SUDAN — broadcast
20260806 093000 UTC
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[00:00:01] But he sacrifices Darfur and Oumran. Both are bitter. Therefore, I
[00:00:04] think that the Sudanese people are promised. Therefore, we must
[00:00:09] the international community. If it does not preserve the morale of our military institution. And we, as the Sudanese people,
[00:00:13] must support our military institution. And this great
[00:00:16] support must continue
[00:00:19] their tools, they use their tools for the military institution, whether it is through popular movements or whether it is
[00:00:22] our media support, or whether it is support from the youth through
[00:00:26] popular support, whether it is
[00:00:31] joint and all
[00:00:33] I want to say that many the supporting forces of the military institution. Therefore, I believe that anyone who monitors
[00:00:37] and follows the scene on the ground,
[00:00:40] at the beginning of the war, many for example, if we analyze the movements
[00:00:43] of the military forces, for example, in North Kordofan, a week or
[00:00:46] two weeks ago, and the movements of the military forces, for example, in West Kordofan,
[00:00:51] move some files within also, observe the situation now in North
[00:00:56] Nations and so on people in Darfur. I mean, I think that the presence of al-Nurqaba, for example, in Omdurman now, I think
[00:01:08] that the erosion and dismantling that
[00:01:11] in Sudan. In the context occurred, that's why I'm saying that many people
[00:01:15] Wad Al-Noura in West Darfur, in don't comprehend the military strategic scene
[00:01:20] the border strip between Sudan from the soil of this accurately, considering that the tools were numerous. People think that the battle was a military battle
[00:01:24] with weapons and so on. No, there were multiple battles, a strategic battle,
[00:01:27] dismantling the militia from
[00:01:29] utilizing available within, ongoing recruitments, and so on.
[00:01:33] Sudan. The meeting Therefore, the issue that we expect in the scenarios is that there will be
[00:01:37] a considerable number of these people who will, I mean,
[00:01:40] they will surrender. A part of them, especially those
[00:01:42] coming from neighboring countries of Sudan, coming
[00:01:46] in Khartoum State as as mercenaries, they will leave, considering
[00:01:48] with points and lines of that a mercenary doesn't die. A mercenary comes to get
[00:01:50] money. When he faces the armies
[00:01:56] defeated this and drones, he will leave, for sure. Yes. Okay, I mean,
[00:01:59] there is news that al-Atta refuted the arguments that
[00:02:03] on the border the militia had put forward, such as the argument of
[00:02:06] the state of 1956. I mean, it is known that this
[00:02:09] war
[00:02:12] circles, whether in the Arab League, in has, I mean, gone through arguments, I mean, starting
[00:02:15] from talking, for example, about democracy,
[00:02:19] and a group of arguments came, including the state
[00:02:22] of 1956, as stated
[00:02:25] by Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta.
[00:02:29] They say that
[00:02:30] Sudanese citizens residing in military defeat does not begin on the battlefield,
[00:02:34] but begins with the decline of ideology. Yes.
[00:02:37] So the militia's ideology declined from democracy, and now
[00:02:41] it has reached talks that have no
[00:02:45] But they were an integral part relation to the war. Are such arguments, which Al-Atta refuted,
[00:02:49] and the decline of the militia's ideology,
[00:02:52] and the absence of even now we don't
[00:02:55] hear any talk about any
[00:02:58] fighting ideology or any cause around which mercenaries
[00:03:02] or the militia can rally?
[00:03:05] Are we now on the verge of no
[00:03:09] ideology, nothing at this stage? I think
[00:03:13] that when the battle
[00:03:14] is exchanged with international was raging in its early stages, the party that
[00:03:19] they are also among the organizations that work in this
[00:03:19] work, in diplomatic work, in was moving the militia's media was not the militia itself. There was another
[00:03:22] party concerned, as media houses working on this matter,
[00:03:27] process of the first degree. It has a great impact on and presenting criticism of
[00:03:30] some things in an unobjective way. Who is this other party? I mean, I
[00:03:34] expect that there will be some
[00:03:37] the fire are expected media houses, it could be steadfastness, it could be
[00:03:40] that we need to continue in this all the parties hostile to the military institution, as well as some
[00:03:43] people who have become agents for some countries. Therefore,
[00:03:46] they were trying as much as possible to belittle the Sudanese national
[00:03:50] institutions.
[00:03:52] Also, real support from They are trying to show that there is a real crisis in the 1956 state that
[00:03:55] they are talking about. Unfortunately, many of those who
[00:03:58] talk, you find that, I mean, their ancestors were an integral part of
[00:04:02] the Sudanese national movement. I mean, when some
[00:04:06] there are refugees present militias from Kordofan talk about the 1956 state,
[00:04:10] we find that Bashar Jamaa is from
[00:04:13] North Kordofan. You find Dabke from
[00:04:18] controlling what is happening in Bakar from South Darfur, and whose hands are in for example, and so on, in Ad Al-Fursan or Dar Al-Ghanem
[00:04:21] previously. Therefore, I believe that these lies,
[00:04:24] this unit, the 1956 state,
[00:04:27] are still detained in houses, for example, in and so on, is
[00:04:28] supporting countries. In this just propaganda to mislead the Sudanese street. And the Sudanese local
[00:04:31] street is very aware. But I used to think that
[00:04:35] if the talk was about a crisis in Sudanese
[00:04:38] politics, or if it was about us failing, for example, to
[00:04:41] manage diversity and so on, it could be within the framework of criticism
[00:04:44] as a way to address the problem. But
[00:04:47] criticizing the 1956 state and what the 1956 state
[00:04:51] did, which our ancestors built, is unobjective criticism. The matter
[00:04:54] of
[00:04:56] talking about the militia now having no discourse, no talk, I mean,
[00:05:00] the militia leader said a week or two weeks ago that we are coming to Khartoum. I don't
[00:05:04] know where they are coming from. I think
[00:05:06] we interact with that they are in continuous community. I mean, the international community is not part of retreat. Therefore, I think that
[00:05:09] there is no objective discourse
[00:05:13] for the militia. And I am very optimistic that the militia
[00:05:16] will retreat in a very short period, and soon we will see
[00:05:20] our armies in El-Nahud moving towards El-Fasher. We will see our armies
[00:05:23] from Dar Zagawa marching
[00:05:26] towards Kutum to El-Fasher. We will see others
[00:05:30] from West Darfur coming towards Geneina, God willing.
[00:05:33] Okay, viewers, let's watch this material, and we will
[00:05:37] comment on it, God willing. When we
[00:05:39] talk about
[00:05:42] Leader Musa
[00:05:45] Hilal, we don't just say, brothers,
[00:05:49] he is the head of the
[00:05:52] Awakening Council. That's it.
[00:05:55] And we don't say he is a popular tribal
[00:05:59] leader only.
[00:06:01] And we say he is a national symbol for all of
[00:06:05] Sudan.
[00:06:08] A national symbol for all of
[00:06:10] Sudan. His positions throughout
[00:06:13] his history
[00:06:16] in Darfur and in Sudan
[00:06:18] as a whole were historical
[00:06:22] positions. If we look
[00:06:25] at them with analysis and in detail, they are in the depth
[00:06:29] of the homeland,
[00:06:31] homeland, from the clay of this homeland,
[00:06:34] and from the waters of this homeland, and from
[00:06:38] the salt of this land. God is great. God
[00:06:44] is great. You, brothers, are not easy. You are a lineage of
[00:06:48] history, a history,
[00:06:50] a white history, a white history. And if
[00:06:54] the enemies of the homeland wanted
[00:06:57] to obscure this history
[00:07:00] blackness, but Sheikh Musa
[00:07:03] Hilal and heroes around him
[00:07:08] plot.
[00:07:13] Dear viewers, welcome again. Doctor, this
[00:07:17] visit of Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta to the Awakening Council
[00:07:21] of the Revolution in Omdurman. Your comment on what he said. Of course, His Excellency
[00:07:25] Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta always distinguishes
[00:07:29] himself with an objective discourse and a historical discourse
[00:07:32] and is truly knowledgeable about national history. If one
[00:07:36] follows this picture,
[00:07:39] next to him is
[00:07:42] Safna Al-Nurqaba. Al-Nurqaba
[00:07:45] is, I mean, in reality, they were not, for example, a general in the Rapid Support Forces. Originally,
[00:07:49] he was from the Border Guards, but he was incorporated into the Rapid Support
[00:07:53] Forces, and they were not satisfied, Al-Nurqaba, Safna, and so on.
[00:07:58] of the support as a fait accompli. But the reality
[00:08:01] fully confirms that the departure of Al-Nurqaba,
[00:08:04] Safna, and others will lead to very significant movements
[00:08:08] towards North Darfur. All indications say that
[00:08:12] the movements will be a considerable number from a very large number of
[00:08:16] axes, considering that the movement will not be in
[00:08:19] one direction, and this is the big challenge that the militia will face,
[00:08:22] considering that they rely on panic. But I
[00:08:26] think that when there are more than seven axes, I mean,
[00:08:30] which direction will it go? Will it go in the West Kordofan axis,
[00:08:33] for example, in El-Nahud areas? Will it go in the Mellit axis,
[00:08:36] for example, in North Darfur? Will it go in the Dar Zagawa axis?
[00:08:40] Will it hold the West Darfur axis and so on? I think
[00:08:43] that we expect
[00:08:47] a considerable number of surprises, considering
[00:08:51] that the movements will be very significant, whether through
[00:08:54] the army, joint intelligence, and so on.
[00:08:58] Therefore, we think that maintaining the morale
[00:09:01] of the army is extremely important.
[00:09:04] the Sudanese street for the military institution is extremely important. Also, the media
[00:09:08] institution must be present in this battle, the battle of dignity.
[00:09:12] Yes. So let me move to a file
[00:09:15] related to the militia. Legal expert
[00:09:19] Dr. Mohammed Al-Zain stressed the importance
[00:09:22] of activating international justice mechanisms and holding accountable
[00:09:26] those responsible for the violations
[00:09:29] committed by the militia since April 15,
[00:09:33] 2023, and its supporters, which
[00:09:36] falls under the classification of war crimes
[00:09:40] and genocide. He emphasized the importance of integrating
[00:09:44] official, popular, and media efforts to support
[00:09:47] the path of international justice. Dr. Al-Zain explained
[00:09:51] during his speech at the 62nd awareness
[00:09:54] conference of the Ministry of Culture,
[00:09:57] Information, Tourism, and Antiquities, which
[00:10:01] was organized by the Sudan News Agency at the Cultural
[00:10:04] Center in Omdurman, he explained
[00:10:07] the importance of understanding the true nature
[00:10:10] of the war and understanding its legal and political context.
[00:10:14] He said that the war waged by
[00:10:17] the militia is not a war between two parties,
[00:10:20] but a war of national dignity and a war
[00:10:24] of existence. It targets the Sudanese state,
[00:10:26] stating that its legal
[00:10:29] description falls within the framework
[00:10:32] of aggression directed against the state, the Sudanese
[00:10:35] people, and national resources. Doctor,
[00:10:39] of course, we must first commend
[00:10:42] the positions and efforts of Dr. Mohammed
[00:10:45] Zain in the international arena. Yes. And in the legal
[00:10:49] context, I mean, do you think
[00:10:53] that legally Sudan has been able to define the issue legally,
[00:10:56] and what are the expected outcomes after these efforts?
[00:11:00] Of course, there have been great efforts made, especially
[00:11:05] people thought that international cooperation would not be at the required level.
[00:11:09] Also, people thought that regional and international organizations
[00:11:13] also did not understand what was happening on the ground. But after
[00:11:16] the movements of some Sudanese
[00:11:20] the surrounding countries and the demonstrations that we saw day
[00:11:23] after day, and the movements of academics, journalists,
[00:11:26] and activists in civil society organizations, they were able
[00:11:30] to convey the truth on the ground, considering that
[00:11:33] many crimes and violations have
[00:11:36] occurred in many cities, in
[00:11:40] El-Fasher, in other areas, in Zamzam camp. But I
[00:11:44] want to say with all honesty that the militia was documenting its crimes,
[00:11:47] and therefore all the evidence and proofs were available, and everyone
[00:11:51] was following. Therefore, but did, I mean, this documentation
[00:11:55] and these proofs,
[00:11:58] I mean, at the legal level and international
[00:12:02] condemnations, and, I mean,
[00:12:06] perhaps decision-making centers or international organizations concerned
[00:12:10] with human rights and law, I mean, is there
[00:12:13] any positive response in favor of Sudan? Of course, of course, even
[00:12:17] now, if we follow what
[00:12:19] is called popular diplomacy, the popular movement had
[00:12:23] a great impact. Also, intelligence diplomacy,
[00:12:26] also, the movements of external work, diplomatic work, international
[00:12:30] relations played a great role in, I mean,
[00:12:34] presenting Sudan's vision in international
[00:12:37] the African Union, in the United Nations, also,
[00:12:40] the strategy of the Council of Ministers that the Prime Minister presented
[00:12:44] concerning peace issues in Sudan, all of these paved the way
[00:12:48] for the international community and regional and international organizations to change
[00:12:51] their understanding of what is happening on the ground. Also,
[00:12:55] other countries, whether in Arab countries,
[00:12:59] Arab countries, and others, were able to refute these allegations.
[00:13:02] The media, also, the local and international media were following closely
[00:13:06] and intimately. Therefore, I think that
[00:13:09] the effort that was made was a great effort by a considerable number of Sudanese
[00:13:13] citizens. Also, we notice that human rights organizations are working.
[00:13:16] I mean, people should not think that there are no institutions
[00:13:20] monitoring the situation on the ground, because we
[00:13:23] see
[00:13:25] that the states have formed committees, what is called
[00:13:28] fact-finding committees about the Rapid Support militia
[00:13:31] in all states of Sudan.
[00:13:34] This information is kept up to date. This information
[00:13:39] organizations and concerned institutions in international
[00:13:44] external work. Therefore, this information was very accurate and
[00:13:48] rich for the international community. I mean, for example, now there are international movements
[00:13:52] to classify the Rapid Support militia as a terrorist militia. All
[00:13:55] of this came through popular effort, official effort,
[00:13:59] academic effort, media effort,
[00:14:01] diplomatic effort. Therefore, I think
[00:14:05] direction. We need to provide more evidence
[00:14:08] and proofs that we must reach
[00:14:12] the highest levels of litigation, whether
[00:14:16] at the level of national judicial institutions or at the level of international
[00:14:20] institutions concerned with human rights issues,
[00:14:23] so that, I mean, what is called
[00:14:25] the destruction that occurred to the Sudanese society at this stage, and it was
[00:14:29] a very great destruction. Okay, yes, Dr. Zakaria, excuse me for interrupting,
[00:14:32] but there is talk that the parties that support
[00:14:36] the militia and that stand behind the militia,
[00:14:43] the world, these parties that are supposed to
[00:14:46] condemn the militia are perhaps
[00:14:50] branches of these
[00:14:53] context, is it possible for these supporting countries
[00:14:57] of the militia to condemn the party that supports it? And if
[00:15:00] we assume that there are, I mean, parties that have condemned
[00:15:03] the militia and classified it as a terrorist militia, and have talked
[00:15:07] about, have talked about genocide, what
[00:15:11] does the classification of the militia as terrorist add
[00:15:14] to Sudan? We have our mechanisms, whether they are
[00:15:18] national mechanisms or our international relations that we
[00:15:21] move through. Therefore, I think that we
[00:15:25] are an integral part of the international
[00:15:28] Sudan. Therefore,
[00:15:31] others in the same way, and we try
[00:15:34] as much as possible to expose some countries
[00:15:37] that were directly supporting the militia in the same way.
[00:15:41] We have national mechanisms, what is called the judicial
[00:15:45] triangle, whether it is the judicial system, the prosecution,
[00:15:48] the police, all the information is now working
[00:15:52] and the militia's violations are reported to the prosecution.
[00:15:55] The thefts that occurred in citizens' property and so
[00:15:59] on. Therefore, we do not rely
[00:16:02] to a high degree on international community institutions. We
[00:16:05] rely on judicial institutions. Therefore, we think
[00:16:09] that there are some countries that we need to sit
[00:16:13] down with diplomatically day after day. We are not at all unable
[00:16:16] to negotiate with the African Union for Sudan's return to
[00:16:19] the African Union table. We are not at all unable
[00:16:23] to, I mean,
[00:16:28] the Arab League. And we are not at all unable to, I mean, the United
[00:16:34] will not cooperate with Sudan. They will not deal with Sudan's issues. I think that there are some judicial
[00:16:37] institutions, there are very influential bodies, what is called
[00:16:41] the American lobby, and there are some institutions in developed
[00:16:44] countries working, monitoring, and so on, I mean,
[00:16:48] affecting even elections in some countries. Therefore, I think
[00:16:51] that there are some institutions that we should work
[00:16:55] with so that we can, as much as possible, ensure
[00:16:59] that these crimes that have been committed are brought
[00:17:02] to justice. And in the same way, what is called
[00:17:06] the mechanisms of what is called
[00:17:08] truth, justice, and reconciliation. All of these are mechanisms that can be
[00:17:12] local, regional, and international. Yes.
[00:17:15] Of course, certainly, if the international community,
[00:17:18] I mean, overlooked what happened in Sudan,
[00:17:21] then certainly the living global conscience
[00:17:25] and history will not forgive this
[00:17:27] militia. Let me move to the second meeting
[00:17:31] of the special committee for preparing for the exchange
[00:17:34] of detainees. The second meeting of the committee
[00:17:38] specializing in preparing for the exchange of detainees, which
[00:17:42] was formed under the decision of the President of the Transitional
[00:17:45] Sovereignty Council No. 270 for the year
[00:17:49] 2026, was held on Saturday, August 1st
[00:17:53] of this year, with the full
[00:17:56] attendance of its members. The meeting reviewed the status of implementing
[00:18:00] previous assignments regarding the enumeration and classification
[00:18:03] of detainees and the preparation of records
[00:18:06] and necessary data lists. The meeting also
[00:18:10] approved the plan set for the preparation process
[00:18:14] and subsequent steps in all stages
[00:18:17] of the exchange process. The meeting also praised
[00:18:20] the interaction of the families of the missing and detainees through
[00:18:24] their response to the committee's appeal to report
[00:18:28] their relatives to police stations and public
[00:18:32] prosecutions. Doctor,
[00:18:35] I mean, what do you expect for the results
[00:18:37] of the meeting? Of course, I think that this is a normal routine
[00:18:41] that happens in all wars. And of course, these are
[00:18:44] efforts related to local, regional, and international
[00:18:47] institutions. This is one thing. If we take it at the international level, what is called
[00:18:51] the International Red Cross and the United Nations,
[00:18:57] field. Also, the process of exchanging prisoners. I
[00:19:00] think that it is a humanitarian
[00:19:04] society, considering that it is a humanitarian issue. Also, the exchange process
[00:19:07] is based on all for all. And at the same
[00:19:11] time, the exchange of prisoners is not only linked
[00:19:15] to the army. It can be the army, the police, and also
[00:19:18] civilians if they are prisoners. I mean, therefore, I think that this is one of the very
[00:19:22] important mechanisms. At the same
[00:19:26] time, I mean, at the same time, they use legal tools, customary
[00:19:29] tools, and religious tools, considering that a prisoner should be treated
[00:19:33] humanely, preserving his
[00:19:36] dignity and so on. Therefore, I expect from this
[00:19:39] committee that it will first go towards
[00:19:42] identifying the missing,
[00:19:45] as well as the detainees, as well as the prisoners,
[00:19:49] and so on. Because the military institution has sufficient
[00:19:52] information about where the prisoners are and so on. Because there are some
[00:19:56] notoriously bad prisons, for example, Dagris prison,
[00:19:59] another prison in El-Shalla, and also some citizens
[00:20:04] El-Fasher, in the eastern neighborhoods, and so on, after the undeclared
[00:20:08] prisons. But I think that the military
[00:20:11] institution is capable of providing information, capable of obtaining
[00:20:15] accurate information and so on. But all of this is done within the framework
[00:20:18] of accurate information through the established mechanisms,
[00:20:22] whether they are legal, customary, and so
[00:20:25] on.
[00:20:27] I mean, is the militia aware of the nature of such
[00:20:31] issues regarding UN charters
[00:20:34] and human rights,
[00:20:37] Sudanese customs and Sudanese
[00:20:40] ethics? I mean, when we talk about such
[00:20:43] issues, is it necessary to include
[00:20:47] what you mentioned? It is necessary for us
[00:20:50] to deal with matters from the perspective of the established
[00:20:53] tools. The militia is forced to cooperate with
[00:20:59] cooperate, the international community will find itself facing a real trial. I mean, therefore, I think
[00:21:03] that it is true that they do not have the ethics that they talk about,
[00:21:06] but perhaps they will put themselves in an awkward
[00:21:10] position if they do not cooperate
[00:21:14] and so on. But I think that such
[00:21:17] files are very important because they have humanitarian
[00:21:20] dimensions. They may cooperate, or they may not cooperate. They may try
[00:21:24] to provide misleading information or so on. But human rights
[00:21:27] organizations are working. They have information about where prisoners are
[00:21:31] detained, where they are in Nyala, where they are in
[00:21:34] El-Fasher, even, I mean, they think that international committees might, for example, visit
[00:21:38] certain prisons, El-Shalla prison in Nyala, or go to Dagris prison
[00:21:42] and so on. But there are also prisons in other places, I mean, other detention
[00:21:45] centers, and accurate information is available. People know it. I mean, yes.
[00:21:49] Okay, let's move to the Ministry of Foreign
[00:21:52] Affairs holding a meeting with the Deputy Country Director
[00:21:56] of the High Commissioner's Office for Refugees
[00:22:01] of following up on the developments of the clashes that occurred
[00:22:04] between the Tigray People's Liberation Front forces and the Ethiopian
[00:22:07] Army on
[00:22:10] and Ethiopia, the Ministry of Foreign
[00:22:14] Affairs held a meeting with the Deputy
[00:22:17] Country Director of the Office of the High Commissioner
[00:22:20] for Refugees in
[00:22:23] discussed the latest developments
[00:22:26] and the humanitarian implications arising from
[00:22:29] the confrontations in the region and their impact on the situation
[00:22:32] of refugees and asylum seekers coming
[00:22:36] from Ethiopia. The Ministry
[00:22:39] asked the Commission to
[00:22:42] highlight the facts and provide accurate
[00:22:45] information to the local and international public
[00:22:49] regarding the humanitarian developments
[00:22:53] strip. Doctor,
[00:22:57] of course, suddenly this issue
[00:23:00] erupted. True, it is sudden, but there are
[00:23:04] previous repercussions, an old renewed problem
[00:23:07] between the Ethiopian government and Tigray, and as is well
[00:23:11] known, they reached a peace agreement in Pretoria
[00:23:14] in South Africa. Why do you think these
[00:23:18] events renewed? I think that one of our
[00:23:21] problems in the Horn of Africa is that peace
[00:23:25] agreements do not last very long, perhaps due to the lack
[00:23:28] of commitment to implementing these agreements, and perhaps
[00:23:31] some institutions are linked to social
[00:23:35] and tribal ties. This is also one of
[00:23:37] the strategic determinants for the Horn of Africa. But I think
[00:23:41] that the real challenge is that when
[00:23:44] we are a state, I mean, we have our internal problems,
[00:23:48] and there are also repercussions for another state,
[00:23:51] refugees and Ethiopians. Again,
[00:23:54] this region is a very active region, I mean,
[00:23:57] it will put us in a very awkward position, because, incidentally, refugees
[00:24:01] sometimes come with their problems, they come
[00:24:04] with many of their own problems. The problem
[00:24:07] of human trafficking, I don't know, the smuggling that happens
[00:24:10] and illegal activities and so on. Therefore, I think that
[00:24:13] sitting with the High Commissioner or UNHCR concerned with
[00:24:17] the work of refugees is a must
[00:24:20] to organize the work of refugees
[00:24:23] and their camps. At least they should be 40 kilometers away
[00:24:27] from the Sudanese cities. For organization purposes, okay.
[00:24:30] Yes, in this context, I mean, in the news, the Ministry asked
[00:24:34] the Commission to highlight
[00:24:37] the facts and provide accurate information
[00:24:41] to the local and international public. Do you think
[00:24:44] what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
[00:24:47] means by providing information? Of course,
[00:24:51] considering that there are refugees, UNHCR says that
[00:24:56] in Sudanese territory. And this
[00:24:59] is a result. Is it expected
[00:25:03] that not all facts will be announced because of the news?
[00:25:05] Of course, I think that international organizations in the early
[00:25:09] stages do not always announce results clearly.
[00:25:13] Why not? Many of them think that they will put themselves in
[00:25:17] awkward positions by not, because they are accused of not being impartial and independent
[00:25:20] and so on. But I think that the assumption should be that
[00:25:24] the refugees themselves have their tools, they have activists in civil
[00:25:28] society organizations who should provide the local and regional public
[00:25:31] with this information about what is happening on the ground, I mean, considering that there are organizations
[00:25:35] that will work, human rights organizations, organizations concerned with gender-based
[00:25:38] violence, organizations concerned
[00:25:40] with issues of food and drink,
[00:25:44] or for example in health,
[00:25:47] and relief and so on. Therefore,
[00:25:51] I think that
[00:25:55] organizations in the early stages of these
[00:25:58] events do not tend to provide information to the public
[00:26:01] clearly. If they provided the public with all
[00:26:04] the information, would that put any burdens on this
[00:26:08] organization? Of course, this is a UN organization,
[00:26:11] UNHCR, this is one of the United Nations organizations. True,
[00:26:15] it puts itself in front of a challenge. Sometimes, the lack of cooperation from
[00:26:18] some countries and so on. But they have
[00:26:21] in interventions and so on, considering that it is one of the United
[00:26:25] Nations agencies concerned with refugee issues. Is it exempt
[00:26:28] from any burdens regarding Sudan? The organization.
[00:26:32] Unfortunately,
[00:26:36] organizations sometimes have some roles, I mean, especially
[00:26:40] in our national crisis, some organizations' roles at the beginning
[00:26:43] were not positive, frankly speaking, I mean, their roles were not
[00:26:47] positive. I mean, it's like they thought that this battle would not
[00:26:51] be like this. But after the situation
[00:26:54] calmed down, now if you notice, some speeches have started to change, movements
[00:26:57] of international organizations are changing and so on. But the roles at the beginning
[00:27:01] were not positive. Yes, okay.
[00:27:04] Let me move to the next file:
[00:27:08] the Ministry of Energy. Press Statement
[00:27:10] No. 3 regarding the outage of the
[00:27:14] Sedmarawi power plant. The Ministry of Energy issued a
[00:27:18] press statement No. 3 regarding
[00:27:21] the outage of the Merowe Dam power plant. Below
[00:27:24] we present the full text
[00:27:26] of the statement: The Ministry of Energy clarifies that,
[00:27:32] generation and national grid management, some alternative
[00:27:36] power supplies have been provided,
[00:27:38] thereby providing electricity
[00:27:42] to large sectors of strategic facilities
[00:27:45] and some residential areas
[00:27:49] follows: Firstly, water
[00:27:52] stations. Ten stations have
[00:27:56] entered service, operating 24
[00:27:59] hours a day, including Talha water station,
[00:28:02] Beit Al-Mal water, and Bahri water, in addition
[00:28:06] to other stations.
[00:28:10] Secondly, hospitals and health
[00:28:12] centers. Electricity has been supplied to
[00:28:15] 15 hospitals and centers operating
[00:28:19] 24 hours a day, including Omdurman Hospital,
[00:28:23] Al-Nao hospital, Soba
[00:28:26] Academic, Al-Turki, Ahmed
[00:28:29] Qasim Bakhri, Bashir, Medical
[00:28:33] Corps, East Nile Alia
[00:28:36] Al-Raqi, Omdurman for Maternity, and Zeinab
[00:28:40] Kidney Dialysis Center. Thirdly,
[00:28:43] residential areas. Electricity has reached wide
[00:28:47] areas of Jebel Aulia, Kalakala, Al-Saliha,
[00:28:51] Abu Sa'id, Umbada,
[00:28:54] Al-Thawra, Arkowit, North Rural,
[00:28:57] Al-Jaili, Al-Ramli,
[00:29:01] and Aweizti. Al-Imtidad, Al-Juraif
[00:29:04] West, Al-Deem, Al-Sahafa, Ad
[00:29:07] Bakr, and Hajj Youssef.
[00:29:10] Electricity supply operations will continue to all
[00:29:14] neighborhoods and other affected states.
[00:29:17] The Ministry confirms that shifts of engineers
[00:29:21] and technicians are working around the clock
[00:29:24] to complete maintenance work
[00:29:27] and connect networks as quickly as possible.
[00:29:31] The Ministry explained that spare parts for the Merowe Dam
[00:29:35] station affected by
[00:29:39] to arrive from abroad within
[00:29:43] three days, God willing. Therefore, the Ministry
[00:29:46] of Energy reiterates its appeal
[00:29:49] to the esteemed citizens to rationalize consumption, especially
[00:29:53] during this critical period.
[00:29:55] We will keep you updated
[00:29:58] on developments in the electricity sector
[00:30:01] first and foremost. Dr.
[00:30:04] Zakaria, I mean, the issue
[00:30:08] of electricity, if
[00:30:10] we discuss it in the context of the war,
[00:30:13] the Karama war, the militia
[00:30:17] was systematically targeting power
[00:30:20] stations,
[00:30:22] which indicates that the talk about
[00:30:26] the 17 foreign countries that participated in
[00:30:30] the Sudan war had among their main
[00:30:33] objectives the failure of the Sudanese state
[00:30:36] and the replacement
[00:30:39] of the Sudanese state with new citizens.
[00:30:42] When we talk about electricity, this hypothesis seems
[00:30:46] a lived reality. Are we still facing
[00:30:49] the repercussions of the destruction carried out by the terrorist
[00:30:53] militia and those behind it,
[00:30:57] or are we on the ground?