SUDAN — broadcast
20260806 180000 UTC
322 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
Data courtesy of The GDELT Project (https://www.gdeltproject.org/), from the Internet Archive TV News Archive.
Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:01] It is influenced
[00:00:04] artificially, then it comes out
[00:00:08] to the recipient and to its general public opinion. Well, what
[00:00:11] differs regarding the issue
[00:00:16] do you read the rapid development in of indicators or the existence of campaigns and individual
[00:00:18] work carried out by some?
[00:00:23] But before you answer this
[00:00:29] the existence of deception within this So, what is the nature of this but we discovered this deception from I mean, excuse me, there are individuals who disseminate this information, and there are entities that carry out misleading work. How can we differentiate between this
[00:00:31] directed effort and individual
[00:00:34] work?
[00:00:39] The militia's media itself is specialized media.
[00:00:43] Therefore, everything
[00:00:46] in the practice of political work within this we talk about is that there are external rooms managing
[00:00:50] this because we are not specialized and
[00:00:53] do not care about media professionals, if there are specialized
[00:00:58] I worked in education in media professionals within the militia, because
[00:01:01] in all axes and in all administrative
[00:01:04] or military departments,
[00:01:07] they are
[00:01:09] across all sectors houses or something.
[00:01:10] So,
[00:01:14] the media that comes from individuals comes
[00:01:17] voluntarily from them,
[00:01:19] I mean,
[00:01:21] with dictates that everyone
[00:01:24] must publish
[00:01:28] this news through WhatsApp
[00:01:32] groups, on Facebook, and so on.
[00:01:35] It is managed in simple ways. Sir Ibrahim,
[00:01:38] there are circulating accusations regarding the existence of external
[00:01:42] funding for these disinformation platforms.
[00:01:46] What is the nature of the evidence for
[00:01:49] the existence of such support for these
[00:01:53] platforms?
[00:01:57] Unfortunately, or to be honest,
[00:02:01] I cannot find
[00:02:04] direct evidence for its existence,
[00:02:07] because my
[00:02:10] experience of presence in the militia was not
[00:02:12] as a media professional, but rather as a politician
[00:02:16] and a member of an advisory council and a member of a legislative
[00:02:20] parcel of council for the civilian administration that was in Khartoum state.
[00:02:23] Therefore, I did not practice media or media
[00:02:27] work within the militia.
[00:02:29] Regarding the Sudanese-Mauritanian episodes, many This is what I say based on what I know
[00:02:32] from a distance in this field. Well, if
[00:02:36] we leave aside the media issue
[00:02:37] consider ourselves and the platforms issue, there is also
[00:02:40] talk about direct
[00:02:43] of civilizations.
[00:02:44] This and indirect support. What are the forms of this support, Mr. Ibrahim, and the types
[00:02:46] of support?
[00:02:49] Direct support is support
[00:02:52] with weapons,
[00:02:54] he affirmed that there would be no negotiations with
[00:02:54] supporters on willing. How did you find working with support with experts, support
[00:02:58] with mercenaries,
[00:03:00] and all forms of military and logistical support are available.
[00:03:03] So,
[00:03:06] and reverting to what is happening on Mr. Ibrahim, how do you evaluate the reality of the militia when you were part of this
[00:03:12] visits carried out at reality? First, let me talk about the political
[00:03:19] of departments in have been achieved aspect, because the reality of the militia, if I talk about the military aspect, because I am still
[00:03:21] a military man, it is clear. Indeed, now after what happened,
[00:03:25] the also the media aspect, I also spoke about general information, but it is available and so on.
[00:03:31] But the political and civilian administrative
[00:03:34] reality is a harsh reality.
[00:03:38] steadfastness. This strength in I assure you that
[00:03:39] this
[00:03:43] so-called state or transitional government
[00:03:47] or "Dagalo's state" as
[00:03:50] some call it,
[00:03:53] it was not so. It was not
[00:03:55] that affects the region and affects a project.
[00:03:58] You could say it's a project
[00:04:01] interrupting. This is all the time for Abdel Aziz al-Hilu,
[00:04:04] for this interview on an old dream for
[00:04:07] Welcome back to the secular system. It found
[00:04:10] its lost cause in the Rapid Support Forces.
[00:04:13] Also,
[00:04:14] perhaps
[00:04:18] the parties,
[00:04:19] recently at the political, including those that split from the Forces of Freedom
[00:04:22] and Change, also
[00:04:25] dreamed of civilian
[00:04:29] rule and the
[00:04:31] theory. I can tell you that the establishment is nothing but a rehearsal
[00:04:34] for a rule dreamed
[00:04:35] of
[00:04:39] by these politicians who support
[00:04:41] يدعمون
[00:04:44] the militia. As for Dagalo, I think they are just
[00:04:48] an ATM. The decision is not in their hands,
[00:04:51] القرار ليس بيدهم
[00:04:52] nor
[00:04:56] do they have anything more than that
[00:04:59] this rifle was exploited, and then these funds
[00:05:03] were exploited.
[00:05:07] I mean, Dagalo himself, I think
[00:05:09] therefore this that Mohamed Hamdan Hemeti is the Samaritan of Sudanese politics.
[00:05:13] He seized the authority of rule,
[00:05:16] power and money, and brought them a calf that
[00:05:20] had no lowing. This is the establishment that misled
[00:05:23] the people.
[00:05:25] And the people, all of us used to think and believe that
[00:05:29] there was a reform project,
[00:05:33] within.
[00:05:37] deception? How do you demonstrate
[00:05:41] entity? This political incubator for the militia's
[00:05:45] political practice is not
[00:05:48] a political practice, but attempts
[00:05:51] to obscure public opinion that there is a government and there is
[00:05:55] Where does the flaw lie, Mr. Ibrahim,
[00:05:59] body? The flaw lies in poor administration, and the
[00:06:03] flaw lies in the violations suffered by the Sudanese
[00:06:06] citizen in those areas.
[00:06:09] And the flaw lies
[00:06:12] in the control of the Rapid Support Forces
[00:06:16] over its members who
[00:06:19] are present within these areas.
[00:06:23] The Sudanese people in those areas suffer greatly. They suffer
[00:06:27] from poverty and lack of resources
[00:06:30] or their absence, and they suffer from a lack
[00:06:34] of security and violations. So,
[00:06:38] to what extent are these components and these entities
[00:06:41] in
[00:06:43] harmony with each other, and to what extent are they
[00:06:46] consistent with these slogans that
[00:06:50] they advocate and adopt through this gathering, the
[00:06:54] Taqaddum gathering? These are empty
[00:06:57] slogans. These are empty slogans
[00:07:01] and hijacked decisions,
[00:07:03] and
[00:07:06] they are merely slogans, nothing more.
[00:07:08] I mean, nothing more. There are no
[00:07:12] things people fight for, and there is no reform people fight for.
[00:07:16] However, there is an external and old agenda
[00:07:20] that is well-known.
[00:07:23] There is an old external agenda known to divide
[00:07:26] Sudan and change the demography.
[00:07:30] It's a big plan. I mean, part of
[00:07:33] this so-called Taqaddum,
[00:07:36] the so-called Rapid
[00:07:39] Support Forces
[00:07:41] Okay, Mr. Ibrahim, we're running out of time, but
[00:07:45] in half a minute, please, how do you assess
[00:07:48] the future of the militia and the future of this political incubator
[00:07:52] in half a minute, please?
[00:07:56] Taqaddum
[00:07:58] alliance is doomed
[00:08:01] to disappear because it has no
[00:08:07] the ground as citizens. As for
[00:08:10] the militia and the Rapid
[00:08:14] Support Forces, I believe,
[00:08:19] the ground, they are also to disappear.
[00:08:23] The victories that
[00:08:29] on the ground and that the Sudanese
[00:08:32] Armed Forces and
[00:08:35] their supporters have made,
[00:08:38] and the Sudanese people's rallying around them, I think
[00:09:23] escalating cooperation and wider horizons for reconstruction.
[00:09:26] Sudanese-Turkish relations have witnessed rapid development
[00:09:31] diplomatic, and economic
[00:09:35] levels, coinciding with field changes in Sudan
[00:09:38] and regional transformations in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
[00:09:42] High-level meetings between the leaders of the
[00:09:45] two countries have increased at a time when international
[00:09:48] reports and analyses talk about growing Turkish
[00:09:52] interest in Sudan as a pivotal country in Red Sea
[00:09:55] security and an important partner in security, investment,
[00:09:59] and reconstruction files. In light of these
[00:10:02] developments, questions arise about the dimensions
[00:10:05] of this rapprochement and its repercussions on the course
[00:10:09] of the war, the future of bilateral relations, and Sudan's
[00:10:57] RSF has been categorized by
[00:11:00] law as a terrorist
[00:11:03] Malaysia so there is no negotiation with a
[00:11:07] terrorist also
[00:11:10] uh most of those who are fighting
[00:11:14] with RSF now
[00:11:17] mercenaries I don't think it is
[00:11:21] logical to negotiate with a
[00:11:23] mercenary. on my ground, so there is no
[00:11:27] negotiation, we put
[00:11:30] very frank and very open
[00:11:33] initiative before the security council of the
[00:11:37] United Nations in the 22nd of December last
[00:11:41] year, and it shows
[00:11:44] the vision of government of the Sudan to
[00:11:47] deal with this Malaysia, we have just
[00:11:51] discussed with my counterpart, the
[00:11:54] foreign are here, some views
[00:11:58] about our holistic
[00:12:01] approach towards the
[00:12:04] peace process in Sudan,
[00:12:07] and in this advancement
[00:12:10] of of our troops on the
[00:12:14] ground, we are closer to the peace
[00:12:18] in Sudan, and that will lay the
[00:12:22] ground for more cooperation.
[00:12:25] cooperation in the rehabilitation of
[00:12:28] Sudan, so the technology
[00:12:31] and the
[00:12:35] the Turkish
[00:12:37] in and the companies of Turkey
[00:12:41] in different fields is going to be part and
[00:12:45] the rehabilitation of
[00:12:49] Sudan, so Turkey is
[00:12:52] strategic ally of Sudan so...
[00:13:13] in a minute, please, how do you comment on the Foreign Minister's speech, in which
[00:13:19] the militia?
[00:13:21] The speech of the Sudanese Foreign Minister on Turkish
[00:13:25] territory indicates that he is speaking from
[00:13:28] the territory of an ally, a strategic and strong ally,
[00:13:32] an ally who believes in the Sudanese
[00:13:35] cause, in the Sudanese narrative, and in the legitimacy
[00:13:38] of Sudanese state institutions. Therefore, when the Foreign Minister
[00:13:42] speaks, he speaks from a solid foundation,
[00:13:44] and he stands on a solid foundation, and he
[00:13:48] is confident in the Turkish position that it strengthens
[00:13:52] and there is strengthening of the Sudanese position there.
[00:13:55] There is full coordination, and understandings. Therefore,
[00:13:59] he speaks with this confidence and this
[00:14:03] the words indicates that the understanding
[00:14:06] is indeed almost
[00:14:09] identical and confirmed on all
[00:14:12] fronts. The issue of Sudan is not an issue of bilateral
[00:14:15] relations, not an internal issue only, but it is an issue
[00:14:20] the political environment
[00:14:23] in the region and I'm sure there are international,
[00:14:26] regional, and global intersections.
[00:14:30] Time is running out quickly. Let me go back to my question, excuse me for interrupting, but
[00:14:34] how do you interpret this rapid development in Sudanese-Turkish
[00:14:37] relations? The rapid development in these
[00:14:41] Sudanese-Turkish relations indicates
[00:14:44] that this relationship has come a long way
[00:14:48] and reached a very advanced stage. It has moved
[00:14:52] from the issue of words
[00:14:56] and courtesies, rather it has moved
[00:14:59] from, let me say, mere signing
[00:15:02] of agreements, even if they were strategic
[00:15:06] agreements, as stated by the presidents
[00:15:08] of the two countries, to the stage of practical implementation.
[00:15:12] Thus, this rapid development, the successive
[00:15:15] visits by senior officials, indicate that
[00:15:19] this relationship has come a long way and reached the stage
[00:15:22] of practical implementation of relations. The strategic
[00:15:26] and follow-up of that
[00:15:28] implementation
[00:15:30] day by day, stage by stage, and
[00:15:34] follow-up, this development,
[00:15:37] required shuttle visits by senior
[00:15:40] officials, and this
[00:15:42] is reflected in the statements, not only conclusions from
[00:15:46] us, but it was clearly reflected in the statements, starting from
[00:15:50] the statements of Dr.
[00:15:54] Mohamed Osman, I mean, in your opinion, what are the strategic dimensions
[00:15:57] of the relationship between Sudan and Turkey, specifically
[00:16:01] in the Red Sea
[00:16:02] region?
[00:16:05] Your question concerns this strategic dimension. Strategically, my
[00:16:09] dear brother, this relationship, first of all,
[00:16:12] does not stem from the premise that it is not merely a bilateral
[00:16:16] relationship, but rather
[00:16:18] a relationship that stems from a solid common
[00:16:21] ground and a common vision regarding the entire region.
[00:16:25] And from here came this strength and came
[00:16:28] this
[00:16:32] depth in this relationship. Therefore, the statements are
[00:16:35] profound. And with great scope, as
[00:16:39] I told you, the statements of the presidents
[00:16:42] of the two countries, the statements of the foreign ministers of the two countries, and the statements of officials
[00:16:46] of the other
[00:16:49] country speak about this. Why? Because this
[00:16:52] relationship stems from a deep understanding
[00:16:55] and a strategy that encompasses the vision
[00:16:58] of the entire region. What does that mean? It means that Turkey and Sudan
[00:17:02] are now united by a deep understanding
[00:17:05] on policy. And a vision
[00:17:08] and a plan for the entire region regarding
[00:17:11] the security
[00:17:14] of the region, regarding the strategic
[00:17:17] relationship, and regarding understandings regarding
[00:17:21] the exchange of interests between this region.
[00:17:24] The exchange of commercial
[00:17:26] interests and trade
[00:17:28] and the waters of the Red
[00:17:32] Sea. Okay, doctor, let me ask about this point specifically, excuse me for interrupting, but
[00:17:36] in your opinion, what are the most prominent
[00:17:40] areas of cooperation, I mean, I am talking about cooperation, that
[00:17:43] can witness progress during the coming period
[00:17:47] between Sudan and Turkey?
[00:17:49] The most prominent statement that speaks
[00:17:53] about
[00:17:55] the essence of this relationship and the areas it includes was
[00:17:59] a turning point. It was the statement made by President
[00:18:02] Erdogan. He stated verbatim that the relationship between Sudan
[00:18:05] and Turkey is now a strategic relationship that includes cooperation in the political,
[00:18:09] security, military and military
[00:18:13] manufacturing fields, and
[00:18:16] investments and economic cooperation in agricultural
[00:18:20] and industrial investment. So,
[00:18:22] Mr. Erdogan, the Turkish President, listed
[00:18:26] a large list that includes all types
[00:18:29] of cooperation, and he stated that this strategic relationship has extended into all these
[00:18:33] depths. Not only that, but successive
[00:18:37] statements came to translate
[00:18:40] this relationship from the highest level of leadership
[00:18:43] to the executive stage. Therefore, we
[00:18:47] are witnessing shuttle
[00:18:50] the executive level by ministers, undersecretaries
[00:18:53] of ministries, and directors
[00:18:56] each other's counterparts in order to implement what has been
[00:19:00] agreed upon in
[00:19:03] strategic memoranda of understanding. So,
[00:19:06] when we move to
[00:19:10] practical implementation on the ground, that includes
[00:19:13] infrastructure, reconstruction, rehousing,
[00:19:17] and restarting factories. There is
[00:19:21] a signing of an agreement regarding the operation of Port
[00:19:24] Sudan and its twinning with the Turkish port of Mersin.
[00:19:27] Agriculture,
[00:19:30] agricultural technology,