SUDAN — broadcast
20260920 100000 UTC
546 transcript segments
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:00] you won't find the meeting. They discover that the
[00:00:03] meeting place has been changed, so they say that the communists,
[00:00:07] the researchers, and the Sudanese Congress
[00:00:11] this formula. and this is the main problem. are running the meeting. The leadership has changed. People from the
[00:00:11] the Rapid Support Forces did Umma Party and the Unionist Party go and don't find the meeting. So, when they blamed each other,
[00:00:15] one of the deceased, may God have mercy on him, said to them, "Honestly,
[00:00:18] the funding party
[00:00:21] steadfastness in position for this movement has stipulated to us that any
[00:00:24] of its people, Islamic force with an Islamic character
[00:00:27] should not continue with us until the stage after
[00:00:30] the collapse of the Ansar." From here, the exclusion began. Yes, it actually
[00:00:33] started. This story, of course, the
[00:00:36] 1969 coup failed due to exclusion, and
[00:00:39] the 1958 handover and transfer failed due to exclusion,
[00:00:42] and, I mean, this story of the partisan
[00:00:46] battle with and political club where the banner is passed from one generation to another, no, there is no handover.
[00:00:49] Al-Sadiq Al-Bahdi once held a forum
[00:00:51] called Al-Majaya. This was in 2000, as soon as
[00:00:55] he returned, in 2002. It was called the crisis of Al-Majaya in the Umma Party.
[00:00:59] Those who were talking about this story were people who started politics in the sixties,
[00:01:02] you know. So, you gave them a chance from
[00:01:06] the people to say that there is a crisis of Al-Majaya, even though
[00:01:09] they have been in Al-Majaya since the sixties. It's a big
[00:01:12] difference,
[00:01:14] really big, big differences,
[00:01:18] The main message big mentalities, meaning the difference in mentalities
[00:01:21] between them is
[00:01:24] this I believe, extremely large, unfortunately. Despite this, they only
[00:01:29] neglecting our inherited failure. I mean, the only thing
[00:01:32] forum, until they pass on to each other is failure.
[00:01:35] One person I know was commenting to me, he said, "My brother,
[00:01:39] They told me not to Muhammad al-Faki is a student
[00:01:41] be too optimistic. They told me that of Sharif Hussein al-Hindi." And I will say this, some people will be upset,
[00:01:44] of course. So I said to him, "His student
[00:01:46] Militia, the signs of its rebellion, the signs in what? I mean,
[00:01:47] of the coup that you mentioned, what did he learn from him?" For example, al-Faki Sulaiman, a member of the council, yes,
[00:01:54] intensity he used in the Yes, what exactly did you focus on from the tone of the speech, but in a member of the Federal Assembly, the apprehension this sovereign council, a member of the sovereign council, and now he is the head, yes,
[00:01:58] very despairing of the former, the former. So, this is Sharif Hussein al-Hindi's student.
[00:02:00] So I said to him, "Sharif Hussein, exactly, may God have mercy on him. What did he learn from him?
[00:02:04] I mean, what is the feature that appears in
[00:02:08] Muhammad al-Faki that makes us say, 'He took it from Sharif Hussein
[00:02:11] al-Hindi?'" My brother, I said to him, "You, out of mercy for
[00:02:15] has occurred, and it can change many concepts Sharif Hussein, do not attribute
[00:02:15] the 2019 formula, what was the worst thing it did in this person to him."
[00:02:17] what was the most prominent political message So I told him, "We studied this story
[00:02:20] and we dealt with the leaders. There is no such thing
[00:02:23] different political forces in as these parties inherited
[00:02:24] party. The Rapid Support Forces were
[00:02:24] their harm and their dealings with
[00:02:25] Well, the people. The successors inherited nothing but failure, unfortunately."
[00:02:28] Then came 2019,
[00:02:31] and therefore you were convinced that you should
[00:02:34] leave. Indeed,
[00:02:38] And he mobilized a number of people, relies on leaving was not, I mean, it didn't have
[00:02:42] a reason. We had a media project that we couldn't work on
[00:02:45] in these circumstances
[00:02:48] inside Sudan. And on that basis, I traveled,
[00:02:53] the visions that will be realized in I mean, the circumstances of 2013 or the circumstances of 2019.
[00:02:55] The rise of the Forces of Freedom and Change to power,
[00:02:58] I was able to predict it after six months or a year,
[00:03:02] approximately. I mean, April 2019, I left
[00:03:05] November 2020. So the idea
[00:03:08] was that we already had a project that we wanted to establish abroad, a media partnership
[00:03:12] project.
[00:03:17] So he emphasized this a specific point, needs And Turkey had laws that allowed this matter. But
[00:03:21] important aspect without a doubt, the fear for the fate of the country was present,
[00:03:24] that people should support this yes, and it still is. Okay, Professor Mustafa,
[00:03:27] I want to interpret the scene that you started with. Professor
[00:03:30] Hassan, you took me back to 2020, but I want to take you back to
[00:03:34] 2019. What did you see in the political scene
[00:03:37] at that time that was also
[00:03:42] party, a disaster that you could say was imminent? Where
[00:03:46] did the collapse begin from the partnership itself
[00:03:50] General Al-Bashir, even your opponents will not between the military and civilians? Where did you see this?
[00:03:53] Yes,
[00:03:55] of the points any observer of the general political scene in
[00:03:57] Sudan
[00:04:00] in that during that period was following the disputes
[00:04:04] that arose among the leaders of the regime themselves. At that time,
[00:04:07] there were two factions.
[00:04:09] The head of state at that
[00:04:13] time had established
[00:04:16] the Rapid Support Forces on the
[00:04:18] assumption that they could help protect
[00:04:22] the regime or protect the rule at that time.
[00:04:24] changed. This war, over But unfortunately, it became clear that the Rapid Support Forces
[00:04:28] were a devilish sprout, and we continued
[00:04:32] to follow, and you all followed this
[00:04:34] anew, matter. They positioned themselves
[00:04:38] and this was the frightening thing the Unionists, so they handed in very sensitive areas
[00:04:40] what he sees as wrong, and he is now doing this and opened indication that there is something important is that this the door for the recruitment of a very large number
[00:04:43] of them. At that time,
[00:04:46] the matter of Operation Decisive Storm also came up. A large number
[00:04:50] of them were given the opportunity to have
[00:04:53] a huge financial return. The European Union intervened, and I'll show you
[00:04:56] a complex international issue. The European Union also intervened
[00:05:01] in the issue of migration, and there was a huge financial return,
[00:05:04] meaning the Rapid Support Forces were able
[00:05:07] the army. You tried this in at that time, and we were following this, similarity in the and we were making predictions.
[00:05:11] in the constitutional document, and you tried it in Even on radio the framework agreement, you tried it before and television, he had
[00:05:13] a presence in the interviews and so on. It was a very
[00:05:16] dangerous matter, and it was
[00:05:20] obvious that anyone with a slight sense of security
[00:05:24] would have paid attention to this matter. And this is what ultimately
[00:05:27] led to the leaders of the Rapid Support Forces becoming convinced that they were the ones
[00:05:31] who could control Sudan and control the destinies
[00:05:36] I mean, the destinies of the citizens. So, since then, frankly, for me, it was not a surprise, the story
[00:05:40] of the coup or the attempted coup of the Rapid Support Forces and its rebellion against the state. For me, it was not
[00:05:43] a surprise because the state at that time began to weaken in internal conflicts.
[00:05:47] Perhaps people now don't talk about it much, but it began
[00:05:51] to weaken in internal conflicts and began to weaken
[00:05:54] by strengthening a voracious military
[00:05:58] faction at the expense of the armed forces,
[00:06:00] at the expense of other security forces. So the scene was clear to us,
[00:06:04] and I was expecting this, but I did not expect, frankly, that such destruction as happened in Sudan
[00:06:07] would occur at that time. I mean, even now, we are
[00:06:10] entering the radio. The streets of some parts of Khartoum, some large buildings, it was truly
[00:06:13] a sad matter, and thank God
[00:06:16] that the treatments have begun, the restoration of what happened has begun,
[00:06:20] even though it will take a lot of time. But the return of life,
[00:06:23] and I came just recently, in the past two days, the return
[00:06:27] of life to normal, or somewhat normal,
[00:06:31] all of this encourages people to return and settle down again in
[00:06:34] Sudan. And ever since I moved to
[00:06:37] the house after staying in the hotel for a few days after participating
[00:06:40] in the media
[00:06:45] I entered television now, I swear by Almighty God, the electricity has not been cut,
[00:06:48] nor has the water. This is just your weak foot.
[00:06:53] it's possible. Well, the talk about the Rapid Support
[00:07:00] perhaps it was one of the messages or one of the things that
[00:07:03] the President, First Lieutenant General Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, talked about
[00:07:07] in his meeting with the media. You
[00:07:11] four were witnesses
[00:07:20] to this
[00:07:23] meeting and attended it.
[00:07:26] I want to ask all four of you,
[00:07:30] that you specifically understood from the President's speech
[00:07:33] at the forum in Bukhari?
[00:07:38] first of all, and although I like
[00:07:41] to talk about the many
[00:07:44] years of the appropriate
[00:07:48] period, we want to connect people to the speech. We will talk about the most important thing
[00:07:51] we gathered from the President's speech.
[00:07:55] I believe that General Abdel Fattah
[00:07:57] Al-Burhan's
[00:08:00] statements were largely taken as news.
[00:08:03] This was not the main point. So,
[00:08:07] you should always focus on why
[00:08:09] these messages were sent at this time, the implications
[00:08:12] of the timing. Who are the people who received these
[00:08:16] messages, and why were they issued at this
[00:08:19] particular time? So I think
[00:08:21] that Al-Burhan's speech as a whole, not
[00:08:27] analysts and commentators to delve deeper
[00:08:30] than the news coverage that
[00:08:33] happened. That's why
[00:08:37] the President had a very high
[00:08:41] appetite to speak with the media
[00:08:45] for this long, I mean.
[00:08:48] I think four hours,
[00:08:51] meaning he sat with any
[00:08:54] and perhaps Professor Hassan also has
[00:08:58] more analyses.
[00:09:01] But I will pick up on one point and leave
[00:09:05] the rest
[00:09:07] to my colleagues. The most important thing that caught
[00:09:11] my attention in Al-Burhan's speech was that he
[00:09:14] spoke with great confidence, as if he wanted to convey a message
[00:09:17] that the armed forces and the Sudanese army
[00:09:20] that you saw in the first months of the war are not
[00:09:23] the army that exists now.
[00:09:27] Many things have changed,
[00:09:30] even the international
[00:09:34] and its view of the armed forces has three and a half years,
[00:09:38] has given this army a very high
[00:09:41] ability to rearrange its papers and restructure itself
[00:09:47] and it has given it strength and training that I believe
[00:09:51] no other army in the region has had. It has benefited from the circumstances themselves and has matured. Yes, it is now
[00:09:54] very strong. Therefore,
[00:09:58] there was an important point that no one else should raise a weapon
[00:10:02] to take over the power in Sudan again.
[00:10:05] And that this is the basic equation in the whole matter
[00:10:09] in the President's speech. I think that Sudan's problem since
[00:10:13] 1955 until
[00:10:17] today is this weapon
[00:10:20] that is used. It is a weapon
[00:10:24] for demands sometimes.
[00:10:26] It is used as a mercenary weapon, as happened in
[00:10:30] the Rapid Support Forces,
[00:10:34] So I think that President
[00:10:38] Al-Burhan, through this sentence,
[00:10:41] settled many matters, and we hope that this
[00:10:46] continues, so that no one
[00:10:49] who carried a weapon will share
[00:10:52] power and wealth because of this weapon. Dr.
[00:10:56] Hassan, what was striking to you while you attended the meeting
[00:10:59] and followed the President's speech? The meeting was
[00:11:01] a mixture of many
[00:11:04] emotions, humanitarian
[00:11:06] emotions, including
[00:11:09] what
[00:11:12] you could call political,
[00:11:14] military, economic
[00:11:17] discourse.
[00:11:21] Talk about the missing power itself.
[00:11:25] The most prominent thing in it was the role of the Sudanese people.
[00:11:28] The President spoke about the Sudanese people in a way that
[00:11:32] he said he was unable to express his gratitude
[00:11:36] to the Sudanese people for their firm stance
[00:11:39] with the armed forces.
[00:11:43] in the speech
[00:11:44] and in the President's remarks,
[00:11:49] was directed at the people themselves.
[00:11:52] Because he spoke about
[00:11:55] things that deserve consideration
[00:11:59] and deserve
[00:12:00] that people should reflect on them
[00:12:03] a lot and analyze
[00:12:06] them and deserve that
[00:12:10] people should know the existing contradictions. And what exactly
[00:12:14] did you focus on?
[00:12:17] this speech? I focused on the fact that he was
[00:12:23] the forces that he called several times
[00:12:27] the amorphous forces, which are the Forces of Freedom and Change. These
[00:12:30] forces, he had
[00:12:34] delved into the depths of these forces and dealt with them
[00:12:37] many times at different times
[00:12:41] and reached the conclusion that these forces are hopeless in their ability to
[00:12:44] offer anything to the Sudanese people or to stop
[00:12:49] foreign parties and the things they are doing now, to stop them from the Sudanese
[00:12:53] people. This is what I understood. Secondly, his
[00:12:56] reliance, indeed, he relies
[00:13:00] on the Sudanese
[00:13:02] the media. He gave the media a large space and
[00:13:06] a significant role. And he believes
[00:13:09] that people who
[00:13:13] build the future, build
[00:13:18] the future, and not force.
[00:13:21] And secondly, he, of course, focused
[00:13:26] on the executive branch. He focused on it
[00:13:30] a lot, and he thinks that there are many shortcomings
[00:13:33] that need to be completed, and that
[00:13:37] we are not lacking in those capable of completion, meaning that we could have done more than that. The state could have done
[00:13:40] more than that for the Sudanese people, but
[00:13:44] the reality is completely different, and that there are many
[00:13:47] things that need to be avoided,
[00:13:51] and he spoke about this aspect clearly and frankly,
[00:13:55] and that the current
[00:13:57] government needs a lot of effort
[00:14:00] to reach a stage where it truly represents the Sudanese
[00:14:04] people and truly
[00:14:07] represents the aspirations of the Sudanese people.
[00:14:10] Professor Ismail, it was also reported
[00:14:13] in the news that you were the most
[00:14:16] enthusiastic about the President's speech,
[00:14:19] and perhaps
[00:14:21] you had an intervention
[00:14:25] meeting. The news varied. Hassan said this, Hassan
[00:14:29] didn't say that, Hassan commented on such and such a point. I want to know
[00:14:33] what was most striking to you and what you said to the President.
[00:14:36] Look, let me give you the general framework,
[00:14:40] and then I can comment on the story of the Rapid Support Forces.
[00:14:44] The general framework is that if you
[00:14:47] reflect on it, Sudanese politics are repeated
[00:14:50] pages, I mean, in many of its
[00:14:54] features or steps or so on. For example,
[00:14:56] in 1958, people were fed up
[00:15:00] with the rivalry with
[00:15:03] over power to Abboud hoping that
[00:15:07] they would control the Unionists'
[00:15:10] enthusiasm so they wouldn't win the next elections, and then they would reclaim
[00:15:14] power. This is exactly what Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi, may God have mercy on him, did
[00:15:17] in 1989, which was presenting Omar Al-Bashir so that
[00:15:20] he would confiscate the field, and then after three
[00:15:24] years, he thought that he would reclaim, reclaim,
[00:15:27] reclaim power. Look at the
[00:15:30] features.
[00:15:33] Nimeiri's relationship with the leftists
[00:15:36] in 1969. Then in 1971, then
[00:15:40] the recovery or the revolution,
[00:15:44] or Nimeiri's return at the expense of
[00:15:47] the left, Hashim Al-Atta and others. If you review Nimeiri's speech
[00:15:50] as he talked about the leftists and criticized them and the talk that
[00:15:54] came out, and that he blames Abdul Khaliq Mahjoub and he blames those people, and that you
[00:15:57] deceived us, you didn't offer anything to the country and you gave us
[00:16:00] unrealistic projects. When you look at the feature of President
[00:16:04] Al-Burhan's speech about the Forces of Freedom and Change alliance,
[00:16:08] you find these features similar,
[00:16:11] as if this history, Sudanese history,
[00:16:15] is circular, and even its radius is very
[00:16:18] short, meaning it quickly repeats itself. But
[00:16:21] what I picked up
[00:16:24] first is that General Al-Burhan has developed
[00:16:27] greatly in his rhetorical
[00:16:30] abilities. Of course, military personnel don't have much
[00:16:34] to do with producing political discourse. That's not the job of military personnel. But
[00:16:37] when they are forced and find themselves responsible for producing
[00:16:41] political discourse, they master it more than partisans, by the way. When
[00:16:45] they are forced, yes, they are the essence
[00:16:48] of the state. The state became the state, meaning producing political
[00:16:51] discourse, producing political discourse that connects you with people.
[00:16:55] General Al-Burhan, throughout his presidency of the Sovereign
[00:16:59] Council in partnership with the Forces of Freedom and Change, did not speak
[00:17:02] much. On the contrary, he spoke more. But now that
[00:17:06] there is a clear
[00:17:08] story, it is clear that they are gaining this experience. I mean, now
[00:17:11] if you listen to Hamdok's political discourse in a press conference or so,
[00:17:15] and he speaks in his lazy and yawning
[00:17:18] way and so on, and you listen to Al-Burhan, and you listen to Yasser Al-Atta, and you listen to Kabashi,
[00:17:22] it is clear that the capabilities are different. The capabilities are different not in
[00:17:29] itself. When we were leaving,
[00:17:31] I joked with Al-Burhan, I said, "You spoke for two
[00:17:35] hours." He said, "I actually asked to speak for four
[00:17:38] hours." He actually said, "I wanted
[00:17:41] to speak, yes, I wanted to speak for four hours." He, by the way, when he requested
[00:17:44] it, he specified that he would meet the media for two hours. He requested
[00:17:48] that the meeting be open, yes.
[00:17:52] His desire to speak. The second thing is that he was not
[00:17:55] speaking from a paper, and he spoke about very sensitive
[00:17:59] and very delicate issues. Issues
[00:18:02] whose sensitivity lies in the most important takeaway: that he completely severed ties with
[00:18:06] foreign entities, meaning that foreign entities
[00:18:09] are now enemies, he has placed them in the category
[00:18:13] of enemies.
[00:18:16] justifications for this, saying that all the people who come to us,
[00:18:20] we hear one thing from them, and then they go out and say something else. And
[00:18:23] it's clear, this story also, he completely severed ties
[00:18:27] with the Forces of Freedom and Change. I mean, when you describe
[00:18:30] them as opportunistic and amorphous forces, what was in it exactly?
[00:18:33] He described them as amorphous and opportunistic forces. Opportunistic when
[00:18:37] he said they came and asked me to stay in power for 10
[00:18:41] years, me and my protection, to be guarding and protecting them for 10
[00:18:44] years, and they tempted me to be outside the army for another 10
[00:18:48] years. And the well-known discourse of the Forces of Freedom
[00:18:52] and Change is civilian democratic transformation.
[00:18:55] But under the table, they were asking the military to continue
[00:18:59] for 10, 10 years. And this is exactly the same lies that
[00:19:02] Nimeiri exposed in his partnership
[00:19:05] with the leftists.
[00:19:08] So this is the point of agreement. The second matter
[00:19:10] is also
[00:19:13] clear that he, as he said, he
[00:19:15] reads
[00:19:17] a lot of documents. He reads,
[00:19:21] meaning he wants to deal with the media directly without
[00:19:24] reports, directly. He reads directly
[00:19:27] and he memorizes, that's what he said, he said I read and memorize.
[00:19:31] And it's true, I don't know many of the people who write, but I memorize the words. I
[00:19:35] met him last year, and I found him very affected. Or he is very affected by what
[00:19:38] is written and what is published. And I even discovered or
[00:19:42] felt that there was a lot of psychological burden from
[00:19:45] the negative talk.
[00:19:48] So it is clear that he also wants to improve the relationship
[00:19:52] between him and the media.
[00:19:55] But in this context, I believe that
[00:19:59] we have restored General Al-Burhan for the sake of the
[00:20:01] nation, because I told you that the formula of
[00:20:05] 2019 was disturbing. A disturbing
[00:20:08] formula because it was a formula for sabotage, and unfortunately,
[00:20:12] it relied on partnership with the army,
[00:20:15] in the matter. But now this formula has been broken,
[00:20:19] and we have recovered
[00:20:22] the elements that were partners in this national
[00:20:25] project. Meaning that it was a failed partnership. Yes, exactly.
[00:20:29] No, it was a booby-trapped partnership. I mean, you want to bring
[00:20:32] these army leaders and run under their feet and behind their backs
[00:20:35] a project to destroy the Sudanese state. I mean, you want General Al-Burhan to be sitting
[00:20:39] there, and you want the Rapid Support Forces to swallow
[00:20:48] the framework agreement, and you tried it in the coup of 23.
[00:20:52] And therefore,
[00:20:55] it is clear that General Al-Burhan
[00:20:58] broke He also mentioned in the
[00:21:02] speech a historical thing, that they met
[00:21:06] President Al-Bashir, the former president, and talked to him about
[00:21:09] the necessity of militarizing the Rapid Support
[00:21:12] Forces. And this is the part where General Al-Burhan
[00:21:16] also needs advice. We, too, brothers,
[00:21:19] as media, we also have political responsibilities. What are our political
[00:21:22] responsibilities? Our political responsibilities are that we
[00:21:25] must preserve the course of the battle within the national
[00:21:28] framework, within the framework of preserving national unity. I
[00:21:32] met him last year and told him, "Your Excellency, you currently have no
[00:21:36] Al-Bashir. Mr. President, yes.
[00:21:40] Al-Bashir is now a past event. That past has mistakes, and you are responsible
[00:21:44] for correcting them now, given that you are the President. Your battle is with whom?
[00:21:47] Your battle is with, your current
[00:21:51] battle is with. I pointed out to him, yes. Your current battle is with the Rapid Support Forces, and these people
[00:21:55] are lined up with you so that you will eliminate the rebellion and eliminate
[00:21:59] this conspiracy. Therefore, these are your strengths. Do not
[00:22:02] fight a battle within the national ranks.
[00:22:06] At least, if we don't say within the national ranks, don't fight a battle within the ranks that
[00:22:09] support you. And I say this
[00:22:13] because it is our role. If we don't tell him this, we will be
[00:22:19] role. Now, before your speech,
[00:22:21] how did he say, "I have no battle"? He told me that he was, of course,
[00:22:25] talking about this in the context of clarification: "You say that I expanded the Rapid Support
[00:22:29] Forces and I increased the Rapid Support
[00:22:30] Forces."
[00:22:33] This issue is the responsibility of the Ansar at the level
[00:22:37] of Omar al-Bashir, and he was saying this with vehemence, with anger,
[00:22:40] with the same last meeting. So I want to
[00:22:44] warn, my brother, that there were mistakes in this matter.
[00:22:48] There are no two or three in Ansar. There were mistakes,
[00:22:50] and there were many corrections as well. The person who comes
[00:22:53] after that, the president who comes after that, does not talk
[00:22:57] about mistakes, he corrects them.
[00:23:01] And now, for example,
[00:23:05] Sudan? What was the worst thing it did in Sudan?
[00:23:08] It made the Rapid Support Forces a political party.
[00:23:11] It transformed them into a political
[00:23:14] part of the Ansar and were a fighting group, and in circumstances, I mean, now
[00:23:17] we can also say that the Forces of Freedom and Change should not
[00:23:20] blackmail people by saying, "Omar al-Bashir created the Rapid Support Forces." Omar al-Bashir
[00:23:24] created the Rapid Support Forces as a fighting force. You made them a political
[00:23:28] armed force. And Al-Burhan is not to blame for this story.
[00:23:32] You made the constitutional document. You brought
[00:23:34] the credit for this revolution, should you have taken the Rapid Support Forces and put
[00:23:38] them in prison with Al-Bashir? Isn't that protecting
[00:23:41] Al-Bashir? What should you have done naturally?
[00:23:45] You brought Al-Burhan, but you didn't bring the credit for the revolution. Al-Burhan came with his responsibilities
[00:23:48] as the army commander. But you came with the credit for the revolution. The first thing you should have done was take
[00:23:52] Al-Bashir's weapon, which is the Rapid Support Forces, and imprison them with him. But you wanted
[00:23:56] to establish a partnership with them, and not a partnership at the level of military protection,
[00:24:00] no. You wanted to create a political formula where the Rapid Support Forces would be a partner.
[00:24:03] This is the worst thing that was done. This is the worst thing that was
[00:24:07] done. Now, when General Al-Burhan says to you, "Well, we made mistakes, and these people
[00:24:11] deceived us, and we are paying the price for what came," he said, "on our heads,"
[00:24:14] meaning he used the phrase "we paid the price," meaning from us.
[00:24:18] He said it directly, meaning a leader who lost
[00:24:21] all his presidential guards, these are heavy prices.
[00:24:25] Now, General Al-Bashir is correcting these mistakes, and this is the pattern
[00:24:29] that a leader who does not remain
[00:24:32] a prisoner of past stations follows. He learns
[00:24:36] from them. General Al-Burhan, not
[00:24:40] benefit from this mistake. Yes, because Hassan
[00:24:43] is always inclined towards Islamists and expresses
[00:24:47] that he was part of a system that he now criticizes.
[00:24:50] This is the talk of his opponents. No, look, I'm talking about General Al-Burhan, that
[00:24:54] now, as a leader, you should not trap yourself in old stations.
[00:24:58] You overcome them. You overcome, meaning you take
[00:25:01] lessons, you see the mistakes, correcting them is your responsibility, and you benefit from
[00:25:04] the present. He is doing this in a good way. I mean, now,
[00:25:08] how were the Rapid Support Forces established? How did they become a system? Even
[00:25:11] by the way, we don't want to restrict ourselves by saying that the Rapid Support Forces in 2019
[00:25:15] were not part of the process. No, we don't want to restrict ourselves to this story,
[00:25:19] nor to these stations. You are a leader. We, the observers and politicians
[00:25:23] and analysts, discuss these mistakes. The leader
[00:25:26] corrects, he corrects
[00:25:30] well. He is doing it 100% well, and this
[00:25:33] is what should be encouraged and supported and people should stand behind him because
[00:25:37] we have one enemy now. I mean, I told
[00:25:41] them last year, I told him, "Al-Bashir
[00:25:44] doesn't care about this story. You don't need to be agitated
[00:25:48] by this issue. You are responsible for correcting
[00:25:52] the mistakes you found and those that were made
[00:25:55] after 2019." And it's not wrong
[00:25:58] that, I mean, the leader's responsibility is to correct, to correct
[00:26:02] mistakes.
[00:26:04] Also, I keep telling him that he shouldn't get
[00:26:07] into a media discussion in media coverage of something that could
[00:26:11] cause confusion in the media space, like
[00:26:14] this, and from the womb of the armed forces, yes.
[00:26:18] I mean, for example, after this episode, after this meeting, some people
[00:26:21] , I'm sorry I went on for so long, some people
[00:26:24] sent me the document of the decision to withdraw Article
[00:26:27] 5. A lot of it, yes, this article is like this
[00:26:31] and this article is like that. You are busy with mobilizing
[00:26:34] people, not stirring up controversy within the cohesion
[00:26:37] of the national ranks. Don't stir up controversy within
[00:26:40] it. These advices
[00:26:43] can provoke anger and stir up, but it is important for
[00:26:47] a person to say them. I will come back to you and complete the story
[00:26:51] of the Rapid Support Forces. Professor Mustafa
[00:26:53] also عزيز Professor Hassan
[00:26:56] Ismail, and he pointed to specific parts of the speech,
[00:27:00] and I noticed that you agreed with him on the part about the Rapid Support
[00:27:04] Militia. What was your impression? What caught
[00:27:07] your attention in the meeting and in the President's speech
[00:27:11] and his meeting with the media in conclusion? I think
[00:27:14] it was the forum. Frankly, the role of the media
[00:27:18] at this stage and its importance, and then
[00:27:21] I was blaming those
[00:27:23] who organized
[00:27:27] meeting because the
[00:27:30] meeting was not broadcast
[00:27:33] in full. I think that was a very strong message to
[00:27:37] many people, yes, to all Sudanese people.
[00:27:39] But the issue of Mr. Burhan's
[00:27:42] meeting with journalists, as I told you, is that he felt the role of the media in
[00:27:46] this stage, and I said this if I had the opportunity
[00:27:49] to speak on the platform, I said that the media no
[00:27:52] longer means its role is just to convey news,
[00:27:56] but rather to create public opinion
[00:27:59] and to create events. He
[00:28:03] agreed with me on this opinion
[00:28:05] and referred to this also on the platform,
[00:28:09] and I think that
[00:28:12] what happened was a great achievement, and a great breakthrough
[00:28:17] of political forces in dealing and general concepts
[00:28:21] with in terms of the actions of
[00:28:25] Sudan.
[00:28:27] The second and very important thing
[00:28:31] is Mr. Burhan's speech and his criticism even of the state's
[00:28:34] preparations. This was not happening for many reasons,
[00:28:38] because we wanted a government in this specific aspect.
[00:28:41] He said we don't want a government of doctors or a government
[00:28:45] of professors that has no relationship with the Sudanese people, that has no
[00:28:49] such glory. This was a message, yes, it was a
[00:28:52] very strong message, which he said we want people
[00:28:55] who feel the concerns of the Sudanese people and work
[00:28:59] to solve them and to address them. He also said this
[00:29:02] in his speech on the platform. I said
[00:29:05] that the duty of the state, the duty of the ruler in general,
[00:29:08] is to work on the principle of stability,
[00:29:11] to feed the hungry and to protect from fear. You ensure
[00:29:15] people's livelihoods and protect their security.
[00:29:19] aspect, and I think this is a very
[00:29:23] in the speech, and I think
[00:29:27] direction and give people the opportunity to criticize
[00:29:30] and
[00:29:33] the general performance of governments, the existing governments, this government or the coming government.
[00:29:37] People should correct
[00:29:39] their mistakes and propose solutions, and as Brother Professor
[00:29:43] Hassan Al-Hassi told you, the media's role itself is
[00:29:46] to correct mistakes and to present
[00:29:50] some suggestions personally as a media professional or journalist or
[00:29:53] so on. We all can
[00:29:57] seek other opinions through political
[00:30:00] forces or experts or specialists about some
[00:30:03] government policies. I think it was a successful speech,
[00:30:07] but I also blame that this speech was not
[00:30:10] broadcast in full. Even if it was broadcast for an hour
[00:30:13] in the evening, say what I said live, I am afraid of something happening, but even
[00:30:17] after the speech ended, it was a strong speech and a great speech.
[00:30:21] And I conveyed this to the presidential media, Al-Bukhari also confirms your
[00:30:25] point. Yes,
[00:30:28] of course, the speech contained,
[00:30:31] as we mentioned, many and important
[00:30:34] things, and perhaps
[00:30:37] the first
[00:30:40] prolonged speech by Mr.
[00:30:43] Burhan, I think that the messages contained
[00:30:47] a large part for the international community as states,
[00:30:50] and for external organizations
[00:30:54] or international mechanisms. For example, he talked
[00:30:57] clearly about the Quartet.