I honestly thought, for example,
[00:15:06] The field developments of Taiz.
[00:15:09] The siege of Taiz is complete. Yes, yes. The siege of Taiz is almost complete
[00:15:13] militarily. The advance from the south towards the city of Taiz
[00:15:17] is underway. The city has almost completely
[00:15:20] fallen militarily. Now, according to the available news,
[00:15:24] the leaders and senior military
[00:15:27] commanders have evacuated the city. Only remnants of field
[00:15:30] forces remain. However, armed groups are present.
[00:15:34] Friends, show Taiz on the map.
[00:15:38] Yes, this is approximately where Taiz is. Yes, now it is completely
[00:15:42] green around Taiz. Yes, yes. Approximately, yes. This
[00:15:46] siege is complete, and the city of Taiz remains. Almost
[00:15:49] a partial advance in these southern heights, if it happens, can be said to
[00:15:53] be completely successful. And that massive and noisy operation
[00:15:57] that Saudi forces carried out to break
[00:16:00] the siege of Taiz completely failed. The operation that they started
[00:16:04] from down here to try to take control of the Strait
[00:16:07] to relieve pressure from the Taiz region,
[00:16:10] well, it failed. Ansar Allah was able
[00:16:13] to retake positions that it had sometimes evacuated,
[00:16:17] and it was able to manage the
[00:16:20] situation. Well, this goes back to the serious operational capability
[00:16:24] that Ansar Allah has. They have truly done a great job. With that
[00:16:28] volume of logistical support they had received against them,
[00:16:31] they created a very big event.
[00:16:35] Now, the city is almost
[00:16:38] on the verge of falling. Of course,
[00:16:41] militarily and operationally, it has fallen. Yes, yes, yes. Even
[00:16:45] politically, it is collapsing. Here, we see
[00:16:48] the serious role of the Qataris. In the previous program, we discussed Al Jazeera
[00:16:52] and how much Al Jazeera is, after all, tearing
[00:16:55] its clothes over the issue of Yemen
[00:16:59] and the issue of Taiz, which was the tinderbox of the conflict
[00:17:02] in this Taiz dossier and the Bab
[00:17:06] al-Mandab region.
[00:17:08] Al Jazeera seriously tried to play a role and
[00:17:12] kept giving news that it was on the verge of falling,
[00:17:15] it's falling now, how far have they advanced, and the news
[00:17:18] was mostly
[00:17:21] not consistent with reality. But I think yesterday's tweet
[00:17:24] by Mr. Hamad bin Jassim, the former Prime Minister
[00:17:28] of Qatar, shows how difficult the situation is
[00:17:32] for the Qataris. Let me start with an introduction
[00:17:35] and then get to the tweet. You see, the Qataris
[00:17:39] had a very significant influence in Yemen, at least in the contemporary
[00:17:43] era. They had valuable
[00:17:46] influence and had done great things. For example,
[00:17:49] during the first to third Saada wars,
[00:17:53] from 2004 to 2007,
[00:17:55] the Qataris were the main mediators between
[00:17:58] the Ansar Allah movement
[00:18:02] in Saada and the central government. And even after
[00:18:05] that, the Qataris tried to have a lot of influence
[00:18:09] and played a serious role in the political space of Yemen.
[00:18:12] Then in 2011 and the
[00:18:15] Islamic Awakening or Arab Spring, whichever one
[00:18:18] you prefer, and the events that happened in that context,
[00:18:22] Qatar and the Brotherhood gained a lot of power.
[00:18:25] We can say that the main base of this movement is Taiz.
[00:18:28] Even during the events that happened in Egypt in 2014,
[00:18:32] the fall
[00:18:34] of Morsi. Correct. Yes. After 2014,
[00:18:43] very large demonstrations in defense of Morsi were held. That is, the influence of the Brotherhood
[00:18:47] movement could be clearly seen here. Well, these political
[00:18:51] forces here in Taiz are Qatar's allies
[00:18:54] and valuable allies as well. They are also important forces
[00:18:58] for Qatar. Qataris ultimately don't want to lose this field asset
[00:19:02] and we see that now
[00:19:05] all this
[00:19:28] are the real symbols of the hidden government in Qatar. What is a figure like
[00:19:32] Mr. Hamad bin Jassim saying? What is his point?
[00:19:35] His most important point is that, well, the situation is such that
[00:19:39] the entire Gulf Cooperation Council, meaning the six countries
[00:19:42] of the Gulf Cooperation Council, are facing an existential
[00:19:46] threat. Everyone must come to Saudi Arabia's aid. Everyone
[00:19:49] must help Saudi Arabia repel
[00:19:52] the Ansar Allah threat. And now
[00:19:55] this is while we have witnessed that even the scene
[00:19:59] of Yemen was a scene of deep and severe differences between
[00:20:03] Qatar and Saudi Arabia, at least in the years 2017 to
[00:20:06] 2019. That is, during the Qatar blockade incident, we witnessed
[00:20:09] that Qatar's Yemeni allies
[00:20:13] were at the forefront of attacking
[00:20:17] Saudi policies in Yemen and in the entire Islamic world.
[00:20:20] And well, the Qataris
[00:20:23] had very seriously used these allies. But despite
[00:20:27] all the differences they have, we see that in the current situation,
[00:20:30] where their interests are at stake and their valuable political
[00:20:33] asset in Taiz is at stake, we see that they have come to the forefront with all their might. Now,
[00:20:37] they are trying to fully activate Al Jazeera's capacity,
[00:20:41] and on the other hand, they are also trying to support it in this way. The fact that
[00:20:45] he tweeted such a tweet and made such a statement in this situation
[00:20:49] is meaningful. It's a political support
[00:20:52] and probably, well, a serious non-political support they are giving
[00:20:55] to the Saudis, so that the Saudis' will
[00:20:58] at least does not break in confronting Ansar Allah, and perhaps
[00:21:02] they will increase military pressure on various fronts to break
[00:21:06] the siege of Taiz or to protect the Qataris' political asset. Well, I infer something,
[00:21:10] if it's wrong, forgive me. Can we have the tweet about
[00:21:13] Iran? Let me say that apart from the Yemen discussion, also mention this. This is also
[00:21:17] what I want to say. The war in Yemen
[00:21:21] is not a simple matter. That is, to imagine that just because one
[00:21:24] side, Saudi Arabia, and the Yemenis brought the angry American rider
[00:21:28] to its knees in that war, the matter is now over, is naive.
[00:21:32] That's not how it is. Alliances are formed,
[00:21:36] and initiatives are created by our enemy,
[00:21:39] and they design things. It's not like, for example, four airports were hit.
[00:21:43] Perhaps sometimes it's inferred that Saudi Arabia gets two
[00:21:47] of its airports hit, and it doesn't want to escalate tensions. Well, that's it.
[00:21:50] No, because retreating has other consequences. It seems
[00:21:54] that the war will not end so easily.
[00:21:57] Yes, well, let's just ignore Yemen for a minute. Nothing in
[00:22:00] the Middle East is simple. The Middle East is not a suitable environment
[00:22:04] for beginners. It's a difficult place, everything is complicated.
[00:22:07] است
[00:22:09] He's talking about something here, he says
[00:22:12] that this
[00:22:15] existential threat that Saudi Arabia is facing,
[00:22:18] شده.
[00:23:20] Hamad bin Jassim bin Jassim.
[00:23:23] And now Al Thani is still in power. Now, if this
[00:23:26] is behind the scenes and he is
[00:23:29] the same person who, for example, when Mr. Zarif wrote
[00:23:32] something, he came and said, "Excellent, that's a good
[00:23:36] point, let's follow this line." Now, the question arises
[00:23:40] here because look, later he says, "Well, there is an existential threat,
[00:23:44] and Yemen has been put forward. He is also hitting
[00:23:47] our main enemy." Of course.
[00:23:54] In some cases, Iran is right; in others, we are right. Either he doesn't know what an existential
[00:23:57] enemy is, or he doesn't understand where his existential
[00:24:01] enemy is. The guy is saying, "Lift my siege," and it's over.
[00:24:04] Now,
[00:24:07] from one perspective, I would say that if we consider an existential enemy to mean
[00:24:11] a complete change in the balance of power,
[00:24:14] which, of course, is not called an existential enemy, but they are truly
[00:24:18] in danger of revolution.
[00:24:46] Maybe he can't do it as much as Saudi Arabia. To the extent of the capability.
[00:24:50] I mean, he hasn't really launched an existential
[00:24:53] war with Saudi Arabia. No, no, I mean, I looked at Yemen now, and I'm only concerned with the Iran
[00:24:57] part. Let's look at the map for a second. You see, I want to see
[00:25:00] where we stand, at what point we are fighting.
[00:25:04] Let's just say they think America attacked, and we stood firm, and it's over.
[00:25:08] Now let's go, for example, and resolve it. The fact is that
[00:25:11] some things are really changing, and we are in that moment of change.
[00:25:15] It's possible that because we are in a moment of change, we don't fully understand it. May I take
[00:25:19] your point? Yes, let's just go up
[00:25:21] so we can have both the peninsula and Iran next to each other.
[00:25:25] باشیم
[00:25:27] Look, this is our dear Iran. All these Arab countries
[00:25:31] that we are talking about in this region are located
[00:25:34] on the peninsula. The largest of them is Saudi Arabia. We have Qatar
[00:25:38] here, we have the Emirates. Now there is a small island here called
[00:25:42] Bahrain, which is smaller than our Qeshm.
[00:25:45] And I would also say that here is the Sultanate
[00:25:49] of Oman. To Yemen and Kuwait, which are
[00:25:52] here. These countries that we see here
[00:25:56] are all familiar to us, but I want to say that some obvious things need to be reviewed again.
[00:25:59] There are two main waterways on both
[00:26:02] sides of them. If they have money, it means they have to export
[00:26:06] something to have money, and with their money, they import
[00:26:09] something. They can't eat oil or money,
[00:26:13] or bite into the bank account that shows the numbers on their phone.
[00:26:17] It's obvious, right? Welfare depends on
[00:26:20] foreign goods. Ultimately, it must be here.
[00:26:24] On one side, they are facing Iran that has controlled the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:26:28] and America is trying to take it back. We just talked about the leakage in the Strait of Hormuz.
[00:26:31] America, with effort and power,
[00:26:34] has come illegally, like this, to not let Iranians
[00:26:38] come and no one notices, to take a little oil or a lot of oil,
[00:26:41] whatever. But it's doing something. Well, this situation can't continue. I want to export
[00:26:45] oil, increase my production, etc. I can
[00:26:48] do more. On this side, there is Yemen, and with
[00:26:52] both of them, we have animosity. Now Hamad bin Jassim is saying
[00:26:56] they are our main enemy. With Yemen, we also have an existential enemy.
[00:27:00] Well, in this situation, a dangerous situation for them, in this
[00:27:04] dangerous situation, which Nima is right to say is not our fault that your situation is now
[00:27:08] dangerous. Someone driving at 180 to 190 km/h without being in
[00:27:11] a normal state on the highway, going the wrong way, if they crash, it's really their own doing.
[00:27:15] But you can't deny that the situation is dangerous for them. We are just saying the situation
[00:27:19] is dangerous for them now. There is no value judgment on the issue. Well,
[00:27:22] to understand that he tries his best.
[00:27:26] Now, all the efforts of those in
[00:27:30] our country who think, "Well, we're friends now. Look, they're scared.
[00:27:34] Now it's good that they're scared. Now it's good for them to go to
[00:27:38] Israel." So what should we do? Let's try to bring them closer.
[00:27:41] You scared the Emirates and it went to Israel.
[00:27:44] Otherwise, we can bring it back, for example,
[00:27:47] to bin Salman.
[00:27:51] Khashoggi wasn't chopped into pieces with a saw there.
[00:27:54] He was an honorable, pure, and innocent person. Now you scared him that he will chop
[00:27:58] the people of Yemen into pieces, and other examples.
[00:28:01] So in this situation that we are in,
[00:28:04] regardless of how the war was imposed on us, what the situation is like,
[00:28:08] we can understand one thing. That is, later, when history, when, I don't know,
[00:28:12] Australians, for example, read about this period,
[00:28:15] they will say that there was an Iranian who, with his ally, Yemen,
[00:28:19] for the first time in a long time in history,
[00:28:23] found the opportunity to grab
[00:28:26] the throats of those who had more economic and more political
[00:28:29] and security power against him. And then they will ask how
[00:28:33] he used this tool. Did he go and cut cake together,
[00:28:37] for example, cutting cake, or did he try
[00:28:41] to use things and establish and register
[00:28:45] his minimum rights here? So let's look at
[00:28:48] this part of Hamad bin Jassim's speech from this perspective. And when
[00:28:52] you pay attention, Hamad bin Jassim is part of the
[00:28:55] "doves,"
[00:28:58] meaning he is part of the "peace-loving" faction, advocating
[00:29:01] dialogue, solving problems with money, and so on.
[00:29:04] In a country where he himself is part of the "doves,"
[00:29:08] meaning a "dove within doves" among Arabs,
[00:29:11] he says Iran is an existential enemy.
[00:29:14] Well, and now you think, for example, what should bin Zayed be like?
[00:29:18] That is, if we look at this, we can imagine bin Zayed.
[00:29:22] In return, what will happen?
[00:29:25] Is this what I mean? I want to say that sometimes the issue is not for us to say, "Well,
[00:29:29] that's one way, let's go talk, solve it
[00:29:33] together." Sometimes you have no other way
[00:29:36] than to establish power and then negotiate. Look, let me give you an example from before
[00:29:39] the revolution and conclude my remarks. A Ba'athist government
[00:29:43] came to power in Iraq that, from the beginning
[00:29:46] of its rule, had covetous eyes
[00:29:50] on Iran. Before it, they also had them. That is,
[00:29:54] Abd al-Karim Qasim, even though he wasn't Ba'athist, was not good with Iran, but his focus
[00:29:58] was more on Kuwait. Now, these Ba'athists who came shifted their focus
[00:30:01] towards Iran. Then this government, as long
[00:30:05] as
[00:30:07] it wasn't pressured, I'm not making a value judgment. The Shah, through
[00:30:11] the Kurds, exerted pressure, and there were other pressures
[00:30:15] until the 1975 Algiers Agreement was signed, which established
[00:30:19] Iran's rights. Then, after the imposed war, when it ended, what did Iran say?
[00:30:22] It said, "I don't want the 1975 agreement, which was before the revolution. I want to go back to
[00:30:26] 1975." Saddam wrote a letter to the late Ayatollah.30.3/897"> Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was the president
[00:30:30] then. He said, "I have accepted this and
[00:30:33] he also wrote underneath it, 'You have achieved all the demands you had, let's finish it
[00:30:37] now.' This letter of his, out of those 8 exchanged letters, is available on
[00:30:40] the internet and has also been published as a booklet, both the exact
[00:30:44] Persian text and the Arabic text. So
[00:30:47] sometimes you have to put pressure. Now they might say that was Saddam. Pay
[00:30:51] attention, at the time the 1975 Algiers Agreement was signed,
[00:30:54] we hadn't fought with them yet. It was a hostile situation,
[00:30:58] exactly the situation with Oman.