SYRIANNEWS — broadcast
20261102 180000 UTC
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[00:00:04] important in this discussion. Excuse me for
[00:00:13] In Homs governorate, the general intelligence thwarts
[00:00:16] a terrorist plot to target the oil
[00:00:19] refinery there. This is something that may be
[00:00:23] in matters, normal in light of the events that the country
[00:00:26] is going through. However, what is not normal is that
[00:00:30] this news comes in the context of a series of previous
[00:00:33] attacks on energy sites and lines
[00:00:36] there. Also, another thing happened concurrently
[00:00:40] with that. The general intelligence service overthrew
[00:00:43] a cell belonging to ISIS in Deir
[00:00:47] ez-Zor. What is the important thing in this news? The important
[00:00:51] thing is that this
[00:00:54] to arming. cell had carried out a series
[00:00:56] warfare, in many of assassinations, and the last of them was targeting a member of the Ministry
[00:01:00] of Defense and targeting members of the Ministry
[00:01:03] of Defense is a matter that must
[00:01:06] be looked into deeply, as well as
[00:01:08] the targeting of power stations and lines. Is
[00:01:13] and incursions into there a connection, I wonder, between the two matters, or is it just a
[00:01:17] coincidence in events? What
[00:01:19] is the extent of the development of the work of the security services? Have
[00:01:23] the security services succeeded in building an intelligence
[00:01:26] system capable of dismantling
[00:01:31] capabilities, despite their modesty, networks before they carry out their attacks, or is
[00:01:33] the multiplicity of threats necessitating a broader
[00:01:37] review of the security strategy? These questions
[00:01:40] and many others will be discussed
[00:01:42] and put on
[00:02:02] to discuss ISIS's work in
[00:02:06] So, the Internal Security Forces announced the arrest of a cell belonging
[00:02:10] consider it the primary threat protect. Okay, now in today's episode, on to the terrorist ISIS organization in Deir ez-Zor
[00:02:13] following a precise intelligence
[00:02:16] follow-up. Investigations confirmed the cell's involvement in a series
[00:02:21] studies indicate, I agree with of assassination operations in the governorate, the last of which was targeting a member of the Ministry
[00:02:25] of Defense in Al-Mayadeen. Meanwhile, the General Intelligence
[00:02:29] Directorate thwarted a terrorist plot to target
[00:02:38] we must look at what is happening in the table.
[00:02:42] Security experts and strategic
[00:02:46] runs parallel to files say that the security situation is not measured only by what succeeds in
[00:02:49] being dismantled, but also by what can be discovered before it
[00:02:53] turns into a danger. From
[00:02:57] harm parties at the regional Homs to Deir ez-Zor and all Syrian governorates, security and intelligence
[00:03:01] events have accelerated and intertwined. Challenges
[00:03:04] to stability have intertwined with the legacy of long years of
[00:03:07] conflict, until the security battle began
[00:03:09] to be more than just pursuing
[00:03:11] that Iran left in armed men
[00:03:12] the region despite its withdrawal from and arresting those involved.
[00:03:15] Now I will not delve into operations because its capabilities have indeed It is a battle to protect the state
[00:03:18] and its institutions and vital
[00:03:23] and the Deir ez-Zor desert, and the Badia were liberated from facilities. In the past hours, the security scene witnessed
[00:03:26] month, we witnessed a kind of two simultaneous
[00:03:27] escalation in developments. The General
[00:03:30] Intelligence thwarted a terrorist plot to target
[00:03:34] the region. This Homs refinery, one of the basic
[00:03:37] we found many pillars for securing oil
[00:03:38] and some economic derivatives.
[00:03:39] of operations was reduced to eight, and even in
[00:03:40] targets in In parallel with a security operation in Deir ez-Zor that ended with the arrest of
[00:03:43] a two-person cell linked
[00:03:46] to ISIS.
[00:03:48] Yes, I do not deny there was an escalation in Investigations revealed the involvement of those arrested in a series of assassinations
[00:03:56] of attacks on shows, going back to in the governorate, the last of which was the martyrdom of a member of the Ministry of Defense in the city of Al-Mayadeen. And here we must pause at the targeting
[00:04:00] of a member of the Ministry
[00:04:01] There are many of Defense and the subsequent questions about
[00:04:04] the reasons, goals, and repercussions. The Internal
[00:04:07] Security seized weapons and ammunition in the cell's
[00:04:11] hideout, while investigations continue
[00:04:15] militias and their shield in regarding it. But the importance of these
[00:04:18] developments does not lie in the number of those arrested
[00:04:23] you to Syrian News for or the thwarted plots, for the targeting of Homs refinery puts energy security at the core
[00:04:27] of the equation, especially since the targeting is not
[00:04:30] the first of its kind, but
[00:04:32] that seek to undermine comes after a series of attacks on energy sites and
[00:04:35] lines. While
[00:04:39] and Iranian agencies in ISIS, in my estimation, in regime from the assassination incident in Deir ez-Zor raises the question
[00:04:41] of sleeper cells and their ability to move
[00:04:44] and execute despite the ongoing operations
[00:04:47] against them and the significant reduction in
[00:04:52] second on their danger. The important question in these
[00:04:53] the list. Yes, ISIS is among developments arises about the possibility of linking
[00:04:56] them, or whether they are scattered movements
[00:05:00] that coincide with different
[00:05:04] And Israel ranks goals.
[00:05:08] For discussion on the table in this
[00:05:11] episode, I am pleased
[00:05:47] there is no doubt, there is no disagreement, whether
[00:05:51] inside Syria or perhaps even outside Syria, that
[00:05:54] the state is targeted on more
[00:05:57] than one level, and perhaps from more than one
[00:06:00] side. But the most important question is, are
[00:06:04] we facing the targeting as required?
[00:06:07] Some say that there are still shortcomings
[00:06:10] in some security aspects. Is this accurate or not?
[00:06:20] topic and we must be precise in describing all
[00:06:24] cases. Yes, indeed, Syria is going through
[00:06:26] a sensitive transitional period, and
[00:06:30] the state is still rebuilding and restructuring
[00:06:33] its security, military,
[00:06:36] and police institutions. There are threats from the legacy of the former
[00:06:40] regime or from the legacy of the past war. The state is facing
[00:06:43] them and dealing with them in different ways. In the midst
[00:06:46] of this security war, today there are no longer military battles,
[00:06:50] battles on the field, or direct confrontations. Today, we are facing
[00:06:53] the scene of a security battle, which is naturally
[00:06:57] more dangerous and more
[00:07:01] state because it is not like a clear, direct field
[00:07:04] war where your enemy is in front of you.
[00:07:07] In a security war, the enemy can come
[00:07:10] from between your fingers or from behind your back and stab you.
[00:07:13] Therefore, the challenges are great
[00:07:16] in the midst of modest
[00:07:19] capabilities. In my opinion and estimation, the Syrian
[00:07:23] state, with its nascent agencies,
[00:07:26] which are progressing steadily,
[00:07:29] is doing a fairly good job and to a large extent in
[00:07:33] confronting these terrorist threats. Today we are talking about
[00:07:35] your episode, an episode about the threat of the terrorist organization of ISIS. The threat of the terrorist
[00:07:39] organization of ISIS is the primary threat that threatens the Syrian state
[00:07:42] today. ISIS is the primary
[00:07:46] one, and not other parties. There are
[00:07:49] other parties that can be discussed at length, but
[00:07:52] let's focus on ISIS because the situation is complicated
[00:08:00] I saw, there was a
[00:08:04] period of calm and
[00:08:07] forced media silence from the organization during the past
[00:08:10] summer. Forced media silence. The organization does not claim all
[00:08:14] the operations it carries out in Syria. Yes. Until
[00:08:18] it came, forced. Why forced? You say forced? Forced for security
[00:08:21] reasons specific to the organization itself. It does not want to reveal its sources, or it
[00:08:24] means there were many failed operations that
[00:08:28] the organization did not succeed in carrying out or achieving its goals
[00:08:32] as a result of the proactive security operations carried out by the Syrian
[00:08:35] state. Okay, until last
[00:08:40] operations, to be precise. Operations that
[00:08:43] I describe as easy
[00:08:45] targets in open areas
[00:08:52] areas that are not fully protected.
[00:08:55] If you remember, during last July,
[00:09:00] improvised explosive device operations in the capital, Damascus, and its suburbs.
[00:09:04] The terrorist organization was able
[00:09:19] Yes, there is more than one party, but each operation has its own pattern,
[00:09:22] its own party behind it.
[00:09:26] But I recall, for example, the operations that took place during
[00:09:29] President Macron's visit. They were a terrorist bombing of
[00:09:33] a kind. It was certainly with a high probability that
[00:09:36] ISIS was behind them. These operations ended today. There are no longer operations
[00:09:40] that we witness by ISIS inside.
[00:09:43] Therefore, as a result of various reasons, one of which is why
[00:09:46] they ended. You are asserting that they ended. We will not see this type now.
[00:09:50] They have sharply declined. Yes, they have sharply declined. Well, what is the reason
[00:09:54] for the decline? The reason for the decline is that there are intelligence
[00:09:57] capabilities added to the Syrian security agencies, and there are also logistical
[00:10:00] tools added inside cities. More about these
[00:10:04] logistical tools, for example, we used to offer advice to the Ministry
[00:10:07] of Interior and intelligence agencies to increase the number of cameras,
[00:10:11] the number of surveillance cameras.
[00:10:25] failed completely, and this is a great achievement for
[00:10:28] the new Syrian administration. When ISIS failed
[00:10:31] in this strategy, it resorted to compensation. How is
[00:10:35] compensation made? Compensation is made by fleeing towards easy
[00:10:38] targets. For example, members of the Ministry of Defense
[00:10:41] or road security or customs officers. These
[00:10:45] are heavily present in open areas and on agricultural
[00:10:49] roads and on roads where sometimes they are
[00:10:52] in their special military uniform and in their car also
[00:10:55] with their slogans and in areas where they are heavily present
[00:10:58] and it is easy to target them. Therefore,
[00:11:01] the organization resorts to these easy targets. It also resorted to targeting some
[00:11:05] economic targets. If you watch, there
[00:11:08] was an escalation in the economic war launched by the organization against
[00:11:12] the Syrian state, to be clear. When its strategy
[00:11:15] failed in the cities, it resorted to economic warfare and easy targets.
[00:11:18] Even in economic
[00:11:21] cases, it did not succeed in targeting sensitive
[00:11:24] sites within power stations. In some specific
[00:11:27] cases, such as the Tishreen power plant, it succeeded in targeting a point
[00:11:31] of great importance within the plant, but most
[00:11:35] of the targets were either oil pipelines in open
[00:11:38] desert areas that are not fully protected, some
[00:11:42] targets of Iraqi oil tankers that transport
[00:11:45] oil, and these are also easy targets. But generally,
[00:11:48] the dangerous organization still exists, so that the viewer is aware,
[00:11:52] but the Syrian security
[00:11:56] despite the limited capabilities, are developing themselves
[00:11:59] autonomously and can pursue these threats and uncover
[00:12:03] them. The danger still exists. I will give you a simple example regarding
[00:12:06] the targeting of cities. There was a preemptive
[00:12:10] operation in the city of Al-Tal
[00:12:12] that thwarted a cell of ISIS. This very cell
[00:12:16] was involved in planting an IED in the same area, but the IED did not
[00:12:19] cause any losses. After this operation,
[00:12:23] we did not hear of any ISIS operation in city centers and in
[00:12:26] urban areas. This indicates that the organization is fleeing from city centers to
[00:12:30] open areas to economic targets that the state cannot
[00:12:35] the table, we are discussing targeting in general. You see, from your perspective, that
[00:12:39] the biggest danger now comes from ISIS. Yes, indeed. Do you agree with that, Mr.
[00:12:43] Ali? In fact, all
[00:12:46] Mr. Diaa on this matter, because all studies indicate, including the UN Security Council
[00:12:50] report issued in August, that
[00:12:54] ISIS is a fundamental threat to security in Syria,
[00:12:57] and it talks about the organization's strategies
[00:13:00] for targeting. It talks about how these
[00:13:03] strategies are changing. If you refer to previous reports, it has
[00:13:07] an almost monthly report and also reports covering previous
[00:13:10] years. It states that the Islamic State organization has
[00:13:13] updated its targeting strategy within Syria.
[00:13:17] It talks about a strategy of targeting government
[00:13:20] officials because the organization explicitly adopted
[00:13:24] hostility towards the government. It
[00:13:26] adopted a strategy of attacking checkpoints, as Mr. Diaa
[00:13:29] mentioned. Therefore, police officers,
[00:13:32] road security officers, and security officers.
[00:13:36] It also adopted hit-and-run
[00:13:39] declined recently. If we notice that
[00:13:42] since Syria
[00:13:44] joined the international coalition to fight ISIS in late, perhaps
[00:13:48] November 2025,
[00:13:52] if we look at the reports and the level of operations carried out by the organization,
[00:13:56] we would find, for example, that in May
[00:14:00] 2026, the number
[00:14:04] the months before and after 2026, within
[00:14:07] these limits. But in 2025, the number of operations
[00:14:10] reached 40, at
[00:14:13] an average of 39 operations per month for 2025. This
[00:14:18] the question you asked Mr. Diaa, whether the state succeeded. Yes,
[00:14:22] the state succeeded. Just reducing this
[00:14:25] number to this percentage is considered a great
[00:14:28] success, with the acknowledgment that
[00:14:32] the matter requires great efforts and that the state is still building
[00:14:34] its security forces and agencies to confront
[00:14:38] ISIS. Yes, but there is no shortcoming from
[00:14:42] the agencies in some aspects. I do not believe
[00:14:46] that there is a shortcoming. In fact, ISIS
[00:14:49] carries out operations in other
[00:14:52] countries that have highly
[00:14:56] fortified security and military structures. This happens in Turkey and Jordan,
[00:15:00] for example. This happens in Jordan. We notice that it carries out
[00:15:03] qualitative operations. But the strategy today in Syria, as we mentioned, perhaps
[00:15:07] another element has been added and this is what the UN
[00:15:10] Security Council spoke about in its August report:
[00:15:14] an attempt to create sectarian strife between the components.
[00:15:17] So it set a goal for itself to target religious leaders from different
[00:15:21] sects within Syria to sow strife within
[00:15:25] the sects. Therefore, the interpretation in the report
[00:15:28] was also that targeting a Shiite religious leader in the Sayyida Zeinab area is
[00:15:32] the responsibility of ISIS.
[00:15:34] Therefore, I want to point to an issue
[00:15:38] here that perhaps you will address later:
[00:15:41] that the issue is not only state efforts or military efforts and security
[00:15:45] agency efforts, because it needs something else, which is a strategy
[00:15:49] of winning hearts and minds, because there is a problem at the societal
[00:15:52] level when the organization tries to destabilize societies,
[00:15:56] destabilize local environments, create strife between the components of Syrian
[00:16:00] society. Surely, among the goals
[00:16:03] is, in fact,
[00:16:06] either to gain members or to gain enemies of the state. Any hostility
[00:16:09] that occurs is hostility towards the Syrian state. Therefore,
[00:16:12] the battle is open on several
[00:16:15] fronts, and this is a great danger. This
[00:16:18] issue cannot be solved only, you want to say that now
[00:16:22] the organization can
[00:16:25] gain additional members from
[00:16:27] the current situation. Let's go back to what happened,
[00:16:31] for example, in the events in northeastern Syria,
[00:16:34] and the escape
[00:16:36] of perhaps 150 people who fled, and the state pursued
[00:16:40] them and arrested a large number of them. Yes. And let's
[00:16:43] talk about the fact that there was chaos inside the region
[00:16:47] and prisons. We do not know yet
[00:16:50] that a final outcome
[00:16:53] or a map of the movements
[00:16:57] of those who managed to escape, for example,
[00:16:59] and how they are
[00:17:02] being pursued now. Where
[00:17:05] are they active? There are great efforts, but I
[00:17:09] want to add another point in this regard. ISIS
[00:17:12] is not the ISIS we only know, meaning that it is the main
[00:17:16] Islamic State. Now the question is that each
[00:17:20] intelligence agency, perhaps at the regional level, has its own ISIS.
[00:17:24] Let's be frank, there is correct.
[00:17:27] This is almost agreed upon. Agreed upon. Yes.
[00:17:30] There are
[00:17:32] currents within ISIS.
[00:17:34] These currents,
[00:17:36] each current perhaps is managed by an intelligence agency affiliated with a state.
[00:17:39] Therefore, the strategy of ISIS at
[00:17:43] the central level may take a form, perhaps,
[00:17:47] for other groups working under the supervision of intelligence agencies, perhaps
[00:17:51] Israeli, perhaps Iranian, perhaps other
[00:17:54] regional states have been able to infiltrate because this is a natural
[00:17:57] thing. In security interpretation, perhaps Mr. Diaa and the rest of
[00:18:01] the esteemed guests agree that even European
[00:18:03] countries have been able, in one way or another, to plant elements
[00:18:07] and groups from within the Islamic
[00:18:10] State of ISIS. Therefore, also,
[00:18:15] the region. Sometimes, some
[00:18:19] operations that target, for example, the Syrian economy may
[00:18:23] be interpreted, in one way or another, by what
[00:18:26] regional parties feel, that such projects,
[00:18:29] for example, energy projects, the talk about energy projects today in Syria may
[00:18:38] The question now is whether such probabilities, now
[00:18:42] these parties use their ISIS, which
[00:18:46] you referred to, in Syria, or rather, the parties perhaps affiliated
[00:18:49] with them directly.
[00:18:57] and let's also talk about the existence of weak
[00:19:00] points in the Syrian environment. We know that, for example, there are
[00:19:04] groups working with Israel, alignments
[00:19:17] and groups within other areas, perhaps in coastal areas
[00:19:20] and other areas, and this is not a generalization, but this is a possible
[00:19:37] Mr. Ali and Mr. Diaa, there is
[00:19:41] almost an agreement that the biggest danger now from a security perspective
[00:19:45] in Syria and the issue of targeting the state
[00:19:47] comes from ISIS.
[00:19:50] Do you also agree with this
[00:20:04] me, and through my reading of the security threats
[00:20:10] the nascent Syrian state, I place
[00:20:15] second place, or it is the second threat
[00:20:18] to the Syrian state. Second, not first. Where
[00:20:22] does it stand? Where does it rank? You say
[00:20:25] second, Mr. Rashid, so that we understand you clearly. You say
[00:20:31] the first. The first
[00:20:32] is
[00:20:35] where ISIS ranks as a security threat to the nascent Syrian
[00:20:39] state.
[00:20:42] first. While Iran and its militias
[00:20:45] and its arms in the region and its presence in the region, especially
[00:20:49] Mr. Ali, was also pointing to a point that might be
[00:20:58] agree with him, even Mr. Diaa also agrees
[00:21:01] that international parties may even have,
[00:21:04] let's say, their own ISIS or a part of ISIS
[00:21:07] now specific to them. Therefore, there is
[00:21:10] perhaps an intersection
[00:21:13] meaning things are complex.
[00:21:16] Yes, I
[00:21:28] for the international coalition to combat terrorism, it would be in its interest
[00:21:32] to provide, or for international bodies, led by
[00:21:35] America, to work, and we also followed the military
[00:21:38] and security movements
[00:21:41] and the lifting of sanctions related
[00:21:44] Therefore, it is
[00:21:46] possible to arm
[00:21:50] and train military security agencies to confront
[00:21:53] ISIS in a way that is appropriate for the Syrian
[00:21:56] situation. While Israel ranks first due to the international
[00:22:00] negligence in stopping its violations
[00:22:03] the Syrian
[00:22:10] to be precise, now we are
[00:22:13] discussing the internal security situation, and we have put on the table
[00:22:16] two incidents that occurred during the last hours: first, an attempt
[00:22:20] to target the Homs refinery, which was successfully
[00:22:23] thwarted, and another incident
[00:22:26] also related to targeting a member of the Ministry
[00:22:29] of Defense. And this, it
[00:22:33] was known that ISIS was the target. Therefore, we
[00:22:36] are talking about internal
[00:22:38] conditions.
[00:22:42] Yes, I spoke generally about the security threats facing
[00:22:46] the Syrian state, both internally and externally. Yes. I was going
[00:22:52] the Syrian arena after the fall of the regime and ISIS.
[00:22:55] To some extent, we can
[00:23:00] at the internal level. Why? Because if
[00:23:04] we follow the statements issued
[00:23:07] by ISIS through its magazine, Al-Naba,
[00:23:10] we notice that since the fall of the regime and
[00:23:14] the new Syrian administration taking power in Damascus,
[00:23:17] it began with a hostile
[00:23:20] discourse towards the Syrian state and the authority
[00:23:23] that took power,
[00:23:26] and it relied on incitement,
[00:23:29] mobilization, and harsh religious discourse in order
[00:23:33] to mobilize its supporters in the Syrian
[00:23:36] there, but also resorted
[00:23:53] adopt, as part of its strategy, the targeting
[00:23:56] of the Syrian government now, and not do so during
[00:24:00] the Syrian regime? Doesn't this explain an overlap
[00:24:02] and implementation?
[00:24:05] I mean, let me say that, yes, I agree with you that Israel is
[00:24:09] a strategic enemy, but Israel uses
[00:24:11] its tactics, Iran uses its tactics, and
[00:24:15] ISIS may be, perhaps this borders on
[00:24:18] certainty, one of the tactical tools in the conflict within
[00:24:24] strategic conflict between Israel or Iran. You mean exactly,
[00:24:27] ultimately, one cannot separate
[00:24:31] the issue of ISIS from the threats existing at the regional
[00:24:38] this matter. On the contrary, I agree that there is a tacit
[00:24:42] cooperation between ISIS and all parties or some parties,
[00:24:45] especially the Iranian militias in the Syrian arena,
[00:24:48] especially ISIS.
[00:24:51] operations that it carried out against the Syrian
[00:24:54] Democratic Forces (SDF) east of the Euphrates, and they were under the watchful
[00:24:58] eye and facilitation of the Iranian militias and the Syrian regime forces.
[00:25:02] And today, due to the dangerous actions of the Iranian
[00:25:05] the Syrian arena, and the attempt by Iran
[00:25:08] to communicate, I mean, there are several
[00:25:12] reports from reputable research
[00:25:15] and media institutions that indicated that Iran is trying to revive
[00:25:19] its networks, and through these attempts, I do not rule out that
[00:25:23] there are unannounced communications between ISIS
[00:25:29] the Syrian arena so that ISIS can
[00:25:32] organize its operations
[00:25:46] this is the main point. Mr. Rashid used
[00:25:50] the term "tacit cooperation," and this may be,
[00:25:53] according to what he said, one of the possibilities or one of the angles
[00:25:56] for reading the scene related
[00:26:00] to security threats in
[00:26:03] Or is the story more like, let's
[00:26:06] say, collusion, meaning a convergence of
[00:26:10] interests, and not necessarily there is coordination
[00:26:13] between the parties that are trying
[00:26:22] Karim, we must define two basic determinants so that
[00:26:25] I can answer your question.
[00:26:28] The first determinant was that everyone knew
[00:26:32] that ISIS, like all radical terrorist organizations,
[00:26:36] whether right-wing or left-wing, is infiltrated
[00:26:39] by intelligence agencies of multiple
[00:26:42] countries. We know very well that it is a transnational
[00:26:45] organization. This organization cannot exist
[00:26:49] in areas of Syria, in areas of Iraq, in other areas, without international
[00:26:52] intelligence support. How does it secure weapons? How does it secure
[00:26:56] members? How does it secure members crossing borders
[00:26:59] towards specific areas such as Syria and Iraq?
[00:27:02] This is a known fact since the beginning of
[00:27:06] the Syrian revolution, especially after 2013,
[00:27:10] when this organization emerged in the northeastern region of Syria.
[00:27:13] Yes, the other matter is that we must know that there is a strong
[00:27:17] relationship between other terrorist organizations, such
[00:27:20] as the Iranian arms, the Iranian militias, and Hezbollah,
[00:27:24] the terrorist. Also, the remnants of the regime. There is a strong relationship
[00:27:28] between them and the organization. It may be through collusion. It
[00:27:32] may be that the same entity supports all
[00:27:35] of them in order to prevent the emergence of a strong
[00:27:39] state in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime.
[00:27:43] We all know that Iran suffered a severe blow in Syria after
[00:27:46] its defeat and that of its proxies and the victory of the blessed
[00:27:49] Syrian revolution. Therefore, in my opinion,
[00:27:52] what, if we want to identify the dangers, each
[00:27:56] terrorist organization from the organizations, which you mentioned and
[00:27:59] which still has remnants in Syria whether the regime's solutions
[00:28:02] or terrorist organizations such as ISIS
[00:28:05] and the remaining arms of Iran in the region, all these
[00:28:09] organizations, in my opinion, let's go to what you said,
[00:28:12] they serve each other in
[00:28:15] implementing an agenda that is imposed or directed by
[00:28:19] those who support all these organizations,
[00:28:23] they all agreed to prevent Syria's rise, prevent Syria's unity,
[00:28:27] and present Syria to the world as
[00:28:30] weak in the face of terrorist threats.
[00:28:33] To strike the Syrian economy fatally in order to
[00:28:36] mobilize the popular base against
[00:28:39] the new nascent state. Therefore, if we want
[00:28:43] to talk in this context, I believe that the danger
[00:28:45] of ISIS
[00:28:48] the other dangers, which are the remnants of the regime's loyalists
[00:28:52] and which are the remnants
[00:28:55] a little while ago, at the beginning of his speech, he was saying that the biggest danger, the biggest
[00:28:58] at the top of the list, number one, is now ISIS.
[00:29:03] Sir, ISIS is no less dangerous than any other organization, but also
[00:29:07] we must not overlook the remnants of the regime's loyalists. We must
[00:29:10] not overlook the sleeper cells
[00:29:15] the region. I mean, we must understand a matter of
[00:29:18] importance. Let me give you an example: at the beginning of the liberation, when
[00:29:22] the Deir ez-Zor region,
[00:29:26] the defunct regime in 2024,
[00:29:29] at the end of 2024, we found many
[00:29:33] headquarters of Iranian militias. The flags of al-Aqab, which the
[00:29:36] ISIS organization was using,
[00:29:39] tools that the organization uses, whether
[00:29:43] flags or slogans or even a specific dress.
[00:29:46] I mean, ISIS is famous for wearing the Afghan or, as it is called, the Afghan
[00:29:49] uniform. We found these things.
[00:29:52] We found them in places where Iranian militias
[00:29:56] were stationed. The incidents
[00:29:59] shepherds in the Badia of Tabanni in Deir ez-Zor,
[00:30:02] and also in the Badia of Raqqa, and Palmyra and the Badia
[00:30:05] in Homs, were carried out under the name
[00:30:09] of ISIS, but those who carried them out were Iranian agendas. This does not mean
[00:30:12] that ISIS is also a dangerous terrorist organization,
[00:30:15] but we must not limit the full
[00:30:19] responsibility currently for what is happening in Syria to the ISIS
[00:30:23] organization. No one, no one means no one limits the full responsibility
[00:30:26] to ISIS, but we are discussing the issue of who
[00:30:30] poses perhaps a greater threat than
[00:30:33] others. In my opinion, everyone who
[00:30:37] did not like the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's
[00:30:41] the countries is now moving its tools in Syria,
[00:30:45] including ISIS, and at the top of them is ISIS. Yes, I admit,
[00:30:48] as my colleagues pointed out, that ISIS poses the
[00:30:52] greatest and most dangerous threat
[00:30:55] currently, but this does not mean that we should overlook the remnants
[00:30:59] of the organizations.