SYRIATV — broadcast
20261012 020000 UTC
507 transcript segments
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[00:00:06] memories and formed a Syrian and neutralizing it from the struggle
[00:00:35] to control
[00:00:39] The partisan division that existed then in
[00:00:45] We had three coups
[00:00:48] from March 30th until
[00:00:50] December 18th. December,
[00:00:54] we had three coups:
[00:00:57] Husni al-Za'im's coup, Sami al-Hinnawi's coup,
[00:01:00] and Adib Shishakli's coup. From
[00:01:04] 1963 until
[00:01:07] immediately 1966, they established a police state.
[00:01:12] In every corner of this They established a police state. There were
[00:01:16] military institutions
[00:01:20] all subject to loyalty
[00:01:23] and entrenched in a sectarian body. At the same
[00:01:27] it is true that on the one hand, time, they were also able
[00:01:30] to, يعني, the whole state
[00:01:33] was placed under their control.
[00:01:37] Hafez al-Assad decided that he would be
[00:01:40] the ruler of this country for a long
[00:01:43] time at least, and then he would discover that he had
[00:01:47] and partisan polarization, specifically the ability to bequeath power to his sons, meaning to transform the republic
[00:01:50] into a
[00:01:52] kingdom. Military
[00:01:55] and
[00:01:57] the Syrian army and reflected on authoritarian influence led to economic
[00:02:02] was led by a group of influence as well. A social class was created parallel to the authority and intertwined
[00:02:07] ended an era of with it, forming an economic
[00:02:27] Alawite officers and two system.
[00:02:33] After four decades of the Assad family seizing power
[00:02:37] Ahmed al-Mir and Abdul Karim al-Jundi, they are from in Syria, and at this very moment, Syrians
[00:02:41] broke the barrier of fear, announcing the start
[00:02:44] of a real revolution in the country, despite
[00:02:47] the outbreak of demonstrations before that. The day before they stormed
[00:02:50] Daraa, the Minister
[00:02:53] order to control of Defense called me and said, "What's wrong with Daraa governorate, Muhammad?" I told
[00:02:56] him, "Do you want me to tell you the official version, or do you want
[00:02:59] the truth?" He said, "No, I want
[00:03:01] the truth." I told
[00:03:04] him, "Honestly, people have reached a stage
[00:03:07] where they exploded. People can no longer
[00:03:10] endure it."
[00:03:12] And I gave him several examples, you know. So I'm containing it. He told me, "I can
[00:03:16] storm and search, but I don't want blood, Muhammad. I
[00:03:21] Hafez al-Assad initially relied don't want blood." This is what
[00:03:24] General Ali Habib said. This is, you know, this is a story. Okay,
[00:03:28] them led by what's the solution? I told him, I presented him with 12 proposals at the time for a solution
[00:03:31] in Daraa governorate,
[00:03:34] because the crisis was, to some extent, confined to some
[00:03:37] other pockets, but Daraa was
[00:03:39] the basis. So he
[00:03:42] ideals. What is expected of told me, "Tomorrow
[00:03:44] the army is not to at 12 o'clock, be
[00:03:45] other staff. Meaning, the division interfere in at my place." We told him, "God willing." His office manager called me
[00:03:48] at 11 o'clock and told me not to come to him. He had a meeting at the regional
[00:03:51] command.
[00:03:54] They met at the regional command and decided to storm
[00:03:57] Daraa with the army.
[00:04:01] The revolution was met with violent intervention from the numerous
[00:04:05] security agencies that fill the country. After the failure
[00:04:08] of the security solution, the regime
[00:04:11] attracting officers based on resorted to the military solution
[00:04:13] loyalty, not on by deploying its army to cities and towns. The peaceful
[00:04:16] revolution turned into a brutal war, and the military
[00:04:20] establishment fought a fierce battle
[00:04:22] against civilians.
[00:04:28] their only goal was to maintain against were removed, which was mostly It is clear that the authorities in Syria were pushing for the army to enter this conflict and be a major part of it. The intervention came in
[00:04:32] stages. In military terms, the intervention came
[00:04:35] in stages. However, the more
[00:04:40] towards security over building the army, the core of the army, from legal way to understand this intervention is that it came with clear military orders and clear authority
[00:04:43] from the top of the pyramid to the bottom, as
[00:04:47] we are talking about the President of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces. This
[00:04:50] came
[00:04:52] with orders, whether oral or written. We are not
[00:04:56] trusted by the regime.
[00:04:59] and intelligence establishment became Of course, all Sunni sons without exception are not trusted,
[00:05:02] and therefore they pose a problem in leaking
[00:05:05] information and executing orders.
[00:05:09] would control So anyone who wants to defect will defect anyway. It wasn't a big deal for him.
[00:05:15] The regime marginalized the army before the revolution, creating
[00:05:19] parallel military formations to the security
[00:05:21] agencies, which became more prominent during
[00:05:24] the war, such as the National Defense Militia, composed
[00:05:28] of volunteers from Alawite areas, after the army was heavily
[00:05:32] depleted and its numbers halved
[00:05:35] by 2014,
[00:05:38] due to the killing and defection of tens of thousands of its soldiers
[00:05:40] and officers.
[00:05:43] I announce my defection from the army and my joining the ranks of the Syrian
[00:05:47] youth, along with a number of elements of the Free Syrian
[00:05:50] Arab Army. I announce my defection from the ranks of the Syrian
[00:05:53] Arab Army. I am Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Sattar Younes, commander of the
[00:05:57] Martyr Hamza Al-Khatib Battalion, affiliated with the Syrian Army. There was no widespread
[00:06:00] defection movement. The regime was able to
[00:06:04] foresee movements of discontent and crush them in
[00:06:08] their infancy. For example, Ali Habib was removed in the first
[00:06:11] months. He is from the Mutaura tribe,
[00:06:14] and he, you know, held high
[00:06:18] positions in the command of the Syrian army and was
[00:06:20] removed.
[00:06:22] The assassination of the crisis cell senior
[00:06:25] officers, Assef Shawkat, Turkmani, and Daoud
[00:06:29] Rajha, and so on. As soon as the regime felt that
[00:06:32] these individuals could have a different opinion, they were completely
[00:06:36] liquidated. This depletion,
[00:06:39] Syria did not witness the depletion of a complete
[00:06:42] military unit in the sense of
[00:06:45] social and sectarian engineering, but these
[00:06:48] units, the main nerve
[00:06:51] of the main forces in them was the Sunni
[00:06:55] component, in quotation marks.
[00:06:58] It leaked from within, meaning it remained structures, but
[00:07:01] in terms of human power, it decreased within this. This
[00:07:05] army used sectarianism as a suicide belt, and it showed that it was a suicide
[00:07:09] belt, that if you move, with what
[00:07:12] I have and the cohesion of the agencies I have, I will destroy the country
[00:07:16] and detonate the suicide belt when
[00:07:19] necessary.
[00:07:20] In the army,
[00:07:24] they were able to convince people
[00:07:27] because political sectarianism became institutionalized
[00:07:30] in governance. They started convincing them that their existence was linked to the existence
[00:07:33] of the regime, so it was a defense of existence for some,
[00:07:37] and others were forced. When you are
[00:07:40] in the army for military service, or as an officer, you have to execute.
[00:07:44] I'm not justifying this,
[00:07:47] but this is the reality.
[00:07:50] And unfortunately, the army stage has changed,
[00:07:54] in my opinion, in the revolution. Today, one of the most dangerous
[00:07:58] consequences for the regime is that the army has turned into
[00:08:00] a militia.
[00:08:05] The regular army, the numerous security agencies, and the local
[00:08:08] militias all failed to quell the revolution.
[00:08:12] So the regime resorted to using allied sectarian militias
[00:08:16] from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan,
[00:08:19] and others. This further complicated
[00:08:22] the scene of sectarianism and militias within the country,
[00:08:25] and their dominance increased until the army became a facade behind which the militias
[00:08:29] hid. The army belongs to the Assad family,
[00:08:33] not a national army. I mean, look at
[00:08:36] the course of the Syrian revolution from
[00:08:39] 2011 until now. When you see a pilot
[00:08:43] bombing people, bombing civilians, bombing children, bombing
[00:08:47] women, you say this is not an army, this
[00:08:50] is a ruling gang with no values whatsoever, no morals, and no
[00:08:57] politics. The situation in Syria was
[00:09:01] different. The conflict between civilian and military began
[00:09:05] with the core formation of the Special Forces
[00:09:08] of the Levant, which the French established from Syrian
[00:09:13] forces. We are now talking about approximately 1920.
[00:09:16] French colonialism in
[00:09:20] 1920 destroyed the core of the national army
[00:09:23] that was formed with the first independent state in Syria
[00:09:27] under the leadership of King Faisal bin Hussein, and established
[00:09:30] military institutions loyal to it after it
[00:09:34] crushed the volunteers of the national army led by the then
[00:09:37] Minister of War, Yusuf al-Azma, who fought the decisive
[00:09:40] Battle of Maysalun, near
[00:09:42] Damascus.
[00:09:47] France adopted
[00:09:51] minorities because they had a colonial
[00:09:53] and orientalist view that Syria
[00:09:57] was a diverse mix of sects
[00:10:01] and so on. The Sunnis and Sunni Muslims were
[00:10:04] their primary enemy. They could attract
[00:10:07] minorities in different ways because
[00:10:11] in the past, during the Ottoman era and old times,
[00:10:14] the methods
[00:10:17] of governance involved discrimination against
[00:10:21] small sects like the Alawites and
[00:10:24] the Druze. So France exploited these existing
[00:10:27] discriminations and painful
[00:10:31] army core from minorities.
[00:10:34] The army, as one of the pillars of the state, which is,
[00:10:38] let's say, the Syrian French
[00:10:41] mandate in Syria, or the Syrian
[00:10:44] state built by the French, the army in it is pivotal,
[00:10:48] first of all, and its goal is not to express the will of
[00:10:52] the people or the will of a nation.
[00:10:56] Its goal is to help the mandate authority
[00:11:00] the people. The primary mission of these
[00:11:04] forces was to suppress
[00:11:07] the national movement,
[00:11:10] and thus here we had a great
[00:11:13] friction between local
[00:11:15] armed
[00:11:18] elements from ethnic groups and minorities
[00:11:21] and the national forces that were demonstrating in the main
[00:11:25] areas.
[00:11:30] In response to French colonialism and to obstruct its goals
[00:11:34] of dividing Syria into mini-states, the Great
[00:11:37] Syrian Revolution erupted in
[00:11:38] 1925 and ended with Syria gaining
[00:11:42] its independence with the withdrawal of French forces in
[00:11:45] 1946.
[00:11:51] When the process of independence began and the national
[00:11:55] authority took over the army, the
[00:11:58] national leaders started thinking about
[00:12:02] how we would deal with this army.
[00:12:06] Should we build upon it
[00:12:07] or
[00:12:10] remove it and replace it entirely
[00:12:14] with a national institution?
[00:12:17] So they decided to
[00:12:21] keep what existed and build upon it. They gathered these
[00:12:25] different forces, the gendarmerie, the Desert Patrol,
[00:12:28] the Army of the Levant, and so on, which the French were using from different regions
[00:12:32] and for different purposes to consolidate their control over Syria.
[00:12:35] They gathered them and formed a national army
[00:12:39] that lacked sufficient cohesion,
[00:12:43] a true message, ideology, and a clear
[00:12:46] idea of its function, what is the function of a national
[00:12:48] army? After independence,
[00:12:52] Syrian political elites entered into conflict and infighting
[00:12:56] among themselves, which weakened the already fragile political life
[00:12:59] and created a power vacuum that the military
[00:13:03] establishment, represented by the army, rushed
[00:13:06] to fill. The political structure in the Syrian state
[00:13:09] was not solid, meaning it was not deeply rooted. The political
[00:13:13] structure, plus the conflicts that existed, because
[00:13:16] the ruling class was a bourgeois class or a feudal
[00:13:19] class, essentially. So their main concern
[00:13:23] was
[00:13:26] to gain power by any means. At the same time,
[00:13:29] you don't have a military institution that is also
[00:13:32] national in the known national
[00:13:36] sense, with its true national function, which is to defend
[00:13:39] the homeland and protect the constitution. All these
[00:13:42] factors led to the military establishment overstepping the political
[00:13:46] institutions that existed in Syria. The problem was not in
[00:13:49] the army's structure, but in the structure of the republic. The biggest
[00:13:52] victim of what happened in Syria was the fragility
[00:13:56] of the republican structure. There was no conviction among
[00:14:00] the military establishment that the republican
[00:14:02] system and civilian rule were viable or
[00:14:05] sustainable. Consequently, the republic
[00:14:08] was subjected to, the republic became a plaything,
[00:14:11] and its positions became playthings in the hands
[00:14:13] of the military.
[00:14:22] Less than a year after the Nakba in Palestine,
[00:14:25] Syrian officer Husni al-Za'im led the first
[00:14:28] military coup in contemporary Arab history, thus
[00:14:31] opening the door to a long series of coups in
[00:14:35] Syria and to military rule in the entire
[00:14:38] region. The process of frustration
[00:14:41] that occurred during the Nakba in Palestine, in the 1948
[00:14:44] war, with the Salvation Army, played
[00:14:47] a role in inciting people
[00:14:52] the ruling class or rulers. Husni
[00:14:56] al-Za'im carried out a coup
[00:14:58] with American assistance, or at American
[00:15:02] instigation, and with the aim of his expectations, and it went
[00:15:05] well. Then came the next coup, and so on. So, within
[00:15:09] one year, we had three
[00:15:11] coups. From March 30th
[00:15:15] until December 18th,
[00:15:18] December, we had three coups:
[00:15:21] Husni al-Za'im's coup, Sami al-Hinnawi's coup, and
[00:15:25] Adib Shishakli's coup. I mean, all of them were
[00:15:29] and each coup had a political goal
[00:15:33] behind it.
[00:15:37] Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the wheel
[00:15:41] of governance in Syria turned at a tremendous speed, marked by successive
[00:15:44] military coups. The successive
[00:15:47] military regimes were interspersed with some years of civilian rule
[00:15:50] and democratic manifestations, such as the spread of newspapers, public
[00:15:54] freedoms, and diverse pluralistic party
[00:15:58] activity, which created a kind of intense competition among parties for power
[00:16:02] and political
[00:16:03] roles.
[00:16:07] Due to the post-independence period, it was also a period of political
[00:16:11] testing for all social components, as they would enter the political
[00:16:13] field.
[00:16:17] Syrian society, which was on the one hand important and good diversity,
[00:16:21] but this also reflected on the issue of the army. So the army was
[00:16:24] a platform for political competition,
[00:16:27] meaning the essential element in any army should be neutrality. This element was
[00:16:30] lost in the post-independence period. There were leftist
[00:16:34] tendencies, Nasserist tendencies, and communist tendencies. Each one tried
[00:16:38] to use the army to increase
[00:16:41] its power against the other political party, meaning
[00:16:44] also the weakness of the political
[00:16:48] class pushed some parties to use the army and divide
[00:16:51] the army even further, meaning they tried to use
[00:16:54] the army in competition among themselves, and this is what gave
[00:16:57] the army, in the end, greater value,
[00:17:01] that instead of the army intervening
[00:17:05] within political forces, political
[00:17:08] forces started using the army
[00:17:11] to protect themselves. From here, the issue
[00:17:15] of politicization entered
[00:17:17] the army.
[00:17:21] At the height of political
[00:17:24] on March 8,
[00:17:26] 1963,
[00:17:29] a military coup occurred that was the beginning of a major change that affected
[00:17:35] the entire state. The coup
[00:17:39] officers who had served in Egypt during the Syrian-Egyptian
[00:17:42] unity, which later became known as the Military
[00:17:46] Committee in the Ba'ath Party. Praise be to God,
[00:17:50] who fulfilled the hopes of the Syrian people and the people
[00:17:53] of Egypt and united their hearts
[00:17:57] and united their state. Of course, this
[00:18:00] committee consists of three
[00:18:04] Ismaili officers.
[00:18:07] Hafez al-Assad, Muhammad Omran, Salah Jadid are from the Alawite sect.
[00:18:11] As for
[00:18:15] the Ismaili sect. These formed
[00:18:18] a political party committee within the armed
[00:18:21] forces in Cairo when they were serving in that
[00:18:25] region. So they started forming this core in
[00:18:30] power or to, let's say, transform
[00:18:34] the Syrian army from a military state
[00:18:38] to a sectarian state or to
[00:18:41] an ideological state. From '63 to
[00:18:44] '66, they established the police
[00:18:47] state.
[00:18:50] They established the police state.
[00:18:53] There were military
[00:18:57] institutions
[00:18:58] all
[00:19:02] subject to loyalty and entrenched in a sectarian
[00:19:05] body. At the same
[00:19:09] time, they were
[00:19:12] also able to, you know, the whole
[00:19:14] state was placed under
[00:19:18] their control.
[00:19:20] The military committee soon led another coup against
[00:19:24] the Ba'ath Party's political leadership and ousted it from
[00:19:27] the formal facade of power. The coup was led by the Alawite
[00:19:31] officer Salah Jadid in February 1966
[00:19:33] and was called the February
[00:19:38] movement within
[00:19:41] the party. After '66, they started forming
[00:19:44] a sectarian army of their own, and they started
[00:19:50] competence. This is the difference that led to
[00:19:54] the weakening of the Syrian army. Loyalty before
[00:19:57] competence. So a large number of officers who were not
[00:20:00] loyal to the Ba'athist group minorities.
[00:20:04] This is Salah Jadid,
[00:20:08] Hafez Assad, Muhammad Omran,
[00:20:12] Hatoum, etc. All of them are minorities, and Abdul
[00:20:14] Karim
[00:20:17] al-Jundi. And their goal was to overthrow the Ba'ath only to
[00:20:20] consolidate power for their group, but
[00:20:23] in the end, a sectarian bloc emerged in the heart
[00:20:27] of power from minorities.
[00:20:29] Therefore, the top of the pyramid
[00:20:33] for the military from minorities.
[00:20:38] Then the purges began within the minorities,
[00:20:41] because until
[00:20:44] it was settled that the Alawite bloc
[00:20:47] power.
[00:20:49] After a struggle and purges on sectarian
[00:20:53] bases and the Alawite bloc's monopolization of power,
[00:20:56] differences soon erupted within it. The two poles of the Alawite
[00:21:00] bloc, Salah Jadid and Hafez al-Assad, engaged in a bloody
[00:21:03] conflict that intensified and flared up after the Palestine setback in
[00:21:06] 1967.
[00:21:09] Each side tried to blame the other for
[00:21:12] the defeat. Slowly, the balance shifted towards Hafez
[00:21:15] al-Assad, the Minister of Defense at the time, and the one with the strongest
[00:21:19] authority in the military establishment.
[00:21:22] He was the Minister of Defense and started planning from '66 to
[00:21:25] '70 how to place loyal people
[00:21:28] in key positions, which are considered crucial
[00:21:31] for the army and its units. He started the process of conflict
[00:21:35] with Salah Jadid. Of course, Salah Jadid
[00:21:38] became the Assistant Regional Secretary,
[00:21:42] so he exploited his party position
[00:21:46] as power. So at that time, of course,
[00:21:50] his departure from the army weakened Salah Jadid, making
[00:21:54] the entire arena, the entire army stage,
[00:21:57] under the control of Hafez al-Assad. Hafez al-Assad is the master
[00:22:01] of coups. He participated in the March 8th coup
[00:22:03] and participated in all the coups from March 8th.
[00:22:07] Several coups occurred until 1970, and he was involved
[00:22:11] in all of them. Therefore, he knew where
[00:22:14] the weaknesses were. He took over the Ministry
[00:22:16] of Defense in 1966.
[00:22:20] And he started preparing himself for this matter by
[00:22:23] bringing closer everyone
[00:22:27] who was absolutely loyal to him.
[00:22:29] He started bringing them closer to him, relying on them,
[00:22:33] and entrusting them, regardless of competence, regardless of qualifications,
[00:22:37] regardless of all other matters. The important thing was that they were primarily
[00:22:41] loyal to him. And this is what he benefited
[00:22:44] from when he turned against his colleagues in
[00:22:47] 1970.
[00:22:53] Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power
[00:22:57] military coups that lasted two decades.
[00:23:00] After that, he imposed his control over all state institutions
[00:23:04] and restructured them to ensure his continued rule.
[00:23:07] From '66 to
[00:23:11] '70,
[00:23:12] the accumulation
[00:23:15] of repressive institutions continued and grew.
[00:23:25] It doubled
[00:23:28] and expanded. By 1970, the state that was looking for a totalitarian
[00:23:32] dictator was ready.
[00:23:34] Hafez al-Assad was ready.
[00:23:38] So Hafez al-Assad took over the previously established state,
[00:23:41] built upon it, and developed the octopus-like
[00:23:45] intelligence agencies they built from
[00:23:48] '63 to '70.
[00:24:11] on the Alawite sect and formed all
[00:24:14] the forces, most of
[00:24:18] the Alawite sect. For example,
[00:24:20] military divisions were led by Alawites, with some formations
[00:24:24] allowing, for instance, the Druze sect to have one division commander.
[00:24:28] The Sunni sect might have one or two divisions, but they were controlled
[00:24:31] by security officers and by
[00:24:35] commander could not move anything. Also,
[00:24:38] the military leadership of the army, for example, the Minister of Defense, the Chief
[00:24:42] of Staff, were from the Sunni sect, serving as a Sunni facade
[00:24:46] in order to do what they wanted through a person.
[00:24:50] Someone named Hafez al-Assad decided that he
[00:24:52] would be the ruler
[00:24:55] of this country for a long time at least, and then
[00:24:59] he would discover that he had the ability to bequeath power to his sons,
[00:25:03] meaning to transform the republic into a
[00:25:06] kingdom. Now, this cannot happen unless he does
[00:25:09] two things: he has a military power
[00:25:12] base that is 100% loyal, and that's where
[00:25:16] he got involved with sectarianism. And he needs a very
[00:25:20] strong military force that can control society. That's why he,
[00:25:24] I mean, he took over the army with 60,000
[00:25:28] by 1980, the number of the army was half a million.
[00:25:31] So, I mean, this half a million,
[00:25:35] is this army ruling? No, here the army is no longer
[00:25:39] ruling. Here, we can say that
[00:25:42] we have moved from a military rule to Hafez al-Assad's rule. Hafez
[00:25:46] al-Assad's rule is a family rule, and the army is subordinate to him,
[00:25:50] not the army. I mean, he is the one who rules. He uses the army
[00:25:54] as a means for
[00:25:56] his rule. The Syrian armed forces
[00:26:00] witnessed significant changes during Hafez al-Assad's era,
[00:26:03] aimed at subjugating the military establishment
[00:26:08] for power by creating new military
[00:26:11] formations within the army that received extensive
[00:26:15] armament, training, and privileges.
[00:26:32] The truth does not always lie in what
[00:26:34] we see, but in what
[00:26:38] was absent or made absent from
[00:26:42] the scene. Among the ruins of documents and the shadows
[00:26:45] of maps, we trace the smallest
[00:26:49] clue. We listen, we explore,
[00:26:52] we investigate, we search, and we discuss,
[00:26:56] striving to highlight what was missing from the details
[00:26:59] of the picture. The Explorer on Syria TV.
[00:27:15] country,
[00:27:20] there is a story worth
[00:27:22] telling, and perhaps you will be the one to see
[00:27:26] it first. We at Syria
[00:27:30] TV are launching.
[00:27:42] In people's camera, your lens makes the news.
[00:28:05] Since the early 1970s, after
[00:28:08] taking power, Hafez al-Assad left the regular
[00:28:12] armed forces
[00:28:14] to their own devices and began organizing new
[00:28:18] forces to protect
[00:28:20] his position. First, the Defense Companies were formed
[00:28:24] by his brother Rifaat al-Assad. The Defense Companies were
[00:28:28] formed in
[00:28:29] 1971.
[00:28:32] They started with 20,000 sectarian
[00:28:35] Alawite elements from the Mutaura
[00:28:39] tribe,
[00:28:42] which belongs to the Assad family. Some of them are from the Assad family,
[00:28:45] some from the Mutaura tribe. Then, a new number of these
[00:28:49] Defense Companies were formed until the Defense
[00:28:52] Companies reached 55,000 fighters after many from
[00:28:56] the Murshidiyya sect joined them. They received
[00:29:00] a large share of weapons and equipment,
[00:29:04] becoming an army within an army. Hafez
[00:29:07] al-Assad started through his brother in the matter of the Defense
[00:29:11] Companies, which he considered the reserve
[00:29:14] force, the reserve force to protect the regime.
[00:29:18] This developed after the dispute that occurred regarding
[00:29:21] Rifaat al-Assad's attempt to seize
[00:29:25] power. It developed in that
[00:29:28] they started with the idea of the Republican Guard and the establishment
[00:29:31] of the Fourth Division. And
[00:29:35] then, during Bashar's era, it developed to become
[00:29:38] the main force, meaning it is the main striking force
[00:29:41] within both armies.
[00:29:45] Hafez Hafez
[00:29:48] the military establishment as a military
[00:29:51] institution was almost completely marginalized
[00:29:55] under Assad and even more so under Bashar,
[00:29:57] in favor of, let's say, militias loyal
[00:30:01] to the family. What are these militias? They are an army,
[00:30:04] called an army, but in practice, they are not subordinate to the military establishment.
[00:30:08] They are independent under the authority of
[00:30:11] the family. First, the Defense Brigades, the Struggle Brigades, these are
[00:30:15] all marginalizing the army. On the contrary, these are all excluding the army
[00:30:19] and weakening it. Then the Republican Guard,
[00:30:22] the Fourth Division, all of them. They built
[00:30:25] armies whose goal was to maintain power. These
[00:30:31] power and protect the president.
[00:30:37] One of the most important changes included in the military restructuring
[00:30:40] in Syria was the tilting of the balance
[00:30:43] military affairs, as Hafez al-Assad established multiple
[00:30:46] security agencies and branches, most of which
[00:30:50] had higher authority than the armed forces.
[00:30:53] He strengthened his presence through intelligence
[00:30:57] agencies that he gave.