PAKISTANTV — broadcast
20260808 083000 UTC
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[00:00:00] states,
[00:00:03] of of we have seen
[00:00:05] of of that, especially also post Mark, there has been very different ways in which the international community sees
[00:00:08] and interacts with Pakistan,
[00:00:10] and of course the role of mediator also enhanced this
[00:00:13] of geopolitical position and because of
[00:00:16] a result of Pakistan's proactive foreign policy, we've seen these engagements taking
[00:00:20] place now with such agreements also being
[00:00:23] developed with very important allies for Pakistan, how do you
[00:00:27] of think that also continues to shape our geopolitic? position and
[00:00:31] our foreign policy stunds
[00:00:33] of and especially our outlook in the ways that different countries want to engage with
[00:00:36] Pakistan. If I take you
[00:00:40] back 14 months,
[00:00:42] May 2025, India has had miscalculated that we are
[00:00:46] less relevant to the world, when they taxed
[00:00:49] of us, they thought that they are too relevant and Pakistan should
[00:00:51] of be made irrelevant, that did not
[00:00:54] a succeed and we earned our relevance not to their liking obviously, and
[00:00:57] became
[00:00:58] a regional stabilizing. last May and
[00:01:02] fast forward to June
[00:01:03] of of 2026, we prove to the world that we are not only not
[00:01:07] sponsoring terrorism, but we are a peace loving country which not only
[00:01:11] upholds its own sovereinity, but obviously we can significantly
[00:01:15] contribute to bringing a super power and obviously Iran to a
[00:01:19] common ground and make them work at least on the peace
[00:01:22] talks, number
[00:01:23] of one, and then I keep saying most
[00:01:25] of the time that globally you can buy a
[00:01:29] military...
[00:01:30] you can buy industry, you can buy anything that you want to build,
[00:01:34] what
[00:01:34] of you cannot buy through money is your influence, your impression and your
[00:01:38] narrative, that has been, that has to be earned,
[00:01:41] of and we earned in last 14 months and the world considers us
[00:01:45] a responsible country, obviously which is keenly obviously interested in the
[00:01:49] global peace, number one, and that is why you see you do not
[00:01:53] a do just by marketing yourself, you do not create the influence, you you have
[00:01:57] to manifest, you have to prove it, and the last one year we have... proven it to the
[00:02:00] world, he is the country, in spite of having challenges
[00:02:04] economically and on other fronts, we still
[00:02:08] of have great intentions of contributing, so I think we've earned the influence, we've
[00:02:12] earned the relevance and the
[00:02:13] of diplomatic platforms are one by one opening for us and world
[00:02:17] finds that now more credible partner in the peace instead of what
[00:02:21] our enemies had projected over the years and rather over the
[00:02:24] decades that this is nation which cannot be trusted and especially after our
[00:02:28] going nuclear a lot of campaign bunting against us saying that we are
[00:02:32] irresponsible country which obviously cannot be trusted by the global
[00:02:35] players, so I think we found new relevance, we hope and continue to
[00:02:39] contribute, and the last thing
[00:02:40] I like to add on ambassador Imran saying that I hope and pray tomorrow Iran
[00:02:44] can be made very into comfortated zone by ensuring that
[00:02:48] this is nothing to do with the Iran and I'm sure Iran would
[00:02:52] of understand that if there is vacuum between these regional countries it will
[00:02:56] create or invite aggression from especially Israel because they like to
[00:03:00] create
[00:03:00] a relevance here in this region, the more united we are, may not be under an
[00:03:04] agreement every country, but I think the more cohesive relationship,
[00:03:08] more trust that we have,
[00:03:10] it will deny and obviously diffuse any opportunity which those
[00:03:14] countries, especially the transregional countries may like to make attempt and
[00:03:18] intrude into creating a bad relationship between the
[00:03:21] muslim countries. Right, thank you very much
[00:03:25] for joining us and being a part
[00:03:27] of the news room today, ambassador, let me get back to... in terms of how
[00:03:31] we're looking at the situation and especially in terms of what
[00:03:34] me this will entil in the future
[00:03:36] for a country like Pakistan of course and it's very important
[00:03:40] ties with countries like Saudi Arabia and
[00:03:44] of Turkey, it's important to see how exactly this will transpire as part
[00:03:47] of the defense cooperation in case of any aggression, but in what in
[00:03:51] what ways do you think it also looks at
[00:03:55] or impacts Pakistan's own
[00:03:58] regional? and in the ways that Pakistan would also like to
[00:04:02] strengthen its geopolitical and military positions and the
[00:04:06] kind of threats that the country is facing, how do you think that such
[00:04:10] alliances, if not part of this agreement, but in terms
[00:04:13] of the importance of engaging and expanding our alliances with different
[00:04:17] in countries, how does that help Pakistan's position in terms of
[00:04:20] leveraging towards the aspects that are
[00:04:24] of a special interest to
[00:04:26] of us? yes, I think, I think...
[00:04:31] the the message that goes out of this
[00:04:35] a trilateral
[00:04:37] a alliance is that that Pakistan is
[00:04:41] at least now trusted on the on
[00:04:44] the middle
[00:04:45] of eastern side and the western side with one country is
[00:04:49] a NATO member so it it
[00:04:53] of a raises Pakistan's position
[00:04:57] defensifies but at the same time. It provides
[00:05:00] deterence now geopolitically
[00:05:04] of Pakistan's main problem nowadays
[00:05:07] arises from the east or the west, I think
[00:05:11] in those two. theaters also, i think the message goes
[00:05:15] out whether there are
[00:05:18] joint kinetic operations as air
[00:05:22] commodor said whether js 17 would go
[00:05:26] from this place to that place, but it gives it
[00:05:30] gives punch, it gives punch to pakistan that it's
[00:05:34] part of a trilateral alliance, we had our
[00:05:37] RCDs, we had other ecos, but this is
[00:05:41] historically the first trial at with Saudi Arabia
[00:05:45] was the first bilateral alliance, but this is now a
[00:05:49] trilateral alliance, so so I think I think it gives
[00:05:53] Pakistan lot of lot of weight in international affairs
[00:05:56] in its own geopolitical conflicts, it gives it
[00:06:00] gives Turkey, Turkey lot of it that Turkey is
[00:06:04] now playing role regionally also being
[00:06:08] a being being a NATO member and it affords.
[00:06:12] Saudi Arabia, the multilayered
[00:06:16] defense protection, it has
[00:06:19] protection from the from the US, but now it it
[00:06:23] is also in alliance with two two different countries, so
[00:06:27] geopolitically it helps Saudi Arabia also,
[00:06:30] so it will raise challenges for Pakistan
[00:06:34] in its mediation, but generally it will be
[00:06:38] very beneficial for Pakistan this agreement.
[00:06:42] Right, ambassador Imran, there is also of course the aspect
[00:06:46] of what ways we're looking at the
[00:06:50] situation develop between the United States and Iran,
[00:06:54] and like you mentioned earlier, Pakistan's role of mediation is very, very
[00:06:58] integral to this and is closely linked to how exactly Pakistan is
[00:07:01] interacting with key regional players, I'd like you to stay with us for the next segment also that takes
[00:07:05] closer look at the situation and how
[00:07:08] exactly this is moving forward, we've also been joined for that.
[00:07:13] ment by Brian Steet was author and senior fellow with Narrative strategies and
[00:07:16] author of Narrative War. Thank you very much Brian for joining us and being a part
[00:07:20] the discussion today. In light of what we are seeing happening now about six
[00:07:24] months from when this war actually started, how do you
[00:07:28] think that the United States has progress throughout this
[00:07:32] conflict and what it is that the Trump administration uh is
[00:07:35] still hoping to achieve or at least is
[00:07:39] communicating that is trying to achieve to its own public. where do
[00:07:43] you think uh is the goal post and what's the strategy to achieve
[00:07:46] it? oh, that's a lot of questions. okay,
[00:07:50] so uh, i don't
[00:07:54] think the goal posts have changed as much as
[00:07:58] the commentary on the goal post uh implies that they've
[00:08:02] changed, but that's said, i think that there is a
[00:08:05] certain realization that the way to get
[00:08:09] the goals or to accomplish the goals. that were
[00:08:12] originally set out is going to have to
[00:08:16] happen through some other means, it is not going to
[00:08:20] be sufficient to inflict harm on
[00:08:23] the state of Iran, and then that will cause Iran to
[00:08:27] concede whether that's nuclear enrichment or it
[00:08:31] conceeds its support
[00:08:35] for regional non-state
[00:08:37] actors, I keep the straights of
[00:08:40] Hormus separate because... a straight is
[00:08:44] issue that was not the reason
[00:08:47] that the Trump administration went into the war, it's
[00:08:50] a it's an objective that became
[00:08:54] an objective because the war, so it's part
[00:08:58] of the Trump administration went in with a
[00:09:01] highly kinetic meaning
[00:09:05] bombing and inflicting
[00:09:08] damage that way, they they went in.
[00:09:13] this with that being their method, but
[00:09:17] now
[00:09:18] and and then Iran responded after several weeks by
[00:09:22] closing or at least primar mostly closing the straight of
[00:09:26] horm, which now means that we are a
[00:09:29] negotiation about something that interestingly enough
[00:09:33] should not even be matter of negotiation, the straight is considered
[00:09:37] by everyone except Iran and maybe now
[00:09:40] Oman to be in. international waterway and
[00:09:44] nobody has the right to negotiate over movement through an international
[00:09:48] waterway, but that's sort of where we are, I'm
[00:09:52] not, I personally I'm not happy that that's where we are,
[00:09:56] I, I think the administration would be happy if we could
[00:10:00] get out of this position with something
[00:10:03] that looks like return
[00:10:06] to the
[00:10:10] conditions before the war began. because even
[00:10:13] with that, if everything else returned to the pre-war
[00:10:17] conditions, uh, the United States has still
[00:10:21] inflicted tremendous damage to the...
[00:10:25] IRGC to the Iraqi military and their
[00:10:29] capacity to conduct operations and
[00:10:31] also inflicted tremendous harm to the
[00:10:35] Iranian economy, I think I said Iraqi military, but the IRGC
[00:10:39] military and to the Iranian
[00:10:41] economy, so those could be considered
[00:10:45] wins all by themselves, now the only obstacle to
[00:10:49] declaring victory, I think from a political
[00:10:52] standpoint would be - something that can be
[00:10:56] communicated as the reopening the straight of
[00:10:58] hormos right ambassador
[00:11:02] Imran, in in your perspective, when we see the
[00:11:06] situation inch closer between Iran and Oman in the
[00:11:09] agreement that essentially will give lot of control to Iran, which is
[00:11:13] what
[00:11:13] it has been asking for, and Brian is right in saying that that's a product the war in itself
[00:11:17] and not perhaps the core core objective as to why it started, but in what ways
[00:11:21] do you think that now lot of this is centered around the state? for moves
[00:11:25] and how exactly will that be navigated further and whether or not
[00:11:29] there is move forward towards its resolution that is acceptable
[00:11:33] to the US, which can then lead to at least addressing the core
[00:11:36] questions? thank you, I think,
[00:11:40] I think if the Oman and Iran
[00:11:44] agreement on the straight is
[00:11:47] actually done
[00:11:49] with done and dusted as a say the
[00:11:53] supreme leader has agreed to it. "I think
[00:11:56] Oman would not be in total contravention the
[00:12:00] US, man were knowing Oman very
[00:12:03] well, I think Oman would discuss this
[00:12:07] with with Great Britain because it has primacy in
[00:12:10] Oman as well as the US, it would not go
[00:12:14] against the against US, so I don't
[00:12:17] know whether the sort of root
[00:12:21] agreement that they are doing on the straight and..."
[00:12:25] voluntary fees whether it has tasset us approval or not, i
[00:12:29] would think man would never sign to anything
[00:12:33] that is anti entire us,
[00:12:36] so why the strate is important? because the
[00:12:40] straight stopped the whole
[00:12:43] discussion even before it could start,
[00:12:47] the 60 day period and all of that, so negatively it
[00:12:51] obstructed everything and my hope is that if it is
[00:12:55] indeed resolved between those two countries,
[00:12:58] probably discussions can start on other major
[00:13:02] issues or or as footprint called the various
[00:13:06] cold posts which are going to be discussed in the so-called
[00:13:09] mou, right?
[00:13:12] Brian, how are you looking at the ways in which the
[00:13:16] the leadership in Iran right now is approaching
[00:13:20] these aspects and of course the possibilities of negotiations, of
[00:13:24] course earlier. especially at the start the rhetoric was
[00:13:28] centered around the leadership and with that essentially different now in
[00:13:32] place. do you think that there has been a change in the way that Iran is interacting
[00:13:36] with the US or do you think that it's pretty much the
[00:13:38] same? well I well obviously there's a
[00:13:42] change from last February and
[00:13:46] till today and uh what is
[00:13:49] interesting and I mean I wish I could be a fly on the
[00:13:52] wall uh which I have not been so I'm not... exactly sure how it's
[00:13:56] being done, but the way it kind of comes across to as an
[00:14:00] observer is a little bit like an American
[00:14:03] police interrogation from an American tv
[00:14:07] show or movie where you have a good cop and a bad
[00:14:11] cop and the way the interrogation
[00:14:14] goes in television and movies is uh you have
[00:14:18] somebody who acts like the uh the
[00:14:22] victim or the... criminals
[00:14:26] friend and then another cop comes in and asks like the tough
[00:14:29] guy like
[00:14:30] the they want to do
[00:14:31] all this harm
[00:14:32] and i don't know and and i've talked
[00:14:36] with other people that kind of implied that the
[00:14:39] negotiators who are working both with the omanis
[00:14:42] and interacting with the americans even though the Iranians will say they're not
[00:14:46] negotiating directly with the americans uh those
[00:14:50] negotiators are essentially still irgc
[00:14:53] individuals that all they did was take off the uniform and put a
[00:14:56] suit, they're not fundamentally uh of
[00:15:00] different ideology or different world view, so I don't
[00:15:04] think Iran has two different tracks, one that's
[00:15:08] inclined to negotiation and one that's not,
[00:15:11] and therefore I'm kind of curious if Iran
[00:15:15] is doing this simply as a
[00:15:19] stage to sort of make the
[00:15:22] Americans look foolish where... they the
[00:15:26] Americans will be able to say, oh, it looks like we have deal, and
[00:15:29] then the IRGC spokesperson or whoever it
[00:15:33] is, will then come out and say, no, there is no deal, and then maybe
[00:15:36] they'll fire a... rocket or something like that to prove that they're right,
[00:15:40] and and therefore there's this confusing
[00:15:43] element. That's how it looks from the
[00:15:47] outside, that there is confusion within Iran. What I'm thinking more and
[00:15:51] more is there's not confusion within Iran, they're just making
[00:15:54] it look that way because it's to their benefit to
[00:15:58] kind of uh so
[00:16:02] confusion on the part the American
[00:16:05] delegation with whom... they
[00:16:07] interact, right? um, another
[00:16:11] important aspect, Brian, is with reference to Israel's
[00:16:15] actions in the middle east and then Israel's relationship with the
[00:16:18] United States, how exactly do you think
[00:16:22] that um, where does it stand at the moment, and whether or not there is a
[00:16:26] change in that relationship, and the importance that it has
[00:16:29] been given previously or historically to Israely
[00:16:33] interests. oh, that's that's a really good
[00:16:36] question. so there's there are changes on
[00:16:40] multiple frauds, some them are now almost three years old, starting
[00:16:44] with October 7th, 2023 or
[00:16:47] 20 yeah, 2023 with
[00:16:50] the uh support
[00:16:54] for Palestinians and to a degree just plain support for
[00:16:57] Hamas that has taken place in
[00:16:59] America, I believe that you have previously talked
[00:17:03] on this show about Abdul Rahman El
[00:17:06] Said. uh the person who is now
[00:17:10] the democrat uh candidate for the US
[00:17:14] senate from the state of Michigan and his
[00:17:17] success uh in that and using
[00:17:20] particularly the US relationship with Israel,
[00:17:23] it is quite clear that the Democrat party in the
[00:17:27] United States is now almost, well it's a
[00:17:31] majority opposed to relationships with Israel
[00:17:35] and as a block US
[00:17:37] people uh voted against support for
[00:17:41] Israel, so it's within America, there's a
[00:17:45] really fascinating dynamic happening where Israel used
[00:17:49] to be 20, 30 years ago, it was a unifying
[00:17:53] voice, you would get people on the far left and people
[00:17:56] on the far right on the American political spectrum, and they would disagree on
[00:17:59] everything else, but they would vote together
[00:18:03] a bill to support Israel, but now that is... not
[00:18:07] true, I think it would be very, very hard to get almost
[00:18:11] any house votes for
[00:18:15] support for Israel bill, and
[00:18:19] in the Senate, maybe two or three, maybe more, but it's
[00:18:23] it's very slight, now between the
[00:18:26] US executive and the Israeli executive, that's another
[00:18:30] interesting dynamic, uh,
[00:18:33] President Trump does not seem to be, and I don't know him personally.
[00:18:37] so I can't say this for certain, but he does not seem to be a person who likes to
[00:18:41] be bossed around, nor a person who likes to
[00:18:45] be uh made to look foolish,
[00:18:48] and uh, BB
[00:18:51] Netanyahu has very strong
[00:18:55] personality, and he states things very
[00:18:57] unequivocally, which then kind
[00:19:01] of comes across as if he's ordering the American
[00:19:04] president, and that has... rankled President
[00:19:08] Trump over the F-35 sale to Turkey
[00:19:12] or while the reintroduction of Turkey into the
[00:19:16] F-35 program and uh and then
[00:19:19] of course uh the promises of the
[00:19:23] Netanyahu government with respect to what would
[00:19:26] happen in Iran or how quickly Iran would go
[00:19:30] uh have not come to fruition and I don't think Trump is happy with
[00:19:34] that so I think there's there's more friction. between the
[00:19:38] Netanyahu government and the Trump administration than there was
[00:19:42] back in February, but I I don't know, I don't
[00:19:46] think it's as bad as some people are portraying it, I don't think
[00:19:49] that there's a break, I don't think it's a fundamental shift, I just think that
[00:19:52] it's it's not as positive as it was six months
[00:19:56] ago uh, and if it is negative, it's a
[00:20:00] negative that could be overcome by positive
[00:20:03] accomplishments. Right, I understand that.
[00:20:07] ambassador Imran, I'd like your perspective of this too, especially given what
[00:20:11] we've seen transpire throughout this conflict in the way it
[00:20:15] started and how it has evolved so far, there is of course aspects of what
[00:20:19] is going on both within Israel and the United United
[00:20:23] States that adds to the influence on the key
[00:20:27] decision makers and the actions that they take, but in what ways do you think that
[00:20:30] this factor and then of course Israel's actions v
[00:20:34] Gaza, the west bank, Lebanon, and then... so the front
[00:20:38] between the Huti rebels in Saudi Arabia, how exactly are all
[00:20:42] these dynamics affecting the decisions being taken by
[00:20:46] both Iran and the United States and what do you think they are? making
[00:20:50] their own interests in light these developing
[00:20:52] situations? very difficult and very
[00:20:56] very expensive sort of
[00:20:58] question. i agree with brian that
[00:21:02] there might be some meritants between the executive branches
[00:21:06] of Israel
[00:21:08] and and the US,
[00:21:12] but they seem to be getting along, mean i don't
[00:21:16] know whether whether they'l be obvious and..."
[00:21:20] policy and the legislature, as he has
[00:21:22] explained, the house and the senate, they
[00:21:25] are, there
[00:21:27] are a different kettle of fish, I am not, and
[00:21:30] I wish I could be a fly on the wall in the
[00:21:33] IRGC, I don't know,
[00:21:36] I and I would agree with Brian again that
[00:21:40] this theory about a great dissonance in the
[00:21:44] Iranian government structure, I think this is
[00:21:46] overplayed, this '
[00:21:51] "there probably may be good cop or bad cop or
[00:21:54] maybe the irritants are much lesser
[00:21:58] than those that are portrayed. there has been
[00:22:01] a major Iranian loss,
[00:22:05] there have been major losses in the last 10 days
[00:22:09] also, so I don't know whether they would
[00:22:12] force the hand the IRGC and they would,
[00:22:16] they would not fire rocket, as Brian says disrupt the..."
[00:22:20] to disrupt the peace process once again or to prove their
[00:22:24] point, I hope they don't, because here in
[00:22:27] Pakistan, we are we are affected not only
[00:22:30] because the economic offshots but because we have we put
[00:22:34] our own whole state in the
[00:22:38] mediation process and that has that has
[00:22:42] been the center of our of our work, if
[00:22:45] I might say so, so I hope they don't,
[00:22:49] but one can't predict the IRGC just
[00:22:53] as one can't predict Trump, one
[00:22:55] can't predict the IRGC as
[00:22:58] well, right? thank you very much ambassador Imran for joining us
[00:23:02] and being a part the news room today. Brian, my last question to you, especially
[00:23:06] given now, how the situation has developed further and we're
[00:23:10] almost of course six months into it, there's the added economic
[00:23:14] pressures also that Mr. Trump is facing and of course the
[00:23:18] entire world is facing, but in what ways? do you think that the
[00:23:21] effect that that we see within the United States
[00:23:25] towards the Trump administration in this presidency and then of course the
[00:23:29] decreasing popularity that we've seen, how much of that
[00:23:32] is being navigated by the administration and what
[00:23:36] is being said that can then appease or
[00:23:40] satisfy the American public the kind of rises and prices that they're
[00:23:44] also witnessing? okay, it's really good
[00:23:48] questions '
[00:23:52] "I'm going to say the obvious, Donald J. Trump is not the
[00:23:55] typical American president uh, and where
[00:23:59] that might be really important is lot of
[00:24:03] presidents might radically adjust or might even have not even
[00:24:07] gotten involved in during an election year, even a mid-term election
[00:24:11] year, into incursion uh that
[00:24:14] he has. I don't know that he is as
[00:24:18] concerned as say a..." normal president
[00:24:21] would have been uh given the same thing or the same
[00:24:25] circumstances that said uh this war is unpopular
[00:24:29] it is an unpopular amongst republicans it is
[00:24:33] it is wildly unpopular among democrats and
[00:24:36] it is unpopular among independents and of course the independence
[00:24:40] are what matter because it's about a 40/40 well it's
[00:24:44] probably like 35 35 30 in America where you
[00:24:48] have about even 35 each
[00:24:52] rep or republican and democrat and about 30% independent and that depends on
[00:24:56] the state uh that you're talking about, and so independent
[00:25:00] voters are are significantly
[00:25:02] important uh, they are moved
[00:25:06] obviously by by economics, gas prices are higher in
[00:25:10] America, but they are way lower in America than almost anywhere else
[00:25:13] in the world, and huge reason for that is because the Trump administration's
[00:25:17] energy policies that have... ensured that America is
[00:25:21] producing more oil now than it is ever produced
[00:25:25] before, so uh, the Trump
[00:25:28] administration could make the argument that this was
[00:25:32] necessary war, I don't think they've communicated that particularly well to this
[00:25:36] point, and then they could also make the argument at the same time that the reason
[00:25:39] why things aren't worse is because
[00:25:43] the policies that they've implemented that are very
[00:25:46] pro-energy, so all of those things, I i would just..." argue that it's
[00:25:50] all not necessarily doom and gloom, but if you
[00:25:54] are democratuh
[00:25:57] campaigning for election, or you're a
[00:26:01] democrat political? consultant, you have lot to be happy
[00:26:05] about in terms the mood and in terms the economic direction, and
[00:26:09] that general polling, so if you look at right track, wrong
[00:26:12] track, it's it's not favor the
[00:26:15] in Trump administration at all, and
[00:26:18] Trump's overall popularity is below 40%, which
[00:26:22] tends to be a bad marker in terms of holding seats,
[00:26:26] so there's a lot
[00:26:27] of intricacies within the American political system that are quite unique this
[00:26:31] year, but still, I would say it doesn't look good,
[00:26:35] but I don't think it's hopeless, and it really will, it
[00:26:39] will be - as a person who enjoys watching the political
[00:26:43] game, it this will be fascinating election
[00:26:47] season to watch, because I don't think it's going to come out
[00:26:50] as lot the surface level
[00:26:53] predictions are are predicting, I think it's going to be closer run
[00:26:57] thing than people imagine, but that's just
[00:27:00] a guess on my part definitely, definitely. be interesting if nothing else, thank
[00:27:04] you so much Brian State for joining us and being a part the show today, the
[00:27:07] going on and the developments of course taking place very integral in terms of what is
[00:27:11] happening in the larger middle east and what the future scenario will be and we'll be here to
[00:27:15] talk more about that as it develops, that's all that we have from the newsroom today,
[00:27:19] we'll now see you on
[00:27:20] monday.
[00:29:08] No, we were not happy with him buying oil from
[00:29:11] Russia. If India doesn't buy oil, it makes it
[00:29:15] much easier, and they're not going to buy,
[00:29:17] they.
[00:30:42] Hello and good afternoon, you are watching Pakistan TV and
[00:30:46] I am Rafi Sohel with the top stories the hour. Let's have
[00:30:48] look.