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20260806 080500 UTC
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[00:00:03] threat in the previous
[00:00:15] at the end of this
[00:00:20] May God bless you.
[00:00:20] is happening abroad energy centers in many The atmosphere of war returns to
[00:00:25] in this dialogue. No, the region with
[00:00:26] 7.5 million Palestinians scattered an American military
[00:00:28] to go towards such escalation against pressure that occurred on Iran. An escalation that included
[00:00:31] the entire region after Tehran's attacks that
[00:00:35] affected a number of Arab countries in an attempt
[00:00:39] betting on changing regimes from to expand the scope
[00:00:41] of, of the war. Today, the entire world looks to the Middle
[00:00:44] East with an eye of anticipation
[00:00:47] the new data at the international, and worry. This region is considered one of
[00:00:55] Clinton's visit here was a kind that depend on Iran for energy, the most important regions affecting the international economy and the movement of and reject this global trade. So, in
[00:00:57] point to such light of these measures,
[00:00:58] to prevent such has it become impossible to reach agreements
[00:01:02] that stop the rolling fireball in the Middle
[00:01:07] self-sufficient militarily in East? All parties in this war
[00:01:09] may be part of are losers. So, where can this military
[00:01:13] madness in the region lead us? And why
[00:01:16] is the language of diplomacy absent at this
[00:01:19] critical stage? What new things does
[00:01:22] Washington
[00:01:24] the cost and push countries to pressure have to impose on the field? And what does
[00:01:27] demands. Also, at the same Tehran have to confront? at the international And will
[00:01:30] the search for
[00:01:32] and we are heading towards the land routes for global there are negative repercussions on trade lose Iran the card of
[00:01:32] runs, runs, and whoever gets the most
[00:01:35] the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab? And can
[00:01:39] international economic crises
[00:01:42] resolutions. and the approaching date of sovereign state on the midterm elections coup affect Palestinian curb the American
[00:01:46] administration's desire for further escalation in the region?
[00:01:50] country. And this is a policy that applies Many questions we ask today about the future
[00:01:53] the repercussions will be dangerous in the
[00:01:53] entry into this we now have two factions in of the Middle East in light
[00:01:55] Lebanon, in Saudi Arabia, in of the heated atmosphere
[00:02:00] has been raised. Yes. But let's put it to endure and the war rolling towards the unknown. In light of escalating regional tensions,
[00:02:03] the region returns
[00:02:08] and circulated to our embassies factions close to Iran in yesterday, there were a number of to a circle of anticipation with renewed American statements regarding Iran. The
[00:02:12] another framework of stances of US President Donald Trump regarding the possibility of targeting the Iranian
[00:02:16] energy sector in case of escalating confrontation
[00:02:19] Professor Mohamed Nader Al-Omari, researcher in the state of conflict ongoing, but it does
[00:02:20] we cannot go to elections, we go to raised fears of
[00:02:21] with further the situation sliding towards a broader confrontation
[00:02:26] to my guest. We continue these conflicts. Such a that could exceed the limits of direct conflict. These statements coincide with
[00:02:30] with you, and there are many Iranian attacks that targeted targets in a number of Arab
[00:02:32] likely possibility in the countries, which brought back
[00:02:39] being partners, and we are the foundation of it goes towards escalation, to make to the forefront fears of and are based on the expansion of the conflict in light of the continued exchange of military and political messages between the parties
[00:02:43] of the crisis. For its part, the Palestinian
[00:02:46] leadership reiterated its rejection and strong condemnation
[00:02:49] of the Iranian attacks that
[00:02:51] members out of 150 targeted several Arab countries,
[00:02:54] and even in affirming full solidarity with them, as it considered these
[00:02:58] attacks a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter
[00:03:03] by the National Council and also by and the principles and rules of international law. It expressed its full support
[00:03:07] for its Arab brethren
[00:03:10] The state is a higher entity than in confronting any escalation or external
[00:03:12] threat.
[00:03:14] Although the chances of a comprehensive escalation are still
[00:03:18] a decree must be issued by present, they remain why we want to go to elections. No, we will go to Council according to also linked to considerations
[00:03:21] of mutual deterrence and international stances seeking
[00:03:25] but in to contain the crisis.
[00:03:28] reality, And between the probabilities of confrontation and the chances of de-escalation, the
[00:03:32] And we held a long series of region remains in a very sensitive stage,
[00:03:36] and proceed with such as any uncalculated step could ignite a broad regional confrontation
[00:03:40] or, conversely, open a new window
[00:03:43] for diplomatic efforts aimed at
[00:03:46] preventing a comprehensive explosion.
[00:03:59] capital, Damascus,
[00:04:02] Professor Muhammad Nader
[00:04:15] critical junctures or when the scene is foggy in
[00:04:19] the region, we go towards analyses.
[00:04:22] And you, with your master's in international relations,
[00:04:27] face targeting oil facilities in have your readings and studies about
[00:04:29] two concerns. Yes, there is concern from the future of the region. Through your observation
[00:04:32] and follow-up of the course
[00:04:34] and we must pressure of events, where are we going the Israeli side regarding the election process in today in light of this
[00:04:36] escalation? I still
[00:04:40] is the continued involvement of the United States of America adhere to my opinion, which I presented here through my participation
[00:04:42] with you on more than one occasion, that the region will enter
[00:04:47] and the repercussions of that a stage of neither war nor peace, and it will remain in this situation, so to speak, until
[00:04:52] to allow developments occur, whether
[00:04:57] the Palestinian people to a scenario that our people in Jerusalem each party these developments take place at the level of internal political systems in
[00:04:58] vision saves the Palestinian the decision-making capitals, or until
[00:05:01] military resolution is achieved. Until this moment, it is not
[00:05:04] possible to talk about an absolute military resolution for three reasons.
[00:05:09] This is the focus of today's these forces present in The first reason: any military resolution requires a transition
[00:05:13] from the stage of aerial military targeting to occupation
[00:05:16] or to ground intervention. And this matter is not
[00:05:20] available at this time due to the high
[00:05:24] cost of such an issue, the absence of indirect alternatives
[00:05:27] from forces belonging
[00:05:30] to levels within the systems,
[00:05:33] whether in Iran or even at the level of
[00:05:37] other geographical maps. Consequently, the high cost
[00:05:40] of ground operations, as well as changing
[00:05:44] regimes directly, is not available yet.
[00:05:48] The second point is also
[00:05:52] within, whether through يعني
[00:05:54] depleting states at this
[00:05:58] time, I think, especially concerning Iran, is also not
[00:06:01] available, and this is what Washington
[00:06:05] and Israel relied on during the previous period and did not succeed
[00:06:09] in it. On the contrary, today some estimate that
[00:06:12] the intervention or the initiation of military action against
[00:06:16] Iran granted the Iranian regime legitimacy
[00:06:19] to maintain and preserve the internal situation
[00:06:22] in a more ambiguous and controlled manner, if I may
[00:06:25] say, in terms of managing the internal system. Consequently,
[00:06:29] this is a factor today that can be talked about, that military
[00:06:32] resolution is not possible. The second factor today is that there is no
[00:06:36] such thing as what was previously called international coalitions
[00:06:40] to change regimes. We see that the classic
[00:06:43] relationship that linked the United States of America
[00:06:47] with the European Union countries is far away today,
[00:06:51] and even within NATO, despite the image that
[00:06:54] brought together the leaders of this alliance and the agreements that took place
[00:06:57] recently at the Turkey summit, I believe that even
[00:07:01] at this moment, there is a kind of rift between
[00:07:04] the United States of America and some NATO
[00:07:07] countries, and we have heard many statements from
[00:07:11] Europeans and NATO members saying that this war is
[00:07:14] an Israeli-American war and not our war. And
[00:07:19] calls and British statements that confirmed that
[00:07:23] we are not concerned with this war, and this
[00:07:26] is the second indicator. The third indicator
[00:07:29] today, meaning the regional and international conditions and the nature
[00:07:32] of the complexity of conflicts and the risks
[00:07:35] that can arise from these conflicts through what
[00:07:38] can be called conflict management, meaning the creation
[00:07:42] of conflicts within the conflict itself, this matter
[00:07:45] will make the cost of any open and direct
[00:07:49] war very high. Therefore, we are in a stage of no
[00:07:52] stability, no open war in an
[00:07:55] absolute sense, and no peace at this time, because any
[00:07:59] agreement, even if agreements are reached, there are no
[00:08:02] ingredients for the continuation of these agreements because, until this
[00:08:06] moment, the nature of influence at the regional level, the nature
[00:08:09] of the division of interests, has not yet crystallized. There is
[00:08:13] a very large contradiction and a very large rift in the vision. I mean,
[00:08:16] in short, I understand from you that there is instability
[00:08:19] at all levels.
[00:08:21] It is as if all parties are waiting
[00:08:25] for something to happen to the other. I mean,
[00:08:29] today everyone is looking for something to change for
[00:08:32] the other. Everyone is looking for something that might
[00:08:36] suddenly occur to the other,
[00:08:40] there are no changes. I mean, if we look at the general situation,
[00:08:44] I mean, today, perhaps I am talking about some analyses,
[00:08:47] perhaps there is a party in Tehran waiting for midterm
[00:08:51] elections in America that might change the American
[00:08:54] position. There is another party waiting for the Israeli elections
[00:09:00] the Israeli position. There are those who look at a conflict within
[00:09:03] Iran that might change the shape
[00:09:06] of the Iranian regime from within, and thus exit
[00:09:09] the war. Everyone is betting on changes, but the reality
[00:09:13] is different. The reality is a state of stalemate for all parties,
[00:09:17] and this means that at any moment there can be
[00:09:20] an expansion of the war. We noticed that the Iranian attacks on Arab
[00:09:23] countries developed. America threatens
[00:09:27] to bomb energy centers or energy points or Iranian
[00:09:31] energy stations, and this could trigger a broader
[00:09:34] war. How can we understand all these
[00:09:37] developments? These developments and these points are extremely important. First, here
[00:09:41] I will go back to the introduction when we said that all parties
[00:09:45] are losers, with the exception of Israel. The Israeli entity is the one that wants this
[00:09:49] war for two reasons. The first reason
[00:09:53] in the region, and the second reason is to fuel the extreme right
[00:09:56] present within Israel to win the upcoming elections.
[00:10:00] The second point I referred to, which is
[00:10:02] waiting, meaning
[00:10:06] for developments in the political
[00:10:10] internal affairs of the other parties, is that today some are betting on time. Iran
[00:10:14] is betting on time to exhaust the United States of America
[00:10:17] economically, especially since
[00:10:21] the Middle East, both human forces and military forces,
[00:10:34] as well as the rising cost of living within the United States of America,
[00:10:37] will change the mood of the American voter during
[00:10:40] the upcoming elections. However, even this bet is
[00:10:43] wrong from Iran's perspective for two reasons. The first reason is that there are
[00:10:47] among Republicans what can
[00:10:50] be called conservatives or
[00:10:53] hardliners who were pushing for war on Iran and overthrowing
[00:10:56] the regime in Iran. There are also among Democrats those who believe
[00:11:00] in this, and the proof of that is the passage of more
[00:11:04] than one project in Congress regarding the war against Iran
[00:11:07] and the endorsement of this position. The second consideration
[00:11:11] or the second point
[00:11:13] is that the division occurring within Iran may be
[00:11:17] an artificial division between those who, meaning
[00:11:20] the hardliners who are represented by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, and
[00:11:24] those who demanded reaching a peace agreement.
[00:11:27] Consequently, the attempt to balance
[00:11:30] on the tightrope of paradoxes by Iran
[00:11:34] the Iranian mindset, especially through
[00:11:38] the escalation we see from the Iranians at times, by
[00:11:42] targeting Arab countries, as well as targeting the international economy
[00:11:45] and energy sources to raise
[00:11:49] the United States of America to agree to the Iranian
[00:11:51] conditions. This is the closest
[00:11:55] scenario from the Iranians. The possibility
[00:11:58] of the situation exploding at the regional level is present, but
[00:12:01] will we face an explosion through direct
[00:12:05] wars between powers? This is possible,
[00:12:08] but we may face another scenario, which is a change in the nature
[00:12:12] of the conflict. In other words, today some believe
[00:12:15] that Saudi Arabia's
[00:12:18] conflict and its inability
[00:12:22] Iranian provocations and Iranian
[00:12:26] and Houthi targeting, and its recent participation with the United
[00:12:29] States of America in targeting some
[00:12:32] Iraq, is an indication that the scene may go towards
[00:12:37] conflicts, whether ethnic or sectarian at the regional
[00:12:40] level. Consequently, this keeps
[00:12:44] not mean that there will be a direct resolution after
[00:12:49] scenario is plausible and the Israelis have talked about it more than once,
[00:12:53] and even the US special envoy to
[00:12:56] Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrak, stated that these
[00:13:00] peoples are warring
[00:13:02] conflicts. Therefore, such indications may be interpreted
[00:13:06] by some as meaning that the United States of America, if it
[00:13:09] senses its inability to resolve the war, wants
[00:13:13] to expand the circle of conflict but indirectly through
[00:13:17] wars, meaning that it does not want to be the main party in these. Exactly, it fuels
[00:13:21] these conflicts in one way or another and keeps the region in this state
[00:13:25] of conflict to exhaust the countries of the region from one side, to guarantee the security
[00:13:28] of Israel from another side, and from a third side,
[00:13:32] so that it does not incur or be involved in a zero-sum war, if I may
[00:13:36] say, so that it does not directly incur direct
[00:13:39] military costs as a result of these wars,
[00:13:42] because today there are nearly 50 to
[00:13:46] 70 thousand American soldiers in the Middle
[00:13:49] East. Therefore, some read the scene as meaning that the direct
[00:13:52] involvement of these in Iran may have a very high cost,
[00:13:56] both human and even financial, especially since
[00:14:00] today the United States of America is alone in terms
[00:14:03] of human forces and has not yet been able to
[00:14:07] find a substitute for it at the human level, whether from
[00:14:12] the Kurdish forces present in northern Iraq, to
[00:14:16] be the means to pressure the Iranian regime.
[00:14:19] Consequently, we are facing a scene where
[00:14:22] the conflict may change from a direct conflict to a proxy
[00:14:25] war, but that does not mean that it is an open war, but if
[00:14:29] the United States of America goes to target
[00:14:32] energy in Iran, I believe that Iran will then feel
[00:14:36] that it is in a decisive war, and consequently it will
[00:14:40] seek to raise the cost for everyone. At the heat, we will talk about
[00:14:43] targeting, meaning energy stations in
[00:14:46] Iran and what can
[00:15:34] Al-Omari, a researcher in international relations. We were
[00:15:37] talking about the problem or risks
[00:15:41] of targeting energy centers in Iran, and the United
[00:15:45] States of America had threatened it at the beginning of the war
[00:15:48] on Iran. Iran also threatened to
[00:15:52] target
[00:15:56] countries in the region.
[00:15:59] And as I said, today, Iranian
[00:16:02] energy stations are considered by Iran as a national security
[00:16:05] or a red line for its national security. On the other
[00:16:09] hand, there are major countries that depend on this.
[00:16:12] I mean, today, China, for example,
[00:16:15] 20%
[00:16:18] meaning of China's energy imports
[00:16:21] come from Iran. There are countries like Pakistan,
[00:16:25] there are countries like Russia, many countries
[00:16:29] even Europe partially.
[00:16:31] I ask about the danger of this step. How
[00:16:35] can or what can
[00:16:39] happen after it? I mean, when
[00:16:41] we talk about targeting energy, we are not talking only about Iran, we
[00:16:45] are talking about energy sources in the Strait of Hormuz
[00:16:48] completely, which is considered one of the two main
[00:16:52] arteries, and also Bab al-Mandab, which Iran has
[00:16:55] threatened on more than one occasion that it may be closed if that happens.
[00:16:59] Consequently, we are talking about between 20 to
[00:17:02] 30% of the world's main energy sources or
[00:17:05] the passage of energy through these regions. In addition to international
[00:17:09] trade, here we are talking about China, this
[00:17:12] is a possibility, but we are also talking about the European
[00:17:15] economy, which is exhausted as a result of the Ukrainian-
[00:17:18] Russian war, and which depends at a certain stage on alternative energy
[00:17:22] sources, whether Qatari liquefied gas or
[00:17:25] also Gulf oil. Therefore, I
[00:17:28] believe that if the United States of America
[00:17:32] takes such an option, we will be at a stage, the penultimate
[00:17:36] escalation stage, because the United States
[00:17:39] of America may resort at a certain
[00:17:42] stage, if even targeting energy routes does not succeed,
[00:17:45] to using tactical nuclear weapons, and this is
[00:17:49] a likely and very likely
[00:17:53] matter, especially since the complexity of the scene
[00:17:56] and the ideology present in the Iranian regime
[00:17:59] and the inflexibility of the Iranian negotiator may push
[00:18:03] the United States of America to the final stage of resolution through the use of such
[00:18:06] weapons. And this is a very
[00:18:10] final stage, if I may say, especially if
[00:18:13] Trump or the American administration feels
[00:18:17] that targeting or paralyzing Iran through energy sources
[00:18:20] has not succeeded significantly or the cost was very high. I mean,
[00:18:24] imagine that if energy sources in
[00:18:27] Iran were targeted, and Iran responded by targeting energy sources in the Gulf states
[00:18:31] the occupied
[00:18:34] territories in occupied Palestine, yesterday there was also an attack on oil
[00:18:37] and vital and chemical facilities in Haifa that will not be
[00:18:41] out of the picture. Does this mean the return of
[00:18:44] the Lebanese southern front and Hezbollah's entry also alongside
[00:18:48] Iran? This is likely. Does this mean that there will be escalating
[00:18:51] steps from more than one front, and thus we will return to what was
[00:18:55] called the 40-day war? This is also very likely.
[00:18:58] However, today, targeting Iranian energy may have many repercussions.
[00:19:02] The repercussions, first and foremost, are the return of
[00:19:06] Iran's allies to enter the confrontation because today
[00:19:09] their interests will be harmed. We will be facing a scenario of a decisive
[00:19:13] war, if I may say. The second point is the attempt to raise the cost
[00:19:16] to its highest levels in an attempt to pressure regional countries to exert
[00:19:20] pressure on the United States of America not to go towards further
[00:19:24] escalation. The third stage is sending a message to the American
[00:19:29] of targeting, and therefore it still has options. The fourth
[00:19:32] point is also to push Iran's allies to intervene directly,
[00:19:36] and we are talking about Russia and China, who have no
[00:19:40] interest in the fall of the Iranian regime,
[00:19:43] as that would cause a geostrategic tremor at the regional
[00:19:46] and international level.
[00:19:49] And the fifth and most prominent point is the direct repercussions on
[00:19:53] energy, meaning that if energy sources in Iran
[00:19:57] are targeted, from production and storage and so on,
[00:20:01] there will be an Iranian response. Will we
[00:20:04] the Gulf, vital areas? Will we face
[00:20:08] targeting transit routes,
[00:20:11] the space internet, or what is called underwater cables? Consequently, we will
[00:20:14] also face events that will cause
[00:20:18] a tremor in the economy, especially digital
[00:20:22] communications and so on,
[00:20:24] on investment activities as well
[00:20:28] as productivity. Will we face
[00:20:34] develops towards more fragmented conflicts, if I may say,
[00:20:38] expanding the circle of wars to include the entire
[00:20:41] region? This is very likely. Therefore, I
[00:20:44] believe that Trump's retreat, first and foremost,
[00:20:48] from implementing this
[00:20:53] stage was the result of two factors. The first factor
[00:20:56] is the regional pressure exerted by some regional
[00:21:00] countries not to go there, because they fully realize that
[00:21:03] today there is a depletion of anti-
[00:21:07] defense sources and defensive means.
[00:21:11] And the second factor is the international
[00:21:15] the American administration not
[00:21:18] a direction due to the repercussions on the international economy.
[00:21:22] But today, I believe, in my personal reading, that the presence
[00:21:25] of an administration as it is today in the United
[00:21:29] States of America, and also the Iranian position and the ideology that
[00:21:32] the Iranian regime relies on, and the existence of
[00:21:35] Israel's extreme right-wing mindset and the attempt
[00:21:39] to maintain a state of tension at the regional level and obstruct any
[00:21:42] agreements, all these three factors
[00:21:45] may lead at some
[00:21:47] a development. However, its repercussions
[00:21:51] and consequences will be very large and cannot
[00:21:54] be limited in scope. I believe
[00:21:58] that it will be the beginning of an expanded confrontation, but in multiple forms.
[00:22:02] I mean, today, if we observe the
[00:22:04] diplomatic
[00:22:06] movement in light of the ongoing
[00:22:09] war, we notice that the American
[00:22:13] escalation language was less severe before Netanyahu's
[00:22:16] the visit, the American tone escalated. And it is
[00:22:20] clear to all observers that Israel has an interest
[00:22:23] in the continuation of this war, and this
[00:22:26] interest coincided with the Trump administration. But
[00:22:30] on the other hand, there is American internal opposition
[00:22:33] to this war. There is a European boycott of this
[00:22:37] war. There is Asian resentment towards this
[00:22:41] war. There is a reluctance from the countries of the region to enter
[00:22:44] this war. So, we are facing international
[00:22:48] wills of the extreme right within
[00:22:52] Israel and the United States of America, in light
[00:22:55] of the coming changes, the midterm elections, the Israeli
[00:22:58] elections, the general change
[00:23:01] in the international mood at the popular and official levels, or at least
[00:23:05] the parliamentary level in many European countries. Can
[00:23:08] the United States continue
[00:23:11] escalation? I mean, the reality will impose itself on a general
[00:23:15] de-escalation in the region. This depends on three major
[00:23:19] developments. The first development is the extent of the United
[00:23:22] States of America's ability, if
[00:23:26] this escalation qualitative, decisive,
[00:23:29] and explicit. I mean, the United States of America
[00:23:33] may go towards very large operations and try to present
[00:23:36] these operations as the end of this war and push towards a diplomatic
[00:23:40] approach. And this is Trump's style today under the name of
[00:23:44] "peace through strength." And we saw this even in Palestine and we saw
[00:23:47] it also in Venezuela. But I don't think such a
[00:23:51] thing will succeed with Iran for reasons related to the nature
[00:23:54] of the regime and also what
[00:23:57] Iran possesses in terms of offensive
[00:24:00] and defensive tools. Consequently, if the American
[00:24:03] administration reads that, as happened at the beginning of the war, that
[00:24:07] there are reports that may have been presented again by Israeli
[00:24:10] intelligence, and this, even Trump responded to it by saying that we do not need
[00:24:14] intelligence reports, we may be facing a development today, that the
[00:24:18] state institutions
[00:24:21] may take Israeli intelligence reports seriously
[00:24:26] a development, especially since there are some leaks
[00:24:30] from Israel that the Iranian regime
[00:24:33] has become very weak, and consequently any broad and comprehensive operation
[00:24:39] regime. Consequently, here, here we will be
[00:24:42] facing a development like a double-edged
[00:24:44] sword. If that happens,
[00:24:48] this will be in favor of Netanyahu and Trump before
[00:24:51] the two upcoming elections, the American midterm elections
[00:24:54] and the Israeli legislative elections in early
[00:24:57] next November. But the negative side of the sword
[00:25:01] will be theirs if Iran manages to
[00:25:04] absorb this blow and raise the cost at
[00:25:07] the regional level. Consequently, here we will also be facing
[00:25:11] repercussions on the election box in a negative way for both
[00:25:14] Netanyahu and Trump. Therefore, there is a division
[00:25:17] within the United States of America in the position. Today,
[00:25:21] there is a change in the American mood due to the economic situation
[00:25:25] and also the economic repercussions. This is a factor,
[00:25:28] but there are also those in the United States who believe that this battle does
[00:25:32] not concern us at all, and he said
[00:25:35] that it is Israel's war and talked about that directly.
[00:25:38] But nevertheless, we are talking about decision-making centers, and these
[00:25:42] decision-making centers are influenced by pressure
[00:25:46] groups. Here, as we are talking about
[00:25:49] forces and also currents within the United States of America
[00:25:53] that are not interested in this war and are also harmed, there are also pressure
[00:25:57] groups and interests that have an interest in the continuation of this war. I mean,
[00:26:00] when we talk about the renewal of signing
[00:26:04] defense agreements at the regional level worth
[00:26:08] approximately 4 trillion dollars over three years, we
[00:26:11] are talking about the interest groups that
[00:26:14] produce
[00:26:16] weapons in the United States of America, and these are looking for
[00:26:20] the continuation of wars and their fueling to sell these
[00:26:23] weapons. Also, oil companies, I mean, today we are talking that the United
[00:26:27] States of America has moved in terms of gas and oil production from
[00:26:31] the fourth and sixth place globally to the first place in that. We
[00:26:34] are also talking about controlling energy
[00:26:38] markets through the production of this
[00:26:40] oil and gas and transforming it into
[00:26:44] a political tool by the United States of America for countries, whether in raising
[00:26:48] the cost or even in terms of making decisions.
[00:26:52] Therefore, today, the wills of countries are present
[00:26:56] escalation, but do they have the ability to influence
[00:27:01] a decision? I believe that until this moment, no,
[00:27:04] for two reasons. Firstly, the United States of America is
[00:27:09] capabilities. Consequently, this matter
[00:27:12] can make the American decision independent. And we heard on more than
[00:27:16] one occasion from Trump that NATO was wrong when it did not participate, and also we
[00:27:20] participated and we did and we were the ones who
[00:27:22] decided. The second factor is related to economic control
[00:27:28] system level. Just as
[00:27:31] the domestic front, there are also positive repercussions through
[00:27:35] choking international markets and pushing countries.
[00:27:38] to deal with the United States of America, whether
[00:27:41] to secure the passage of energy or even to buy energy from the United
[00:27:45] States of America, and this is interpreted by some as
[00:27:49] meaning it can be used as an American pressure tool
[00:27:51] during the next phase, but
[00:28:11] for our people in Palestine, in the West Bank
[00:28:14] stability, peace and the establishment of the Palestinian
[00:30:32] of the national dream and the milestones
[00:30:34] that established Palestine's presence in the hearts
[00:30:38] of its people and the world. The Palestinian National Council
[00:30:42] remains a part of the story of a people who have never
[00:30:45] abandoned their identity and rights.
[00:30:49] The Palestinian National Council,
[00:30:52] historically and currently, has taken historical
[00:30:56] decisions that constituted pivotal stations
[00:30:59] in the journey of the Palestinian cause.
[00:31:03] What are the most important stations that the National Council
[00:31:06] considers turning points in its history?
[00:31:12] meeting with the President of the National Council,
[00:31:15] Mr. Rawhi Fattouh.
[00:31:41] of the previous meeting, we will talk about
[00:31:46] these sessions of the Palestinian National Council,
[00:31:49] which, as we said,
[00:31:51] constitute something new
[00:31:55] in the history of the Palestinian cause,
[00:31:59] given
[00:32:02] regional, and national
[00:32:05] levels. We are now after the advent of the Palestinian
[00:32:09] National Authority
[00:32:12] to the homeland. There
[00:32:15] are many changes, many achievements,
[00:32:18] and many challenges. Also,
[00:32:21] the Palestinian National Council
[00:32:24] had the priority in making all these decisions.
[00:32:27] How was this session in 1996 in
[00:32:31] Gaza? Look, the National Council
[00:32:34] is the parliament of the entire
[00:32:36] Palestinian people.
[00:32:39] It represents the Palestinian people everywhere in the homeland and abroad, and as I explained
[00:32:43] to you earlier, it represents the majority.
[00:32:45] After returning to the homeland, after returning to the homeland,
[00:32:49] we held elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council and elected
[00:32:52] 88 members at that time, who formed the Palestinian
[00:32:55] Legislative Council of the Palestinian National Authority.
[00:32:58] We considered these 88 members to be the complementary members
[00:33:02] of the homeland's share in the Palestinian National Council.
[00:33:05] Therefore, here, a national council was truly established
[00:33:09] for the first time, complete with all its components, meaning
[00:33:13] Palestinian factions,
[00:33:15] Palestinian unions, independent personalities, and the homeland from within
[00:33:19] through the Legislative Council. And indeed, at that
[00:33:22] time, may God have mercy on Sheikh Abdul Hamid Al-Sayeh,
[00:33:26] he passed away, and we elected brother
[00:33:29] Salim Al-Za'noun, may God have mercy on him, as President of the National
[00:33:32] Council in Gaza, where we held the first meeting.
[00:33:36] It was the first time, after
[00:33:39] the June defeat and after
[00:33:42] the Israeli occupation and agreements, that
[00:33:45] the Palestinian National Council convened on Palestinian land in
[00:33:49] Gaza, in the Gaza Strip. At that time, we elected the Executive
[00:33:52] Committee, and the Executive Committee forms the government of
[00:33:56] the entire Palestinian people in the homeland and the diaspora. It is the
[00:33:59] supreme leadership of the Palestinian people, and the head of the Executive
[00:34:02] Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization is also the supreme President
[00:34:06] of the Palestinian people. However, later, when we declared the Declaration of Independence,
[00:34:09] we had a President of the State elected by the National
[00:34:12] Council or the Central Council. Now,
[00:34:15] Brother Abu Mazen is the President of the State and is elected
[00:34:18] the Central Council. His election is confirmed.
[00:34:21] Why?
[00:34:25] the organization, but when the state materializes on the ground, the role
[00:34:29] of the state becomes more important than the role of the PLO. However, our system is still the system
[00:34:33] of the PLO, yes. As long as the political system is the system of the
[00:34:37] PLO, then the National Council sets
[00:34:40] policies for the Executive Committee to implement them on
[00:34:43] the ground for the entire Palestinian people. So, the session was very
[00:34:47] important and created an attractive environment, because the Oslo
[00:34:50] Agreement,
[00:34:52] by the way, created an attractive environment for the land and for the return
[00:34:55] of people. And if we count the people from 1994
[00:34:58] until today, despite all the Israeli
[00:35:02] منع (prevention) after the second Intifada,
[00:35:05] and especially after Hamas's division from
[00:35:09] all Palestinians, more than 1.8 million Palestinians have returned.
[00:35:12] اكثر من مليون و 80000 فلسطيني
[00:35:15] So what was politically created was the creation
[00:35:19] of an attractive environment and the return of people. Today,
[00:35:22] unfortunately, there is a repulsive environment in the Gaza
[00:35:25] Strip. True, and I,
[00:35:28] to diagnose matters as they are, after the Hamas coup in
[00:35:32] 2007, more than 40,000 young Palestinians
[00:35:35] migrated from the Gaza Strip.
[00:35:39] So Hamas created a repulsive environment from the Gaza Strip,
[00:35:42] which the National Authority and the movement
[00:35:56] created. We are still paying the price, we are still paying the price, and what is happening in Gaza now, we are paying its price as a result of this division.
[00:35:59] Therefore, my dear sister, the Palestinian
[00:36:02] National Council's stations were prominent stations and had
[00:36:06] and created transformations and created
[00:36:09] new policies that helped
[00:36:12] continue their struggle to obtain their right to self-determination
[00:36:16] and establish an independent state. From here, the 1996
[00:36:18] session was a very important session,
[00:36:22] especially since it was held in the homeland, and parliamentary life continued
[00:36:26] within the framework of the National Council in a continuous and organized manner until this moment.
[00:36:29] Yes, there was a visit by President
[00:36:33] Clinton at an important stage that also gave
[00:36:36] a great political momentum,
[00:36:39] and the National Council also had this
[00:36:42] 1998 session. No, it was an ordinary session.
[00:36:46] In 1998, the National
[00:36:49] Council was fully assembled in the Gaza Strip
[00:36:53] to welcome President Clinton. The issue of the National
[00:36:56] Charter was on the agenda at that time, and indeed, we overcame
[00:37:00] this issue, and
[00:37:03] it was also a kind of confirmation of the American-Palestinian relationship that
[00:37:06] was created after the Oslo Agreement. Because if I remind you, on
[00:37:09] September 13, 1993,
[00:37:13] the Oslo Agreement was signed in the White House on
[00:37:17] an American paper, on an American paper. Therefore,
[00:37:22] of recognition of the Palestinian National Authority, which was
[00:37:26] on its way to statehood. It was supposed that in May
[00:37:29] 1999, the Palestinian state would be established,
[00:37:33] but as you know, after Rabin's
[00:37:35] assassination, Israel overturned
[00:37:39] all the Oslo agreements. Yes, these
[00:37:42] compulsory passages that
[00:37:46] the Palestinian people were forced to go through
[00:37:50] continued with invasions
[00:37:53] and until the coup
[00:37:55] that occurred. You spoke
[00:37:59] eloquently about what happened,
[00:38:01] but how did this
[00:38:07] political life?
[00:38:10] Undoubtedly, the coup, as they say, halted
[00:38:13] all our political development, given that
[00:38:19] the homeland: Gaza is controlled by Hamas,
[00:38:22] and therefore, whoever wants to negotiate with us, the question of who you represent
[00:38:28] this way: despite all the practices that have occurred and that
[00:38:32] Hamas continues to commit in the Gaza Strip,
[00:38:35] which led to what it led to in terms
[00:38:38] of repercussions, especially after October 7, the repercussions for which we are paying the price today,
[00:38:41] the international community still adheres to the Palestine Liberation Organization
[00:38:45] and the Palestinian National Authority as the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian
[00:38:48] people. But let's discuss, I mean, three days ago
[00:38:51] Hamas issued a statement wondering how
[00:38:55] the President issues decrees, amends laws, and calls for elections
[00:38:58] without consulting them. Well, Hamas, when you do what you do, who do you consult?
[00:39:02] Now Hamas negotiates without us
[00:39:07] the Palestinian people. We are the foundation of the Palestinian leadership. We are the foundation of the Palestinian
[00:39:10] components. Far from us, you discuss and negotiate,
[00:39:14] and you take the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip hostage for your
[00:39:17] personal interests, and you blame us? Blame yourselves first. If anyone has the right to
[00:39:21] criticize, it is us who criticize Hamas for what it has brought upon our
[00:39:25] Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip now, our people are suffering from famine,
[00:39:29] from disease, from everything. There is no drinking water,
[00:39:32] no medicine, nothing. And Hamas is still
[00:39:36] discussing its own fate, and not
[00:39:39] the fate of the Palestinian people. And they ask us
[00:39:43] elections. We will go to elections, and whoever wants to walk with us is welcome.
[00:39:47] Whoever doesn't want to walk with us, may God be with them. We are going to legislative
[00:39:50] elections and National Council elections, and we are going to general
[00:39:54] elections, despite all the pressures on us. We have
[00:39:57] a financial siege, a political siege, an economic siege, and a siege from all sides.
[00:40:01] And yet, we continue. These barriers that you see
[00:40:05] and the expanding settlements and the daily suffering of our farmers
[00:40:08] and our people everywhere in the West Bank and Jerusalem, why? Because we
[00:40:12] are steadfast on the land and we want to achieve the Palestinian state. Hamas only discusses
[00:40:16] Hamas. It is now discussing
[00:40:19] despite Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, and all the mediators,
[00:40:23] and it has taken the Palestinian people to another angle,
[00:40:26] which is that all these agreements were brought to us by Hamas.
[00:40:30] And yet, Hamas
[00:40:32] is stubborn in its position, and the fate of our people is dying, unfortunately. Our
[00:40:36] people in Gaza are dying and starving in Gaza. And until now,
[00:40:40] unfortunately, unfortunately, we still have a group
[00:40:43] from the Red Cross that is still discussing this issue. No,
[00:40:47] Hamas's issue is an issue that we must confront. Either Hamas
[00:40:50] truly returns to the Palestinian national consensus within the framework of a Palestinian
[00:40:54] national program that dictates the Palestinian situation, and the Palestinian people are not
[00:40:57] the ones who dictate it. So, in this case, we do not reach
[00:41:01] a national dialogue, but rather a national dialogue with its vision,
[00:41:05] not a national dialogue with the vision of all Palestinians, that we are,
[00:41:08] okay, proposing peaceful popular resistance because that's all we can do. That's all
[00:41:12] we can do now. So, welcome, if you want a political program, come with us.
[00:41:16] Come with us. We are not asking you to be part of us. No, we want you to be part of us,
[00:41:20] but we agree on a comprehensive Palestinian vision. This Palestinian
[00:41:25] situation from loss and destruction. If Hamas bets on being included
[00:41:29] in the Iranian-
[00:41:33] American dialogue, it is mistaken. Hezbollah was included. Hezbollah
[00:41:37] became part of the equation. Lebanon became part of the equation.
[00:41:48] to all Palestinians and involve all Palestinians, not to negotiate,
[00:41:51] not to take us to its program. Unfortunately,
[00:41:55] unfortunately, I blame, I clearly blame
[00:41:59] our brothers in the Palestinian factions, who are part of
[00:42:02] the PLO, for going with Hamas
[00:42:05] they must have a clear stance. Protecting your people is more important
[00:42:09] than protecting individuals. Therefore,
[00:42:17] no, this talk should not be tolerated. We must
[00:42:21] confront it with every meaning of the word.
[00:42:25] Even the mediators who sympathize with them
[00:42:28] have started blaming them, haven't they? Yes, this
[00:42:32] is not how the conflict
[00:42:34] goes. The Palestinian situation. If they want to
[00:42:37] be partners in the general Palestinian situation in a Palestinian
[00:42:41] national program drawn up by the PLO, let them come. We
[00:42:45] ask them to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative. The whole world
[00:42:48] recognizes it as the sole legitimate representative. Why don't you, Hamas, recognize
[00:42:52] it as the sole legitimate representative? We say adherence to international
[00:42:55] legitimacy resolutions. International legitimacy resolutions are in our favor.
[00:42:58] Resolution 2334. Please discuss it, letter by
[00:43:02] letter and word by word. See what
[00:43:05] fulfills all your
[00:43:07] time, we say that there are commitments for the state of
[00:43:10] Palestine. Commitments for the PLO. We are not
[00:43:14] asking you to recognize Israel. We are not telling you to recognize Israel, but
[00:43:17] at least recognize international
[00:43:25] should not be, we should not surrender to
[00:43:29] these destructive policies, unfortunately,
[00:43:32] destructive and futile. No, we have a clear vision that unites all
[00:43:36] Palestinians. Unfortunately, those who want to have a vision and want to be
[00:43:40] with Hamas and be subservient to Hamas, may God be with them. But this way,
[00:44:10] facts that our audience
[00:44:13] and everyone who
[00:44:16] is keen on Palestinian nationalism
[00:44:20] and Palestinian representation should know.
[00:44:23] We are now talking about this National
[00:44:27] Council, with all that it represents
[00:44:29] for Palestinians, for all Palestinians.
[00:44:33] And we are on the verge of
[00:44:36] elections, and a decree has been
[00:44:40] issued for these elections. What
[00:44:43] is happening now? Your role as the Palestinian National Council
[00:44:46] means that there was an initiative by His Excellency President
[00:44:50] Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen that we hold elections for the Palestinian National
[00:44:55] the law that all factions of the PLO, including
[00:44:59] Hamas, passed in 2013. Yes,
[00:45:02] and a committee was formed to prepare
[00:45:06] for the elections of the Palestinian National Council, headed by me as the President of the National Council.
[00:45:12] meetings and we carried out, I mean,
[00:45:14] a review and revision of the law that the factions passed in
[00:45:18] 2013 and made some amendments to it.
[00:45:21] This was also accompanied by the formation of a committee to draft the constitution, the constitution
[00:45:25] of the State of Palestine, which the committee also completed
[00:45:31] the platform, and also
[00:45:34] the public, from the Palestinian people. Now we have completed all
[00:45:38] the work. The agreement between all factions in
[00:45:42] 2013 was that the number of members of the National Council
[00:45:45] would be 350. We agreed that there would be 150 members
[00:45:49] for the diaspora states and 200 members
[00:45:51] for the interior. The 200 members constitute the share
[00:45:55] of the interior, and at the same time, they are the same 200 members who are members
[00:45:59] of the Legislative Council of the Palestinian National
[00:46:01] Authority.
[00:46:04] Until now, the constitution has not been put to a referendum,
[00:46:07] but we are still governed by the Basic
[00:46:10] Law that was passed by the First Legislative Council
[00:46:13] and approved by President Abu Ammar in 2002.
[00:46:16] This is what governs us now, the Basic
[00:46:19] Law. So, in light of that, the President also
[00:46:23] issued, I mean, a decision by law with amendments to
[00:46:26] Election Law No. 1 of 2007 with several articles
[00:46:30] so that there would be integration
[00:46:34] between the National Council Election
[00:46:36] Law and the general election law for the National Authority.
[00:46:52] The threshold in the Legislative Law is 2%,
[00:46:56] and the threshold in the National Council is 1%. We unified
[00:46:59] it to 1%. Yes, the women's quota was 20% in the Legislative
[00:47:02] Law and 30% in the National Council.
[00:47:05] We unified it to 30%. So, there
[00:47:09] is a unification in concepts. But what
[00:47:13] is a scattered Palestinian community. We have
[00:47:18] around the world. Therefore, there are large Palestinian communities. For example,
[00:47:22] now we have in the Arab
[00:47:25] countries, in Egypt, for example, we have half a million Palestinians, and they get
[00:47:28] 15 members out of the 150. Yes. So how do we
[00:47:31] get them? We have three ways. Either they come
[00:47:35] through direct election if the state allows us. In
[00:47:39] this case, we open voter registration in embassies,
[00:47:42] and they come, and we give them two weeks for Palestinians
[00:47:46] to register as voters and we hold
[00:47:48] elections if the state allows us. But if the state does not
[00:47:52] allow it, then in this case, we go to what we call
[00:47:55] the electoral college. This college also selects from
[00:47:59] within the college Palestinian factions, unions,
[00:48:02] national figures, associations, businessmen,
[00:48:05] dignitaries. We form this electoral
[00:48:09] gathering or electoral college, and
[00:48:12] the electoral college can reach 500 people in a country like,
[00:48:15] for example, Egypt. These agree on the 15
[00:48:19] by election. Yes, yes. I mean, whoever
[00:48:24] votes becomes one of the 15. If we can't hold
[00:48:27] elections and can't form an electoral college,
[00:48:30] we agree after consulting the popular sentiment, meaning
[00:48:34] we consult the Palestinian community in that
[00:48:37] country and agree on the selection of community representatives in that
[00:48:42] to everyone, whether in the United States of America, in Europe, in Syria, in
[00:48:48] the UAE, in Latin America. I mean, all these policies,
[00:48:51] we have formed groups or delegations
[00:48:54] for us now. We have formed them
[00:48:57] and received the approval of the President
[00:49:00] abroad to prepare everything.
[00:49:03] This is through your communication with the state
[00:49:07] for holding elections and your communication with the community in case
[00:49:12] the electoral college, and you should
[00:49:15] have all the required logistical matters
[00:49:19] ready. And after completing all these procedures, and they have, of course,
[00:49:22] two weeks. After two weeks, we start requesting from those who are
[00:49:26] ready, we send them the delegation. Those who are not ready, we postpone
[00:49:29] until they are fully ready to send
[00:49:33] the delegation. All this opportunity is by the end of next
[00:49:36] August, which is August.
[00:49:39] We must have 130
[00:49:44] abroad. We postponed the United States of America due to reasons within
[00:49:47] the American arena. Therefore, we will have completed the share
[00:49:50] of abroad. The share of the interior remains. The share of the interior,
[00:49:54] the President announced in a previous decree the elections in November
[00:49:57] next. We also requested from the Central Elections Commission,
[00:50:01] His Excellency the President requested from the meeting committee to prepare
[00:50:03] all the necessary things for the electoral process,
[00:50:07] and 90 days before the elections,
[00:50:10] His Excellency the President specifying the day, and at the same
[00:50:14] time, he calls upon the Palestinian people
[00:50:17] for elections of the members of the Palestinian
[00:50:20] Legislative Council, who are by definition members of the
[00:50:24] Palestinian National Council from the share of the homeland. This is the mechanism that
[00:50:27] we are working on now. We, I mean, hope that by the end
[00:50:31] of this year, we will have a Legislative Council
[00:50:34] for the State of Palestine or for the Palestinian Authority,
[00:50:38] and at the same time, we will have a National Council for all Palestinians all
[00:50:41] over the world. We hope so, and we are indeed working on this.
[00:50:45] I am tasked, actually, with this
[00:50:47] direction by President and Hussein al-Sheikh
[00:50:50] is tasked with following up on the matter with my brothers in the Executive Committee
[00:50:54] of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the members of the Follow-up
[00:50:58] the President. They are tasked with following up on these procedures,
[00:51:02] and I personally, I mean, daily, I follow up on this matter
[00:51:05] within the task entrusted to me, and I hope that
[00:51:08] we will finish forming the external part before
[00:51:11] the end of August, and I also hope that we will go
[00:51:15] in November next to the elections of the Legislative
[00:51:18] Council. But there are
[00:51:23] Jerusalem, and we must
[00:51:26] the international community, because the international community has indeed, and they spoke to me,
[00:51:30] I mean, as President of the National Council, they spoke to me from more than one
[00:51:34] international parliamentary gathering, and they welcome the idea and the call
[00:51:37] for parliamentary elections in Palestine. There must
[00:51:41] be pressure from them on Israel
[00:51:46] to exercise their right to vote in the city of Jerusalem.
[00:51:50] And also, the situation in the Gaza Strip. I mean, the security situation in the Gaza Strip
[00:51:53] is still complex, and at the same time, we fear that there might be
[00:51:57] obstruction either from local forces or from the Israeli
[00:51:59] side to obstruct the elections. We are moving towards exercising
[00:52:03] all pressure because the entire community
[00:52:06] is asking us to revitalize Palestinian parliamentary life
[00:52:23] people have historically yearned
[00:52:26] to live a democratic life within a free and fair electoral
[00:52:29] process and within parliamentary practices
[00:52:33] as well. Through my first experience, when I was President
[00:52:37] of the Legislative Council, I realized the value and importance
[00:52:41] of our Palestinian people's interest in Palestinian legislative life,
[00:52:44] and how there was indeed a wide discussion on enacting
[00:52:48] the laws and legislations we were working on, and a great welcome for them. This parliamentary
[00:52:52] life must be restored now with
[00:52:55] full force. And I indeed call on
[00:52:58] our Palestinian people to care and to integrate into the upcoming
[00:53:01] elections directly and...
[00:53:05] If we indeed succeeded in restoring true
[00:53:08] parliamentary life within the framework of the Legislative
[00:53:11] and National Council to the entire international community, it will salute
[00:53:15] us and respect us, because this is the democratic life we want, and we,
[00:53:18] in our policies, in fact, and in our policies,
[00:53:22] historically, we believe in democratic life and its practice
[00:53:25] correctly. I call on our people to pay attention to the issue
[00:53:28] of the National Council abroad and at home, and I also ask our people
[00:53:32] to pay attention to the issue of the National Council, I mean the Legislative Council,
[00:53:37] state, and this state will come, will come, will come,
[00:53:40] an independent, free, fully
[00:53:44] its land with East Jerusalem as its capital, whether anyone likes it or not,