SUDAN — broadcast
20260806 173000 UTC
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[00:00:00] The world has seen in the first
[00:00:00] and pressure recent operations in which
[00:00:03] the armed forces are involved in any country,
[00:00:06] in any country to fight insurgency.
[00:00:10] I mean, I say that these armed forces are still
[00:00:14] practicing the process of pressure on
[00:00:16] the enemy so that the enemy cannot
[00:00:20] carry out
[00:00:23] force targets operations in the organization and then return
[00:00:26] again by carrying out offensive operations. Okay.
[00:00:30] Okay, Mr. Abdul Aziz, let me ask another question. In your opinion, to what extent
[00:00:34] on the Kordofan
[00:00:34] We expect, as we said have the airstrikes affected or in terms
[00:00:37] of specifically the issue of supply
[00:00:41] and movements for
[00:00:48] of the martyrs of the Sudanese people and the martyrs of the armed
[00:00:52] forces and all
[00:00:56] for this militia and the joint forces and all the security agencies supporting the armed forces in the battle of dignity.
[00:01:00] This existential battle for the masses of the Sudanese people, in
[00:01:04] fact,
[00:01:07] Come to prayer. the air force or all the security
[00:01:09] agencies and the various bodies in the armed
[00:01:13] forces
[00:01:14] for the ground forces to be have provided
[00:01:18] that were previously stockpiled every body or every institution has provided
[00:01:22] Come to a very big work and a tremendous effort in managing
[00:01:26] the battle of dignity and breaking the power
[00:01:28] of the Rapid Support Militia. And in this second instance, let me
[00:01:32] salute the Sudanese
[00:01:34] Come to success. Air Force, especially the Sudanese Air Force.
[00:01:38] It has completely confirmed that this weapon
[00:01:42] is the weapon that decides the outcome, and it is a very
[00:01:46] precise weapon and decisive in breaking
[00:01:50] Come to the militia's power, and not as some claim that it targets some
[00:01:54] areas at times, but
[00:01:57] also the Sudanese intelligence, the Sudanese
[00:02:01] intelligence agency, confirmed
[00:02:04] many areas in its readiness and accuracy, I believe that controlling especially in the last
[00:02:06] one operation that broke the power
[00:02:09] in North Kordofan State,
[00:02:12] especially in the city of Al-Bara
[00:02:15] whether the great powers and Jibr Al-Shaykh and other areas that were liberated recently
[00:02:18] and are now in the embrace of the nation. All
[00:02:22] these agencies have confirmed their readiness
[00:02:25] and accuracy and have done
[00:02:28] enough of
[00:02:31] So this capability the work entrusted to them. In fact, all these
[00:02:35] from the paralysis and the strong efforts, which in their entirety represent
[00:02:37] the Sudanese Armed Forces, are in fact
[00:02:41] the main reason for breaking the power of the Rapid Support Militia,
[00:02:45] simple people, especially the supplies. The supplies that the
[00:02:48] armed forces and joint forces managed to capture
[00:02:51] in the city of Jibr Al-Shaykh, specifically,
[00:02:55] this is a great effort and not by mere chance
[00:02:58] or a ground operation. Only, but rather an intelligence
[00:03:02] operation or
[00:03:03] that can evade an air operation, a ground operation
[00:03:07] that was completed in all aspects of the armed forces
[00:03:10] in carrying out this successful operation.
[00:03:14] And these supplies now
[00:03:17] mean that the Rapid Support has become a very
[00:03:21] big problem, and it has perhaps
[00:03:25] you, are created caused fear and deep divisions in
[00:03:26] of these operations, the mechanisms its ranks because it does not have
[00:03:30] media industry. They are created its original level as required, and also the small
[00:03:33] and even fuel,
[00:03:36] abroad. all these efforts were accomplished by
[00:03:41] maneuver and redeploy? a ground operation, an air operation, and an integrated intelligence operation. This operation
[00:03:45] contributes to the forces in deploying ground
[00:03:48] essential part of forces throughout the Kordofan region, and also
[00:04:13] media denial does
[00:04:15] not erase the impact of the crime
[00:04:19] contributes to the air force
[00:04:21] in
[00:04:30] now in in the war that is raging
[00:08:43] expert. So, Mr. Othman, how do you assess the extent
[00:08:46] of the impact of these strikes in terms
[00:08:49] of the militia's ability to
[00:08:53] Of course,
[00:08:55] I would say that the impact
[00:08:59] of the air force in
[00:09:04] is a very significant and profound
[00:09:07] impact, given the
[00:09:11] use of high
[00:09:13] technologies
[00:09:16] and the fact that unmanned aerial vehicles are
[00:09:20] very effective and play a huge role. So, certainly,
[00:09:23] these technologies
[00:09:25] used by
[00:09:29] have a very positive impact
[00:09:33] modern warfare. However,
[00:09:37] I would say that clearly
[00:09:42] Sudan, the Sudanese Air Force,
[00:09:44] with its capabilities and capacities,
[00:09:47] has been able to curb the activity
[00:09:50] of these rebel forces by paralyzing their
[00:09:54] movement first. As you have seen,
[00:09:58] in recent times, since
[00:10:01] the liberated areas were liberated recently,
[00:10:05] and until now,
[00:10:07] many militia movements
[00:10:10] have not been able to move as
[00:10:14] they used to, roaming
[00:10:17] in various parts of the theater of operations.
[00:10:20] Now, there is a complete paralysis.
[00:10:24] I wouldn't say complete, but these
[00:10:27] strikes have affected the paralysis of
[00:10:30] movement first. The second
[00:10:34] thing and the noticeable thing is the destruction
[00:10:37] of convoys coming from outside
[00:10:41] the borders. As you have seen and
[00:10:44] are seeing, the air
[00:10:48] aerial targets coming from inside and outside the borders,
[00:10:52] and the destruction of a large number of equipment,
[00:10:56] whether military or even those
[00:10:59] used for funding,
[00:11:01] and cutting, certainly, the supply
[00:11:07] This matter has a negative impact
[00:11:10] on all movements and movements of
[00:11:14] the rebel militia, and this imposes
[00:11:17] a field isolation
[00:11:21] an inability to continue combat
[00:11:24] operations. It is clear, as we said
[00:11:27] earlier, that the operations that took place recently in
[00:11:31] the theater of operations in Kordofan, and
[00:11:34] the defeat that this militia suffered and its abandonment
[00:11:38] of a lot of equipment and supplies
[00:11:43] to carry out operations that were
[00:11:46] expected inside the Sudanese interior, but
[00:11:50] with this crushing defeat, these
[00:11:53] spoils fell into the hands of the armed forces,
[00:11:56] and they are now using this
[00:11:59] equipment and supplies that were left behind
[00:12:12] how do supply routes
[00:12:15] affect the resolution of the battle?
[00:12:19] What are the effects of this control and on resolving
[00:12:22] the battle and achieving quick
[00:12:25] results?
[00:12:28] the crossings is of the basic
[00:12:31] operations in this battle because
[00:12:34] this war is not a war between the Rapid Support
[00:12:38] Militia and the Sudanese Armed Forces, but rather it is an international
[00:12:41] war, a war with regional
[00:12:44] extension, and a war coming from outside the borders, whether the western
[00:12:48] Sudanese borders or even some
[00:12:50] neighboring regional and Sudanese neighboring
[00:12:53] countries. Therefore, the supplies coming from outside
[00:12:57] Sudan feed a large percentage, or more than
[00:13:01] 90% of the Rapid Support's supplies and
[00:13:05] logistical or military support comes from outside
[00:13:08] Sudan. When the armed forces or
[00:13:11] the air force targets the convoys that
[00:13:15] come from outside the borders,
[00:13:18] it has probably decided a large percentage of the battle.
[00:13:21] And the great impact of these supplies
[00:13:25] confirmed that the large ground war that the
[00:13:29] armed forces carried out in Kordofan, especially in
[00:13:32] the cities of Bara and Jibr Al-Shaykh, completely confirmed
[00:13:35] that the extent of the support that comes
[00:13:39] from countries outside Sudan is very great, and all these
[00:13:42] large and heavy vehicles entered the region with the aim
[00:13:46] of destroying Sudan and not with the aim of confronting the armed forces
[00:13:49] because all these weapons are weapons for destroying
[00:13:52] infrastructure, drones, and so
[00:13:55] on. This large ground battle is the first
[00:13:59] of its kind since 2023. This is the largest
[00:14:03] ground operation that took place in Greater Kordofan. Therefore,
[00:14:06] this ground operation brought about very
[00:14:10] great gains, including moral gains
[00:14:13] and administrative gains. There was a very great interaction
[00:14:19] that the joint Sudanese forces were very happy
[00:14:23] with the air force, as if
[00:14:30] they were... Yes, the gains are very great, and also the large and dense foreign
[00:14:34] presence
[00:14:37] was apprehended inside the cities
[00:14:40] in Kordofan. This also
[00:14:44] the external front or Sudanese diplomacy.
[00:14:48] It has provided very great evidence, and also Sudanese
[00:14:51] foreign policy can benefit from this ground operation.
[00:14:59] So, Mr. Othman, how do you assess the recent military
[00:15:02] advances in the Kordofan axes,
[00:15:05] specifically in North Kordofan and West
[00:15:09] Kordofan? These operations
[00:15:13] that took place in recent weeks and are still
[00:15:16] ongoing have had
[00:15:19] a great impact on the course
[00:15:22] of operations for the enemy. And
[00:15:26] they have deprived the enemy of the initiative and given
[00:15:30] the armed forces the initiative, and now they
[00:15:33] are exerting defense
[00:15:37] on the enemy so that it cannot regain
[00:15:41] the initiative again. Therefore,
[00:15:45] it has lost the ability of this militia to carry
[00:15:48] out any offensive operations in the near
[00:15:51] future, or in the very near future. This militia now
[00:15:55] cannot reorganize and then carry
[00:15:58] out offensive operations again due to the loss
[00:16:02] of supply lines and the loss of command and control at the same time,
[00:16:06] and the divisions that have occurred and are occurring daily.
[00:16:11] before, that there will be clashes between
[00:16:15] those who want to leave this militia and join
[00:16:18] the national front in the near future. We expect
[00:16:22] strong clashes in the theater
[00:16:25] of operations, whether in Darfur or Kordofan,
[00:16:28] and these defections
[00:16:32] portend these clashes. The departure
[00:16:35] of many
[00:16:38] ethnicities, if I may use this expression,
[00:16:41] and the widespread anger
[00:16:44] among
[00:16:47] the citizens who are under the control
[00:16:49] of this militia, whether in Darfur or
[00:16:53] Kordofan, now
[00:16:55] the local environment is not
[00:16:59] in favor of this militia, but rather it has
[00:17:03] completely turned in favor of the armed forces
[00:17:06] or in favor of the Republic of Sudan. So, Mr. Abdul Aziz,
[00:17:09] how will these advances, the advances
[00:17:13] of the armed forces, affect the course of operations
[00:17:16] in the Darfur region? Yes, especially
[00:17:19] in Darfur, there is now a very wide
[00:17:23] deployment of the joint forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces,
[00:17:26] and now the area of control or the area
[00:17:29] that is in the embrace of the homeland
[00:17:32] is expanding. It used to be more
[00:17:35] than three or four localities only. But now the ground
[00:17:39] forces have spread to
[00:17:41] Darfur due to the paralysis that has affected
[00:17:45] the Rapid Support Militia and the strong blow that the militia received
[00:17:49] in the Kordofan region. Now
[00:17:52] the ground forces in all areas,
[00:17:55] there is a very small force, some forces
[00:17:59] you could say, very few vehicles. Now they have the freedom
[00:18:03] to move and search for the Rapid Support wherever it is found.
[00:18:08] or this space came
[00:18:12] blows that came from the air force,
[00:18:15] especially in the contact areas and at the borders
[00:18:18] through which supplies enter. And you are all
[00:18:21] following that 80% of the equipment that came
[00:18:25] from outside Sudan in the past 15 days
[00:18:27] has been completely destroyed and its fate has been completely
[00:18:31] sealed. Perhaps the large trucks
[00:18:34] have been burned 100%. Perhaps there might
[00:18:38] be small vehicles
[00:18:41] the eyes of the air force, but large
[00:18:44] supplies and heavy equipment are now
[00:18:47] impossible to enter Sudan's borders,
[00:18:50] except for some air flights,
[00:18:54] and with strict security at specific
[00:18:56] times, this happens in the city of Nyala
[00:19:00] specifically, but there is no room
[00:19:03] for heavy equipment to enter. And this is an opportunity
[00:19:06] that must be utilized correctly,
[00:19:09] and when the armed forces move,
[00:19:13] others must be mobilized because ground forces need
[00:19:16] a very large number of mobilized people and a very
[00:19:19] large number because the areas in western Sudan are vast
[00:19:22] and wide, and we must move the mobilization
[00:19:25] efforts, and the Sudanese people must move so that
[00:19:29] we can decisively defeat this militia completely
[00:19:32] and completely
[00:19:35] with the least effort and with
[00:19:58] In your opinion, what are the most prominent challenges that the forces may face
[00:20:01] during the next phase?
[00:20:03] You could say
[00:20:08] political challenges because
[00:20:11] the
[00:20:13] external or international
[00:20:16] actors have a very significant influence,
[00:20:20] and these are great
[00:20:23] powers and financial empires that support
[00:20:26] this militia, providing supplies
[00:20:30] and at the same time providing diplomatic cover
[00:20:33] for this militia. I expect increased
[00:20:37] pressure on the Sudanese government to
[00:20:41] yield and accept entering into negotiations,
[00:20:44] and this is an unacceptable matter after these great
[00:20:48] gains achieved by the forces. The armed forces and the Sudanese
[00:20:52] government, and gains for the Sudanese
[00:20:54] people. The other thing,
[00:20:58] the other challenge, is the mobilization of the regional
[00:21:01] environment, meaning the neighboring
[00:21:05] countries to the government of the Republic of Sudan, to
[00:21:08] enable this militia
[00:21:11] to gain a stronger foothold than
[00:21:14] before, such as Chad and Ethiopia,
[00:21:18] and to move from these countries to carry out operations
[00:21:21] to relieve pressure
[00:21:24] and Darfur theaters or the internal
[00:21:27] theater on this militia.
[00:21:30] I expect, for example, as you have seen,
[00:21:34] some movements that occurred in our beloved East. I expect
[00:21:38] that and more supplies will flow
[00:21:41] across the borders, despite the great
[00:21:45] impact that the air force
[00:21:48] has achieved in the past period, and it
[00:21:52] continues to do so. The air force deserves our salute, as
[00:21:55] your honorable guest said, for its great
[00:21:59] role in creating a suitable environment and conditions
[00:22:04] able to carry out the ground operations
[00:22:07] that we all expect to be large and
[00:22:11] a very large maneuver,
[00:22:14] as you know, to carry out the
[00:22:17] maneuver, this requires favorable conditions,
[00:22:21] including weather conditions,
[00:22:25] meaning that there must be air superiority
[00:22:28] for the force that wants to carry out a maneuver,
[00:22:32] and it is known that the maneuver took place
[00:22:35] deep inside the enemy's territory, which was carried
[00:22:39] out by the armed and joint forces, and now
[00:22:42] they are fighting behind enemy lines. This maneuver was a large
[00:22:45] and great maneuver that crossed these forces,
[00:22:49] the enemy's front lines, for the front
[00:22:52] defense lines for this militia. It was a big
[00:22:55] surprise even for the Sudanese people, and even more
[00:22:59] of a surprise for this militia and those who support it,
[00:23:05] abroad and the forces that support this militia
[00:23:20] tonight, but after the break.
[00:23:40] Welcome back to Sudan Tonight. And in another file, media
[00:23:44] deception in wartime: Who creates the narrative?
[00:23:47] The war in Sudan has witnessed an unprecedented escalation
[00:23:50] with the use of media and digital platforms as a parallel
[00:23:54] arena for military operations, where disinformation
[00:23:57] campaigns and the spread of misleading information intensify
[00:24:01] following field developments. Evidence indicates
[00:24:04] that Abu Dhabi's regime manages media rooms
[00:24:08] and funds propaganda campaigns aimed at influencing
[00:24:11] public opinion. Questions arise about the nature
[00:24:16] for verifying information, and their impact on citizens
[00:24:32] to what extent, Mr. Ibrahim, has media
[00:24:36] warfare become an
[00:24:46] has become a strategic war.
[00:24:52] But for the media
[00:24:55] war led
[00:24:58] by the militia,
[00:25:05] on the ground at all. And
[00:25:07] it is known that there is documentation
[00:25:10] via satellite and documentation
[00:25:14] via digital
[00:25:17] fingerprint for the perpetrators.
[00:25:20] So, media warfare and rumors
[00:25:24] are one of the tools of conflict,
[00:25:27] as is known, and an attempt to mislead
[00:25:31] and obscure public opinion.
[00:25:33] Thus,
[00:25:36] to what extent, Mr. Ibrahim, are these campaigns of
[00:25:39] media deception linked to
[00:25:42] the military defeats suffered by
[00:25:45] the militia?
[00:25:48] It is an attempt
[00:25:51] to boost the morale of the soldiers, the deceived
[00:25:54] soldiers, these simple soldiers who
[00:25:57] are fed speeches
[00:26:00] and
[00:26:03] false dreams
[00:26:06] and alleged
[00:26:08] goals that we were all deceived
[00:26:12] by. So, it is natural
[00:26:15] that these misleading
[00:26:18] media campaigns
[00:26:21] are linked to the defeats that the militia
[00:26:24] is currently suffering
[00:26:28] on all fronts. So, let me ask an important question at this point,
[00:26:31] sir. In your opinion, what are the most prominent
[00:26:35] methods used to spread
[00:26:37] misleading information?
[00:26:40] It is known that
[00:26:43] from abroad
[00:26:46] with very advanced capabilities. From where, Mr.
[00:26:49] Ibrahim?
[00:26:52] It is known that the UAE is the main
[00:26:56] supporter. This is known.
[00:26:59] And
[00:27:01] complaints have been filed, as is known.
[00:27:04] This is this and other countries that
[00:27:08] many know. So,
[00:27:12] how can we practically verify, Mr. Ibrahim,
[00:27:15] the authenticity of the videos
[00:27:18] or the news and images circulating
[00:27:21] during the war? Simple.
[00:27:24] People now,
[00:27:27] through digital development, it is very
[00:27:31] easy for a simple citizen, even through very
[00:27:35] simple applications, even the recipient
[00:27:37] can know whether
[00:27:41] this is a fabrication or a fact.
[00:27:43] So,
[00:27:46] how did these misleading news
[00:27:50] and fabricated news affect the morale of
[00:27:54] the militia soldiers
[00:27:56] who were suffering
[00:27:59] of the armed forces?
[00:28:03] Their impression was that
[00:28:06] the army was at its
[00:28:09] end, and
[00:28:12] they were pushed into battle
[00:28:15] zones and battles, and then they
[00:28:18] realized the truth after it was too late,
[00:28:22] after they became
[00:28:24] victims of these
[00:28:26] battles. And unfortunately, this
[00:28:30] reality contradicted these claims.
[00:28:33] Did the militia soldiers truly
[00:28:36] believe these allegations and misleading
[00:28:40] news? Of course, they believed them, because
[00:28:43] most of them are simple people, truly
[00:28:48] in terms of education
[00:28:51] and they are in areas that
[00:28:54] unfortunately
[00:28:57] have problems with education and illiteracy,
[00:29:00] and these are old
[00:29:03] repercussions. So, regarding the issue
[00:29:06] of creating the media narrative and directing
[00:29:09] this narrative, how
[00:29:13] do some parties exploit digital platforms?
[00:29:17] How were these platforms utilized to create this
[00:29:21] news?
[00:29:25] The platforms, as I told
[00:29:27] in this
[00:29:33] abroad through
[00:29:36] very advanced centers
[00:29:39] As for what
[00:29:42] is circulated or what
[00:29:45] is released to the world,
[00:29:48] even through the videos that are said
[00:29:51] to belong to the soldiers,
[00:29:54] or it used
[00:29:57] it came directly. Now,
[00:30:00] it is
[00:30:03] artificially affected and then released
[00:30:05] to the
[00:30:08] recipient and public opinion. So, what
[00:30:11] is different regarding the issue
[00:30:14] of indicators or the existence of campaigns
[00:30:18] and the individual work done by some? Excuse
[00:30:22] me. So, there are individuals
[00:30:25] who spread this information, and there are parties that do misleading
[00:30:29] work. How can we differentiate between this directed
[00:30:33] effort and individual
[00:30:34] work?
[00:30:39] The militia's media itself is unprofessional.
[00:30:42] Therefore, everything we talk about
[00:30:46] is that there are external rooms that manage
[00:30:50] this industry, because
[00:30:53] we are not professionals and do not care about media professionals if
[00:30:57] there are actually the militia.