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20260810 180000 UTC
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[00:00:30] Good evening and welcome to this edition of "Beyond the Frame." Donald Trump has been
[00:00:34] once again shaping the political scene
[00:00:36] of the United States quite intensively for a year.
[00:00:40] Europe, at the same time, is witnessing the accelerated strengthening of the right, and
[00:00:44] therefore tonight we open the show with questions that transcend
[00:00:47] daily politics and penetrate the very core of the contemporary
[00:00:51] West. This parallel political shift not only changes
[00:00:55] power relations but also calls into question the foundations of the order
[00:00:58] that for decades... determined the global image
[00:01:01] of democracy, liberalism, and European
[00:01:04] identity. At a time when the Western liberal
[00:01:07] idea is losing the clarity of its promises, when democracy
[00:01:11] shows signs of deep discomfort, and
[00:01:14] civilizational narratives suppress faith in universal
[00:01:17] rights, rational public discourse, it becomes
[00:01:20] crucial to ask what the West even
[00:01:23] means today, whether Europe can think of itself without myths of
[00:01:27] exceptionalism, without historical
[00:01:30] illusions, and without the need to confirm
[00:01:33] its own moral exceptionalism.
[00:01:36] At the same time, growing fears, the fragmentation
[00:01:39] of society, and the erosion of trust in institutions
[00:01:42] raise the question: can democracy bear
[00:01:46] the burden of its own existential panic? Is a transformation
[00:01:50] of the existing order upon us, or the quiet
[00:01:53] construction of a completely new one? Are we
[00:01:55] witnessing the end of an era or the beginning of something that
[00:01:59] we cannot yet name? These dilemmas
[00:02:01] in English, "more of reveal deeper cracks within the very
[00:02:04] Western imaginary, cracks that demand
[00:02:08] a serious, thoughtful reading of the times we live in. This
[00:02:12] is a space where political instability meets
[00:02:15] cultural insecurity, and old ideas about Europe and
[00:02:19] the West confront their own limitations. Stay with us
[00:02:23] tonight.
[00:02:34] Our guest tonight is philosopher, translator, and cultural theorist Boris Buden,
[00:02:37] joining us via video from Berlin. Welcome, Professor,
[00:02:41] thank you very much for the invitation.
[00:02:44] Trumpism is "in" again, they say, and when we say that
[00:02:48] Trumpism is "in," are we talking,
[00:02:51] Professor Buden, only about a style, a political
[00:02:55] fashion, or about a deeper
[00:02:58] transformation of the Western subject? Is Trumpism primarily
[00:03:01] an aesthetic of rebellion against the order, or some
[00:03:04] new form of conformism within that same
[00:03:08] order? And to what extent has that form already
[00:03:11] moved into the European political
[00:03:13] space?
[00:03:15] Uh, I must say right away that you have actually already
[00:03:19] provided many answers with your questions. I can
[00:03:22] say that you are essentially right. Usually,
[00:03:26] uh, when thinking about Trump, people think in such a way
[00:03:30] that it refers to some radically
[00:03:33] changed political
[00:03:36] situation, a radically new
[00:03:40] state that is
[00:03:42] contrary to the previous political
[00:03:45] tradition and history of Europe, the West, the United
[00:03:49] States of America. I, on the contrary, think that
[00:03:52] it is primarily about a very dangerous
[00:03:56] continuity, uh, that what was
[00:04:00] once unimaginable is
[00:04:03] becoming imaginable today, but precisely because what was
[00:04:06] already present
[00:04:09] is being radicalized. Uh, usually when we talk
[00:04:12] about the current state in
[00:04:16] the West, the question is what
[00:04:19] exactly is the West.
[00:04:23] We all think we know what it is,
[00:04:27] uh, and what is it besides being a direction? Of course,
[00:04:31] I assume it's some kind of bloc, a bloc
[00:04:34] that is in any case,
[00:04:37] not politically regulated and
[00:04:40] structured at all. We cannot say that the West is a democracy. We
[00:04:43] never went, there is no Western parliament, we never
[00:04:47] elected people who represent the West. I will give you
[00:04:51] one
[00:04:53] dispute those example: when Boris Johnson, then
[00:04:57] Prime Minister of Great Britain, went to Kyiv
[00:05:00] in 2022 to
[00:05:03] talk to the Ukrainians about the prospects
[00:05:07] after it had already been agreed
[00:05:10] in some way to establish
[00:05:14] peace, to end the war, so that
[00:05:17] the Russians would withdraw to their initial
[00:05:21] positions,
[00:05:23] uh, he spoke on behalf of, now that's a good question, on whose behalf?
[00:05:26] So, he then promised
[00:05:30] the Ukrainians to reject
[00:05:33] that agreement, that
[00:05:37] the West would support them for as long as it takes, right?
[00:05:40] We now...
[00:05:43] meanwhile learned that he put a million,
[00:05:46] a million pounds in his pocket privately, that
[00:05:49] he brought arms manufacturers
[00:05:52] with him, but let's leave that
[00:05:54] aside. Let's ask ourselves this question: on whose
[00:05:58] behalf or what was Boris
[00:06:02] Johnson speaking? Let's leave aside that he was already
[00:06:06] recognized in Britain
[00:06:08] as a liar and charlatan. At that
[00:06:12] moment, Great Britain was not even a member
[00:06:15] of the European Union. So, when he says
[00:06:18] "we," who does he mean? Who authorized
[00:06:22] him to speak on behalf of
[00:06:25] hundreds of millions of people? That's the beginning
[00:06:28] of what we need to ask ourselves. So, that
[00:06:31] question, who represents that West, who
[00:06:34] stands for that West? So, the first thing is,
[00:06:38] that West is not a political, let alone
[00:06:41] a democratic construction. It is a kind of
[00:06:45] post-sovereign, post-sovereign
[00:06:48] form of governance, in which
[00:06:51] there is a strict hierarchy, in which
[00:06:54] that hierarchy is more like something
[00:06:57] I would compare to neo-feudal
[00:07:01] relations than democratic ones. So, in what sense
[00:07:04] do you mean post-sovereign forms of governance? Well, post-sovereign because when
[00:07:07] I say hierarchy, then those who make
[00:07:11] decisions, as we know,
[00:07:14] uh, regarding the acute crisis, which is the war
[00:07:17] in Ukraine, we see that the so-called
[00:07:21] coalition of the willing constantly meets.
[00:07:24] What is this coalition of the willing? We know
[00:07:28] that France and Great
[00:07:30] Britain are there,
[00:07:34] uh, that Ukraine is also
[00:07:36] possibly Poland and
[00:07:39] Germany. But whom
[00:07:42] do they represent? The European Union? Certainly not, because
[00:07:46] Great Britain is there. What kind of construction is this? And
[00:07:50] what about everyone else, what about the people, not only
[00:07:54] those who are within the European Union, Croatia,
[00:07:57] Croatia and Slovenia, but also those who are outside, and their
[00:08:00] decisions will concern the fate of all
[00:08:04] of us. So, in
[00:08:07] assuming, tell me, is it perhaps about
[00:08:10] representatives of an order,
[00:08:12] a neoliberal order that is trying in various
[00:08:16] ways to save itself? In
[00:08:20] any case, it is, but when we talk about
[00:08:23] representation, we know that this representation is not democratic.
[00:08:27] No one from the neoliberal
[00:08:30] order elected them to represent that order. They
[00:08:33] definitely represent some of their own interests
[00:08:37] in case they are competent, in
[00:08:40] case they know how to
[00:08:43] rationally articulate these interests in the world we
[00:08:46] live in and in relation to the reality in which
[00:08:50] we live, which I doubt. So,
[00:08:54] I doubt their competence, that's
[00:08:57] now, that's the next moment that should concern
[00:09:00] all of us, that there are some, I'll say it very
[00:09:04] bluntly, four types who
[00:09:07] meet, close themselves off and then talk
[00:09:10] about, so to speak, destiny.
[00:09:13] Look, we're talking about a possible escalation of this war to
[00:09:16] a nuclear catastrophe, that's no small
[00:09:19] matter. So, when we talk
[00:09:22] about the West at this moment, we are talking about a
[00:09:26] non-democratic construction,
[00:09:29] hierarchical, in which there are clearly
[00:09:32] certain elites, so
[00:09:35] a political class that makes
[00:09:38] decisions without
[00:09:41] the legitimacy of the people on whose behalf they make
[00:09:45] decisions. That's the biggest problem, that they are post-sovereign, that's clear
[00:09:48] to you. It's not Croatia that will decide
[00:09:52] on war and peace, but it will have to accept
[00:09:56] and does accept the decisions that
[00:09:59] have been made. So it cannot even
[00:10:02] be imagined that it would
[00:10:05] decisions, that it could oppose that. Let's stick to
[00:10:08] what you mentioned, the elites, right? Let's call them
[00:10:12] unelected elites, neoliberal unelected elites, and often
[00:10:16] in analyses it is said that
[00:10:19] the rise of the right,
[00:10:22] the rise of Trumpism, is a consequence
[00:10:25] of a revolt against the elites. Now I would ask you, if I may,
[00:10:29] a reversed question: isn't it perhaps that
[00:10:33] the order itself is transforming through these
[00:10:36] figures, that they are not destroying the existing
[00:10:38] system, but rather in a certain way
[00:10:41] adapting it to a new phase
[00:10:44] of capitalism? And if so, where then should we look
[00:10:48] for the line of real political resistance against
[00:10:51] these neoliberal elites?
[00:10:55] I must thank you because with your questions, you answer a good part of those questions
[00:10:58] yourself. So, in part, yes, you are right.
[00:11:02] I'll give you an example:
[00:11:05] uh, Alternative, Alternative for Deutschland, Alternative for Germany,
[00:11:09] that's that new right-wing, populist party,
[00:11:13] as it's called, which threatens
[00:11:16] the previous status,
[00:11:19] the liberal-democratic German status quo, the so-called
[00:11:22] normalcy, stability from the Second World
[00:11:25] War until today, by challenging with its
[00:11:28] right-wing policies. Have you ever
[00:11:31] wondered why it's called Alternative for
[00:11:35] Germany? Well, probably because
[00:11:38] the system had by then reached the point where
[00:11:42] any alternative was impossible, so the very
[00:11:46] idea that something different could
[00:11:49] even be tried was, so to speak, discarded
[00:11:53] on the street. These people came, picked it up,
[00:11:57] offering, of course, no
[00:11:59] alternative, except in the sense that they
[00:12:03] are the ones who will take power, but only with
[00:12:06] one, definitely, definitely
[00:12:09] one single ideological idea
[00:12:12] and interest to deepen
[00:12:15] the neoliberal system to
[00:12:18] the very end. So, in a way, uh, so
[00:12:22] to speak, uh...
[00:12:26] the same," but in a much more radical
[00:12:30] sense. Alternative for Germany is a response to
[00:12:33] the crisis, just as the complete loss of orientation
[00:12:37] of these elites is also an unsuccessful response
[00:12:40] to the crisis, which is not just an economic
[00:12:44] crisis in the sense that, for example, Germany has had no growth for two
[00:12:47] years, that Germany has been in recession for two years for the first time since
[00:12:51] the Second World War. Rather, it is about
[00:12:53] the fact that these people and these elites
[00:12:57] have also lost their way in relation to crises, such
[00:13:00] as the acute crises today, which are the Gaza war, the war
[00:13:04] in Ukraine. They have no rational
[00:13:07] response to these two crises, or rather, their responses
[00:13:11] to these crises are completely contradictory, which
[00:13:15] to any somewhat normal, rational observer
[00:13:19] from the outside looks exactly
[00:13:22] as it is, these are so-called
[00:13:26] double standards, dual standards,
[00:13:29] so, I advocate for this on one side,
[00:13:32] but on the other side something completely different.
[00:13:35] So, uh, it has become so
[00:13:38] obvious that today we don't even see
[00:13:42] how, today what is actually
[00:13:44] fascinating is how these very
[00:13:47] elites do not see the contradictions
[00:13:51] they have fallen into. Uh, so
[00:13:54] the way of suppressing, so to speak,
[00:13:57] the reality in which these elites
[00:14:01] live, uh, has taken on pathological, pathological
[00:14:04] forms.
[00:14:05] So,
[00:14:09] uh, look, let's just take the question of Gaza, let's take
[00:14:12] just the fact that what's happening there is so transparent
[00:14:16] all the time,
[00:14:19] that the entire European Union,
[00:14:23] and finally the entire West, has no answer to
[00:14:27] that challenge, but rather
[00:14:29] tolerates what?
[00:14:32] Genocide. What is the current attitude in
[00:14:35] Germany towards Gaza? Excuse me, what is the current attitude in
[00:14:38] Germany towards Gaza? Is public opinion changing
[00:14:41] regarding the war in the
[00:14:45] Middle East, or is it still some kind
[00:14:49] of that auto-victimizing
[00:14:51] silence regarding everything that is seen
[00:14:55] in the media,
[00:14:57] and what is
[00:14:59] happening there? Olaf Scholz is therefore the former
[00:15:03] Prime Minister of Germany. When he
[00:15:06] spoke about Germany's attitude towards Israel,
[00:15:10] uh, he said that it is a so-called "Staatsräson,"
[00:15:14] state reason. So, it's something that is not
[00:15:18] discussed. Uh, Germany supports
[00:15:21] Israel. Why? Because Germany supports Israel. That's
[00:15:25] Staatsräson. That's actually very interesting, because there's this legend
[00:15:29] that Staatsräson, so
[00:15:32] state reason, the logic of the state,
[00:15:35] that this was Bismarck's last word.
[00:15:38] Now, over a hundred years
[00:15:41] later, uh, in a
[00:15:44] democracy, the Chancellor of Germany repeats that. That's
[00:15:47] tabooing. That means we don't talk about it. That's
[00:15:51] how it is, because it is. So, it's completely
[00:15:54] arbitrary, openly from the side
[00:15:57] of the government. Uh, on the other
[00:16:01] hand, when we talk about
[00:16:04] public opinion, we still naively believe
[00:16:07] that there is some civil society, some
[00:16:11] public that when it gets really heated, so to speak,
[00:16:15] and when it puts pressure on the political elites, that those
[00:16:18] political elites will change their stance, that
[00:16:22] there are media that will
[00:16:25] take care to objectively
[00:16:28] inform and present the situation.
[00:16:32] I think we are naive. I think we are naive, and not
[00:16:36] with regard to this,
[00:16:39] uh, I think everyone in the former Yugoslavia
[00:16:43] can, can, uh, understand very quickly what
[00:16:46] I am talking about if I just ask one question:
[00:16:50] how much did the media contribute to the wars in
[00:16:53] the former Yugoslavia, to what
[00:16:57] extent do the media not
[00:16:59] allow peace to be established in the former
[00:17:03] Yugoslavia? We all know how important
[00:17:06] that was. We all know those answers, so now it's no longer
[00:17:09] a Balkan specialty, it's now
[00:17:13] a European, Western European, German
[00:17:16] specialty. Listening to Deutschlandfunk, which is German state
[00:17:19] radio, I can no longer distinguish information
[00:17:23] from propaganda. That's what's new, but 10 years ago it
[00:17:27] wasn't like that. It has changed. So, would it be
[00:17:30] possible in such a situation
[00:17:34] for uh...
[00:17:37] people, for so-called civil society to exert
[00:17:41] that pressure on their politicians, for something
[00:17:44] to change? Look, I am
[00:17:46] pessimistic. I think it's not possible, that it's no longer
[00:17:50] possible, that the crisis of existing
[00:17:53] liberal democracy,
[00:17:56] parliamentary democracy with political
[00:17:59] representatives in parliaments
[00:18:03] and so on, has reached a point
[00:18:08] from which it can no longer
[00:18:10] produce a radically new
[00:18:13] policy that is necessary to
[00:18:16] stop this rush into chaos. I am afraid
[00:18:19] that many see a radically new policy precisely in this already
[00:18:23] mentioned Alternative for Germany,
[00:18:26] AfD, which the despair
[00:18:30] of German citizens drives towards
[00:18:33] supporting the AfD? Well, I don't know, I wouldn't call
[00:18:38] it despair,
[00:18:40] but in any case,
[00:18:44] a crisis that, which is
[00:18:48] experienced as an inability
[00:18:50] for people to influence their destiny in
[00:18:54] their democratic state. Uh,
[00:18:57] the feeling that all important
[00:19:00] decisions are made bypassing them.
[00:19:04] Uh, that's something that theory has already
[00:19:07] talked a lot about, about the emptying
[00:19:11] of contemporary democracy, about the fact
[00:19:14] that in contemporary Western, I'm talking about
[00:19:17] Western democracies, that parties, on the one hand,
[00:19:21] have completely distanced themselves from their electorates, but they have
[00:19:24] come so close to each other that it's difficult
[00:19:27] to distinguish them. I think that today, for example, in Germany, it's very difficult
[00:19:31] to distinguish uh Christian
[00:19:35] Democrats, Social Democrats,
[00:19:38] and the Greens. Look, the Greens
[00:19:41] uh at a recent congress turned into
[00:19:44] an openly warmongering party.
[00:19:47] It's very difficult, for me it's very difficult in what sense warmongering, what are you
[00:19:51] referring to specifically?
[00:19:53] Specifically, of course, to the attitude towards the
[00:19:57] war, the war in Ukraine. They really
[00:20:01] believe that it is advocating that
[00:20:04] uh uh that this
[00:20:07] war should last until the last Ukrainian,
[00:20:11] and they are willing to sacrifice the whole of Ukraine
[00:20:14] just so that they don't lose the war.
[00:20:18] So, they have no more connection
[00:20:21] to reality. But listen, uh, let's
[00:20:25] be, let's be honest, who ended the wars
[00:20:29] in our region? Well, not
[00:20:32] the Europeans, not the Germans, not the European
[00:20:35] Union. The Americans did it. How did they
[00:20:38] do it? By recognizing
[00:20:41] the situation on the fronts, whose boot
[00:20:44] is on the ground, that's their territory, right?
[00:20:48] Regardless of war crimes, genocide, and
[00:20:52] everything else. So the Americans came, they established order,
[00:20:55] that's called Pax Americana, and that's
[00:20:59] uh, that's what, I think that's the regime that rules in the area
[00:21:03] of former Yugoslavia, instead of us now thinking that there are
[00:21:06] sovereign states in which people
[00:21:10] uh elect their politicians who then represent
[00:21:13] them and convey their will
[00:21:17] not only in daily politics, but in
[00:21:21] geopolitics. So in a geopolitical sense, I
[00:21:24] think that the
[00:21:28] space for expressing the sovereign
[00:21:31] will of the people in these areas is so
[00:21:34] diminished that we can no longer speak of democratic
[00:21:38] sovereignty, but what we can speak of is
[00:21:41] some kind of regime. I call that regime, that
[00:21:45] regime Pax Americana, American,
[00:21:48] American peace. Uh, that's all, everything
[00:21:52] that is arranged
[00:21:54] in our region, uh, is arranged by American
[00:21:57] will, not the will of these people. Maybe Pax Americana
[00:22:00] will ultimately be
[00:22:04] uh what gives the decisive word on
[00:22:07] the fronts in Ukraine.
[00:22:11] That's how it looks so far, as far as I can see. I don't see what could,
[00:22:15] what could be different. In
[00:22:18] Israel, it will. In Israel, as we
[00:22:20] see, uh, Americans
[00:22:24] are not so, so present. Israel, Israel
[00:22:28] pursues a different policy that is more
[00:22:31] similar to what is called Pax Romana,
[00:22:34] Roman, Roman peace. As you know, Roman peace
[00:22:37] is not based on making agreements with
[00:22:41] warring parties, but on completely destroying
[00:22:45] the enemy, right? That's what we, that's what we
[00:22:47] learned in school.
[00:22:50] Latin Cato the Elder:
[00:22:53] "Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam,"
[00:22:56] meaning Carthage must be destroyed.
[00:22:59] That was the reason for the Third Punic War. So,
[00:23:02] kill people, resettle them,
[00:23:05] destroy everything. That's, uh,
[00:23:09] look, we're talking about this, we can call it
[00:23:12] genocide, but that's a form of peace, achieving peace and resolving
[00:23:15] problems in Roman, Roman tradition.
[00:23:19] Americans, as you know, prefer
[00:23:22] pragmatic situations in
[00:23:25] which they look at who has what cards, right? You know that Trump
[00:23:29] constantly tells Zelensky, "where are your cards, where are your cards?
[00:23:33] You have no cards," right? So, uh, as
[00:23:36] it now looks, uh, Trump
[00:23:40] or as we call him, Trumpism, Trumpism
[00:23:43] actually inherits
[00:23:45] and deepens
[00:23:48] and intensifies what is
[00:23:52] classically called Pax Americana.
[00:23:55] Donald Trump did not invent
[00:23:58] the Monroe Doctrine, according to which, as we know,
[00:24:02] the entire continent of South
[00:24:06] America is within the domain of American
[00:24:09] power, in which America takes the right
[00:24:12] to to
[00:24:16] to organize
[00:24:20] political elites there according to its will and
[00:24:23] its interests. So we all know that, but it's been
[00:24:27] like that for such a long
[00:24:31] time, we're talking about centuries, almost centuries.
[00:24:34] And as for Israel, didn't
[00:24:38] the West tolerate the occupation, the illegal
[00:24:41] occupation, apartheid since
[00:24:45] '67, at least since '67, right?
[00:24:48] So, how many years has it been during
[00:24:52] which no one seriously tried to solve that
[00:24:55] problem? Now, look, when we talk about the West, we ask ourselves the question
[00:24:59] what are those borders, the borders
[00:25:02] of the West? Well, look at what Libya looks like, look at what
[00:25:05] Israel looks like, what Lebanon looks like, what Syria
[00:25:08] looks like, what Iraq looks like, what Afghanistan
[00:25:11] looks like. These are, these
[00:25:15] are borders that are not just drawn, but
[00:25:19] arranged by illegal military
[00:25:22] interventions, occupations, massive use
[00:25:26] of force that was brutal. Look,
[00:25:30] uh, uh, in the first Gulf War, what is called
[00:25:33] the kill ratio, so the ratio of how many of
[00:25:37] ours died compared to theirs, was in the case of American,
[00:25:40] American intervention, one to 300
[00:25:43] something. For every American killed, 300
[00:25:47] something of theirs died. What is that ratio today in Israel?
[00:25:51] These are not wars, these are
[00:25:54] massacres. Now, when I say that, it sounds like I hate
[00:25:57] the West, you know, in that sense of campism. I'm now for
[00:26:01] someone else, against the West. Uh,
[00:26:04] I don't think at all that Putin is something fundamentally
[00:26:08] different in any sense. The worst thing about
[00:26:11] Putin is that he tries to be
[00:26:14] the same as his Western
[00:26:18] role models. He also tries through illegal
[00:26:21] military interventions to achieve his
[00:26:24] interests. He also uses
[00:26:27] violence. He
[00:26:30] destroys
[00:26:32] the existing order, violates existing borders.
[00:26:36] So, but none
[00:26:39] of what he does
[00:26:42] is new at all. So,
[00:26:46] today the situation is such that the moment you
[00:26:50] criticize the West, you immediately
[00:26:52] become a Putinist, I said at the beginning of the war
[00:26:56] that Putin, we can talk about Russia
[00:26:59] being provoked, that it was...
[00:27:02] provoked by NATO expansion, but the answer to
[00:27:06] that provocation should not have
[00:27:08] been war. I wrote back then that Putin, in that
[00:27:12] sense, deserves the fate of Ceausescu,
[00:27:16] although his rigged process doesn't need to
[00:27:19] last that long. However, despite
[00:27:22] that, we must understand that the
[00:27:25] situation is much, much
[00:27:27] more dangerous
[00:27:30] that there is no more, that is what I think.
[00:27:32] I think that is what is most important for
[00:27:35] people in our regions. We behave here
[00:27:38] like some kind of fans, some are
[00:27:41] for, some are for the West, for Europe, others are for, others are
[00:27:45] for Putin. That is so pathetic, I mean,
[00:27:48] both sides should first look truth in the eyes. That
[00:27:52] truth is that they cannot influence
[00:27:56] that destiny, which is also their destiny.
[00:27:59] So, I think that is the initial question, not... for us to
[00:28:02] speculate here, now that this one
[00:28:06] global system is falling apart,
[00:28:09] uh, now there are other China and so
[00:28:13] on, now it will turn into something
[00:28:16] new. Then
[00:28:19] we cheer and speculate as
[00:28:22] helpless observers. The question
[00:28:25] is, therefore, for all of us in these former
[00:28:29] Yugoslav territories, can we even...
[00:28:32] imagine creating such a such
[00:28:36] a such a state, to
[00:28:39] articulate such a policy in which
[00:28:42] we would at least to some minimal extent
[00:28:45] take destiny into our own hands, hands. That is obviously possible
[00:28:49] only if we start cooperating
[00:28:52] with each other. So, that is the only
[00:28:56] thing that can people in this, this, these, these
[00:28:59] our regions can. "I can't
[00:29:03] say, it can pull them out of all problems, but it can
[00:29:07] give them hope, it can give them
[00:29:09] uh
[00:29:12] a feeling that they matter, and their
[00:29:15] voice matters. Is it opening, is this
[00:29:18] crisis of the West opening up space
[00:29:22] for, you just mentioned China, for
[00:29:25] China to become a global, uh,
[00:29:29] the most relevant player when it comes to exports."
[00:29:32] Peace, that actually through
[00:29:35] a decade or two, as in one of
[00:29:38] my earlier conversations with Professor Academician
[00:29:42] Nerzuk Ćurak, he said that Chinese
[00:29:45] would become uh lingua franca in
[00:29:49] a decade or two.
[00:29:51] Look, the situation is such that 60% of all books in the world that have been
[00:29:55] translated have been translated from English, then
[00:29:58] there is 10% each for French and
[00:30:01] German. So, three languages make up
[00:30:04] 80%
[00:30:06] of all translated books in the world, Chinese is
[00:30:10] marginal,
[00:30:12] below 1%, at this moment. How that will
[00:30:16] develop, I don't know, word, when it comes to language,
[00:30:20] then these are very
[00:30:23] dynamic things. Perhaps it would be, perhaps it would be better
[00:30:26] instead of speculating about what will happen with the Chinese
[00:30:30] language, to remind people in... in our regions that
[00:30:34] according to a study by the European Union, which you can
[00:30:37] check, it's online, the European Union
[00:30:41] analyzed 30 languages in
[00:30:44] Europe, not just, not just those, those that are
[00:30:47] within the European Union, but also, for example, Serbian, those that are outside,
[00:30:51] outside, uh, it analyzed how these
[00:30:54] languages react to the challenge of digital
[00:30:57] technology, and the conclusion is: