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20261012 113000 UTC
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[00:00:00] perhaps that is the most important part of
[00:00:13] Yes, during his term of
[00:00:40] Welcome to the Israel watch: new political scandals have
[00:00:44] emerged concerning the al-Aqsa flood operation, while
[00:00:47] Israel has apparently failed to translate its military
[00:00:51] gains into meaningful results, warnings we're
[00:00:54] also voiced that Israel cannot continue its buffer zone
[00:00:58] strategy. Meanwhile, latest polls showed as rise in
[00:01:01] Netanyahu's popularity just weeks away from the Kennesit
[00:01:05] elections. We will discuss these topics and more with general
[00:01:09] Elias farhat, military and strategic expert. Welcome general
[00:01:12] elias. A scandal described as a political
[00:01:15] earthquick in the entity has emerged after
[00:01:18] Netanyahu's former military advisor revealed that the
[00:01:22] time of a phone call received by Netanyahu on the
[00:01:25] morning of the alaxa flood operation on October 7
[00:01:28] has been altered. Later
[00:01:31] Barberman, who was the chief of staff, asked to change the schedule of the protocol
[00:01:35] so that the call at 6:40 was at 6:29.
[00:01:38] The discussion about the collection of protocols
[00:01:42] began two
[00:01:44] or three weeks into the war.
[00:01:48] At the end of October, I was approached
[00:01:51] by several sources,
[00:01:55] several sources, and they told me
[00:01:58] that there was something unusual. At the end of October, two or three
[00:02:02] weeks after the outbreak of the war, while we were preparing or beginning the maneuver
[00:02:06] in Gaza, I was approached
[00:02:09] by people who said that in the Prime Minister's Office, protocols were being collected
[00:02:13] and this collection of materials was being carried out contrary to procedure. I approached
[00:02:16] the Attorney General. I remind you, we are in the middle of
[00:02:20] a war. A faction of the war collected stenograms
[00:02:23] and protocols. And all
[00:02:25] I did
[00:02:28] was not want to accuse anyone. I did not want to start anything. I wanted
[00:02:31] to stop it. I approached her
[00:02:34] and asked to clarify the procedures formally, and that is
[00:02:38] what happened. She approaches
[00:02:41] me, she approaches
[00:02:43] me,
[00:02:47] and what,
[00:02:50] and tells me, uh,
[00:02:53] she tells me, that she was instructed,
[00:02:57] uh, to bring the stenogram of: that phone
[00:03:00] call at 6:40, the first phone call in red,
[00:03:04] and she was instructed to change the time of the call from 6:40
[00:03:07] to 6:29,
[00:03:10] by whom? The chief of staff,
[00:03:13] Barberman, the chief of staff.
[00:03:16] She, she came into my office, closed the door,
[00:03:19] and told me,
[00:03:22] this says it all. She understood that it was irregular. I
[00:03:26] believe she was in distress.
[00:03:30] She also knew, first of all, she knows what is allowed and what is forbidden,
[00:03:33] and I remind you, two months before, a document was issued
[00:03:37] explaining what is allowed and what is forbidden. She
[00:03:41] describes to me the entire conduct, she
[00:03:44] says, I am not allowed to change it. Moreover, she says
[00:03:47] it also appears on the computer, this is a phone
[00:03:50] call that is recorded, it says 6:40,
[00:03:53] 6:4,
[00:03:56] and...
[00:03:58] She was told to change it. If I remember correctly, even
[00:04:02] the change was initiated by the chief of staff. You have
[00:04:06] no dispute about this, these are facts
[00:04:08] that are undisputed.
[00:04:10] עוררים.
[00:04:15] I remember that the first thing I
[00:04:18] asked, why are we dealing in January
[00:04:22] 24, with a
[00:04:25] stenogram of a four-minute
[00:04:28] morning call.
[00:05:00] one is the one that's talking
[00:05:02] list will favor one of about his chief of staff which she revealed here on the tv and
[00:05:06] now before we have heard another one
[00:05:10] that Mr Senar himself,
[00:05:19] a former Palestinian minister and he is a part of
[00:05:22] Fatah, the wing of Muhammad Dahlan, the
[00:05:25] reformist, he told
[00:05:29] Mr Aboudi in order to pass this message to the
[00:05:32] Israeli,
[00:05:35] Aboudi passed the message to Mr Muhammad
[00:05:39] Dahlan, his boss and
[00:05:43] to Sheikh Muhammad bin Zaid. Mohammed bin
[00:05:46] Zaid gave a phone call to
[00:05:48] Netanyahu and told him that it's serious
[00:05:52] and that Hamas is preparing
[00:05:54] something.
[00:05:57] Yahya Sinwar
[00:05:59] wanted to issue a warning and to pass this warning
[00:06:03] to Israel in order to lift the blockade on the
[00:06:07] Gaza Strip and to alleviate the measures
[00:06:10] that are tightening the...
[00:06:13] the tightening measures on the
[00:06:16] crossing points in Gaza.
[00:06:18] So finally
[00:06:22] Netanyahu and his staff underestimated
[00:06:26] this warning and they
[00:06:28] were
[00:06:31] sure that Hamas or any
[00:06:34] other anybody else, than war or
[00:06:37] anything, are not able to do what they are
[00:06:40] threatening. Taking it in a serious way, yes, they
[00:06:44] underestimated Hamas and this is was the big
[00:06:48] surprise that even they received the
[00:06:51] warning. Yeah, and some, some
[00:06:54] also some leakage said that the
[00:06:57] Egyptian intelligence also sent them
[00:07:00] a warning that Hamas is preparing an
[00:07:03] offensive against Israel, but they underestimated
[00:07:06] the, the strength of Hamas, the ability of Hamas to
[00:07:10] do something like this, indeed.
[00:07:42] estimated that 80% of its military power has been eroded,
[00:07:46] it has very few rockets left, it has no ability
[00:07:49] to produce rockets or RPGs, but it
[00:07:52] has 30,000 armed men, it still controls two million
[00:07:56] residents of the strip, its shadow continues to harm Hamas
[00:07:59] and its people and is preparing for a prolonged
[00:08:02] stay in 60% of the strip under
[00:08:06] our control. In Lebanon, Hezbollah was also hit hard,
[00:08:10] lost many of its military capabilities, lost Nasrallah and the veteran
[00:08:13] leadership, but it is still a military organization that poses
[00:08:17] a threat to the IDF and to the Israeli home front, its internal
[00:08:21] status in Lebanon has eroded, but Israel is not taking advantage of this rare
[00:08:25] opportunity for a settlement that will lead to the dismantling of Hezbollah, and there too,
[00:08:28] the assessment is for a prolonged stay in the new
[00:08:31] security zone. Iran, after two rounds
[00:08:34] of fighting, suffered severe blows, but remained
[00:08:38] an extremist regime, even more so than before, with
[00:08:41] more uranium and the ability to keep more uranium.
[00:08:45] The regime is in internal distress, but it is quite clear
[00:08:49] that the fighting there will resume in the future, probably not
[00:08:52] far off. Bottom line, three years of fighting
[00:08:55] brought amazing military achievements, but
[00:08:58] we did not achieve an absolute victory in any of the arenas.
[00:09:12] talking about, or we are talking about is that they
[00:09:16] use the use of force, the disproportionate force
[00:09:19] against Lebanon, against Gaza, against the West Bank.
[00:09:23] I don't think that they will shift the strategy. They are still using this
[00:09:26] force against innocent people, against
[00:09:29] civilians, against the
[00:09:33] the people of southern Lebanon
[00:09:36] today. I mean, to
[00:09:39] destroy all buildings in the... and even
[00:09:43] in the Gaza Strip. This strategy
[00:09:46] will not be shifted. But as long as
[00:09:50] it is connected to the
[00:09:53] strategy of fighting Hamas or
[00:09:57] Hezbollah,
[00:10:01] the Israelis are aware that their strategy did
[00:10:04] not succeed. Yeah, this strategy of opening
[00:10:07] fronts and all. But would they actually try to change it in a way
[00:10:11] or shift it into maybe finding an agreement
[00:10:14] or something perhaps with the Lebanese front or the Syrian? For
[00:10:18] example, on each front there is the mission not
[00:10:21] accomplished. Yes.
[00:10:25] For example, in Gaza, the
[00:10:27] two targets that were determined by Israel is
[00:10:31] that first to release the
[00:10:34] hostages without any
[00:10:37] exchange, without any exchange
[00:10:41] by force. And they more than two years
[00:10:45] in order, more than two years in order to make a
[00:10:49] swap of prisoners with Hamas. The second
[00:10:52] target was to wipe out Hamas
[00:10:56] and attack
[00:11:00] it so that they will
[00:11:03] dismember all the, yeah. As in using the force
[00:11:07] against them as they did in other fronts, like opening fronts again and
[00:11:10] again. Hamas is still existing and still constituting a
[00:11:13] threat in Gaza to Israel. And this is
[00:11:17] what most of Israel's commentators and other leaders
[00:11:21] from the... they said, not reaching the goal. Yes, yes. Hamas is still
[00:11:25] in Gaza and is constituting a danger
[00:11:28] on, or that to Israel. And they didn't
[00:11:30] release the prisoners without, without
[00:11:34] a swap. They were
[00:11:37] obliged to do a presidential swap. Yes. But General
[00:11:40] Farhat, will this lead them to rethink that military is
[00:11:44] not getting us anywhere? Maybe they can try a different approach,
[00:11:48] a different strategy with the Lebanese government, as we mentioned, for
[00:11:51] example. I mean, the political track is not...
[00:12:03] the United Nations concerning the Palestinian issue and
[00:12:07] concerning ceasefire in Gaza or concerning an
[00:12:11] international observers or monitors. And
[00:12:14] they replaced it by what's so called a Board of
[00:12:17] Peace, which didn't work. Up till now, we are
[00:12:20] still waiting for this Board of Peace, more than one year
[00:12:23] after the, uh, declaring of the ceasefire. More
[00:12:27] than 1,200 Palestinians were killed in the ceasefire.
[00:12:30] So I don't think that the United
[00:12:33] States will allow or will
[00:12:37] pave the way for Israel to change a
[00:12:41] political track or to follow a political track.
[00:12:44] Israel does not have the resources to continue with
[00:12:48] its current military strategy and must find external
[00:12:52] surrounding partners to improve its security situation.
[00:12:56] Good evening, three years after what changed first and foremost, the security
[00:13:00] concept of all of us. Now we want buffer zones
[00:13:03] between our borders and the enemy. We created
[00:13:07] effective buffer zones in their territory, in the Gaza
[00:13:10] Strip, in Lebanon,
[00:13:12] in Syria. It must be said, Netanyahu is trying to achieve
[00:13:16] an Israeli consensus here, there is no one currently calling to withdraw
[00:13:19] from there. In 1990, the IDF
[00:13:22] thought that the security zone established just five years earlier
[00:13:25] was a success. In 2000, it was such a hell
[00:13:29] that we fled from there after having contributed greatly to its establishment
[00:13:33] and strengthening. An Israeli leader must wake up every morning. An Israeli
[00:13:36] leader must wake up every morning and think about how I get
[00:13:39] out of all these places tonight, and in an agreement with someone who can
[00:13:43] enforce it. How do I make it like Jordan, Egypt, our two
[00:13:47] quietest borders? How do I not create
[00:13:50] a local uproar there, especially since we don't have soldiers for all the buffer zones.
[00:14:25] soldiers to be recruited in the
[00:14:28] army. And they
[00:14:31] called the, the reserves several times. And
[00:14:35] which created a chaos and mess in
[00:14:38] the working class and some factories
[00:14:41] and some institutions. When you recall the
[00:14:45] employees to go to the military for months
[00:14:49] or three months or six months, something like this, there is a
[00:14:52] big problem in human resources,
[00:14:55] which prevents the Israelis
[00:14:57] from a big mobilization of its
[00:15:01] forces in order
[00:15:03] to
[00:15:06] launch attacks on several fronts at the same time. So they can't
[00:15:09] continue in this strategy. I don't think that they
[00:15:11] can fight on the, in the West Bank
[00:15:15] and Gaza and Lebanon and Syria and
[00:15:19] finally with Iran as well. Yeah,
[00:15:22] indeed. A former Israeli military officer
[00:15:25] noted how Netanyahu is trying to rally support
[00:15:29] despite Hamas not being defeated, while also
[00:15:32] refusing to take responsibility for and
[00:15:35] preventing probes into the...
[00:15:41] If I had told you three years ago on October 8,
[00:15:44] 2023, that in three years from now, Hamas would remain
[00:15:48] in Gaza, armed, digging tunnels, and preparing, according to
[00:15:52] the IDF's warnings and its report, until yesterday, for a kidnapping attack
[00:15:55] or an attack against IDF forces, and if I had told you on that same day
[00:15:59] that in three years from now, Prime Minister Netanyahu would still
[00:16:02] be sitting in his chair, he would prevent the establishment of an inquiry
[00:16:05] committee, he would not take responsibility.
[00:16:37] "they are not satisfied by
[00:16:40] the what's so called victories
[00:16:43] of Netanyahu in killing
[00:16:47] the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah and even in Iran.
[00:16:51] They need more and more.
[00:16:53] So we notice that there is a
[00:16:56] dispute between
[00:16:58] Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and between both and
[00:17:01] Netanyahu. And there is a problem in the
[00:17:05] list for the..."
[00:17:08] at least for the rightists in the, in the
[00:17:11] elections. So as to the
[00:17:15] other, uh, I mean the
[00:17:18] other right and the the moderates, if there are moderates
[00:17:22] in Israel, they feel that Netanyahu
[00:17:25] failed. But both sides
[00:17:29] feel that Netanyahu failed. One
[00:17:32] from a position that he should do
[00:17:35] more than that. And others say he failed to
[00:17:39] do as in he didn't do enough what, what we should
[00:17:42] do. So, so but how
[00:17:45] can we take this to the ballots and the casting of
[00:17:48] ballots? How this will affect Netanyahu in the
[00:17:52] elections? I think at last
[00:17:54] Netanyahu,
[00:17:57] most of them they feel that he is the man of this
[00:18:00] time. Yeah. And he only can lead Israel in this
[00:18:04] time. And I do not rule out the return
[00:18:46] Yair Golan's Democrats party, the Joint List,
[00:18:49] after the disqualification of Balad, maintains its strength with
[00:18:52] nine seats. Yisrael Beiteinu drops
[00:18:55] from nine seats to eight. United Torah Judaism
[00:18:59] and Ben Gvir's Otzma Yehudit remain with eight
[00:19:02] seats, as last week. Also Deri's Shas and Smotrich's
[00:19:06] Religious Zionism. No change, seven
[00:19:09] seats for each. Mansour Abbas's Ra'am gains
[00:19:12] one seat, from five to six, and Ofer and Nenner's
[00:19:16] Am Echad remains with five seats. Below
[00:19:20] the electoral threshold, no change. Adel and Zeliha are still out with
[00:19:24] less than 3% of the votes. The ultra-Orthodox public
[00:19:27] in Blue and White are again far from the electoral threshold. And this is the map
[00:19:31] of the blocs. The coalition increases its lead with
[00:19:34] a poll result of 55.
[00:20:07] Gaza and the West Bank and Lebanon and Iran, they
[00:20:11] they, they have no disputes on these issues. They have disputes
[00:20:14] on domestic issues, not on the
[00:20:18] policy, security and foreign policy.
[00:20:21] So no matter if it was Netanyahu
[00:20:25] or a new prime minister, but
[00:20:28] actually in these numbers, we
[00:20:32] see that they are approaching each other and the
[00:20:36] Arab
[00:20:40] them. I think
[00:20:43] why is he appearing to be gaining since you
[00:20:46] mentioned that they have similar approaches? Why not seem
[00:20:50] to be gaining ground? Yes, to be gaining
[00:20:53] ground. Yes, the
[00:20:55] people, he has a theory
[00:20:58] of violence.
[00:21:03] the chief of staff, he called for
[00:21:06] violence at every task of the armed forces in
[00:21:09] Israel, in the West Bank or in Gaza or any other
[00:21:13] place else, anyway.
[00:21:14] So
[00:21:17] but people, they want to change the look of the
[00:21:21] prime minister from
[00:21:24] without
[00:21:27] changing the mentality, the core, the
[00:21:30] conduct. Yes. Israeli
[00:21:34] social media commentators heaped heavy criticism on
[00:21:38] Netanyahu, holding him responsibility for what they
[00:21:41] described as their dire
[00:21:42] situation.
[00:21:46] The disasters in Israel never end. It is drowning in wars and
[00:21:49] blood. While Netanyahu's voters insist on
[00:21:53] sacrificing Israelis to elect him again. Our entire lives
[00:21:57] are miserable and harsh. Why?
[00:22:00] Noam Tibon: How did Netanyahu ignore all the
[00:22:03] warnings on October 7 and lead Israel into the worst
[00:22:07] disaster in its history, only to then fail in his
[00:22:10] multiple wars? Mr. Fix, if Netanyahu did
[00:22:14] not care about us being slaughtered on October 7, then
[00:22:18] we must not allow him to be elected
[00:22:20] again.
[00:22:22] General, yes, do you think Netanyahu endangered
[00:22:25] Israel's security for
[00:22:28] his own political purposes and not Israel's benefit? It is
[00:22:32] no secret that he has trouble in the judiciary and he
[00:22:36] might be arrested when he
[00:22:39] loses the immunity as a prime
[00:22:43] minister and will turn to be an
[00:22:46] ordinary citizen, then the court will... will
[00:22:50] arrest him and he will enter, he
[00:22:53] will go to jail and will prison five or six
[00:22:57] years,
[00:22:59] as far as we hear in the media.
[00:23:02] So it's
[00:23:04] not
[00:23:08] he should exploit all the
[00:23:11] political and security issues to save his situation. Some people
[00:23:15] say that he is prepared to wage a war
[00:23:18] before the elections in order to cancel the elections because of
[00:23:22] war. They can do it to avoid
[00:23:25] his prison after the
[00:23:28] elections. But could he do
[00:23:30] this? This is a great decision. I don't think that
[00:23:34] he can do it without the, the approval of the United
[00:23:37] States. So it's not
[00:23:41] his own issue. It's not his personal issue. It's not Israel's
[00:23:45] issue. It's an issue of the United States more than an issue for
[00:23:48] Israel. Indeed. Well, thank you General Lias for joining us
[00:23:52] today. Thank you everyone for watching and goodbye.
[00:24:21] July 31st, 2026, nighttime
[00:24:24] Strait of Hormuz, southern Iran. The United
[00:24:27] States launched a heavy wave of strikes against command centers,
[00:24:31] radars, surveillance systems, and air defense
[00:24:34] positions across southern Iran, intended to make the skies over
[00:24:38] southern Iran safer for American aircraft. But just hours
[00:24:42] later, something unexpected
[00:24:43] happened.
[00:24:46] An American MQ-9 Reaper was shot down over the Strait of...
[00:24:50] News: The MQ-9 is no ordinary
[00:24:53] drone. It is one of America's primary platforms for
[00:24:56] intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision
[00:24:59] strikes, capable of remaining airborne for more than a full day
[00:25:03] while carrying an advanced suite of sensors and weapons. And this was
[00:25:06] not the first Reaper lost. Since the beginning of the war, Iran
[00:25:10] has taken around 50 MQ-9 Reapers out of operation,
[00:25:14] roughly one quarter of the entire US Reaper fleet. But the real story
[00:25:18] was only beginning. Shortly afterward, an
[00:25:21] F-35 entered the picture, one of the world's most advanced
[00:25:24] combat aircraft, designed specifically to penetrate
[00:25:28] sophisticated air defense networks. But stealth does not
[00:25:31] mean invisible. One radar may detect only a faint
[00:25:35] signature. An infrared sensor may pick up the heat from its engines.
[00:25:38] Another system may detect its electronic emissions. And when the
[00:25:42] information from all of these systems is connected through a single network, a
[00:25:46] much clearer picture of the target begins to emerge. That same
[00:25:50] night, the tracking of the F-35 reached the level of a
[00:25:53] weapons quality lock, a warning the pilot could not
[00:25:56] ignore. The F-35 did not continue its mission and
[00:25:59] quickly left the area. And
[00:26:03] the story. Air defense success does not always mean
[00:26:06] shooting an aircraft down. Sometimes it is enough to stop an
[00:26:09] aircraft designed to penetrate hostile airspace from completing its
[00:26:13] mission. And now for the United States, the issue is
[00:26:17] no longer simply the loss of an MQ-9 or the retreat of an
[00:26:21] F-35. The bigger question is, how could a network whose
[00:26:24] radars and key components had been attacked only hours earlier
[00:26:28] remain operational and still force one of America's most advanced
[00:26:32] aircraft to America's most advanced aircraft to abandon
[00:26:36] its mission, an incident that not just affected
[00:26:39] its flight path, but its entire not just its flight path, but its entire
[00:26:43] calculation over Iran's skies. The
[00:26:46] equation in Iran's skies is no longer the same.
[00:30:16] The remainder of our top stories: Iran has rejected Washington's claims that
[00:30:19] energy shipments continue freely through the Strait of Hormuz,
[00:30:23] saying the US's reliance on other countries for fuel
[00:30:26] contradicts its own narrative.
[00:30:29] Saudi Arabia extends suspension of flights at the main airport in the
[00:30:33] capital.