PAKISTANTV — broadcast
20260808 053000 UTC
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[00:00:00] future for a country like Pakistan of course um and it's
[00:00:03] very important ties with countries like Saudi Arabia and
[00:00:09] of of Turkey uh it's important to see how exactly this will transpire as part
[00:00:12] of the defense cooperation in case of any aggression, but in what in
[00:00:16] what ways do you think it also looks at
[00:00:19] or impacts Pakistan's own
[00:00:23] regional problems and in the ways that Pakistan would also like to
[00:00:26] strengthen its geopolitical and military. missions and
[00:00:30] the kind of threats that the country is facing, how do you think that such
[00:00:34] alliances, if
[00:00:35] of not part of this agreement, but in terms
[00:00:40] of of the importance of engaging and expanding our alliances with
[00:00:41] in different countries, how does that help Pakistan's
[00:00:43] of position of in terms of leveraging towards the
[00:00:47] aspects that are of a special interest to
[00:00:49] us? yes, I
[00:00:52] think, I think the the
[00:00:56] message that goes out of this trilater.
[00:01:01] a Alliance is that that Pakistan is
[00:01:05] at least now trusted on the on
[00:01:08] the middle eastern side and the western
[00:01:11] side with one country is a
[00:01:14] of NATO member so it it
[00:01:17] a raises Pakistan's
[00:01:21] of position defensive fies but at the same
[00:01:23] of time of it provides deterrence
[00:01:26] of now of geopolitically Pakistan's. main
[00:01:30] problem nowadays rises from the east or the
[00:01:34] west,
[00:01:35] of think in those two theaters also, i think the message goes
[00:01:39] out whether there are
[00:01:43] joint kinetic operations as air
[00:01:46] commodor said whether
[00:01:49] jf 17 will go from this place to that place, but it
[00:01:53] gives it gives punch, it gives punch to
[00:01:56] Pakistan that it's part of a trilateral alliance.
[00:02:01] "we had our RCDs, we had other
[00:02:04] of ECOs, but this is historically the first
[00:02:07] trial at with Saudi Arabia
[00:02:09] of was the first
[00:02:11] of bilateral alliance, but this is now a trilateral alliance,
[00:02:14] so so
[00:02:15] a I think I think it gives Pakistan lot of lot of
[00:02:19] weight in international affairs in its own
[00:02:22] geopolitical conflicts, it gives, it gives
[00:02:25] of Turkey, Turkey lot of it
[00:02:28] of that Turkey is now playing role. regionally
[00:02:31] also being a being being a NATO
[00:02:34] member and it afford Saudi Arabia the
[00:02:38] multilayered
[00:02:40] defense protection, it has
[00:02:44] protection from
[00:02:45] of the from the US, but now it it is also in
[00:02:48] alliance with two two different countries, so geopolitically it
[00:02:52] helps Saudi Arabia also, so it
[00:02:56] will raise challenges for Pakistan in its mediation.
[00:03:00] "but generally it will be very
[00:03:03] of beneficial for Pakistan this agreement. Right,
[00:03:07] ambassador Imran, there is also of course the aspect of
[00:03:11] what
[00:03:11] of ways we're looking at the situation develop
[00:03:15] between the United States and Iran, and like you mentioned earlier,
[00:03:19] Pakistan's role of mediation is very, very integral to this and is
[00:03:23] of closely linked to how exactly Pakistan is interacting with key regional players,
[00:03:27] I'd like you to stay with us for the next segment also that takes a..." als look at the
[00:03:31] situation and how exactly uh this is moving
[00:03:35] of forward, we've also been joined for that segment by Brian Steet was author and
[00:03:39] senior fellow with narrative strategies and author of narrative war. thank
[00:03:42] you very much Brian for joining us and being a part
[00:03:44] of the discussion today. in light of what we are seeing happening now about
[00:03:48] six months from when this war actually started, how do
[00:03:52] you think that the United States has progress throughout this
[00:03:56] conflict and what
[00:03:57] of it is that the Trump administration uh is still hoping to
[00:04:01] achieve or at least is communicating that is
[00:04:04] trying to achieve to its own public, where do you think is the goal
[00:04:08] post and what's the strategy to achieve it?
[00:04:12] oh, that's a lot of
[00:04:13] of questions. okay, so
[00:04:18] of - i don't think the goal posts have changed as much
[00:04:22] as the commentary on the goal post implies that
[00:04:26] they've changed, but
[00:04:27] of that said, i think that there is a... certain
[00:04:30] realization uh that the way to
[00:04:33] get the goals or to accomplish the goals that were
[00:04:37] originally set out is going to have to
[00:04:40] happen through some other
[00:04:42] in means, it is not going to be sufficient to
[00:04:45] inflict harm on the state of
[00:04:48] Iran
[00:04:49] and then that will cause Iran to concede whether
[00:04:53] that's nuclear enrichment or it
[00:04:55] conceeds its support
[00:04:59] for regional non-state
[00:05:01] actors, keep the straights of
[00:05:05] hormos separate, because the straight
[00:05:07] of is issue that was not the
[00:05:12] in me reason that the... administration went into the war, it's
[00:05:14] a uh, it's an objective that became
[00:05:18] an objective because the war, so it's part
[00:05:22] the Trump administration went in with a
[00:05:26] highly kinetic uh, meaning
[00:05:29] bombing and inflicting damage
[00:05:33] that way, they they went into
[00:05:36] this with that being their method,
[00:05:40] but now and... and then Iran responded
[00:05:44] after several weeks by closing or at least
[00:05:47] primar mostly closing the straight of hermus, which
[00:05:51] now means that we are a negotiation about
[00:05:55] something that interestingly enough should not even be matter of
[00:05:59] negotiation, the straight is considered by everyone except
[00:06:03] Iran and maybe now Oman uh to be an international
[00:06:07] waterway and nobody has the right to negotiate over
[00:06:10] movement through an international water. waterway, but that's sort of where
[00:06:14] we are, uh, I'm not, I personally I'm not happy
[00:06:18] that that's where we are, I, I think the
[00:06:21] administration would be happy if we could get out of this
[00:06:25] position uh, with something that looks
[00:06:28] like return
[00:06:30] to - the
[00:06:34] conditions before the war began, because even
[00:06:38] with that, if everything else returned to the pre-war
[00:06:41] conditions, "the United States has still
[00:06:45] inflicted tremendous damage to the
[00:06:49] IRGC, to the Iraqi military and their
[00:06:53] capacity to conduct operations and
[00:06:55] also inflicted tremendous harm to the
[00:06:59] Iranian economy, I think I said Iraqi military, but the IRGC
[00:07:03] military and to the Iranian
[00:07:06] economy, so those could be considered
[00:07:09] wins all by themselves, now the..." the obstacle to
[00:07:13] declaring victory, i think from a political
[00:07:16] standpoint would be something that can be
[00:07:20] communicated as the reopening the straight of
[00:07:23] hormos. right, ambassador
[00:07:26] Imran, in in your perspective, when we see the
[00:07:30] situation inch closer between Iran and Oman in the
[00:07:34] agreement that essentially will give lot of control to Iran, which is
[00:07:37] what it has been asking for, and Brian is right in saying that that's a product the war in
[00:07:41] itself and not. perhaps the core core objective as to why it started, but
[00:07:45] in what ways do you think that now lot of this is centered around the straight
[00:07:49] offers and how exactly will that be navigated further and whether
[00:07:53] or not there is move forward towards its resolution that is
[00:07:56] acceptable to the US which can then lead to at least addressing the
[00:08:00] core questions. thank you, i
[00:08:04] think, i think if the man and
[00:08:07] Iran agreement on the straight
[00:08:11] is actually done
[00:08:13] with, done and dusted as the say the
[00:08:17] supreme leader has agreed to it, I think
[00:08:20] Oman would not be in total contravention the
[00:08:24] US, Oman were knowing Oman very
[00:08:27] well, I think Oman would discuss this
[00:08:31] with with Great Britain because it has privacy in
[00:08:35] Oman as well as the US, it would not go
[00:08:38] against the against US wishes, so I don't know.
[00:08:42] whether the sort of root agreement
[00:08:46] that the they are doing on the straight and some voluntary
[00:08:49] fees, whether it has tasset us approval or not, i would think
[00:08:53] man would never sign to anything that is
[00:08:57] anti entire us,
[00:09:00] so why the straight is important, because the
[00:09:04] straight stopped the whole
[00:09:07] discussion even before it could start
[00:09:11] the 60 day. period and all of that, so negatively it
[00:09:15] obstructed everything, and my hope is that if it is
[00:09:19] indeed resolved between those two countries,
[00:09:22] probably discussions can start on other major
[00:09:26] issues or or as footprind court, the various
[00:09:30] cold posts which are going to be discussed in the so-called
[00:09:33] mou, right,
[00:09:37] Brian, how are you looking at the ways in which the the
[00:09:41] leadership in Iran right now is approaching these
[00:09:45] aspects and of course the possibilities of negotiations, of course
[00:09:48] earlier, especially at the start, the rhetoric was
[00:09:52] centered around the leadership and with that essentially different now in
[00:09:56] place, do you think that there has been a change in the way that Iran is interacting
[00:10:00] with the US or do you think that it's pretty much the
[00:10:02] same? well, well obviously there's a
[00:10:06] change from last February and
[00:10:10] till today and ' what is
[00:10:13] interesting, and I mean, I wish I could be a fly on the
[00:10:16] wall, which I have not been, so I'm not exactly sure how it's
[00:10:20] being done, but the way it kind of comes across to as an
[00:10:24] observer. is a little bit like an American
[00:10:28] police interrogation from an American tv
[00:10:31] show or movie where you have a good cop and a bad
[00:10:35] cop and the way the interrogation
[00:10:39] goes in television and movies is uh you have
[00:10:42] somebody who acts like the uh the
[00:10:46] victim or the supposed criminals
[00:10:50] friend and then another cop comes in and asks like the tough
[00:10:54] guy like there they want to do all this harm, and I
[00:10:57] don't know, and and I've talked with other people
[00:11:01] that kind of implied that the negotiators who are
[00:11:05] working both with the Omanis and interacting with the Americans, even though
[00:11:09] the Iranians will say they're not negotiating directly with the
[00:11:12] Americans, those negotiators are
[00:11:15] essentially still IRGC individuals, that all they
[00:11:19] did was take off the uniform and put a suit, they're not
[00:11:22] fundamentally of a... different ideology or
[00:11:26] different world view, so I don't think Iran has
[00:11:30] two different tracks, one that's inclined to
[00:11:33] negotiation and one that's not, and therefore I'm
[00:11:37] kind of curious if Iran is doing this
[00:11:41] simply as a stage to
[00:11:45] sort of make the Americans look foolish, where
[00:11:49] they the Americans will be able to say, oh, it looks like we have deal,
[00:11:53] and then the IRG see spokesperson or whoever
[00:11:57] it is will then come out and say no there is no deal and then maybe
[00:12:01] they'll fire rocket or something like that to prove that they're right
[00:12:05] and and therefore there's this confusing
[00:12:07] element that's how it looks from the
[00:12:11] outside that there is confusion within Iran what I'm thinking
[00:12:14] more and more is there's not confusion within Iran they're just
[00:12:18] making it look that way because it's to their benefit
[00:12:22] to kind of uh
[00:12:26] so confusion on the part the American
[00:12:30] delegation with whom they
[00:12:32] interact. right um another
[00:12:36] important aspect Brian is with reference to Israel's
[00:12:39] actions in the middle east and then Israel's relationship with the
[00:12:43] United States, how exactly do you think
[00:12:46] that um where does it stand at the moment and whether or not there is a change
[00:12:50] in that relationship and the importance that it has been
[00:12:54] given? previously or historically to israely
[00:12:57] interests,
[00:13:02] support for Palestinians and to a degree just plain
[00:13:05] support for Hamas that has taken place in
[00:13:08] America, I believe that you have previously talked on
[00:13:12] the show about Abdul
[00:13:14] Rahman
[00:13:17] the person who
[00:13:18] is now the democrat
[00:13:22] candidate for the US senate from the state of Michigan.
[00:13:26] and his success in that and using
[00:13:29] particularly the US relationship with Israel, is quite
[00:13:33] clear that the democrat party in the United States
[00:13:37] is now almost, well it's a majority
[00:13:41] opposed to relationships with Israel, and
[00:13:45] as a block US congress people
[00:13:48] uh voted against support for Israel, so
[00:13:52] it's within America there's a... really fascinating
[00:13:56] dynamic happening where Israel used to be 20
[00:14:00] 30 years ago, it was a unifying voice, you would get people on
[00:14:04] the far left and people on the far right on the American political
[00:14:07] spectrum, and they would disagree on everything else, but they would
[00:14:10] vote together a bill to support
[00:14:14] Israel, but now that is not true, I
[00:14:18] think it would be very, very hard to get almost any
[00:14:21] house votes for
[00:14:24] a support. Israel uh bill
[00:14:27] and in the Senate, maybe two or three, maybe
[00:14:31] more, but it's it's very slight, now
[00:14:34] between the US executive and the Israeli
[00:14:38] executive, that's another interesting
[00:14:40] dynamic, uh, President
[00:14:43] Trump does not seem to be,
[00:14:45] and I don't know him personally, so I can't say this for certain, but he does not seem
[00:14:49] to be a person who likes to be bossed around, nor a person
[00:14:53] who likes to be... uh made to look
[00:14:56] foolish, and uh,
[00:15:00] BB Netanyahu has very
[00:15:04] strong personality, and he states things very
[00:15:07] unequivocally, which then kind
[00:15:10] of comes across as if he's ordering the American
[00:15:14] president, and that has rankled President
[00:15:17] Trump over the F-35 sale to
[00:15:21] Turkey, or
[00:15:22] or while the reintroduction of Turkey into the... f35
[00:15:26] program and uh and then of
[00:15:29] course uh the promises the
[00:15:33] Netanyahu government uh with respect to what would happen
[00:15:37] a iran or how quickly Iran would go uh have not
[00:15:41] come to fruition and I don't think Trump is happy with that, so I think
[00:15:45] there's there's more friction between the Netanyahu government
[00:15:49] and the Trump administration than there was back in
[00:15:52] February, but I I don't know, I don't think it's as
[00:15:56] bad as some people are portraying it, I don't think
[00:15:58] that there's a break, I don't think it's a fundamental shift, I just think that
[00:16:01] it's it's not as positive as it was six months
[00:16:05] ago uh "and if it is negative, it's a
[00:16:09] negative that could be overcome by positive
[00:16:13] accomplishments. Right, I understand that
[00:16:16] ambassador Imran, I'd like your perspective of this too, especially given
[00:16:20] what we've seen transpire throughout this conflict and the way
[00:16:24] it's started and how it has evolved so far, there is of course aspects
[00:16:28] of what is going on both within Israel and the United United
[00:16:32] States that adds to the influence on the key
[00:16:36] decision makers in the ac'. that they take, but in what ways do you think that
[00:16:39] this factor and then of course Israel's actions
[00:16:43] v Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and then also
[00:16:47] the front between the Huti rebels in Saudi Arabia, how exactly
[00:16:51] are all these dynamics affecting the decisions being
[00:16:55] taken by both Iran and the United States and what do you think they are
[00:16:59] making their own interests in light these developing
[00:17:01] situations? very difficult and very
[00:17:05] very expensive. sort of
[00:17:07] question, I agree with Brian that
[00:17:11] there might be some meritants between the executive branches
[00:17:15] of Israel
[00:17:18] and and the US,
[00:17:21] but they seem to be getting along, I mean I don't
[00:17:25] know whether whether they'l be obvious in
[00:17:29] policy and the legislature as he has
[00:17:32] explained the house and the Senate, they
[00:17:35] are there are different. kettle of fish, I am
[00:17:38] not, and I wish I could be a fly on the wall in the
[00:17:42] IRGC, I don't know,
[00:17:46] I and I would agree with Brian again that
[00:17:49] this theory about a great dissonance in the
[00:17:53] Iranian government structure, I think this is
[00:17:56] overplayed,
[00:17:58] this they probably may be
[00:18:02] good cop or bad cop or maybe the
[00:18:05] iritants are much lesser. than those that are
[00:18:09] portrayed, there has been major
[00:18:13] Iranian loss, there have been major losses in
[00:18:17] the last 10 days also, so I don't know
[00:18:20] whether they would force the hand the IRGC,
[00:18:24] and they would, they would not fire rocket, as
[00:18:28] Brian says disrupt the to disrupt the peace process once
[00:18:32] again or to prove their point, I hope they don't,
[00:18:35] because here in Pakistan. we are we are affected not
[00:18:39] only because the economic off shoots but because we
[00:18:43] have we put our own whole state in
[00:18:47] the mediation process and that has that has
[00:18:51] been the center of our of our work if might say
[00:18:55] so so hope they don't but
[00:18:59] one can't predict the irgc just as one
[00:19:02] can't predict trump one can't
[00:19:06] predict the...
[00:19:09] see is right right, thank
[00:19:10] you very much ambas imran for joining us and being a part the news room today.
[00:19:13] Brian, my last question to you especially given now how the
[00:19:17] situation has developed further and we're almost of course six months into it,
[00:19:21] there's the added economic pressures also that Mr. Trump
[00:19:25] is face facing and of course the entire world is facing, but in what ways
[00:19:29] do you think that the effect that that we see within
[00:19:33] the United States towards the Trump administration and this
[00:19:37] president? see and then of course the decreasing popularity that we've seen, how
[00:19:41] much of that is being navigated by the
[00:19:44] administration and what is being said that can
[00:19:48] then appease or satisfy the American public the kind of
[00:19:52] rises and prices that they are also witnessing?
[00:19:55] okay, it's really good questions
[00:19:58] - I'm going to say the
[00:20:02] obvious, Donald J. Trump is not the typical
[00:20:05] American president, and where that
[00:20:09] might be really important is lot of presidents
[00:20:13] might radically adjust or might if even have not even gotten
[00:20:16] involved in during an election year, even a mid-term election
[00:20:20] year into incursion uh
[00:20:23] that he has. i don't know that he is
[00:20:27] as concerned as say normal president
[00:20:30] would have been given the same thing or the same
[00:20:34] circumstances.
[00:20:35] that said uh This war is unpopular, it is an unpopular
[00:20:39] amongst Republicans,
[00:20:41] it is, it is wildly unpopular among democrats
[00:20:45] and
[00:20:46] it is unpopular among independents, and of course the independent.
[00:20:50] or what matter, because it's about a 40, 40, well, it's
[00:20:54] probably like 35, 35, 30 in America where you
[00:20:57] have about even 35
[00:21:00] each or republican and democrat, and about 30%
[00:21:04] independent, and that depends on the state that you're talking
[00:21:08] about, and so independent voters are are significantly
[00:21:12] important, they are moved
[00:21:15] obviously by by economics, gas prices are higher in America,
[00:21:19] but they... are way lower in America than almost anywhere else in the world, and
[00:21:23] huge reason for that is because the Trump administration's
[00:21:26] energy policies that have ensured that America is
[00:21:30] producing more oil now than it is ever produced
[00:21:34] before, so uh the Trump
[00:21:37] administration could make the argument that this was
[00:21:41] necessary war, I don't think they've communicated that particularly well to this
[00:21:45] point, and then they could also make the argument at the same time that the reason
[00:21:49] why things aren't... worse is because
[00:21:52] of uh the policies that they've implemented that are very
[00:21:56] pro-energy, so all of those things i would just argue that
[00:21:59] it's all not necessarily doom and gloom, but if
[00:22:03] you are democrat uh
[00:22:06] campaigning for election or you're a
[00:22:10] democrat political consultant, you have lot to be happy
[00:22:14] about in terms the mood and in terms the economic direction and
[00:22:18] that general polling. so if you look at right track, wrong
[00:22:22] track, uh, it's it's not in favor the
[00:22:25] Trump administration at all uh, and Trump's overall
[00:22:29] popularity is below 40%, which tends to be a bad
[00:22:33] marker uh in terms of holding seats, so there's a lot of
[00:22:37] intricacies within the American political system that are quite unique this
[00:22:40] year, but still I would say it doesn't look good,
[00:22:44] but I don't think it's hopeless uh, and it really will, it
[00:22:48] will be - "the person who enjoys watching the political
[00:22:52] game, this will be fascinating election
[00:22:56] season to watch, because I don't think it's going to come out
[00:22:59] as lot the surface level
[00:23:02] predictions are are predicting, I think it's going to be closer run
[00:23:06] thing than people imagine, but that's just
[00:23:09] a guess on my
[00:23:10] part definitely, definitely be interesting - nothing else, thank you so much, Brian
[00:23:14] state for joining us and being a part the show today, the going on and the developments
[00:23:18] of course taking place a very..." in terms of what is happening in the larger middle
[00:23:22] east and what the future scenario will be and we'll be here to talk more about that
[00:23:26] as it develops. that's all that we have from the news room today. we'll now see you on
[00:23:29] Monday.
[00:23:50] Hello and welcome to experts corner. This is Mahin
[00:23:52] Joffrey.
[00:23:58] Uh, I think Trump once he had elected
[00:24:00] to go to
[00:24:00] war.
[00:24:06] Uh, only Congress can actually undo the sanctions, so
[00:24:09] whatever Trump says, it has to go through Congress. One
[00:24:13] the key weapons that Iran is using this moves for is leverage against the
[00:24:17] US. Having a US presence on your territory. has made you
[00:24:21] more likely to be attacked realignments taking place to counter the
[00:24:25] Israelis and that includes your country, Pakistan, along
[00:24:28] with uh Saudi Arabia and Egypt and
[00:24:31] Turkey.
[00:24:40] From the heart of South Asia to the cross roads of central Asia, from the turbulent
[00:24:44] Middle East and North Africa to the power corridors the west. Iran
[00:24:48] has successfully... demonstrated its
[00:24:51] ability not just to negotiate its
[00:24:55] term, but also to negotiate on
[00:24:59] each term for that amount of time that
[00:25:03] Tehran considers as strategically equivalent.
[00:25:06] article 3 the NATO treaty is all about
[00:25:10] self-defense and that's been a sore point between the United States of
[00:25:14] America and the other NATO allies since the foundation
[00:25:17] the uh the alliance. So what's happening now is burden
[00:25:21] sharing is going evolve to burden shifting, Amit
[00:25:25] Shah, he is the one who is running the extortion,
[00:25:28] assassination and all these plots sitting a
[00:25:32] government office, being a minister of India, America
[00:25:36] knows it, Canada knows
[00:25:37] it.
[00:25:51] Pakistan has done human work, it's been
[00:25:54] absolutely remarkable what Pakistan, what
[00:25:58] Islamabad has been able to bring about? Well, I think the
[00:26:02] countries. mediating have to keep plugging away and trying to find
[00:26:05] a modus a solution. i think the first thing that has to
[00:26:09] happen is there has to be agreement on the straight of hormos
[00:26:13] because that was the cause of this latest war. most
[00:26:17] important part is going to be dialogue and i think the
[00:26:20] Pakistan back door diplomacy uh Qatar
[00:26:23] also uh is essential. india is not only
[00:26:26] destabilizing the region. india
[00:26:28] has i think it's look at this ambition. it it was involving.
[00:26:32] terrorist acts in Canada, the persecution of minorities in India has
[00:26:36] been very, very long problem,
[00:26:39] very systemic problem, systematic persecution
[00:26:43] the Muslims there, not only the Muslims but also the
[00:26:46] Christians, forces are police and devies and
[00:26:50] scouts rangers, they are doing the very
[00:26:53] best.
[00:27:10] Ofganistan remains a central hub in the global truck
[00:27:13] trade. According to the UNODC 2025 report,
[00:27:17] it produced 433 tons of opium in
[00:27:20] 2024, nearly 20% the global
[00:27:24] supply. Despite a temporary drop after the
[00:27:27] 2022 ban, cultivation rose again by
[00:27:31] 19%. in 2024. Trafficking networks
[00:27:35] stayed active. Average opium prices of
[00:27:38] $750 per kilogram reflect the continued
[00:27:42] demand and functioning smuggling routes. According to the world
[00:27:45] drug report 2025, total global opium
[00:27:49] production in 2024 reach
[00:27:51] 2,140 tons. Myanmar led with
[00:27:55] 995 tons, which is 46%. Followed
[00:27:59] by Afghanistan at 433 tons. which is
[00:28:02] 20%, while Mexico and Colombia produce smaller
[00:28:06] shares. These figures highlight that despite bans and
[00:28:10] crackdowns, the global opium trade remains deeply
[00:28:14] entrenched with regional networks adapting and
[00:28:17] expanding. Moreover, an cartels are shifting from
[00:28:21] plant-based drugs to synthetics like crystal meth, which
[00:28:25] are cheaper to produce and easier to hide and harder to
[00:28:29] detect, showing that the threat is moving from field. to
[00:28:33] laboratories spreading globally, but Pakistan is
[00:28:36] actively countering this threat under the national
[00:28:40] anti-narcotics policy 2019 and backed by the laws like
[00:28:44] the control of narcotics substances act
[00:28:46] 1997, pakistan's anti-narcotics force
[00:28:50] (Anf) conducts extensive operations in
[00:28:53] Balochistan, kp and Singh, using drones,
[00:28:57] satellite imagery and modern agricultural methods,
[00:29:00] Pakistan eradicates poppy. props even in remote
[00:29:04] areas. In 2024-2025 alone Pakistan cleared
[00:29:08] hundreds of hectares of puppy fields, dismantled
[00:29:11] 419 illegal waterboards, destroyed
[00:29:14] 64 solar systems and repatriated 1
[00:29:18] and10 foreign traffickers. National seizures exceeded a
[00:29:22] 361 metric tons of narcotics worth
[00:29:25] billions, cutting off major supply lines with
[00:29:29] technology driven surveillance, corridor and...
[00:29:33] and the interagency coordination, pakistan maintains its
[00:29:37] poppy free status since 2001. the country
[00:29:41] is not just protecting its borders, it's safeguarding the
[00:29:44] region.
[00:30:10] Hello, you're watching Pakistan TV, I am Sadif Ali Khan. Let's take a look
[00:30:14] at the headlines
[00:30:15] first.
[00:30:37] Pakistan, kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Turkey is signed the Makka joint defense
[00:30:41] agreement. The historic pact aims to strengthen collective deter.