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20260915 203000 UTC
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[00:00:00] regular access to western media, but
[00:00:03] increasingly his supporters have presented these assets as
[00:00:07] evidence of something much bigger, the ability to lead
[00:00:11] Iran
[00:00:12] of a after the Islamic Republic.
[00:00:18] That claim requires
[00:00:19] a different standard, because being famous is not the same as being
[00:00:23] powerful. A large social media following is not a political
[00:00:27] organization, viral hashtag " If Kahlavi is to be
[00:00:31] considered serious candidate to lead a political transition,
[00:00:35] the important questions are no longer about how many people follow him
[00:00:38] online? The questions are much harder.
[00:00:42] of Where is the organization? Where are the structures capable
[00:00:46] of operating inside Iran? Who coordinates
[00:00:50] supporters? Who makes
[00:00:53] of decisions? Who negotiates with rival political
[00:00:56] factions? Who can mobilize people beyond?
[00:01:00] social
[00:01:01] a media,
[00:01:01] celebrity and of when a genuine political crisis arrives, who can
[00:01:05] actually act? These are not minor
[00:01:08] details. They are the difference between having audience
[00:01:12] and having political
[00:01:16] of power. Mr. Rusbek Iskandari, an Iranian political activist based
[00:01:20] in Canada. What are some
[00:01:22] of the qualities that one should possess in order to lead a country,
[00:01:26] and which
[00:01:26] of these qualities do you think that Rezal Pahlavi lacks? there
[00:01:30] is famous English saying uh with great power comes great
[00:01:34] responsibility, anybody who wants to
[00:01:38] volunteer to be a political
[00:01:40] leader uh or ending up
[00:01:44] being the president or prime minister needs to have
[00:01:48] of some sort
[00:01:50] of of social
[00:01:50] of skills, he or she needs to be
[00:01:53] able uh to lead people uh when we're talking
[00:01:57] about the word leader - doesn't come with
[00:02:01] titles, it doesn't come with the name uh, it
[00:02:05] actually means the real uh power, the real
[00:02:08] ability, which makes
[00:02:12] this person kind of
[00:02:15] accountable
[00:02:19] of of the people who follow him or her, I hardly can
[00:02:22] find this sort of a specification uh in this
[00:02:26] person before the... war
[00:02:30] launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28th
[00:02:33] February, powerful narrative had developed within parts
[00:02:36] of the Iranian oppositions online
[00:02:39] ecosystem. The Islamic
[00:02:42] of Republic was portrayed as being close to collapse. Iranian
[00:02:46] society was supposedly waiting for an alternative and
[00:02:50] Pahlavi with his international profile and enormous digital
[00:02:53] presence was increasingly presented as the figure most
[00:02:57] capable of filling that vacuum.
[00:03:20] of
[00:03:30] meetings of into public ones including a meeting with
[00:03:34] a Israelization could present him as a symbol of a western
[00:03:39] in lifestyle and win him some supporters, but I don't believe he
[00:03:43] has gained real popularity. If he were
[00:03:46] popular, he would have social base and could actually
[00:03:50] do something inside
[00:03:51] Iran. But that
[00:03:55] narrative contained a critical assumption that visibility
[00:03:59] was. evidence of strength, it wasn't
[00:04:02] a
[00:04:03] person can dominate social media and still lack the machinery
[00:04:07] required to exercise political
[00:04:09] power. Mr. Muhammad Hosen Hamze, an
[00:04:13] iranian political analyst, and based on
[00:04:17] that determined the weight of different political currents. One
[00:04:20] tactic is artificial mass amplification, using
[00:04:24] organized
[00:04:25] bots and targeted algorithms to create the
[00:04:28] impression.
[00:04:46] their views
[00:04:47] and to amplify such an extent that audiences believe this person is
[00:04:51] actually a leader capable of mobilizing social
[00:04:54] movement. this is in fact a form of
[00:04:57] neocolonialism.
[00:05:01] A Rouder's investigation described Pahlavi as a
[00:05:04] a well-known figure in Iran's opposition, but also reported that claims
[00:05:08] about an extensive network of supporters inside Iran could not be:
[00:05:43] but the situation eventually led to killing in
[00:05:46] Canada and his supporters ignored his
[00:05:49] calls. Canadian police established that Pahlavi
[00:05:53] supporters were behind the killing, so he is not
[00:05:57] popular and there is no real unity among his
[00:06:00] supporters. That
[00:06:04] distinction is crucial. Being the most
[00:06:07] recognizable opposition figure does not make someone the most
[00:06:11] organizationally. powerful and the events of
[00:06:14] 2026 put that distinction under
[00:06:17] extraordinary pressure. when the United States and
[00:06:21] Israel launched direct military action against Iran, some
[00:06:25] Pahlavi supporters anticipated a rapid collapse the Islamic
[00:06:29] Republic. The expectation was
[00:06:32] straightforward. Military pressure would weaken the
[00:06:36] state, the system would fracture,
[00:06:39] and an opposition figure with an established international. profile
[00:06:43] could emerge as a leader of a transition, but
[00:06:47] that sequence did not materialize, and when
[00:06:51] political reality refuses to follow the script written on social
[00:06:54] media, movements have to confront an uncomfortable
[00:06:58] possibility, perhaps they confuse the size the audience
[00:07:02] with the size the
[00:07:03] movement.
[00:07:07] A political movement becomes consequential when it can turn
[00:07:10] individual supporters into a... functioning structure, people who
[00:07:14] communicate, coordinate, make decisions, build allies
[00:07:18] and act
[00:07:19] collectively.
[00:07:24] Social media can create the appearance of all of this without
[00:07:27] actually providing it. A million views do not create
[00:07:31] a political machine, viral hashtag does not
[00:07:35] create a chain of command, and supporters scattered
[00:07:39] across different countries do not automatically constitute.
[00:08:14] lack of support in Iranian society: one is the
[00:08:18] revolutionary identity of Iranian society.
[00:08:21] Iranians have sought independence for decades, and that is
[00:08:25] fundamentally at odds with the institution of
[00:08:28] monarchy. even Imam Khumeini, the late founder
[00:08:32] the Islamic Republic, viewed the palivi regime
[00:08:36] as a symbol of dependence and national
[00:08:39] humiliation. the martered leader the revolution also
[00:08:42] described the pahalavi regime as puppet regime.
[00:08:46] Based on this historical narrative, Iranians do not see the
[00:08:50] Pahlavi era through the lens presented by western
[00:08:53] media. They see someone dependent on foreign powers
[00:08:57] and who has spend years watching events unfold from
[00:09:00] western hotels as an
[00:09:02] outsider.
[00:09:06] This is precisely why the uncertainty surrounding
[00:09:10] Pahlavi's internal network matter. It
[00:09:13] does not prove that he has no supporters inside Iran. It
[00:09:17] reveals something much more important. The
[00:09:21] scale, structure and operational capacity of that
[00:09:25] support remain difficult to
[00:09:27] establish. For an ordinary
[00:09:30] opposition activist, that might not matter
[00:09:33] much. For someone being presented as the potential
[00:09:37] leader of national transition, it matters
[00:09:40] enormously. The reality. is that Reza
[00:09:43] Pahlavi lacks the necessary means to an end, that
[00:09:47] is the power to
[00:09:49] form a coherent coalition from different
[00:09:53] groups. now uh, do you think that such a person can
[00:09:57] claim to be the leader of a political transition?
[00:10:01] if this person uh is
[00:10:03] eligible to run the
[00:10:05] revolution, is he capable of performing
[00:10:09] the job? does he? won this
[00:10:13] job? is
[00:10:14] there any organic relationship between him and his
[00:10:18] supporters and the real people of Iran who live
[00:10:22] there right now as we speak?
[00:10:25] "yes, you can be a president, you can be the prime
[00:10:29] minister, you can be the king in media, but what about the real world
[00:10:33] that we're all living in? so if media stops
[00:10:37] supporting him, will his
[00:10:40] follower uh, go look up for another way
[00:10:44] to be connected with him, is there any
[00:10:47] organism, is there any system, is there any
[00:10:50] other tool that his followers can be connected with him?"
[00:10:55] for his team, well, I would say these things doesn't
[00:10:58] exist in reality,
[00:11:02] and the big question is, do they let the
[00:11:06] critics ask him, challenge
[00:11:10] him, anybody who wants to know
[00:11:14] about his plan, his big plan, his master plan, will be
[00:11:17] criticized, will be put down by his
[00:11:20] followers, so this is not a good sign
[00:11:24] of a person. Who claim to
[00:11:28] be the to
[00:11:30] be the because eventually
[00:11:34] followers have to become something tangible,
[00:11:37] people, networks, structures,
[00:11:41] leadership mechanisms and the ability to
[00:11:44] act. Without those things, political
[00:11:47] influence remains largely
[00:11:50] rhetorical.
[00:11:55] For decades, American military interventions in West
[00:11:58] Asia have left behind countless innocent victims and
[00:12:02] immeasurable human suffering. The war against Iran is no
[00:12:06] exception. Beyond the headlines and geopolitical calculations
[00:12:10] are personal tragedies that rarely appear in world's major
[00:12:14] news reports. This is one
[00:12:15] them. That
[00:12:19] night was supposed to be night of joy in Kuhestak aport
[00:12:23] town in Siri County. hormosgon province, families were
[00:12:27] getting ready for a wedding, night for new clothes, seeing the
[00:12:31] bride and groom, music and laughter and children playing
[00:12:35] among their relatives, the wedding venue with smoke and rubble,
[00:12:38] music and laughter gave way to screams and cries. in the attack
[00:12:42] carried out by US force, five people were killed and nearly
[00:12:46] 70 were injured. one of those killed was
[00:12:50] four-year-old boy named Amir Ali Kharimi. Amir Ali had not gone to
[00:12:54] war, he had gone... to a wedding, that day he had taken a
[00:12:57] bath, fixed his hair and could hardly contain his excitement about
[00:13:01] going to the celebration. his mother was supposed to leave a little
[00:13:05] later with him and the rest the family, but Amir Ali, his
[00:13:09] 14-year-old sister Kiyana and several other children left early.
[00:13:13] few minutes later, the explosion happened. Amir
[00:13:17] Ali's mother later said there was a terrible sound, everything was filled with
[00:13:20] smoke, my heart sank. I ran into the street and started looking for.
[00:13:25] my children, but she could not find Amir Ali, the youngest child in the
[00:13:29] family, was no longer among the injured. his body
[00:13:33] had been taken to the hospital within the first few minutes, so
[00:13:36] quickly that his mother did not even have the chance to hold her
[00:13:40] son one last time, but Canana had survived, sharpnell
[00:13:44] had wounded her and she was taken to the hospital, doctors saved her
[00:13:47] life, but the wound she brought home was not only a physical
[00:13:51] one. kyono had witnessed her little brother's fight. final
[00:13:55] moments. Her mother says that even while she was
[00:13:59] injured herself, Kana kept crying and saying, "I saw blood coming from
[00:14:02] Ameri's head. I saw him fall to the ground, home
[00:14:06] that was supposed to be filled with laughter and memories.
[00:14:10] After
[00:14:11] the wedding is now missing one voice, Amida
[00:14:14] Ai's voice, and perhaps the hardest question in his grief is
[00:14:18] this: a child who only wanted to go to a wedding and play with
[00:14:21] his relatives children, why did his last night?" have to be spent
[00:14:25] among smoke, sharpenel, blood and
[00:14:28] tears.
[00:14:32] Then comes an even harder test: can Pahlavi build a coalition
[00:14:36] or can he mobilize the people who already support
[00:14:39] him?
[00:14:42] Iran's opposition is not a single political
[00:14:45] camp, it includes monarchists,
[00:14:49] republicans, liberals, leftists, secular
[00:14:52] activists, ethnic and regional. movements, former
[00:14:56] officials and groups with radically different visions for Iran's
[00:15:00] future. A potential transitional
[00:15:03] leader, therefore has to accomplish something much harder than
[00:15:07] attracking supporters. He has to bring people who
[00:15:11] fundamentally disagree with one another into
[00:15:14] the same political framework, and that is where the
[00:15:18] division surrounding Pahlwie become
[00:15:20] significant. Mr. Amin
[00:15:24] soبحhi.
[00:15:37] 22 campaign, it's clear that they each had their own
[00:15:41] personal goals. Some of those goals were interpreted
[00:15:45] as regime change, but ideologically, Pahlavi lacked
[00:15:49] clear vision for overthrowing the
[00:15:51] system. The ali
[00:15:55] karimi episode is one example, but it is
[00:15:59] hardly the only one. Public disputes have
[00:16:02] repeatedly erupted among opposition personalities over
[00:16:06] who represent. the movement, who belongs inside its
[00:16:10] political coalition, who has the authority to speak for
[00:16:13] it, and who gets to define its political
[00:16:16] direction. Ali karimi, who was once a supporter
[00:16:20] of Reza Pahlawi, has now uh turned against him, even
[00:16:24] issuing threats to expose certain issues. now what does this say
[00:16:28] about the current situation and position the
[00:16:32] opposition camp? کار آقای کریمی،
[00:16:35] ستاد یا سیاست یا.
[00:16:37] with
[00:16:40] Karimi a was large number of followers and during the 2022
[00:16:43] campaign they recruted many high profile
[00:16:47] influencers, now he is pressuring them to deliver on
[00:16:50] promises they made to him. palavi also issued several
[00:16:54] calls during the recent war, apparently expecting something
[00:16:58] similar to the recent riats. cademy opposed the Islamic
[00:17:02] Republic, moved abroad and continued his campaign,
[00:17:06] but saw no results. and became laughing
[00:17:09] stock, more likely their dispute is
[00:17:13] over funding they had agreed on, we may
[00:17:16] see more revelations from other
[00:17:19] bloggers. the problem
[00:17:23] is not that political movements contain disagreements,
[00:17:27] every serious political movement does. the
[00:17:30] problem is that pahlavi's personal popularity has so far failed to
[00:17:34] translate into a stable discipline. and broadly
[00:17:38] accepted political coalition, that remains one of
[00:17:42] Pahlavi's biggest unresolved challenges.
[00:17:46] In the recent years, Reza Pahlawi has tried to demonstrate
[00:17:49] himself as the prominent alternative to the current
[00:17:53] ruling system in Iran. Uh, what were some the
[00:17:56] factors that reinforced uh this image at some point in
[00:18:00] time? اومدن حالا با تکنیک های
[00:18:04] رسانه ای فضایییو ایجاد کردن که انگار. They use
[00:18:08] media techniques to create the impression of significant popularity,
[00:18:12] economic problems give some people an opportunity to ride that
[00:18:15] wave, but anyone who truly understood Iranian
[00:18:19] society would not take such risk. Pahlavi's
[00:18:23] popularity has largely existed online, while
[00:18:26] social media does not reflect the reality of Iranian
[00:18:30] society. Such narratives are often driven by
[00:18:33] organizational interests and cyber armies.
[00:18:39] The question becomes even more revealing when money enters the
[00:18:43] picture. A Reuder's investigation reported that
[00:18:47] several Iranian American investors had contributed more than
[00:18:51] $3 million dollars to Pahlavi's political effort,
[00:18:54] expecting that he could play a role in leading a future transitional
[00:18:58] government.
[00:19:02] The significance is not simply the amount of money, it
[00:19:06] is what that money represented. These people
[00:19:10] were not merely supporting celebrity or a symbolic opposition
[00:19:14] figure. They were investing a political
[00:19:17] project they believed could eventually produce
[00:19:20] power, and some later became
[00:19:23] dissatisfied with Pahlavi's performance and his response to Donald
[00:19:27] Trump's policies. That tells us something
[00:19:31] important. The greater the political expectations
[00:19:35] surrounding Pahlavi, the more difficult. it becomes to hide the gap
[00:19:39] between political image and political
[00:19:41] capacity. People can tolerate
[00:19:44] ambiguity from a symbolic figure. They demand
[00:19:48] results from someone presented as a future
[00:19:51] leader.
[00:19:55] Then comes perhaps the most politically explosive issue, and that is
[00:19:59] Pahlavi's relationship with foreign power and the fact that he has
[00:20:02] openly welcomed American pressure on Iran as a
[00:20:06] whole.
[00:20:10] On February 28, following the launch of Operation Epic
[00:20:14] Fury, he published an article in the Washington Post thanking
[00:20:17] Donald Trump and arguing that the moment could create path toward
[00:20:21] Iran's freedom. He also called for the international
[00:20:25] community to be prepared to recognize legitimate transitional
[00:20:29] government when the time
[00:20:31] came.
[00:20:38] That was not simply commentary on events, it was
[00:20:42] clear political alignment with an American military campaign
[00:20:45] against Iran, and the message became even more
[00:20:49] striking. in the days that
[00:20:51] followed. After American soldiers were
[00:20:55] killed, Pahlavi publicly expressed condolences to their families
[00:20:59] and thank them for what he described as their defense the
[00:21:02] Iranian
[00:21:03] people.
[00:21:09] For his supporters, these statements demonstrate
[00:21:12] pragmatism. An opposition leader welcoming the action of
[00:21:16] foreign power confronting the Islamic Republic.
[00:21:20] for his critics, they expose much deeper
[00:21:23] problem. If someone wants to lead Iran, but
[00:21:27] his political strategy increasingly appears intertwon with the
[00:21:30] military and political power of another country, where does his
[00:21:34] political legitimacy actually come
[00:21:37] from? That is not merely an ideological
[00:21:41] question, it is a question of political
[00:21:43] independence. A leader cannot simply
[00:21:47] assume that foreign military pressure will... create domestic
[00:21:50] legitimacy for him. The opposite can
[00:21:54] happen: the more a political figure appears dependent
[00:21:58] on an outside power to create the conditions for his rise, the
[00:22:02] harder it becomes to demonstrate that his authority originates from
[00:22:06] inside the country itself. And there is an
[00:22:09] extraordinary irony here. Even Donald
[00:22:13] Trump, the American president whose confrontation with the Islamic
[00:22:16] Republic, Pahlavi, openly welcomed, as... question
[00:22:20] whether Pahlavi actually has enough support inside Iran to lead
[00:22:24] the country. In
[00:22:27] January, Trump told routers that Pahlavi seems very
[00:22:31] nice while questioning whether Iranians would actually accept his
[00:22:35] leadership.
[00:22:39] Rizal Pahlavi has tried to introduce himself beyond a monarch and
[00:22:43] as
[00:22:43] a leading figure guiding Iran's political transition. Now, to
[00:22:47] what extent do you think he has been successful? in solidifying this change in
[00:22:51] political identity among the opposition and the Iranian
[00:22:55] society. we need to ask
[00:22:58] this: where is
[00:23:02] this uh eligibility come from? does it come from a
[00:23:06] name? does it come from being
[00:23:09] relevant uh to a dynasty
[00:23:12] which was toppled back in
[00:23:15] 1979? so these are the questions we need to
[00:23:19] ask. "if this person is
[00:23:22] capable of managing or
[00:23:26] leading, well then we can
[00:23:30] discuss this issue, but we need to ask ourselves,
[00:23:33] what is the background of this person? so
[00:23:36] anything related to this
[00:23:39] capabilities will answer the next
[00:23:42] question will be, is he a good
[00:23:46] choice, is he able to lead Iran?"
[00:23:50] through transformation period, so from what I
[00:23:54] see or from what I observed, and there is
[00:23:58] no fact against it, uh, this doesn't exist
[00:24:01] in real world,
[00:24:05] that statement is revealing, strategy recognizes
[00:24:09] the difference between international visibility and domestic
[00:24:13] acceptance, how has Riza Pahlavi's
[00:24:17] backing of Israel and US's action.
[00:24:54] This is why the Ali Karim episode matters, not because
[00:24:57] instagram dispute is historically important, it
[00:25:01] isn't, and not because one former supporter criticizing
[00:25:05] Pahlavi proves that his movement is collapsing, it doesn't,
[00:25:08] it matters because it offers a glimpse into a much
[00:25:12] larger
[00:25:16] problem. Pahlavi has built an extraordinary powerful.
[00:25:20] image, but the evidence for equally powerful
[00:25:24] political organization is far less
[00:25:26] convincing. he has visibility, but
[00:25:30] visibility is not power. he has
[00:25:34] supporters, but supporters are not necessarily an
[00:25:37] organized constituency. he has
[00:25:41] international access, but international access is
[00:25:45] not domestic legitimacy. he has financial
[00:25:48] backing. but money does not automatically produce
[00:25:52] political capacity and he has famous
[00:25:56] name, but famous name does not create a
[00:25:59] government. can we say that uh...
[00:26:32] had social base, after years of relying on hostile media
[00:26:36] to build his image and gain online fame, he
[00:26:39] believed life streams, likes and views could win over the
[00:26:43] Iranian people, but the unity the Iranian people around their
[00:26:47] leadership and the preservation of Iran's integrity showed
[00:26:51] that all of this was just
[00:26:52] illusion.
[00:26:56] the question then is not whether Razza Pahlavi is
[00:27:00] popular, he clearly is among sections the Iranian
[00:27:03] opposition, the real question is whether that
[00:27:07] popularity can survive contact with the realities of
[00:27:10] politics? can he build an organization capable
[00:27:14] of functioning inside Iran? can he unite the
[00:27:18] monarchists and republicans, liberals and leftists,
[00:27:22] secular activists and regional movements? can he
[00:27:26] command loyalty beyond the digital world?
[00:27:29] can he persuade people who do not already support? him that he should
[00:27:33] lead them, can he demonstrate that his political authority
[00:27:37] comes from Iranians themselves rather than from Washington,
[00:27:41] western media or social media
[00:27:43] algorithms, and ultimately, can he turn
[00:27:47] popularity into power? so far,
[00:27:51] the answer to all these questions have been no, and
[00:27:55] the alikarimi drama has just been a case in