N1BOS — broadcast
20260826 050000 UTC
551 transcript segments
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[00:00:00] this duty, we know
[00:00:03] that this
[00:00:07] institution was
[00:00:10] the last resort for everyone,
[00:00:14] the existence of a high representative
[00:00:17] displeasure with the way actually allowed some politicians to be
[00:00:21] extremely irresponsible because they knew that this
[00:00:25] rhetoric would only strengthen the support
[00:00:29] they have... among a part of their voter base, that
[00:00:32] the High Representative would deal with the
[00:00:35] consequences anyway, by changing
[00:00:38] laws or making other decisions for which he had
[00:00:42] authority. We know that
[00:00:45] some concluded that the abolition of the Office
[00:00:48] of the High Representative could result in increased
[00:00:52] responsibility of Bosnian-Herzegovinian
[00:00:55] politicians, but for now we have
[00:00:58] the High Representative and we don't... we also have
[00:01:02] and don't have an uncertain degree
[00:01:04] of responsibility of key political
[00:01:07] players. So, since you've already mentioned the High
[00:01:10] Representative, how do you actually view these latest developments regarding the
[00:01:14] election itself? Well, we have this acting High Representative, who is the American
[00:01:17] Luis Krieshok. We have never had this category in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an acting
[00:01:21] High Representative. We had a High Representative, and now
[00:01:24] there is a struggle between the countries of the European Union and the American
[00:01:27] administration as to who will appoint, so to speak,
[00:01:31] their person.
[00:01:34] It is increasingly being mentioned that the powers of the new High Representative, whoever that
[00:01:37] may be, will be reduced.
[00:01:40] Do you believe, given the institution of the High
[00:01:44] Representative, that his powers will ultimately
[00:01:46] be reduced? The conditions of 5+2
[00:01:49] as the biggest culprit for all the blockades we currently have have not been met. It is increasingly being mentioned
[00:01:53] that the OHR office should be
[00:01:56] closed?
[00:01:58] Well, we remember that, I don't know,
[00:02:01] in 2007, 2008, there was
[00:02:05] talk about abolishing
[00:02:08] that institution, but the
[00:02:11] members of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council
[00:02:14] concluded that the institution is still needed,
[00:02:18] primarily due to the events
[00:02:21] in Republika Srpska, due to the denial of genocide and a number
[00:02:25] of other problems. The current
[00:02:29] situation with the High Representative is actually
[00:02:32] just a manifestation of disagreement
[00:02:35] within that Western bloc,
[00:02:38] within the collective West, which, after Russia's
[00:02:42] withdrawal from participation in
[00:02:45] the Steering Board,
[00:02:47] took over the management
[00:02:50] of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the High Representative.
[00:02:54] Now that there has been a conflict
[00:02:57] between the members of the collective West,
[00:03:00] a conflict between the United States and the European
[00:03:03] Union, the fate and powers
[00:03:07] of the High Representative have been brought into
[00:03:10] question. The fact that
[00:03:13] America wants its own person as the High Representative
[00:03:17] shows an interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[00:03:21] On the other hand, all those
[00:03:24] mechanisms, especially security
[00:03:27] and military ones, that could be used
[00:03:30] in case of a serious crisis, are within the
[00:03:34] jurisdiction of the European Union. This is
[00:03:38] a rather unstable situation that
[00:03:42] increases uncertainty
[00:03:44] regarding the interest and the
[00:03:47] way the collective
[00:03:50] West expresses interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[00:03:54] It is clear that in these circumstances,
[00:03:57] some players, primarily Milorad Dodik,
[00:04:01] concluded that
[00:04:03] companies from Bosnia and Herzegovina at the fair. How this created space for the affirmation
[00:04:07] of their political ideas and plans.
[00:04:10] of Europe. Russia reacted They also believe that expectations have
[00:04:13] increased, that the chances
[00:04:17] that their expectation of the abolition of the institution
[00:04:20] of the High Representative will indeed happen
[00:04:23] soon have increased. Mr. Kovačević, when I asked
[00:04:26] you earlier if the political elite in
[00:04:30] Bosnia and Herzegovina has actually perfected a model of crisis management
[00:04:33] in which the fear of conflict and instability is actually used as
[00:04:36] the only remaining leverage to mobilize
[00:04:40] voters, how much
[00:04:43] do our neighbors, Croatia and Serbia, give
[00:04:46] them a boost, and also the latest developments
[00:04:50] coming from official Zagreb, from Mr. Grlić
[00:04:53] Radman, who again brought up the issue of the third electoral
[00:04:56] unit and changes to the electoral law?
[00:05:01] It is clear that the role
[00:05:04] of the two neighboring countries, Serbia and Croatia, which are
[00:05:07] guarantors of the implementation of the
[00:05:11] Dayton Agreement, is not entirely
[00:05:14] constructive. When it comes to Belgrade's support
[00:05:17] for Republika Srpska and personally
[00:05:20] for Milorad Dodik, viewed in the context
[00:05:24] of the concept of the Serbian world,
[00:05:27] it is clear that this
[00:05:29] does not contribute to the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
[00:05:33] but quite the opposite. As for the Republic
[00:05:37] of Croatia, the Republic of Croatia presents
[00:05:41] itself as a country that largely
[00:05:44] supports the European
[00:05:47] aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is partially true,
[00:05:50] but on the other hand, by insisting on
[00:05:54] the constituent status of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
[00:05:56] the Republic of Croatia
[00:06:00] simultaneously behaves as if that constituent people
[00:06:03] is the diaspora of the Republic of Croatia. So,
[00:06:06] Croatia does not care about the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
[00:06:10] as
[00:06:12] a constituent people, but as
[00:06:16] a minority from the Republic of Croatia. The Republic of Croatia has
[00:06:19] some special powers,
[00:06:22] of course, and special responsibility. I
[00:06:26] think that the actions of the Republic
[00:06:29] of Croatia, with its
[00:06:32] emphasized support for everything that
[00:06:36] HDZ, BiH demands, is
[00:06:39] also not a sign
[00:06:41] of support for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[00:06:45] Disrespect for the Presidency of Bosnia and
[00:06:48] Herzegovina if
[00:06:51] the Croatian member of the Presidency is not the one
[00:06:54] wanted by HDZ, is also
[00:06:57] a contribution to the destabilization of the situation
[00:07:01] in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I must mention
[00:07:05] that meetings of the Prime Minister of the Republic
[00:07:08] of Croatia with the President of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina
[00:07:13] were mostly absent
[00:07:16] until a representative
[00:07:19] of the HDZ came to the position
[00:07:23] of President. This shows
[00:07:25] that Croatia,
[00:07:29] in my opinion, wants to interfere too much
[00:07:32] in the internal political processes in Bosnia and
[00:07:36] Herzegovina. Yes, based on what you
[00:07:39] just said, why then believe and how to believe the words
[00:07:42] coming from official Zagreb when they say that they
[00:07:46] give, unequivocally, support for Bosnia and Herzegovina's
[00:07:49] European path, but in a way, these actions are
[00:07:52] contradictory to all of that? And do we then see
[00:07:56] in this, in their such behavior,
[00:07:59] a continuity of benevolent concern for Croats within
[00:08:02] Dayton, or is this, in fact, just about that internal
[00:08:06] interference, that is, direct interference in the internal affairs
[00:08:10] of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
[00:08:12] Yes, I think it's an inappropriate
[00:08:16] interference in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[00:08:20] The activities of the institutions of the Republic of Herzegovina,
[00:08:24] of the Republic of Croatia, should primarily take place
[00:08:27] through official contacts with the
[00:08:30] official authorities of Bosnia and
[00:08:33] Herzegovina. Now that the President of the Council of
[00:08:37] Ministers is from the ranks of the EU,
[00:08:40] those contacts are indeed taking place. But when
[00:08:44] the President of the Council of Ministers was not a representative
[00:08:47] of the HDZ, there were no contacts at the level
[00:08:51] of prime ministers, but, for example, the Minister
[00:08:54] of Foreign Affairs often visited Bosnia and
[00:08:57] Herzegovina without an invitation
[00:09:00] from his female or male colleague, the Minister
[00:09:03] of Foreign Affairs. He did not go to Sarajevo, but
[00:09:07] only visited those parts of Bosnia and
[00:09:10] Herzegovina where Croats live. He participated
[00:09:13] in religious holidays,
[00:09:16] the opening of religious facilities. This can be
[00:09:20] a part of the relationship, but official
[00:09:24] relations between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and
[00:09:27] Herzegovina should take place through the official
[00:09:31] bodies of power of these two states, and only in this
[00:09:34] way will Croatia fully recognize
[00:09:37] Bosnia and Herzegovina as
[00:09:40] a state. Yes,
[00:09:42] from the perspective of Zagreb, and you, who
[00:09:46] observe the events in Bosnia and
[00:09:49] Herzegovina from the outside, how do you assess
[00:09:52] the position of HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina at this moment, that is, before the elections?
[00:09:56] There is also this series of opposition parties that will stand against
[00:10:00] the HDZ candidate for the Presidency, Darjana
[00:10:03] Filipović, that is Mr. Lučić.
[00:10:06] Do these opposition parties, in your opinion,
[00:10:10] have a chance to threaten the HDZ of Bosnia and
[00:10:13] Herzegovina in any way?
[00:10:16] Well, based on past experience, it seems that
[00:10:20] they don't, and it seems to me that the whole outcry
[00:10:24] that HDZ Bosnia and
[00:10:27] Herzegovina is raising is actually
[00:10:29] just an attempt at a premature
[00:10:32] apology for a possible
[00:10:35] failure of the HDZ candidate in the elections for the Presidency,
[00:10:39] although something else needs to be said: political
[00:10:43] differentiation has occurred among Bosniaks
[00:10:46] and among Serbs
[00:10:50] in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
[00:10:52] but political
[00:10:56] differentiation has not occurred among Croats, because HDZ
[00:10:59] absolutely dominates the
[00:11:03] political scene of Croats in Bosnia
[00:11:06] and Herzegovina. Perhaps, perhaps, but I am
[00:11:09] not sure if it will actually
[00:11:13] happen that way, perhaps
[00:11:16] the eventual success of an alternative
[00:11:20] candidate could lead to
[00:11:23] political differentiation among Croats,
[00:11:27] despite the fact that there are numerous
[00:11:30] parties with a Croatian prefix.
[00:11:33] HDZ is the party that considers
[00:11:36] itself the only legitimate representative of Croats.
[00:11:41] This is, in any case,
[00:11:43] unhealthy. When you talk about that differentiation, we also see what is
[00:11:47] happening in Republika Srpska, especially in the opposition in
[00:11:51] Republika Srpska, which is currently
[00:11:55] runs in two columns. Do you believe that the
[00:11:58] opposition could threaten the current government, primarily SNSD, and
[00:12:02] do you believe that this
[00:12:05] coalition will again form after the elections,
[00:12:07] HDZ, SNSD, whom
[00:12:11] many have characterized
[00:12:14] at the state level of Bosnia and
[00:12:16] Herzegovina?
[00:12:19] I don't know exactly what the election results will be, but
[00:12:22] it is undoubtedly true
[00:12:25] that there is an opposition in Republika Srpska
[00:12:28] and that there are chances that
[00:12:31] those opposition parties will participate
[00:12:35] in the government at the level of Bosnia and
[00:12:38] Herzegovina. The difference between, if we look
[00:12:42] at the mood of Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
[00:12:45] Croats, the difference is in the mood, because
[00:12:48] Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, their political
[00:12:52] elites, are satisfied with
[00:12:55] the existing institutional structure
[00:12:58] of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, its division into
[00:13:01] two entities, and
[00:13:04] Dodik's party and the opposition parties
[00:13:07] are satisfied with such a solution and would in no way
[00:13:11] want to question Republika Srpska.
[00:13:15] On the other hand, in
[00:13:18] the Croatian corps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is widespread
[00:13:21] dissatisfaction with the fact that
[00:13:24] Croats do not have a spatially defined
[00:13:27] entity like Serbs do.
[00:13:31] The declarative support
[00:13:34] for a special electoral unit for Croats, which
[00:13:38] Milorad Dodik constantly repeats, is
[00:13:40] actually just his attempt
[00:13:43] to further destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[00:13:47] Mr. Kovačević, earlier, when we were talking about those interferences from
[00:13:51] outside in the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, how do you interpret the recent
[00:13:55] visits and moves by the Serbian leadership, that is,
[00:13:57] President Aleksandar Vučić, to Bosnia and Herzegovina? Did you
[00:14:01] see this as a benign concern
[00:14:05] for fellow countrymen across the Drina or as a dangerous elaboration
[00:14:08] of the doctrine of the Serbian world that you mentioned earlier,
[00:14:12] by which the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina is actually treated merely
[00:14:16] as a temporary
[00:14:17] category?
[00:14:20] We must say that in this regard,
[00:14:23] the positions of the President of Serbia,
[00:14:26] Vučić, Milorad Dodik, and
[00:14:30] the leader of the Serbian Orthodox Church are almost
[00:14:33] identical. So, for them, the
[00:14:37] Serbian world is a concept to which
[00:14:40] they can eventually appeal if
[00:14:44] they assess that the borders
[00:14:47] in those areas
[00:14:50] could be changed. This
[00:14:53] in no way means that President
[00:14:57] Vučić's visit cannot be considered a sign
[00:15:00] of support for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
[00:15:04] a sign of support for the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it
[00:15:08] is, but rather it is primarily his
[00:15:11] game to try to strengthen Milorad
[00:15:15] Dodik's position.
[00:15:17] Now, elections in Serbia will probably be in October,
[00:15:21] and what do you think are the chances of the Serbian
[00:15:25] opposition breaking through, so to speak, this media darkness
[00:15:28] and shaking Aleksandar Vučić's regime in any way?
[00:15:32] Or are the elections in Serbia
[00:15:35] long since reduced to that sterile performance, where the
[00:15:39] winner is known even before the elections?
[00:15:42] Well, the public in Serbia with long-lasting
[00:15:46] protests due to the accident at the railway
[00:15:49] station in Novi Sad showed its
[00:15:55] President Vučić exercises
[00:15:58] power, but it seems that the government
[00:16:01] in Serbia was still
[00:16:04] more resilient than it seemed in the first months
[00:16:08] of those protests. That protest
[00:16:11] was very broad,
[00:16:14] members of all strata of the citizenry
[00:16:17] of the Republic of Serbia participated in it, but
[00:16:20] a clear political articulation
[00:16:24] was missing. It was clear that those
[00:16:27] protesters were against SNS and
[00:16:31] Aleksandar Vučić, but it was not entirely
[00:16:35] clear what policy
[00:16:38] they were advocating for, and despite
[00:16:41] the initial great momentum
[00:16:45] and expectations that that momentum aroused that
[00:16:49] political changes would occur in Serbia,
[00:16:52] it seems that President Vučić has
[00:16:54] nevertheless managed
[00:16:58] to recover, to regain control.
[00:17:01] Now it seems he is working on the realization of the next plan,
[00:17:05] that he will no longer be the President of Serbia, because according to
[00:17:09] the Constitution, he cannot be, but that he will be Prime Minister.
[00:17:13] Then he
[00:17:15] will use the powers that he has so far, contrary to the Constitution
[00:17:19] of the Republic of Serbia, used as President,
[00:17:22] he will use as Prime Minister. This would mean
[00:17:26] Vučić after Vučić.
[00:17:29] There is no basis to conclude
[00:17:32] that SNS will not win
[00:17:35] the next elections,
[00:17:38] because the political articulation
[00:17:41] of the opposition has been lacking. Part of the problem is
[00:17:45] that the current opposition parties
[00:17:49] in the Serbian parliament have no
[00:17:51] connection with that protest movement,
[00:17:55] and also the movement has not succeeded
[00:17:59] in producing any
[00:18:02] recognizable leaders, and what is even
[00:18:06] more important, a clearer
[00:18:09] political concept. These are
[00:18:12] circumstances that favor President Vučić.
[00:18:15] Yes, Mr. Kovačić, let's also briefly touch upon current world events.
[00:18:19] You are a good expert on the relations between Russia and Ukraine.
[00:18:23] Today, Zelensky says that there is a possibility that the war will
[00:18:26] end by early
[00:18:29] 2027, but today he spoke
[00:18:33] to N1, that is, he spoke with colleague Esmir Milović,
[00:18:36] Oleksiy from Kyiv Independent, and he
[00:18:40] actually openly says that Ukraine is not winning the war, that Russia,
[00:18:44] despite successful Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian infrastructure,
[00:18:46] is almost daily advancing
[00:18:50] in Donetsk. And how do you now assess this increasingly
[00:18:53] obvious discrepancy between the political messages
[00:18:56] of unwavering support that Western leaders send from Kyiv
[00:19:00] and the harsh, exhausting reality on the front line itself?
[00:19:04] First of all, it's a great tragedy for
[00:19:07] Ukraine. Ukraine is a victim of Russian
[00:19:11] aggression, there is no doubt
[00:19:14] about that. But the
[00:19:17] responsibility for the situation in which
[00:19:20] Putin made a wrong, strategically
[00:19:24] wrong decision, harmful, of course, for Ukraine, but
[00:19:27] also harmful for Russia, to attack Ukraine, the responsibility for
[00:19:31] creating that situation lies with the collective
[00:19:34] West, because for 20 years it stubbornly
[00:19:38] refused to treat Russia as
[00:19:41] an equal partner in discussions
[00:19:44] about the security architecture
[00:19:48] to this with aggression against
[00:19:51] Ukraine. President Zelensky would undoubtedly
[00:19:55] want that war to end as soon as possible, but he would also want
[00:19:59] Ukraine to emerge victorious from
[00:20:02] that war. And that's the problem, one cannot
[00:20:06] expect the end of that war in the near future,
[00:20:09] that the expectations of
[00:20:13] either side will be fully met.
[00:20:16] Russia did not succeed in its original intention to
[00:20:20] occupy all of Ukraine and keep it under
[00:20:24] its control.
[00:20:26] Russia, despite sporadic
[00:20:30] advances on the ground, has not even
[00:20:34] occupied the entire territories of those
[00:20:37] three Ukrainian provinces that it declared
[00:20:41] its own territory. So, in that regard, Russia
[00:20:44] is not successful, and President Putin cannot
[00:20:48] allow himself
[00:20:50] to conclude a peace agreement
[00:20:54] in circumstances where it is obvious that Russia
[00:20:57] is not succeeding. But Ukraine,
[00:21:00] thanks to Western aid,
[00:21:04] financial aid, and thanks to
[00:21:07] its resourceful and inventive soldiers and
[00:21:11] engineers, has acquired
[00:21:14] the capabilities to destroy
[00:21:17] targets deep inside Russian
[00:21:21] territory. Now we have a situation where Ukraine
[00:21:24] obviously cannot defend itself from Russian
[00:21:27] ballistic missiles, and Russia cannot
[00:21:30] defend itself from Ukrainian
[00:21:33] drones and missiles. It's
[00:21:37] like we are witnessing a boxing match in which
[00:21:40] neither of the fighters has any defensive gear.
[00:21:44] Such a situation cannot last long.
[00:21:47] President Zelensky's
[00:21:51] expectation that the war could end next year is based on
[00:21:55] the assumption that the West will actually fulfill
[00:21:58] all its promises, but
[00:22:02] at the same time, it shows Ukraine's
[00:22:05] excessive dependence on the
[00:22:07] West. And this opens
[00:22:11] up space for many ambiguities.
[00:22:14] Since President Trump came to office
[00:22:17] for the second time in America, America
[00:22:21] has refused to directly help Ukraine, but America
[00:22:24] sells weapons to European countries that donate
[00:22:28] those weapons to Ukraine. Europeans say that everything
[00:22:31] the Ukrainians asked for, we ordered and paid for, but
[00:22:34] the Ukrainians again say that they are not getting everything
[00:22:38] they need, primarily this Patriot system
[00:22:42] for defense against ballistic missiles.
[00:22:44] And here opens up
[00:22:48] space for questions about
[00:22:51] who is not fulfilling what they declaratively
[00:22:55] advocate for. This
[00:22:57] session of the coalition of the willing
[00:23:01] actually constantly shows
[00:23:05] that dual position.
[00:23:08] They say unwavering support for Ukraine
[00:23:11] until a lasting and just peace is achieved.
[00:23:15] Lasting and just peace means that Ukraine returns all
[00:23:18] currently occupied
[00:23:21] territories to its constitutional and legal order. But at the same time,
[00:23:25] the conclusions mention that when a peace
[00:23:28] agreement is reached, and they don't say what
[00:23:32] its content should be, then those
[00:23:35] coalition members of the willing will deploy their
[00:23:38] forces to provide security
[00:23:41] support to Ukraine.
[00:23:44] It is not clear
[00:23:48] what the primary goal of the coalition of the willing is,
[00:23:52] that is, to prevent Trump's proposal for Ukraine's
[00:23:55] capitulation in the form of a peace agreement of 28,
[00:23:59] and later 20 points, from being implemented. So,
[00:24:03] the coalition of the willing has succeeded
[00:24:06] in preventing the implementation of that agreement, but
[00:24:09] that coalition of the willing obviously expects
[00:24:13] Ukraine to achieve victory against
[00:24:16] Russia on its own, that is, to inflict a strategic defeat
[00:24:20] on Russia. It seems to me that
[00:24:22] these expectations are unrealistic,
[00:24:26] and that it would be reasonable for both Moscow and
[00:24:28] Kyiv to start negotiations as soon as possible,
[00:24:31] even if it's for a limited ceasefire.
[00:24:35] But I hope that the
[00:24:38] start of negotiations could indeed
[00:24:41] signify the announcement
[00:24:45] of a possible end to the war. When it comes to the coalition of the willing
[00:24:48] and the policy of the European Union, it is evident
[00:24:52] that there is only talk of war, only of
[00:24:55] financing Ukraine's military needs, which is fully
[00:24:58] justified, but there is complete
[00:25:01] avoidance of talking about possible diplomatic
[00:25:04] contacts with Russia, about
[00:25:08] finding a possible diplomatic solution
[00:25:11] for that war. And from this we can conclude that
[00:25:15] the coalition of the willing expects
[00:25:18] the end of the war to happen
[00:25:20] with a clear victory of one of the sides on the military field,
[00:25:24] and for now it is impossible to predict how long it would
[00:25:27] last and which side would be the victor?
[00:25:31] So, in your opinion, there are still no indications that this war could end soon?
[00:25:35] Mr. Kovačević, thank you very much for this
[00:25:37] analysis.
[00:25:39] Thank you, dear viewers. That was
[00:25:42] foreign policy analyst and former Croatian diplomat
[00:25:46] Božo Kovačević. Let's take a short break, then new
[00:25:50] guests will arrive in the
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[00:27:27] The jubilee 30th edition of the international general BH Fair Zeps
[00:27:30] 2026 will be held from September 2nd to 5th under the slogan
[00:27:34] "Business First" and will gather more than 500 exhibitors from 15 countries
[00:27:38] worldwide. The partner cities and friends of this year's fair are Zenica,
[00:27:41] Gradačac and Cazin. The fair, but also numerous other
[00:27:44] challenges and topics that the economy in our country, but also in the
[00:27:48] Zenica-Doboj Canton, actually faces. Next, I am talking to Samir Šibonjić,
[00:27:51] Minister of Economy of the Zenica-Doboj Canton. Mr. Šibonjić, good day and welcome to
[00:27:55] the N1 Television program. Good day, it's good to see you. There are a lot of topics and questions, but we will
[00:27:59] start with Zeps, which is starting soon. We know that it interrupted its long-standing
[00:28:02] 2024. I think
[00:28:06] it has returned to Zenica, this
[00:28:09] year under the slogan Business First, what
[00:28:13] does this slogan mean this year for the economy
[00:28:16] of the Zenica-Doboj Canton, but also for the entire Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Well, as
[00:28:20] you already said in the announcement, we are glad that the larger cities in Bosnia and
[00:28:24] Herzegovina have recognized Zeps as
[00:28:27] the central gathering place for all economic entities in Bosnia and
[00:28:30] Herzegovina, with support. We can tell you,
[00:28:34] in 2004, we said that
[00:28:37] we would bring Zeps back, we brought Zeps back. I personally
[00:28:40] traveled a lot to bring
[00:28:44] foreign exhibitors. The partner country
[00:28:47] at the first fair was Istanbul, it was
[00:28:50] the Republic of Turkey. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce was
[00:28:53] the leader
[00:28:56] of activities of the Republic of Turkey. So,
[00:28:59] at that very first Zeps, we announced that
[00:29:03] we would grow with Zeps every year. And we have the number of countries, as I read,
[00:29:07] from all over the world, we can
[00:29:10] say, yes, yes, yes, this year we expect over
[00:29:14] 20 countries, somewhere around 15 exhibiting countries.
[00:29:18] We are glad that all countries in the region are coming,
[00:29:21] Austria is coming with a large number of companies,
[00:29:24] Libya, Slovenia, Italy. As we already said,
[00:29:27] the Republic of Turkey is coming with over 50 exhibitors
[00:29:31] to Zeps, and... we are especially glad that the city of Cazin and the city
[00:29:35] of Gračanica decided to
[00:29:38] come with a larger number of economic entities. Of course, there are also companies from Bosnia
[00:29:42] and Herzegovina. We are glad that in the
[00:29:46] Zenica-Doboj Canton, with Zeps from September 2nd to 5th,
[00:29:49] with the Tešanj fair which will be held from
[00:29:52] the 23rd to the 26th. This is the 20th jubilee fair
[00:29:56] in Tešanj, we can freely say that this month will be
[00:30:00] a festival of economy in the Zenica-Doboj Canton. You said that there will be
[00:30:05] does the Ministry of Economy
[00:30:08] subsidize the participation
[00:30:12] of these domestic companies at Zeps? Well, we have been involved from the very
[00:30:15] beginning, since the return of Zeps, in all activities. Zeps is
[00:30:19] something that has been going on for a while now, preparations are ongoing throughout
[00:30:22] the year. As the Ministry of Economy, we give all companies from the Zenica-
[00:30:26] Doboj Canton, through a public call, the opportunity to participate
[00:30:29] in fairs. That is, we give
[00:30:32] them incentives to participate in the fair. Our goal is to have as
[00:30:36] many companies as possible from the Zenica-Doboj
[00:30:40] Canton present what we do best in
[00:30:43] the Zenica-Doboj Canton, to produce new products, and I think
[00:30:47] that with new products, we will
[00:30:50] present the Zenica-Doboj Canton at Zeps
[00:30:53] 2026, as I said, at the Tešanj Fair. Now, one of the
[00:30:57] panels at the fair is titled "The Future of the Economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina."