SYRIANNEWS — broadcast 20261102 183000 UTC 437 transcript segments Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking Data courtesy of The GDELT Project (https://www.gdeltproject.org/), from the Internet Archive TV News Archive. Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record. [00:00:00] in the al-Tabani desert area in Deir ez-Zor, as well as in the Raqqa [00:00:03] and Palmyra deserts and the desert in Homs, it was [00:00:07] carried out under the name ISIS, but those who carried it out were [00:00:11] Iranian agendas. This does not mean that ISIS is also a [00:00:14] dangerous terrorist organization, but we [00:00:19] fighting this should not limit this issue be addressed? the full responsibility for what is happening in Syria to [00:00:24] negligence in this to delve into the issue of what happened in ISIS. No one, no one limits the full responsibility to ISIS, [00:00:27] but we are discussing the issue of who, [00:00:30] that is, who poses perhaps a greater danger than [00:00:33] others. In my opinion, all [00:00:37] those who did not like the overthrow of Bashar [00:00:41] as long as the two countries are members of al-Assad's regime from the countries are now mobilizing their tools in Syria, [00:00:45] including ISIS, and at the top of them is ISIS. Yes, I admit, [00:00:48] as my colleagues pointed out, that ISIS poses the greatest [00:00:52] armed formations in and most dangerous coalition, why was there no coordination on this threat currently, still feeds on the [00:00:55] but this does not mean that Syria's presence in this we should turn a blind eye to the remnants crises that occur in the [00:00:59] of the organizations. Regarding what happened in Deir ez-Zor, [00:01:03] the liquidation of elements belonging to the Ministry [00:01:06] of Defense exploited [00:01:09] the presence of General Security patrols [00:01:12] between members of this in areas far from [00:01:15] this reality that human centers or population centers. Their presence there [00:01:19] is considered a prize for [00:01:22] ISIS. Today, ISIS, after it [00:01:25] was defeated at [00:01:27] And this also the level of the organization's control [00:01:30] over vast lands in Syria or [00:01:32] Iraq, this organization did not end, and its [00:01:36] danger did not end. It resorted to what is called lone [00:01:39] wolves and resorted to what are called sleeper cells that [00:01:43] become active at the first opportunity and at the first [00:01:45] malfunction, which may be unintentional by security, such [00:01:50] facilities in as a patrol in the desert conducting reconnaissance or [00:01:54] passing through, [00:01:57] it will attack it. This is what [00:02:05] at this [00:02:09] much of [00:02:12] happened in Deir ez-Zor and eastern Deir ez-Zor, [00:02:15] along with the thwarting of an attempt to bomb [00:02:21] that, of course, in the Homs refinery in a terrorist [00:02:22] in order for it to overcome act. This also has implications that we [00:02:25] should not ignore. Here, [00:02:30] to cut off the path for certainly. Today, it suffers from weakness in the goal is to undermine the confidence of the Syrian street in the ability of its leadership to maintain security, as well as [00:02:34] to harm the Syrian economy through bombing attempts carried out by terrorist [00:02:38] organizations, whether those that tried [00:02:41] to bomb the Homs refinery, which, thank God, were thwarted, [00:02:45] or bombings at power stations, or bombings of oil [00:02:49] pipelines. So here, this is a tactic [00:02:52] and in the pictures published in that is not local, but rather [00:02:55] comes with directives from [00:02:57] International Day for Disaster countries that I told you do not want peace in Syria. [00:03:04] Directorate carried out an evacuation Let me ask Mr. Diaa's opinion on this point. [00:03:06] and first aid training. This is not a local tactic. The attempt [00:03:09] to target the Homs refinery and target elements of the Ministry of Defense and other [00:03:13] matters, this is not a local tactic, says [00:03:16] the Homs refinery. And this does the colonel. Such tactics are known for [00:03:19] ISIS, or does it adapt its operations [00:03:22] and procedures based on the field situation and the prevailing circumstances? [00:03:27] will occur in But so as not to go far [00:03:28] station and some pipelines from into conspiracy theories, let's focus more on the threat. The terrorist and on what [00:03:31] Damascus has done and what the Syrian reality [00:03:35] imposes in terms of security challenges. You remember [00:03:39] that the first dangerous and declared operation by ISIS after the fall [00:03:43] of the regime, one day after, was announced by [00:03:46] Damascus in cooperation with the international coalition. It [00:03:49] was to target the shrine of Lady Zaynab. You certainly [00:03:52] know that the shrine of Lady Zaynab was built upon Iranian narratives [00:03:56] for intervention in Syria and defense of [00:04:00] took place and what was circulated in the sanctities. Moreover, if you look at it at first glance from a security perspective, [00:04:03] it is in Iran's interest for something to happen in that area to say, [00:04:07] the Syrian intelligence service, which announced at least to its people, that "look, when I was expelled from [00:04:10] Syria, what happened to the shrine happened, and what happened to this religious [00:04:13] site happened." This is from my point of view. But ISIS is [00:04:18] Jordan and others. Even in Iraq, in ISIS. Perhaps its interests may coincide with some parties. Perhaps [00:04:21] it receives financial support in a certain direction. But ISIS, even during [00:04:25] the regime's time, also targeted the regime and targeted [00:04:28] the Russians, and even targeted the SDF [00:04:32] and targeted everyone. This is a terrorist organization that targets everyone. [00:04:36] But certainly, even with regard to operations [00:04:40] even beyond and announcements, the organization itself used to carry out operations during [00:04:43] periods of forced media silence, even in areas where it [00:04:47] is being raised in terms of questions in this was present, such as in the SDF, or even in areas controlled by the regime, it did not announce that [00:04:51] because it achieved [00:04:54] our position, whether its goal in the end. It targeted [00:04:56] additional support to fight this the point or target it wanted, and in the end, it did not want to reveal its intelligence sources. [00:05:00] Today, to go back more and focus more on [00:05:04] the ISIS threat, why should it be - and I emphasize [00:05:08] the words of Mr. Sadeq Rashid Hourani - that it is [00:05:11] allowed a kind of the primary security threat for local actors? [00:05:15] We are not talking about external actors. We are talking about local [00:05:18] actors. Today, ISIS... [00:05:21] But a little while ago you were saying and agreeing with Professor Ali that even external [00:05:24] actors might also have a direct link [00:05:28] to it. But today, today, even Jordan, as a stable [00:05:31] country with its security [00:05:34] and military forces at the highest levels of readiness [00:05:37] and preparedness, suffered attacks in governorates very [00:05:41] far from the Syrian border. [00:05:44] But I mean that ISIS is not a single entity. There are more [00:05:48] than one party today. Today, even after the fall of the regime, there is no longer [00:05:51] a known leadership for ISIS. The central [00:05:55] leadership ended in ISIS. Today, the organization has formed [00:05:58] itself into scattered sub-networks, decentralized, [00:06:02] that may not communicate among themselves. For example, [00:06:05] I'll give you an example: it was announced recently that the wali [00:06:08] of Homs was arrested. Where was he arrested? He was arrested in the Damascus countryside. [00:06:13] He was targeting, he was behind the bombing of the Imam [00:06:16] Ali Mosque in the city of Homs. He was arrested [00:06:19] in the Homs countryside. Also, other cells. So, coordination operations [00:06:24] organization are at their lowest levels. The coordination process is [00:06:28] that it uses different electronic methods and programs. But [00:06:32] today, the leadership of the organization, the leadership of the tools it [00:06:35] uses, we know something about it. Of course, the security [00:06:38] agencies are aware of it and are monitoring and following up on it. The most prominent [00:06:42] of them, to be clear, are encrypted programs and others. But [00:06:46] today, the organization's leadership is no longer present in Syria. [00:06:50] Today, the organization's funding comes from distant regions in Africa. [00:06:53] There, the main activity of ISIS [00:06:56] - even reports talk about the organization sending money from [00:07:00] Africa to some of its cells in Syria. Today, ISIS is suffering [00:07:04] from a lack of funding, suffering from a lack of [00:07:07] recruitment. What the Syrian state has done on the economic [00:07:11] and social levels, and on the level of eliminating grievances [00:07:14] and discrimination that was imposed in some areas, such as the SDF, [00:07:18] for example, has made the organization lose [00:07:22] the base it used to draw on [00:07:25] to recruit elements and to ideologically charge [00:07:28] elements. Today, all ISIS propaganda is no longer effective, really. [00:07:31] Therefore, we are also waging a professional struggle. It is no longer effective. ISIS propaganda has [00:07:34] not been able to gain additional elements, [00:07:39] recruitment, it suffers from, I mean, today, many [00:07:43] failed operations and preemptive operations. In the [00:07:46] past month, at least, there were more than 10 preemptive operations by [00:07:50] the Syrian state to arrest [00:07:52] scattered cells and seize weapons, [00:07:56] and among them were also [00:07:59] explosive devices, which we saw with [00:08:02] our own eyes [00:08:05] the media. But does this mean that the organization is finished? No, [00:08:09] not certainly. Does it mean that the organization will go away soon? [00:08:13] Certainly not. The danger is still present, but the watchful [00:08:16] eye and the growing security capabilities and innovations [00:08:19] that are being introduced, for example, [00:08:22] it was possible to predict, for example, in the intelligence [00:08:25] operation that protected the Homs [00:08:28] refinery, it was possible to predict that the organization [00:08:32] would target the Homs refinery because it was waging an economic war [00:08:35] and targeted power stations such as the Tishreen [00:08:40] the Gasba line. Therefore, the Homs refinery was a potential target, [00:08:44] and therefore, supervision over it was intensified, and this plan was thwarted. Therefore, there [00:08:48] are those who think, there are those who sit, there are those who monitor, there are those who [00:08:51] anticipate. Monitoring security threats related [00:08:54] to ISIS does not necessarily have to be related to technological [00:08:57] capabilities or security capabilities. There must be [00:09:00] people who are aware of the way this [00:09:04] organization thinks and who [00:09:07] act preemptively to face threats. Only the security forces [00:09:10] have this expertise. Which are present in Syria today, the Ministry [00:09:14] of Interior represented by the anti-terrorism unit, and also [00:09:19] many operations. But does this mean that this organization will end soon? Certainly [00:09:23] not. This danger is still present. Terrorism strikes anywhere, even [00:09:27] stable countries like [00:09:30] the last period, there were five operations by ISIS in [00:09:34] Kirkuk, some of which were also dangerous. It will remain present, [00:09:38] it will remain present, but what will determine its danger and the extent [00:09:40] of its threat is the work of the security agencies, [00:09:44] their capabilities, their [00:09:47] follow-up of indicators and their tracking of these [00:09:51] risks, and all of them specifically. Now there is a fundamental question. Now Syria is part of [00:09:55] the international coalition to fight ISIS, but what [00:10:00] context is whether Syria's joining the international coalition [00:10:03] benefited the Syrian state in developing tools or providing [00:10:08] organization. Did this happen, Professor Ali, in your opinion? [00:10:12] Of course, yes. Syria's entry [00:10:16] into the international coalition to fight the organization allowed, as [00:10:19] we noticed, that the United States of America, for example, [00:10:24] training. There was also a [00:10:27] budget approved, I believe, to support the Syrian state's efforts in [00:10:31] fighting the ISIS organization, and this, [00:10:34] I won't hide it from you, is beneficial in fighting the organization and also [00:10:38] beneficial in the process of moral support for the Syrian state in [00:10:41] confronting this organization, because we noticed that there is a defect at the regional [00:10:45] level, perhaps we do not want [00:10:49] Karak, Jordan. May God have mercy on the victims there, and may God [00:10:51] have mercy on our martyrs also who fell [00:10:55] in the bombing in the Tafilah area and southern Syria. [00:10:58] Therefore, this is a big question that there is a defect, [00:11:02] there is a defect, no doubt, [00:11:06] the international coalition. Perhaps this is the point [00:11:09] of weakness or the big question mark [00:11:13] for two countries that are in the same [00:11:16] issue? But of course, [00:11:20] coalition, as I mentioned earlier, if we look at [00:11:23] the number of operations [00:11:27] of the organization since Syria joined the coalition, [00:11:30] we notice that they have significantly decreased in 2026. [00:11:34] But with the change in tactics and the change in the type [00:11:37] of targets, and I perhaps want to go back [00:11:40] a little to what my colleagues here mentioned, [00:11:43] that in reality, if you want to read [00:11:47] the nature of the event, the nature of the targeting carried out by ISIS today and the organization [00:11:51] towards oil refineries and gas pipelines and... [00:11:56] This explains, in one way or another, the efforts of the Syrian [00:12:00] state to rebuild its economy and where it is going [00:12:03] and which regional parties are benefiting or being harmed. [00:12:07] Therefore, at some point you have to say, if you want to understand what [00:12:11] is happening in Syria or what is happening in Syria, you have to [00:12:14] know what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz, for example. [00:12:18] Therefore, Iran is not [00:12:21] in its interest, and Iran has always prevented, in 1988, [00:12:25] the passage of energy pipelines. The Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline is essentially [00:12:29] an old project, not a new project. Iran pressured [00:12:32] and put money [00:12:34] and [00:12:37] provided the defunct Syrian regime with credit [00:12:40] lines in compensation for [00:12:42] the issue of extending the oil pipeline from Kirkuk [00:12:46] to Baniyas because it does not want this country to remain [00:12:50] dependent. Today, Syria [00:12:52] has freed itself from this dependence and has become [00:12:56] an independent state that sets its plans, [00:12:59] sets its strategy for building the economy. So, the most important point [00:13:03] that can be targeted today in reality to affect the core of the Syrian [00:13:06] state at the popular level, and at the economic level, and at [00:13:10] the strategic level, is to strike [00:13:13] energy facilities. First, it [00:13:17] costs the Syrian state treasury. For example, I will mention [00:13:20] the Homs refinery. Today, every [00:13:24] day, God forbid, if the [00:13:28] targeting succeeded, every day [00:13:31] a disruption in the Homs refinery would cost the state [00:13:34] approximately 5.5 million dollars every day. This is only [00:13:38] from the Homs refinery, from [00:13:41] not also include the issue of the state's loss of foreign [00:13:45] currency and the process of collecting foreign currency to buy fuel. [00:13:49] This does not also include the disruption that [00:13:52] electricity. The disruption that will occur in economic [00:13:56] facilities. For example, targeting [00:13:59] the gas pipeline connecting to the Tishreen station, the loss was [00:14:03] nearly two million dollars daily. This is a direct loss. We are [00:14:06] not talking about collateral losses. Yes, this is draining [00:14:09] the state's economy. It [00:14:12] weakens the confidence of regional parties [00:14:15] in the possibility of actually proceeding with projects like [00:14:18] the Kirkuk-Baniyas project. Therefore, we note in the recent [00:14:22] negotiations or discussions that [00:14:25] the media that the security issue was at the heart of the discussions [00:14:29] between His Excellency President Ahmad al-Shara and Iraqi Prime [00:14:31] Minister Mr. al-Zaidi, regarding how [00:14:35] we will protect these lines. This was at the core of these [00:14:38] discussions. This can give us an insight into why [00:14:42] the state organization is targeting such [00:14:46] facilities. Therefore, there is a social impact, as we [00:14:50] mentioned. [00:14:52] What are people complaining about now? People are complaining about [00:15:03] actually securing a cycle of increased production, [00:15:05] extraction, [00:15:08] and refining within Syria, a complete [00:15:11] production cycle. You reduce costs within Syria, and this [00:15:15] is reflected economically, reflected in factory production, [00:15:19] reflected in bringing people as a workforce into economic [00:15:22] facilities, and reflected in the costs of the product itself, because when [00:15:26] you import energy, there is a value, there is an additional bill being paid on [00:15:30] the bill, on the [00:15:42] now of the international coalition [00:15:45] that Syria joined to fight ISIS. [00:15:49] Is it really doing what it should [00:15:53] to support the tools or the Syrian state in [00:15:56] organization, or is there also a shortcoming or [00:16:01] regard? [00:16:03] First, allow me to point out that the security [00:16:07] operation is a complex and intertwined process, and one cannot look [00:16:10] at security in general in Syria or security in [00:16:14] any other country as being confined [00:16:17] to security personnel and the security apparatus concerned [00:16:20] with tracking terrorist and subversive [00:16:23] networks. Security is a complete system from the economic, [00:16:26] social, political, [00:16:29] and even military [00:16:32] aspects. Therefore, today, when we [00:16:36] follow the activity and operations of ISIS, we notice that [00:16:39] ISIS has a good ability to [00:16:43] read the political reality of the Syrian geography or [00:16:47] the Syrian state. Therefore, it carries out its operations [00:16:50] in a way that disrupts or strikes [00:16:53] has been attested to by [00:16:56] both near and far [00:16:59] for its goodness and balance. For example, [00:17:02] as Sameer Diaa mentioned, [00:17:06] it carried out a terrorist operation that targeted the shrine of Lady [00:17:09] Zaynab in the early days of liberation. It also [00:17:13] targeted one of the Syrian state's facilities [00:17:16] or infrastructure during the French President's visit to Syria. And today, [00:17:20] ISIS is targeting energy [00:17:24] transmission lines and also vital [00:17:28] the Syrian state. It also previously tried to blow up a [00:17:32] railway line in the city of [00:17:34] Homs. Therefore, [00:17:38] the Syrian state should not look [00:17:42] threat as merely a security threat. Rather, there are [00:17:46] a set of measures that ISIS exploits [00:17:49] due to the lack of [00:17:53] full support for the Syrian [00:17:56] state, and here I mean financial support, [00:18:00] the economic and livelihood [00:18:03] hardships that the Syrian citizen is going through and also [00:18:08] ISIS from recruiting elements who were previously, [00:18:11] whether loyal to it or its supporters. As [00:18:15] for the support provided [00:18:17] by the international coalition, as far as I believe, [00:18:21] according to my follow-up, it is so far limited to [00:18:24] information exchange and coordination, and [00:18:28] the larger implementation may be the responsibility [00:18:32] of the security forces and [00:18:51] Rashid. [00:18:54] The Syrian state joined or formed with its neighbors Turkey, [00:18:58] Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq a special operations room for these [00:19:01] countries for which ISIS poses a threat since [00:19:05] 2025. And if this room was formed [00:19:09] and made Damascus its headquarters, and this [00:19:12] indicates, and if it indicates anything, it indicates that the Syrian [00:19:16] state views the international coalition [00:19:19] as a key partner in combating terrorism, and also views [00:19:23] its regional neighbors as partners in [00:19:26] cooperating with them [00:19:33] Diaa. What does ISIS and others who [00:19:36] want to target the Syrian state exploit? And what about [00:19:40] the future? Is time sufficient for us to develop [00:19:43] counter-measures in a way that greatly [00:19:46] limits targeting operations? Look, ISIS, [00:19:49] in short, exploits security, economic, [00:19:52] and social gaps and tries to stir up sectarian [00:19:55] strife. In many situations, the Syrian state has been able [00:19:58] to confront very dangerous conspiracies. The Syrian state, despite [00:20:02] its modest capabilities, Syrians today should be proud of the intelligence [00:20:05] capabilities, the capabilities of combating the organization, [00:20:08] which perhaps far exceed, as a result of the field experiences it has [00:20:12] gone through, the capabilities of regional intelligence agencies, and perhaps [00:20:17] the regional ones. Today, ISIS still poses [00:20:21] a threat. Community awareness, also [00:20:24] media and intellectual awareness, and also lifting [00:20:27] popular and economic grievances, supporting [00:20:30] popular vulnerable [00:20:32] sectors also that the organization [00:20:36] might target and exploit, these are very important [00:20:39] things in combating the organization. Combating the organization is not only through purely [00:20:43] security measures or with an iron [00:20:45] fist. Also, intellectual confrontation [00:20:48] and thwarting the organization, and defeating it [00:20:52] intellectually and socially is considered an important part of combating this. Okay, what [00:20:55] do you think, Professor Ali? Now, [00:20:58] the issue of exploitation, whether by ISIS or other [00:21:01] entities targeting the state, exploiting [00:21:05] vulnerabilities, how should [00:21:08] And is time now sufficient [00:21:11] for us to develop the necessary tools [00:21:15] to significantly reduce these attacks? [00:21:18] As long as an organization develops its strategies, [00:21:21] it is necessarily essential for the state and security [00:21:25] agencies, I think this is a specialized [00:21:27] matter, but [00:21:29] it is necessary to develop strategies to confront this organization. [00:21:33] But the organization cannot be confronted individually, in fact. [00:21:36] Because the organization, I believe, [00:21:44] world, on crises of hatred, [00:21:46] Islamophobia. It is still able, for [00:21:50] example, to attract many disgruntled elements, for example, [00:21:53] today, in a deteriorating economic situation [00:21:56] or the economic conditions experienced by [00:22:00] many countries, including European countries. Therefore, [00:22:04] there is a rule - I apologize, we take the meaning from it - [00:22:07] that if the earth suffers, the heavens prosper. [00:22:10] Therefore, extremist organizations benefit from these [00:22:14] environments. Yes. [00:22:17] applies internally, because the more efforts are made [00:22:21] to weaken the Syrian state by parties, by entities, by [00:22:24] this means an attempt to destabilize local environments [00:22:28] for recruitment and [00:22:31] to influence the state's situation and [00:24:35] we welcome His Excellency the President and the accompanying delegation, and this [00:24:39] is a confirmation of the strength and solidity of the relationship between [00:24:43] Iraq and Syria, and God willing, this will be a good [00:24:46] start for future and strategic projects, God willing. [00:24:55] imposed between the two countries very strong historical relations. There are also economic [00:24:58] ties. [00:25:07] We are very happy, by God, with this [00:25:10] warm reception, and we see your hearts [00:25:14] met us before your eyes. Geography says [00:25:18] the neighbor is the closest. [00:25:20] But wisdom says the closest is blood, and God willing, the blood [00:25:24] of Iraq and the blood of Syria is one blood, and perhaps our blood [00:25:27] is both, and more, because we are ancient. [00:25:31] We and you, God willing, are one people [00:25:34] living in two countries. We want to revive our history, [00:25:38] we want to restore economic cooperation, political [00:25:41] cooperation, unite [00:25:44] at the Arab or Islamic world [00:25:47] level. Your security is our security, God willing, [00:25:50] and vice versa. And God willing, soon we await [00:25:54] your arrival to honor us in your second country, [00:25:58] and you will be the hosts and we will be the guests. God [00:26:01] bless you. [00:26:08] It is very important that we invest your presence today [00:26:11] in your second country, Damascus, so that [00:26:14] we can begin to pave the way. God willing, it will be long and sustainable. [00:26:32] Syria left the trenches of conflicts to take its [00:26:35] place and its standing at the table of security [00:26:38] making. [00:26:41] The Syrian Arab Republic joined the international coalition [00:26:44] against ISIS [00:26:45] and took [00:26:52] a historic step by integrating [00:26:55] the northeast into the institutions [00:26:57] of the national state, and parliamentary life [00:27:01] returned, and we began to hold accountable those involved [00:27:05] in violations during the era of the defunct regime. [00:27:09] And today we are cooperating with full transparency with [00:27:12] the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [00:27:15] and the International Atomic Energy Agency to close [00:27:19] those files technically [00:27:20] and institutionally. [00:27:24] Nations tested by fire emerge stronger [00:27:27] and more immune. And Syrians have chosen to [00:27:31] be builders of a secure and stable tomorrow. And in [00:27:34] our new Syrian policy, we believe that true [00:27:37] security is embodied in states capable of protecting their peoples. [00:29:00] Reduction, teams from the [00:29:03] Hasakah Disaster Management [00:29:07] drill and firefighting [00:30:35] Good evening and welcome, dear viewers, to Syria Tonight. Good evening, Ammar. Good evening, Nadia. [00:30:39] And welcome, dear viewers, wherever you are. And to our files [00:30:42] for this evening. [00:30:43] Minister [00:30:47] of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates discusses with the Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister [00:30:51] in Damascus a number of common [00:30:53] files. [00:30:58] Launching a project to modernize and digitize.