PAKISTANTV — broadcast
20260806 120000 UTC
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[00:00:04] of
[00:00:34] of
[00:00:38] of of Prime Minister Shahbas Sharif
[00:00:42] departs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a
[00:00:44] of three-day official visit from the 6th of August to the 8th. The prime minister is
[00:00:48] accompanied by a high-level delegation comprising of chief of defense
[00:00:52] forces, field
[00:00:53] of marshall, Said Simuner and other ministers. Now
[00:00:56] of during his visit, the prime minister will be holding a meeting with
[00:01:01] Prime Minister Shahbas
[00:01:05] of Sharif
[00:01:09] has highlighted the positive
[00:01:10] of momentum in Pakistan China relations and reaffirmed Pakistan's
[00:01:14] commitment to further strengthening the two countries all weather
[00:01:18] strategic cooperative
[00:01:19] partnership.
[00:01:26] US President Donald Trump says that he prefers
[00:01:28] of a deal with. on over military action while warning that the
[00:01:32] use
[00:01:33] of of force remains an option if diplomacy
[00:01:38] of fails. of
[00:01:43] Iranian deputy foreign minister for legal and international
[00:01:47] of affairs says that Iran and Oman are close to finalizing an
[00:01:51] agreement on the new
[00:01:52] of arrangements for commercial shipping through the straight of
[00:01:55] hermus.
[00:02:01] global
[00:02:01] of oil prices edge lower as concerns ease over potential
[00:02:05] supply disruptions in the middle east, brent crew drops to
[00:02:08] $79 per barrel, while US West Texas intermediate
[00:02:12] fell to $74.5 cents per
[00:02:15] in barrel.
[00:02:21] of US, China and Pakistan raise concerns at the UN
[00:02:25] of security council over terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan, urged the
[00:02:29] Taliban honor counter terrorism
[00:02:31] commitments.
[00:02:52] of
[00:03:01] Broad peak search operation underway as the bodies
[00:03:05] of five more
[00:03:07] of international climbers shifted to the combined military hospital in
[00:03:14] of Skardu.
[00:03:49] Prime Minister Shahbas Sharif has departed for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a three-day
[00:03:53] visit from the 6th to the 8th of August. The prime minister is accompanied by high-level
[00:03:57] delegation comprising
[00:03:58] of the chief of defense forces. field marshall sayir and other
[00:04:01] ministers. more
[00:04:06] of Prime Minister Mohammad Shahbaz Sharif will undertake an official visit to
[00:04:10] Saudi Arabia from 6 to 8 August. He will be accompanied by high
[00:04:14] level delegation comprising the deputy
[00:04:16] of prime minister, field marshall sayir and several
[00:04:20] ministers. During the visit the prime minister will meet the crown prince
[00:04:23] of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman. According to the foreign office, discussions
[00:04:27] would focus on consolidating the Pakistan. Saudi Arabia bilateral
[00:04:31] relations as well as exchange of views on regional and international
[00:04:35] of developments of mutual interest. Discussion will focus on consolidating
[00:04:39] the
[00:04:39] of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia bilateral relationship as well as
[00:04:43] exchange of views on
[00:04:45] of areas of regional and international developments of mutual
[00:04:48] interest. The visit marks Pakistan's longstanding partnership with the
[00:04:52] kingdom of Saudi Arabia anchored intackers of mutual trust,
[00:04:56] cooperation and brotherhood. Foreign Office has said that although the
[00:05:00] visit is taking place against the backdrop of height and tensions in the
[00:05:03] gulf, the visit carries significance
[00:05:06] of beyond the immediate crisis and short term consideration. the visit will further
[00:05:10] strengthen bilateral relations, deepen strategic. cooperation, enhance
[00:05:13] coordination on regional and international issues of mutual interest
[00:05:25] Shahbas Sharif has highlighted the positive momentum in Pakistan, China relations
[00:05:28] and reaffirmed Pakistan's commitment to further strengthening the two countries all
[00:05:32] weather strategic cooperative partnership. He was speaking to the Chinese
[00:05:36] ambassador to Pakistan Jiang Zidong who called on him in
[00:05:39] Islamabad. Now during the meeting the Chinese ambassador. presented a letter from
[00:05:43] Chinese President Shing Ping to the Prime Minister, expressing gratitude for
[00:05:47] his message on the 105th anniversary the founding the Communist Party
[00:05:51] of China. Shahbas Sharif also underscored the importance of enhancing people to
[00:05:55] people contacts as well as expanding exchanges between the political
[00:05:59] parties and parliaments of both the countries. The two sides also
[00:06:02] exchanged views on bilateral cooperation and regional issues of
[00:06:06] mutual
[00:06:06] interest.
[00:06:11] The embassy of Pakistan in Washington DC observed
[00:06:15] yamashmir organized by a special webinar titled
[00:06:18] contemporary challenges to international law in South Asia, Jammu
[00:06:22] and Kashmir dispute and the Indus Waters treaty. Now the event marked
[00:06:26] the seventh anniversary of India's illegal and unilateral revocation of articles
[00:06:30] 370 and 35A of its constitution on the 5th of August
[00:06:34] 2019. The event reaffirmed Pakistan's unwavering solidarity
[00:06:38] with the people of Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir and
[00:06:41] support for. their inaliable right to self-determination in accordance with the
[00:06:45] relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Messages from the
[00:06:49] President, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Pakistan were
[00:06:53] read out loud. reiterating Pakistan's steadfast political,
[00:06:56] moral and diplomatic support for the people of Indian illegally occupied Jammu and
[00:07:00] Kashmir. They called upon the international community to play its role in the peaceful
[00:07:04] resolution the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the international law and
[00:07:08] the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The speakers also underst.
[00:07:12] scored the need for peaceful resolution the Jammu and Kashmir dispute in accordance with the
[00:07:16] international law and the relevant United Nations Security Council
[00:07:19] resolutions. In his opening remarks, ambassador
[00:07:23] Rizwan said Sheikh ambassador of Pakistan to the United States stress the
[00:07:26] importance of international law addressing the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and broader
[00:07:30] rachel
[00:07:31] challenges.
[00:08:28] the hour where the world
[00:08:29] of course looks towards Iran and Oman and the agreement that
[00:08:33] seems to be inches away from being finalized and it seems that there
[00:08:37] is lot going on as to what it is that the future of this straight of hermous is going to look
[00:08:41] like essentially very important aspect of what the United States
[00:08:45] and Iran are also focusing for quite some time now, especially since the
[00:08:48] conflict began in late Feb this year, it seems that lot
[00:08:52] the inbound vessels coming in to the Gulf will
[00:08:56] be in control of Iran if this agreement
[00:09:00] is gone through, and of course what the Iranian side has also
[00:09:04] emphasized, if there is no third party or any other involvement coming
[00:09:07] in, we will be seeing this agreement put in place, what exactly does that do
[00:09:11] to the straight? and then also the conversation between US and
[00:09:15] Iran of course remains to be seen and that will be important in terms the
[00:09:19] larger middle eastern crisises as well and what it is then that the US is going to
[00:09:23] decide to do, in which we've seen that the US president has emphasized a
[00:09:26] lot of control on the straight and the presence the US naval fleet in
[00:09:30] making sure that no authority is being given
[00:09:34] to Iran, however the agreement of course looks at things in a little different
[00:09:46] treaty and what it is that will be the focus of what
[00:09:50] India has been doing since it has so-called held
[00:09:54] the treaty in abayance, we've seen that the permanent court of
[00:09:57] arbitration has also talked about how India's
[00:10:01] emphasis on not accepting the court and not moving
[00:10:04] as part of its obligations does not change the course of action and the international
[00:10:08] momentum remains the same and so the neutral process
[00:10:12] is going to stay as planned and there are going to be independent observers and
[00:10:16] actions that are going to be taken as part the hydropower projects that are
[00:10:20] being constructed by India and so it will be important to see how
[00:10:24] exactly the... "this process is going to continue, what it is that Pakistan can
[00:10:28] do, especially legally, as part the institutional framework laid out in the
[00:10:31] IWT, and what then will be the future scenario of India of
[00:10:35] course continues to do this, and lastly we'll take a look at yome
[00:10:39] Isasal that is being observed today in of
[00:10:43] course Pakistan and in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and
[00:10:47] also in the Indian occupied territory, it's going to be very, very important
[00:10:50] emphasize once again that despite about seven years
[00:10:54] be..." passed since 2019 on this very day that India revoked the
[00:10:58] special status the occupied valley,
[00:11:02] it still remains a very important aspect to be emphasized
[00:11:06] in the international community that the the special status the
[00:11:10] occupied valley cannot be changed unilaterally and just because India
[00:11:14] has put forward its own constitution under article 350 and
[00:11:18] 35 a is not mean that it changes the status the
[00:11:22] occupied territory and so this has to be resolved in. with the UN security
[00:11:26] council resolutions, which again is something that Pakistan has been
[00:11:29] emphasizing and is doing so
[00:11:38] to be the scenario with regards to what Iran and Oman are
[00:11:41] finalizing,
[00:11:42] and what that means for the United States and the conversation between
[00:11:46] Iran and the US, and it's going to be important to take that forward with
[00:11:50] our guests, we've been joined by associate professor Dan Afjan, director
[00:11:53] the Center for Iranian. and studies and Dr. Fadhi Hillani, senior fellowing
[00:11:57] director the Middle East Program at the National Council on U.S. Arab
[00:12:01] Relations. Thank you very much gentlemen for being part the show today. Dr.
[00:12:05] Fadhi, let me begin with you in ways that you observing the
[00:12:09] developments taking place between Iran and Oman, it seems that lot the
[00:12:13] independent observers are pointing out that perhaps this is
[00:12:16] something that again is being looked at as as victory for
[00:12:20] Iran, and what does that do to what the United States has
[00:12:24] been emphasizing? as part of its own control that it wants to exert
[00:12:28] over the
[00:12:37] agreement, which according to US and other
[00:12:40] officials uh is very eminent, and what we have
[00:12:44] heard from the media is that, as very much you mentioned in the
[00:12:47] introduction, is that there will be
[00:12:51] two routes to transit in the straight of herm?
[00:12:55] one is in the uh Iranian territorial waters and the other one is in the
[00:12:59] Omani territorial waters, which means both countries Oman and
[00:13:03] Iran will be in control of that straight, but let's remember that this
[00:13:07] is going to be temporary arrangement for 60 days
[00:13:11] after which there is a supposition that
[00:13:15] the area in between these two routes
[00:13:18] between the Iranian and the Omani waters, which is the
[00:13:22] international waterway during these 60 days
[00:13:25] it will be cleared of minds, which means the Americans
[00:13:29] are looking after the 60 days to bring
[00:13:33] the straight of hermus back to the pre- war arrangement, meaning
[00:13:37] that vessels can exit and transit the
[00:13:40] straight of hermus without being of course
[00:13:44] attacked by the Iranian IRGC
[00:13:48] navy, so the deal
[00:13:51] itself is not going to tell us very much as much. as the details
[00:13:55] of that agreement. Let's remember that the
[00:13:58] Mou, which was structured with some ambiguous
[00:14:02] language gave the opportunity and open the door for the
[00:14:06] Iranians and the Americans to interpret that agreement in two different
[00:14:10] ways. So the idea is that not what kind of agreement we
[00:14:14] will have, but what this agreement entails, does it
[00:14:17] provide the Iranians with permanent
[00:14:21] control over the straight of hermus? That is something I doubt very much to have.
[00:14:25] happen at the same time, I doubt that this agreement
[00:14:28] will uh entail uh very
[00:14:32] openly that the uh Americans will
[00:14:36] consent to arrangements in which the Iranians will be on control
[00:14:39] after that 60 days over the straight of
[00:14:43] hermus, so there is very much what we would like to
[00:14:47] see coming in the coming hours in that agreement, but it's too
[00:14:50] early to say that this uh provides victory to Iran or victory to the
[00:14:54] US. "the US at this time is looking for what is called as
[00:14:58] phased diplomacy, so they want to take out the table for now the
[00:15:02] straight of hermus so that they can focus in the coming stage uh on the
[00:15:05] nuclear program uh which the Iranians have and the highly enriched
[00:15:09] uranium, if that agreement is going to provide us with that
[00:15:13] ability to move to phase two then we can say we have done of
[00:15:17] course uh we are done with step number one and we will be moving step forward to
[00:15:20] step number
[00:15:25] come to you in this as well, even if we see Iran and Oman
[00:15:28] agreeing onto something, how do you think that this
[00:15:32] will be implemented if
[00:15:34] it is not validated by other countries and fully accepted by
[00:15:38] countries, including the United States, and also similarly, do you
[00:15:42] think that there can be lobbying and support garnored, especially in the
[00:15:46] middle east from the Gulf states, perhaps as part of this
[00:15:50] agreement, do you think that they're going to be looking at this and offer support for this
[00:15:53] to be at least mechanism in terms of having the straight
[00:15:57] open?
[00:16:14] I think um, first of all we don't really have
[00:16:18] anything new in our hands, I mean everything and
[00:16:22] dialogue between Iran on over the last few days, which according
[00:16:26] to the Iranian sources are going pretty much well,
[00:16:30] we're already in the
[00:16:31] mo signed on June 17th with the
[00:16:35] mediation of Pakistan definitely. so I think Iran was
[00:16:39] supposed to do that anyway and all these conflicts which
[00:16:42] follow the mou between Iran and United States should not have
[00:16:46] happened if Iran I think would
[00:16:49] have moved faster so Iran I think
[00:16:53] seems to overplay its
[00:16:56] hands at some points and I think the
[00:17:00] crisis over the straight of vomus is an example of that and
[00:17:04] we have a problem here because Iran from the very...
[00:17:07] beginning claimed sovereignty and actually
[00:17:11] mutual sovereignty over
[00:17:13] the syrup with oman definitely the sultanate of
[00:17:16] oman, but same time Iran prevented omanis to
[00:17:20] let the vsles and
[00:17:22] the sheeps pass through their own
[00:17:25] shore shores and then we had these dialogues and the talks
[00:17:29] between these two countries and eventually I think we are very close to
[00:17:33] deal between Iran and Roman to open up this
[00:17:39] to to the world at large, but the question here, we have
[00:17:42] been talking about straight off for obvious reasons
[00:17:46] because it was one to major that locks even
[00:17:50] close reforms as part of its war strategy, but
[00:17:54] i think we should be talking about the gulf region at
[00:17:57] lch, that is i think more important, because when it comes to the
[00:18:01] gulf region, we have number of arab countries in that
[00:18:04] region, gulf countries definitely. "and I think at
[00:18:08] some point Islamic Republic of Iran will have to talk to those
[00:18:12] countries as well and that there I think the real
[00:18:16] difficulty will will start for the Islam Republic
[00:18:20] because there is huge disappointment to say the
[00:18:23] least in in those countries about Iran's wartime
[00:18:27] strategy and even the resentment for Iran attacking
[00:18:30] those countries from the very beginning so I think
[00:18:34] opening up the st form is definitely very..." important, it's
[00:18:38] especially important for the United States of America, it's actually
[00:18:42] important for the global economy,
[00:18:44] especially the the flow of energy from that
[00:18:48] region, but I think the real question is the question the gulf
[00:18:52] region, and we will come to that part the story eventually as
[00:19:01] the ways in which other aspects in the middle east are
[00:19:05] also being observed, particularly of course what? is happening as part of
[00:19:08] Israel's actions against Lebanon, strikes still continue and
[00:19:12] we've also seen Huti rebels have a maritime blocked against Saudi
[00:19:16] Arabia, and of course the situation in Palestine and West Bank
[00:19:20] also is underway. Unfortunately, the kind of
[00:19:24] aspects that we see in the larger Middle Eastern region makes it a very
[00:19:28] conflict brown area. how exactly do you think that this
[00:19:31] situation dynamics as is being looked at by
[00:19:35] Iran and the stance that it's making how exactly do you think it
[00:19:39] will navigate what is happening within the middle east and then to
[00:19:43] what extent the US would also be deciding based on these
[00:19:54] i saying this? because from a US perspective,
[00:19:57] these proxies which you have been referring to in the question have all
[00:20:01] been significantly weakened over the last three years. we are talking
[00:20:05] about the uh what happ what happened to Hamas and
[00:20:09] let's remember that from Washington's perspective, Hamas is
[00:20:12] also an Iranian proxy, but even when we look at Hizballah in
[00:20:16] in Lebanon, that has been also significantly weakened
[00:20:20] according to Washington because the military
[00:20:23] operations which the IDF, the Israeli army has conducted over
[00:20:27] the last two years, the Hies as well have been significantly
[00:20:31] weaken through US military campaign lah last
[00:20:35] year early after President Trump to... office in
[00:20:38] 2025, the major problem which remains according to
[00:20:41] Washington is Iran's support to these proxies,
[00:20:45] but there is a there is an understanding in
[00:20:48] Washington. that what has been seen as
[00:20:52] Iran's forward defensive strategy
[00:20:55] has proven to be a failure, in other words,
[00:20:59] Iran's strategy to defend its border by by uh providing
[00:21:03] proxies in Lebanon and previously in Syria and
[00:21:06] Iraq with military and economic support so that
[00:21:10] attacks could be launched from these places rather than
[00:21:14] waging war against Iran and having the war turn
[00:21:17] into inside the Iranian borders. This has
[00:21:20] all proven to be a mistake in calculation
[00:21:24] because obviously since last year with the 12-day war
[00:21:28] and the current war uh the war has been within Iran's
[00:21:32] border so the Iranian regime decided
[00:21:35] obviously to find another deterrence
[00:21:38] strategy and we
[00:21:40] can talk about moving
[00:21:41] from that forward defensive strategy which I mentioned towards
[00:21:45] looking for to the straight of her moves not only as a bargaining.
[00:21:50] in the negotiations which we are currently having, but also as
[00:21:53] detering strategy, in other words, the Iranian regime can claim that
[00:21:57] any time in the future, if the Americans and the
[00:22:01] Israelis decide to wage war against Iran, Iran can close the straight
[00:22:05] of hermus, and upon this principle the
[00:22:09] Iranian regime can formulate a kind of deterrant strategy to deter
[00:22:13] the enemies, the Israelies and the American as I mentioned from waging that
[00:22:16] war. however, the United States
[00:22:20] Since also President Trump took office
[00:22:23] and we all know about the
[00:22:26] maximum pressure strategy which President Trump even
[00:22:29] took from his first presidency uh which is based on economic
[00:22:33] pressure plus now military pressure has been working on two
[00:22:37] tracks, the first one is weakening the proxies, which according to
[00:22:41] Washington as I mentioned has significantly be weakened and now
[00:22:45] Washington is working with both Beirut and Baghdad
[00:22:49] for a truck. where these proxies will
[00:22:52] eventually have to surrender their weapons
[00:22:54] to the state and these two gover to those two governments in Iraq and
[00:22:58] Lebanon, so that is as far as the proxies are concerned, but as
[00:23:02] far as the military support and the economic support is concerned, there
[00:23:06] is the idea in Washington that weakening Iran
[00:23:09] militarily and economically will actually prevent
[00:23:13] Iran from a long-term strategy to continue supporting these
[00:23:17] groups, so this is why we find that there is a condition. in Washington that
[00:23:21] there will be no economic sanctions lifted
[00:23:24] unless we have deal with Iran and that deal will entil number
[00:23:28] one limits its nuclear capabilities and uranium, but
[00:23:32] eventually there will be also some condition forward on
[00:23:36] Iran trying to support these proxies. These proxies according to
[00:23:40] Washington will eventually diminish if that
[00:23:43] diplomacy with Beirot and Baghdad prove to be successful, but
[00:23:47] that is something we have to wait and see. However. up till now
[00:23:51] and before we see that deal coming into light, everything is starting
[00:23:55] from the straight of hermus, but if that proce successful, as I mentioned,
[00:23:59] we will be moving to phase number two, which is the nuclear. In my
[00:24:02] opinion, the Iranian regime will try to do is
[00:24:06] best to prevent a formula where
[00:24:09] control is control over the straight of
[00:24:13] hermooz is surrendered, because according to the last statement I
[00:24:17] heard from the Iranian officials, surrender. in control
[00:24:20] over the the straight of herms equals
[00:24:24] complete capitulation as President Trump is asking
[00:24:28] for, and in my opinion, this is so far is very hard to get
[00:24:31] in light of what's going on. Right,
[00:24:35] Professor Saran, I'd like your perspective on this too, and add to that, the response
[00:24:39] that you think will exist as part of what the Gulf states decide to do
[00:24:43] and how exactly they will be interacting with Iran moving
[00:24:46] forward and what it is that they are looking forward to in terms. the
[00:24:50] negotiations between US and Iran and especially
[00:24:54] countries like Iraq, which of course have important ties with the
[00:24:58] US, but also deep historical and religious ties with
[00:25:01] Iran. Actually, I would like
[00:25:04] to few remarks on these proxies which
[00:25:08] Iran cause access of resistance, as we all know, I
[00:25:12] think it would be too much to say or to claim that the
[00:25:16] access of resistance has fallen or has collapsed.
[00:25:20] Definitely not, I mean from October 7 to to
[00:25:24] this day, they suffered lot of
[00:25:27] casualties, and definitely they lost much their power,
[00:25:30] but hisbullah is still there, there are Iran
[00:25:34] affiliated groups in Iraq definitely, and there
[00:25:37] is, which I think is not the same with his bull, I
[00:25:41] mean the relationship between the hoothis and Iran, I think it's a
[00:25:45] complicated one, but that's an entirely different story, and
[00:25:48] when you have... if you call it as an Iran
[00:25:52] proxy, which I personally would not, I
[00:25:56] think Iran will at some point try to
[00:25:59] revitalize the acts of resistance. a sense, but it's gonna
[00:26:03] be very, very difficult for the Islamic Republic of Iran,
[00:26:07] hence I definitely agree with Dr. Hilani that hence
[00:26:11] Iran pays a lot of attention to the street of
[00:26:14] formus, as a by gaining chip, yes, but at the same
[00:26:18] time I think as a part of its national security,
[00:26:22] from this time on we will be hearing
[00:26:25] more and more from the Iranian authorities each and every
[00:26:29] crisis, we have been hearing that in the past as well, but Iran
[00:26:33] had never weaponized so to speak this for
[00:26:37] mouse to this point, so now Iran has tried that, tested that
[00:26:41] and successfully did that, and I am sure Iran is going to use that in the
[00:26:44] future as well, so I think we should be focusing on the street
[00:26:48] of more and more, and I think the international community will
[00:26:52] not lead let the street of formus, the the fate
[00:26:56] the Iran alone, because we we we have
[00:27:00] seen how can it hurt the international? economy and
[00:27:04] how
[00:27:04] it can it hurt the flow of energy from the middle east to the rest the
[00:27:08] world, but when it comes to the relationship between Iran and its
[00:27:12] neighbors especially in the gulf region and also beyond, because there is
[00:27:16] also
[00:27:17] I think very deep crisis which is not sufficiently
[00:27:21] addressed
[00:27:21] I think between Iran and Jordan, there is huge crisis
[00:27:25] going on between these two states, but actually the real
[00:27:28] crisis is happening between Iran and its neighbors in the Gulf.
[00:27:32] region starting with Kuwait definitely and then you
[00:27:36] can name each and every one them including Saudi
[00:27:39] Arabia, when we talk to the Iranians in different
[00:27:43] conferences, symposiums or other meetings, they have
[00:27:46] very visible self-confidence for maybe
[00:27:50] understandable reasons, I think they have shown
[00:27:54] impressive resilience against the United States and Israel, that's
[00:27:58] definitely the case, but same time when it comes to their
[00:28:01] rhetoric. than the approach to the neighbors, it's not
[00:28:05] necessarily favorable and it's not necessarily friendly
[00:28:09] and Iran heard these countries for one reason or the other,
[00:28:13] if you ask the Iranians they can legitimize every move that
[00:28:17] they have put into operation from February
[00:28:20] 28 onward, but if you look at it from the other side the
[00:28:24] Gulf, I mean what they feel is resentment because
[00:28:28] they, I mean they lost their prestige
[00:28:30] for example Dubai United.
[00:28:32] Qatar, even Oman was h at some
[00:28:36] point, so I think in Iran will have incredible
[00:28:39] difficulties rehabilitating its relations with its neighbors in
[00:28:43] the Gulf, not that Iran will be excluded from the balance of
[00:28:47] power in the United, which is impossible definitely, but Iran is going to
[00:28:51] have lot of difficulties, and I think not each all
[00:28:54] these states are very interested in in
[00:28:58] quickly rehabilitating their relations with with Iraq.
[00:29:02] "once this war is over and once we are in the post conflict
[00:29:06] period, I think they are going to watch and see the behavior the Islamic
[00:29:10] Republic of Iran and they will not act sly
[00:29:13] to restore their relations with
[00:29:23] Dr. Fadi, in your opinion, when looking at what is
[00:29:26] happening in terms of what the US administration has been
[00:29:30] trying to achieve with Iraq."
[00:29:33] on especially now with this straight affirmas deal inchin
[00:29:36] closer, what do you think will be the way forward that Mr.
[00:29:40] Trump is going to be announcing and especially in terms of what it
[00:29:44] is that he can then present to his own public as to
[00:29:48] what it is that the US has achieved so far, what is
[00:29:51] it is aspiring to achieve and what is the strategy in order to
[00:29:55] achieve that? so far the Trump
[00:29:59] administration has been mentioning that, "this
[00:30:03] war has the strategic end of not
[00:30:06] allowing Iran to have nuclear
[00:30:09] program, nuclear bomb, and of course that
[00:30:13] means we have to negotiate their nuclear program and highly enrich
[00:30:17] uranium, but obviously over the last weeks that there has
[00:30:21] been much talk about another strategic
[00:30:24] end for this war, which is not allowing iran to control the straight of
[00:30:28] hermus, this is why it's very likely that the language"
[00:30:32] here from President Trump after that agreement comes to light is
[00:30:36] that it doesn't give Iran control over the straight of hermooz,
[00:30:40] but it gives it some kind of control over
[00:30:44] allowing ships to transit through the
[00:30:48] uh Iranian waterways so that there will be time to
[00:30:51] clear the waterway in between Oman and Iran from the
[00:30:55] mines which the IRGC has planted during the war
[00:30:59] time.