SUDAN — broadcast
20260920 093000 UTC
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[00:00:00] The people of Sudan,
[00:00:01] Professor Osman Merghani, for Egypt, through Come to prayer.
[00:00:07] in the halls of this have interests from its strategic position, continued to call for the unity of Sudan, and Egypt continued to work for the unity and legitimacy
[00:00:11] Come to prayer. of Egypt in of Sudanese institutions, and did not open any field of dealing
[00:00:15] or cooperation or communication with
[00:00:17] And, I mean, this is a day that cannot the rapid support militia in any
[00:00:22] the last witness, and with me were other major bulwark for way, shape or form. This was of course
[00:00:23] colleagues working at the declared position.
[00:00:24] Come to Perhaps there are positions that are not suitable for publication in
[00:00:27] the context of supporting the Sudanese state.
[00:00:31] Also, at the strategic level, Egypt
[00:00:34] opened its borders to Sudanese people, both
[00:00:38] by land and air,
[00:00:43] on interests, not in the millions.
[00:00:44] on friendships. That's why I This has not happened and does not happen from any other country.
[00:00:47] Even what we call smuggling, by the way, and I traveled by that land route
[00:00:51] many times. Even what we call smuggling is actually an entry
[00:00:54] into Egypt under
[00:00:56] 2020, six years ago,
[00:00:56] of the world believed at one the eyes of or the army and its supporting the Egyptian authorities. If they
[00:01:00] had achieved a complete victory in wanted to block and prevent Sudanese people, they would have done so. For example, it's not very difficult.
[00:01:04] But they opened
[00:01:05] catastrophe was about to befall all their borders to Sudanese people in
[00:01:08] these large numbers. Sudanese people in Egypt did not go to
[00:01:11] camps or remote areas. Sudanese people went to
[00:01:15] Welcome, brother Talal. It's not really what Cairo, they went to the capital very directly and are present
[00:01:18] in different neighborhoods of the Egyptian capital,
[00:01:22] and in neighborhoods that even have a Sudanese character. When you
[00:01:26] went to a city like Faisal,
[00:01:28] people. It will take place in for example, the number of Sudanese people
[00:01:30] in some neighborhoods and buildings
[00:01:34] exceeds the number of Egyptians. This is clear
[00:01:38] and I am one and obvious. The general treatment is very good. There are some anomalies
[00:01:42] here and there, and I think this happens under these circumstances. The difference
[00:01:46] in nationalities, cultures, customs, and traditions, and the clash of interests
[00:01:49] sometimes creates a kind of
[00:01:53] tension, a kind of clashes, but it does not
[00:01:56] affect the strategic positions now. Let's return.
[00:02:00] I was close Sudanese people are also returning in large quantities from
[00:02:04] for example, the relationship between religion and the state in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and we see
[00:02:07] the extent to which our brothers in Egypt are affected
[00:02:10] by this return. So I want to say that the Egyptian position
[00:02:13] is also that Egypt in the political aspect has worked to
[00:02:17] open forums in Sharm El Sheikh more than once
[00:02:21] to try to find a solution to the Sudanese issue, even before
[00:02:24] the war. I mean, since the repercussions of the change in
[00:02:27] 2019. So Egypt is present in the Sudanese
[00:02:31] file positively and very significantly. It is true that some
[00:02:34] Sudanese people had higher expectations than this. They assumed they would make
[00:02:38] comparisons. They thought that their brothers in Egypt should come
[00:02:42] and fight with them, as they did in October in the seventies, and as
[00:02:46] they fought in Cairo to protect Cairo in the sixties.
[00:02:50] But policies
[00:02:52] have changed. The movement of the Egyptian forces is now
[00:02:55] restricted by the laws
[00:02:57] with four of the Egyptian parliament. The Egyptian forces do not fight outside
[00:03:00] Egypt. But that does not prevent it from
[00:03:03] perhaps, perhaps, I say, a military
[00:03:06] I was indeed among file that we get involved in and political analysts in statements about. We don't
[00:03:09] know the extent to which they can be accurate. But I feel
[00:03:12] that our brothers in Egypt at all levels are standing by Sudan.
[00:03:16] As for the second part of the news, the American
[00:03:20] role, I think this American
[00:03:22] doesn't meet with the role is a role
[00:03:25] Bolis has many that has many question marks about it. Frankly, the United
[00:03:28] States of America and various institutions, media
[00:03:31] institutions, brought up the fabrication of the Sudanese
[00:03:35] army using chemical weapons.
[00:03:37] forces affiliated with The speaker is now talking about the Sudanese army using
[00:03:40] chemical weapons without any
[00:03:42] will please the largest number of evidence or proof. And you know that the United States destroyed
[00:03:45] all of Iraq upside
[00:03:48] and the evil of what ascends to down because of the issue harms us from of chemical weapons, and now it is destroying
[00:03:51] Iran. You know that this is a fabrication that has no basis
[00:03:54] in reality. The United
[00:03:57] States, and at the level
[00:04:00] of the American President's advisor, Mr. Bolis, I think he is now
[00:04:03] pursuing a policy that is closer to being dual. They talk
[00:04:06] about de-escalation, they talk about a truce
[00:04:09] at times when they ignore the militia's
[00:04:12] transgressions very clearly. They
[00:04:16] know the reports, the reports of large American
[00:04:19] universities and institutions like Harvard that talk about very serious transgressions
[00:04:23] that have taken place, especially in Al-Fashir. They ignore them and talk
[00:04:28] their rights or to demand justice from about a truce, and they talk about de-escalation, and they talk about humanitarian corridors,
[00:04:31] and they talk about chemical weapons for the Sudanese
[00:04:34] army. The American position is actually a position
[00:04:38] with a big question mark. So, I mean, can Egypt, with this
[00:04:41] contact, alleviate, as you said earlier,
[00:04:44] can it alleviate these
[00:04:47] conspiracies or the intensity of the conspiracies that are being plotted
[00:04:50] against Sudan? Necessarily, of course.
[00:04:54] Sudan has been targeted and is being
[00:04:57] targeted by countries at the level of Sudan's
[00:05:00] neighbors, yes, Ethiopia and Chad and others,
[00:05:03] and at the regional level, a country like the United
[00:05:06] Arab Emirates has tremendous capabilities and has
[00:05:11] in this great very strong relations with Egypt. These are also countries that
[00:05:16] the loose situation in Sudan, such as the United States of America, Britain, and others. I
[00:05:20] think that if it weren't for the presence
[00:05:23] this file, the situation in Sudan could have been much worse than this.
[00:05:26] So Egypt has played a major role and has been a
[00:05:31] Sudan in different stages of this crisis, and it still
[00:05:35] is. Yes, there are those who say that the victories
[00:05:39] of the armed forces are the biggest incentive for security,
[00:05:43] stability, and peace, in a way that preserves
[00:05:46] and serves the interests of the Sudanese people. How
[00:05:49] do you comment on this statement? And look, as I mentioned to you, these international
[00:05:53] relations are based
[00:05:56] believe that the big confusion
[00:06:00] that occurred in this file happened
[00:06:03] because some neighboring countries, regional
[00:06:06] countries, and countries
[00:06:09] point that this militia
[00:06:12] Sudan and was on the verge of taking control of the Sudanese state.
[00:06:16] So they quickly tried to build relations with the militia,
[00:06:19] considering it the alternative or upcoming authority.
[00:06:23] Yes, this hypothesis is based on them wanting
[00:06:27] to build relations with it based on interests, whether in the field of mining or
[00:06:30] other fields. So here, the international
[00:06:34] and regional position, and the position of some very strange neighboring countries,
[00:06:38] is because it is not based on principles or on
[00:06:43] friendships. Now the tide has turned,
[00:06:47] let me answer your question directly. The tide has now
[00:06:49] turned in favor of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the supporting
[00:06:53] forces. Yes, I believe that after this position,
[00:06:56] the international and regional position will immediately begin
[00:07:00] to change, even gradually. This is truly the only
[00:07:03] way to achieve the interests of the Sudanese people. The world only respects the strong.
[00:07:07] If we want to achieve our interests, restore
[00:07:10] our state, and achieve
[00:07:12] a just peace for Sudan, our forces must continue their advance
[00:07:16] from Kordofan to the Um Dafuq area in
[00:07:20] West Darfur. This peace must be imposed by force. Even if people
[00:07:24] sit down with this militia at the negotiating table,
[00:07:27] we must negotiate from a position of strength, and we must make our highest demand
[00:07:31] in negotiations the dismantling of this militia. This is the only
[00:07:35] thing that will achieve our interests as Sudanese citizens, and the only thing that
[00:07:38] will make the world respect us. But I hope people don't forget.
[00:07:42] Any illusions of principles
[00:07:45] and friendships for humanitarian
[00:07:49] files. The world only respects the strong. After years
[00:07:52] of war, the United States signed an agreement with the United
[00:07:56] States from inside the American White House. Ahmad al-Sharaa,
[00:07:59] whom they described as a terrorist and had a $10
[00:08:02] million bounty on his head for anyone who caught him
[00:08:06] or led the United States to him, imposed himself in
[00:08:09] Syria by force through his leadership of the Syrian
[00:08:14] army, and now he is a friend of the United
[00:08:17] States of America. So, my dear sister, the world does not respect
[00:08:21] anyone but the strong. Does Counselor
[00:08:25] Bolis's positions need proof or evidence and proof that he is not
[00:08:28] seeking the interests of the citizen,
[00:08:31] and that he is biased towards the parties
[00:08:35] supporting the militia? Of course,
[00:08:38] question marks about his history and his
[00:08:40] present, because he
[00:08:43] represents, at the present time, the policy of the United
[00:08:46] States, or the policy of the American administration,
[00:08:49] which is greatly intertwined
[00:08:52] with the interests of the United Arab
[00:08:55] Emirates. I mean, his last statement probably confirms that
[00:08:59] there is a need for a truce
[00:09:02] lasting 90 days in Sudan. So what
[00:09:06] will people achieve from a truce? We think
[00:09:09] that the demand of the Sudanese government, or the legitimate
[00:09:12] authority in Sudan, which is calling for
[00:09:16] lasting peace, is what can achieve peace. I mean, people tell them that we don't
[00:09:19] need truces, we need arrangements
[00:09:23] that achieve lasting peace. These arrangements assume that the militia's
[00:09:26] forces will be gathered in specific areas, heavy weapons
[00:09:30] will be disarmed, and weapons appropriate for militias will be seized. After that,
[00:09:34] security arrangements will be entered into. And this, of course, does not
[00:09:37] negate people's right to demand
[00:09:40] the militia. The position of the Sudanese government here is a very authentic
[00:09:44] and very clear position. But Mas'ad Bolis tried to play both sides, and we all
[00:09:48] believe that it is a failed policy and will fail, God willing, through
[00:09:52] our great openness, especially at this time, the military
[00:09:55] openness. Yes, we move on to the fifth file. Member
[00:09:59] of the Sudanese Dialogue Committee, Osman Mirghani, three
[00:10:02] paths for the Sudanese dialogue and continuous
[00:10:05] contacts with community forces, and our movements
[00:10:08] receive international and regional support.
[00:10:12] Has the committee for preparing the Sudanese-Sudanese
[00:10:15] dialogue succeeded in promoting its expected role
[00:10:18] and the nature of
[00:10:19] its initiative?
[00:10:22] I salute my colleague,
[00:10:26] his great effort in the dialogue preparation
[00:10:30] committee, but it is still too early to judge this
[00:10:33] committee. I believe that there is a great
[00:10:36] deal of confusion among Sudanese people, and that is why the dialogue
[00:10:40] preparation committee is important, and why Professor Osman Merghani's
[00:10:43] pen is important. Specifically, there is great confusion among a large
[00:10:47] segment of Sudanese people between dialogue
[00:10:50] and negotiation. Some people confuse
[00:10:53] these two files. Some people believe that
[00:10:57] this dialogue should not take place
[00:10:59] in isolation from others, and they mean the militia
[00:11:03] and its supporters. I believe that this is a separate forum.
[00:11:06] I mean, if there is a political dialogue
[00:11:10] for security arrangements with the militia, that is called negotiation.
[00:11:13] That is a negotiation that takes place between
[00:11:16] the military leadership,
[00:11:20] forces, or the legitimate authority in Sudan and the leadership
[00:11:23] of this militia. And we have already sat in Jeddah,
[00:11:27] both openly and secretly, in other locations. This is called
[00:11:30] negotiation. And negotiation takes place. I mean,
[00:11:34] people say, "Oh, you want to negotiate and leave Darfur?"
[00:11:36] This is the confusion that is happening. Darfur
[00:11:40] is being promoted as being in Sudan, and it is part of
[00:11:43] the Sudanese center, and with its leaders and its citizens, it is part of
[00:11:47] the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue, and this is a separate issue. This dialogue will not take place in Darfur.
[00:11:51] The dialogue is for all Sudanese Khartoum. What is needed
[00:11:55] with the militia is negotiation, and that is a completely separate file and has nothing to do with the dialogue.
[00:11:59] I mean, with the dialogue and has nothing to do with the dialogue. This dialogue,
[00:12:03] of those who were honored in the past few days to sit with the President
[00:12:06] of the Sovereign Council after we
[00:12:09] discussed in the media forum and he gave a very comprehensive explanation.
[00:12:13] I think this explanation needs to be publicized and needs the committee of Professor Osman
[00:12:16] Merghani. People should separate the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue.
[00:12:20] This is supposed to discuss the issues
[00:12:23] of Sudan and Sudanese people after the war. Issues like
[00:12:29] Sudan, whether the state will be secular or a religious
[00:12:32] state. What will be the shape of this state?
[00:12:35] Will it be states or regions? When will the elections
[00:12:38] take place? These electoral rounds,
[00:12:41] these are issues of the Sudanese dialogue that have no direct relationship with the ongoing
[00:12:45] war, except through the circumstances of time
[00:12:48] and place and climate, and they have no direct relationship
[00:12:51] also with the current authority, except for
[00:12:55] the sake of guarantee. Yes, well, I mean, in less than a minute, the acceptance that
[00:12:59] the political and community forces met this committee
[00:13:03] with has become one of the encouraging factors to support
[00:13:07] this committee and to make it succeed. I mean, in less than a minute, in less
[00:13:11] than a minute, I still don't feel that there is great acceptance, and there is a kind
[00:13:14] of ambiguity, and that is what makes the degree of challenge
[00:13:18] required from Professor Osman Merghani and his team very great. I mean, even now,
[00:13:21] a lot is required of him. Yes, well, we
[00:13:25] have reached with this fifth axis
[00:13:28] to a concluding dialogue of the events axis for this day.
[00:13:31] Thank you very much to the journalist and political analyst, Professor
[00:13:35] Bakri El Madani. Thank you and greetings through you
[00:13:38] to our colleagues. Thank you very much, dear
[00:13:41] viewers. Thus, our episode for today from the axis of events
[00:13:45] is complete. Greetings from the working team. Goodbye. Goodbye.
[00:13:48] اللقاء.
[00:23:11] Dear viewers, peace and mercy of God be upon you. May God make your times
[00:23:15] good. Each party has
[00:23:18] a lot to say about the mistakes
[00:23:22] of others, but a war with such
[00:23:25] a heavy price imposes a central
[00:23:28] question that everyone must answer: Where
[00:23:32] did we go wrong? And can
[00:23:34] we build a different future without
[00:23:38] reviewing the path that led us to where we are
[00:23:42] now? These questions and others I will present tonight
[00:23:47] prominent journalists
[00:23:52] Sudan, media professionals.
[00:23:55] I welcome my guests to this episode,
[00:23:58] Professor, journalist,
[00:24:01] and political analyst, former Minister of Information, Professor
[00:24:05] Hassan Ismail. Welcome, Professor Hassan. Welcome, Professor. Welcome to you and welcome
[00:24:08] to the distinguished guests and our teachers. We are happy to see you today
[00:24:12] and your presence at the Political Forum platform after a long absence. Welcome.
[00:24:16] Welcome. The welcome also extends to our teacher, Professor
[00:24:21] Mustafa. Welcome, and peace and mercy of God be upon you. And welcome to the distinguished
[00:24:25] viewers and welcome to our colleagues in this
[00:24:28] episode, which we hope
[00:24:32] those who are watching it, God willing. May it please everyone.
[00:24:35] Your tears were certainly precious when you entered the TV
[00:24:39] building and witnessed the destruction that befell the radio. Oh, by God,
[00:24:42] it was a sad thing,
[00:24:45] and you remember I told you that these people did not come to rule, they came to destroy the state.
[00:24:54] We also welcome Professor Bukhari Bashir. Welcome, Professor
[00:24:58] Bukhari. Welcome, Professor Talal Al-Muddassir,
[00:25:02] an old friend and colleague, and welcome
[00:25:05] to the distinguished guests who are participating with me in this
[00:25:08] episode. And I am truly happy,
[00:25:12] I mean, to return once again to Khartoum and appear
[00:25:16] on national television. I think that this is
[00:25:20] I mean, one of the important features that
[00:25:23] we treasure in our memory, God willing. An audience that you used to see on Al-Zarqa
[00:25:26] channel, and today you appear on Sudan TV. Well, welcome
[00:25:30] to the audience of Sudan TV, I mean, the national TV.
[00:25:33] And welcome
[00:25:36] to others on other channels, and they all, I mean, draw from the same
[00:25:39] lamp, as they say. Welcome to you. A welcome also extends
[00:25:43] to Dr. Hassan Muhammad Saleh, the well-known journalist.
[00:25:46] Welcome, Doctor. Welcome, welcome.
[00:25:50] I am extremely happy to be at
[00:25:53] Sudan TV after an absence,
[00:25:55] and
[00:25:58] the last night I spent
[00:26:01] institution was the night
[00:26:05] of April 15,
[00:26:07] 2023. I was television
[00:26:11] and we left, and in the morning, the war had
[00:26:15] started.
[00:26:19] be forgotten. I was the last witness. Yes, I was
[00:26:26] the television. So we are happy,
[00:26:29] the second happiness, to be with our distinguished colleagues. I mean,
[00:26:33] brother Hassan, brother
[00:26:36] Mustafa, brother Bukhari, Professor
[00:26:39] Talal. Happiness, I mean, boundless
[00:26:42] happiness. Thank you very much. Welcome, Doctor. Well,
[00:26:46] Professor Hassan Ismail,
[00:26:49] the man who left Sudan in
[00:26:51] 2026, meaning six years ago,
[00:26:55] and when he was asked in 20
[00:26:58] and when people asked him at the time why
[00:27:05] he felt a looming
[00:27:08] Sudan, what do you think
[00:27:11] Hassan Ismail saw that day that others
[00:27:14] الاخرون
[00:27:18] we saw, but what we knew.
[00:27:21] I mean, we were part of
[00:27:25] this party club for a long time,
[00:27:28] and part of its institutions, and we know people best,
[00:27:31] and we know people best by their words, their actions, and their claims.
[00:27:35] Honestly,
[00:27:38] in 2013 or 2014,
[00:27:42] when the disagreement began
[00:27:44] between us and the party opposition,
[00:27:47] this disagreement did not come out of nowhere.
[00:27:51] I mean, it resulted from experiences and observations. At that
[00:27:54] time, there were meetings of the consensus forces
[00:27:57] that organized the 2013 demonstrations, and
[00:28:02] to this issue and close to the committees for these movements.
[00:28:06] But I also saw the tendencies
[00:28:09] of people within the consensus forces, so I told them, if this government
[00:28:13] falls and you write about it in the newspaper,
[00:28:17] and you enter the Republican Palace, you will not be able to maintain the electricity
[00:28:20] of the Republican Palace for a single day. This was
[00:28:23] in 2013. This was in 2013, and I wrote it, I mean,
[00:28:25] or 2014. And this is not because of what we saw, but because
[00:28:29] the opposition did not
[00:28:33] prepare even half a word
[00:28:36] regarding the governance of Sudan and the administration of Sudan. I mean, all its energy
[00:28:40] was for opposition. I mean, it did
[00:28:44] not leave any room for its mind to
[00:28:46] develop plans or visions for governance.
[00:28:50] How did they react to your words at the time? No, that's the second disaster.
[00:28:53] That any words you say, your opponent
[00:28:57] doesn't deal with them as a matter of give
[00:29:00] and take. They take it as
[00:29:03] belittling it. That's why our dialogue
[00:29:07] is always between adversaries. It's always
[00:29:10] a dialogue of the deaf. I don't care what you're saying,
[00:29:13] and you don't care what I'm saying.
[00:29:16] That's the disaster, that there are no points of agreement. I'm an opponent,
[00:29:20] that's it. I'm an opponent. That's a line that
[00:29:24] side I'm rivaling since Sudan's independence until now. Yes.
[00:29:28] Yes. And when they meet, for example, let me tell you one of
[00:29:32] the things that made me form this idea in my mind. The consensus
[00:29:35] forces included
[00:29:39] modern currents,
[00:29:42] which are the leftists, Ba'athists, and so on, as is customary
[00:29:45] in classification. So they used to invite people to meetings to
[00:29:49] coordinate and collect reports
[00:29:52] on demonstrations. When the demonstrations intensified,
[00:29:56] a group of them would go to the meeting place and
[00:29:59] not find the meeting. They discovered
[00:30:02] that the meeting place had been changed because
[00:30:05] the communists, Ba'athists, and the Sudanese
[00:30:09] Congress Party were leading the meeting. The leadership changed. Our people, the Umma
[00:30:13] Party and the Unionist Party, would go and not find the meeting. So when
[00:30:16] they blamed each other, one of the leaders,
[00:30:19] may God have mercy on him, said to them, "Honestly,
[00:30:23] the financier of this movement stipulated
[00:30:27] that no Islamic force of an Islamic nature
[00:30:30] should continue with us to the stage after the fall of the Salvation."
[00:30:33] This is where the exclusion began. Yes, it actually started. This story
[00:30:36] of the 1969 coup failed to exclude, and
[00:30:39] in 1958, the handover failed to exclude.
[00:30:42] I mean, this story of the party club
[00:30:45] and the political flag being handed down from generation to generation. No, there is no handover.
[00:30:49] Sadiq al-Mahdi once held a forum
[00:30:51] called the generational crisis. This was in 2000,
[00:30:55] as soon as he returned, I mean, 2002. It was called the generational crisis
[00:30:59] in the Umma Party.