SYRIATV — broadcast
20261012 170000 UTC
502 transcript segments
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[00:00:01] join the Pakistan-India-Pakistan-Saudi abroad, and the main focus in Syria is on saving the situation internally so that it can stabilize and begin a renaissance, so that the economy can live, and so on. There is another party that must be talked about, Dr. Ahmed. It is not just Iran and its militias that are destabilizing the region. There is Israel, which attacks almost daily and violates Syrian sovereignty. How can foreign policy deal with this situation to deter Israeli arrogance? Of course, you know that Israel carries out continuous incursions into Syria and violates Syrian sovereignty. Is it politically or militarily logical that in a situation where you face enormous risks in this direction, you send forces abroad? I do not think so. That is, there is no logic that justifies such a proposal, if the proposal is correct. Perhaps the proposal is not correct, and what Axios and Reuters reported may not have been true, especially since the Syrian Foreign Ministry and the Syrian leadership have not commented on this issue, neither negatively nor positively. But in the issue of Israeli occupation, there is no confrontation or clash with the Israeli occupation forces. Well, but if there were no forces at all, perhaps the encroachment would be greater. However, the presence of many alert Syrian forces must be taken into account by Israel, in addition to the strength of the current American-Syrian alliance, which restrains the Israelis and pressures them to return to the 1974 agreement. What I want to say as a summary of what preceded is that from a strategic point of view, it is certain that Iran's influence in Syria has been cut off. Who cut off Iran's influence in Syria and prevented the delivery of its weapons to Hezbollah and prevented their penetration into Syrian territory? Certainly, the new regime, and this is credited to it, that is, for Saudi Arabia, it is positively seen that it got rid of one of the most difficult problems it faced. We must historically know that Saudi Arabia wants to feel secure in its north and south, and it believes that God has blessed us in our Levant and in our Yemen. Yemen is currently facing the Houthis, while the Levant has permanently expelled Iran from Syria, despite all Iranian attempts. And therefore, the security of the region is interconnected. But let me return to the issue of Israeli occupation, Professor Bassam. It is clear, as Dr. Ahmed said, that Syria still relies on an American role to restrain Israel, but this has not happened in reality. Israeli incursions are expanding day by day and taking over new areas. The entire south of Syria is almost under Israeli military control, not just Quneitra, but also the rural areas of Daraa, all the way to Sweida as well. No, it will not happen. My perception is that relying on the Americans to restrain Israel or return Israel to the points it was at before the liberation is, I believe, a losing bet. I would not say 100% losing, but 60% losing. That is, Tom Barrack has a great deal of power, but when it comes to Israel's security, his power stops. He has a lot of influence over Trump. This is an old friend of his, and so on. But when it comes to Israel's security and American-Israeli calculations and domestic American-Israeli calculations, they are much greater than Tom Barrack's ability to move them. So the idea that the Americans, during this administration and the next administration, can pressure Israel to do that, I think, as I told you, it is a 60% losing bet. 40% may be something. That is, today, there are Israeli voices in the Israeli opposition that say, we are ready to make peace with Israel with a full guarantee, but with very harsh conditions. That is, very difficult conditions to accept in the current electoral situation. The approach adopted by the Syrian government is to separate the issue of al-Hijri from the issue of Sweida, and to attract Sweida to Syria, and to keep the issue of al-Hijri. That is, the issue of Sweida, if it must be dealt with today, the way it is dealt with must be completely different. There is a group loyal to Israel that raises Israeli flags and so on, and is known by name. It takes weapons from Israel, and Israeli planes give them weapons and food, and this is documented and known. But this does not mean that all the people of Sweida are al-Hijri. I think the issue of Sweida should be withdrawn, and Sweida should be returned to Syria, and the issue of al-Hijri should be dealt with separately from the issue of Sweida. This weakens Israel. The more Sweida returns to Syria, Israel's influence on the ground weakens. Thank you. We cannot rely on the idea that we must make peace with Israel until Sweida returns to Syria. I think this is very wrong, 100%. But the door is wide open for Syria, the Syrian government, to return the greater part of Sweida, people and geography, to Syrian territory, to its natural homeland, to its natural place, and to deal with the issue of al-Hijri and his group separately from the people of Sweida. I think this will lead to pressure on Israel. This is the real thing. As for statements and international law and the Security Council, we are against Israel. Israel has never believed in international law or international institutions. It believes in the reality on the ground. And therefore, the reality on the ground must be
[00:00:07] drone is respected.
[00:00:21] Forces in Iraq, and recently
[00:00:34] has an evening, this is a new episode of Syria Today. In our
[00:00:38] first segment, diplomatic and political movements abroad are taking
[00:00:43] many countries place against the backdrop of regional developments, coinciding
[00:00:46] with recurring talk of calls to send Syrian forces to
[00:00:49] Saudi Arabia. Why is Syria's name being dragged into regional conflicts
[00:00:52] and how is Damascus shaping its foreign policy in light of
[00:00:56] regional developments? In our second segment, we have
[00:01:01] years of a visit by members of the People's Assembly to Quneitra Governorate. This is the first
[00:01:05] official visit to the governorate. How are the government
[00:01:08] and the People's Assembly addressing the challenges in Quneitra? In
[00:01:12] our third segment, we discuss the appointment of three former SDF leaders to
[00:01:15] security positions in Hasakah Governorate,
[00:01:18] including the head of intelligence, an official responsible for
[00:01:23] not send light of the existence military security, and another responsible for counter-terrorism.
[00:01:25] So what are the criteria for appointing former
[00:01:29] benefit in approaching SDF leaders to sensitive security positions in
[00:01:32] Hasakah? In our last segment, we discuss
[00:01:37] of Syrian foreign the confiscation of land and the seizure of other land by
[00:01:39] Ekfa Agricultural Investment Company,
[00:01:41] 6 billion dollars. which is affiliated fall of Assad, with the sovereign wealth fund.
[00:01:45] political, Who is Ekfa Company and what are its legal
[00:02:07] even at
[00:02:13] place today.
[00:02:19] to send thousands
[00:02:23] Syria's name is repeatedly Mecca Alliance
[00:02:26] symbolic, but again,
[00:02:27] Asad al-Shaibani to extract the best address the challenges in brought up in scenarios of military intervention in the region, amidst reports of regional and international
[00:02:30] pressure and official Syrian denials, while Damascus faces the equation
[00:02:33] of preserving its new relations and avoiding
[00:02:37] the very strong relations, involvement in the region's
[00:02:40] this alliance. whether with the Lebanese In every corner of this conflicts. Diplomatic movements
[00:02:43] and successive visits
[00:02:46] top Syria's foreign
[00:02:49] Sunni, I political scene, against is still on the backdrop of regional developments,
[00:02:51] am an Arab. led by Yemen,
[00:02:52] I am, I coinciding with recurring talk of calls
[00:02:56] to send Syrian forces to Saudi Arabia, which again
[00:03:00] drags Syria into various conflicts
[00:03:02] in the region. Reports published by Reuters
[00:03:06] and Axios stated that Damascus received a Saudi
[00:03:10] request to provide military assistance to
[00:03:13] the Kingdom amid the escalating war against
[00:03:16] the Houthis, including
[00:03:18] I am not the deployment of Syrian forces in offensive missions on Yemeni
[00:03:23] axis, and territory. This coincided with the meeting between President Ahmed al-Shara and Saudi Crown
[00:03:27] Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the capital.
[00:03:33] is still present. The media advisor to the Presidency Iran's axis is of the Republic, Ahmed Zeidan,
[00:03:35] denied what was stated, while the Foreign Media Department at
[00:03:39] the Ministry of Information stated
[00:03:41] of economic support at the same time, that Syria stands firmly by Saudi Arabia, but
[00:03:44] the government's primary priority is
[00:03:48] an axis, but internal affairs and that any military cooperation
[00:03:51] or exchange of expertise will be conducted exclusively through official
[00:03:54] channels and within the framework of bilateral agreements governing
[00:03:58] relations between the two countries.
[00:04:02] Damascus, which is still working to form its army from
[00:04:05] the focus should groups that were part of the alliance of armed factions
[00:04:11] do not interior that overthrew the regime of Bashar al-Assad, had previously clearly rejected an American
[00:04:14] request to help fight Hezbollah in Lebanon,
[00:04:17] as then-US President Donald Trump raised
[00:04:20] a proposal to involve the Syrian
[00:04:24] army in the conflict, saying that it would do the job
[00:04:28] better. Between public statements,
[00:04:31] excellent with reports, and Syrian denials, Damascus has so
[00:04:35] far succeeded in avoiding involvement in regional conflicts,
[00:04:38] including the war with Iran, for reasons that may be
[00:04:42] related to ideological dimensions and divisions that
[00:04:46] any Syrian intervention in Yemen or Lebanon
[00:04:49] might cause, as well as focusing on recovery and
[00:04:53] internal reconstruction efforts. The question remains open
[00:04:56] here: Will Syria succeed in continuing to distance
[00:05:00] itself from any armed conflict while maintaining
[00:05:03] its diplomatic and international
[00:05:19] to you both. Dr. Ahmed, why is Syria
[00:05:23] being dragged into every conflict, almost all conflicts in the
[00:05:26] region, sometimes by talking about intervention against Hezbollah in Lebanon,
[00:05:30] sometimes about the Popular Mobilization
[00:05:34] about the Houthis in Yemen as
[00:05:37] well? Let me say that perhaps
[00:05:41] the reason for that is the remarkable
[00:05:44] and distinctive performance of
[00:05:48] the liberation forces when they overthrew the regime of
[00:05:51] Bashar al-Assad, and this is what prompted
[00:05:56] to believe that
[00:05:59] Syria could play a role
[00:06:02] in striking Hezbollah or striking the
[00:06:05] Houthis, and also from the premise that
[00:06:08] these fighters have long experience over 14
[00:06:14] fighting against the Syrian regime and direct confrontations,
[00:06:17] and all of
[00:06:20] this leads many countries to believe
[00:06:24] that we can impose on Syrians
[00:06:27] and involve them in such issues in light of
[00:06:30] a difficult economic situation and in
[00:06:35] of many
[00:06:38] meetings and rapprochements that
[00:06:41] occur as a principle of Syrian foreign policy. But in
[00:06:45] my assessment, the basic principles
[00:06:49] policy do not allow such issues to
[00:06:53] take their course, and as
[00:06:55] I said before, when
[00:06:59] the issue of Syria's entry into Lebanon was raised, that
[00:07:03] this would not happen, and indeed the Syrians
[00:07:07] did not intervene in Lebanon because the risks arising
[00:07:10] from this intervention are much greater, in addition to the importance of focusing
[00:07:14] on the Syrian interior. Syria has not
[00:07:18] yet intervened in any external issue, but will
[00:07:21] that continue, in your opinion, Dr. Ahmed? And it
[00:07:25] will not intervene, you said, for multiple reasons, including the importance of the internal
[00:07:29] situation, and the number required for external
[00:07:32] work is certainly large, and
[00:07:35] it is not possible
[00:07:39] fighters protecting security in Syria, the army,
[00:07:42] and the borders outside Syria in
[00:07:44] order to carry out external missions, despite
[00:07:51] or with our Saudi brothers.
[00:07:54] Our constant approach is that we seriously study the
[00:07:57] issue and consider
[00:08:01] all aspects and take into
[00:08:04] account the risks. That is, can Syria
[00:08:08] withstand any Iranian
[00:08:13] attacks that could strike it,
[00:08:16] such that they would be devastating
[00:08:20] strikes? Is the international
[00:08:22] community, especially when Syrian intervention in Lebanon
[00:08:26] was proposed, willing to provide qualitative weapons
[00:08:29] to Syria? And Israel accuses Syria
[00:08:32] of being a terrorist regime.
[00:08:35] Can the international community, led by
[00:08:39] the United States, provide an Iron Dome to
[00:08:43] protect Syria from Iranian strikes that
[00:08:46] could hit Syria? None of this has happened.
[00:08:50] We are in dire need
[00:08:53] and unfortunately, even the international community does not provide
[00:08:57] such economic support in a way that would
[00:09:00] convince Syrians to consider such issues. But I
[00:09:04] want to say that in principle,
[00:09:08] Syria does not want to interfere
[00:09:11] in the affairs of neighboring countries or other Arab
[00:09:14] countries, and that
[00:09:18] be on the
[00:09:21] and achieving security and stability in the interior,
[00:09:25] economically in this exhausted country, as
[00:09:28] a result of 60 years of the Baath
[00:09:31] regime. Professor Bassam, US President Donald Trump
[00:09:35] had suggested Syrian intervention in Lebanon. Recently,
[00:09:39] there is talk of a Saudi request for Syria to intervene
[00:09:43] against the Houthis, even if there is an official
[00:09:46] denial of that. But this raises the question
[00:09:49] again: Why is Syria's name always brought up
[00:09:53] and it is asked to intervene in issues
[00:09:56] outside its borders?
[00:09:59] Thank you first of all, and secondly, all
[00:10:02] these areas we are talking about, Hezbollah was
[00:10:06] occupying Syria, the Popular Mobilization Forces were present
[00:10:10] in Syria, training. That
[00:10:12] is, the Iranian center was in Syria.
[00:10:15] Its training center was in Syria. The Houthis,
[00:10:19] when the regime fell and after the liberation,
[00:10:22] went to Iraq. The Houthi forces are present in Iraq,
[00:10:26] Saudi Arabia, and the Syrian borders. So it
[00:10:29] may be that some people exchange. That
[00:10:33] is, when the American President was saying that Syria would enter, he
[00:10:37] was more of a media propagandist
[00:10:40] for the Lebanese government and the Israeli government
[00:10:44] to reach an agreement, more than an American
[00:10:47] desire for Syria to enter Lebanon. It
[00:10:51] was more to put it in that context
[00:10:55] than for Syria to actually have the ability
[00:10:59] to go to Lebanon and fight Hezbollah,
[00:11:02] while the Israeli army occupies parts of Syria,
[00:11:06] and so on. So we need to differentiate
[00:11:09] between media and journalistic talk that is used
[00:11:11] to advance negotiations taking place elsewhere,
[00:11:15] Trump's statement on Syrian entry into Lebanon,
[00:11:18] and the reality that Syrians have knowledge
[00:11:22] that the Ministry of Intelligence, the Intelligence Directorate,
[00:11:25] the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign
[00:11:28] Affairs have a lot of information about the
[00:11:32] activities of these groups, Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization
[00:11:35] Forces, the Houthis, what they were doing in Syria,
[00:11:39] not just at the level of crimes, but at the level
[00:11:43] of organization, management, camouflage, and armament.
[00:11:47] These are very important issues that benefit
[00:11:50] the conflict or
[00:11:54] this conflict in other areas. So when
[00:11:57] Saudi Arabia asks Syria for help,
[00:12:01] of course Saudi Arabia, two weeks ago, bought
[00:12:06] So why do they need Syria by
[00:12:10] any measure? But in many aspects, Syria
[00:12:16] Saudi Arabia. This symbolic participation with
[00:12:19] Saudi Arabia is very important. Without Saudi Arabia,
[00:12:23] Syria would not have reached its current
[00:12:27] relationship with the United States. That is,
[00:12:30] our relationship with the United States is a Saudi-Turkish
[00:12:33] patronage, and we cannot say that we did not
[00:12:37] enter. So I do not think that
[00:12:41] anyone is asking Syrians
[00:12:44] of armies to Saudi Arabia. I think
[00:12:48] the issue is more
[00:12:51] what Syria possesses in terms of intelligence
[00:12:55] information from the Ministry of Defense, Intelligence,
[00:12:58] and Foreign Affairs about all the efforts of
[00:13:02] this system, apart from the killing that
[00:13:05] it was carrying out against the Syrian people
[00:13:08] on a daily basis, providing weapons, money,
[00:13:11] training, leaders, names of individuals, these
[00:13:15] are very important issues. But Professor Bassam, you are referring
[00:13:18] to this matter, and it
[00:13:21] is clear that there is something like an
[00:13:25] international and regional understanding to end Iran's influence
[00:13:28] in the region. Is that true?
[00:13:31] To what extent can Syria resist
[00:13:35] pressure if it is pressured to send troops
[00:13:38] to some fronts, regardless
[00:13:42] of the number, even if the numbers are
[00:13:45] symbolic or otherwise? Look, Syria is
[00:13:48] under two severe pressures at the
[00:13:51] same time.
[00:13:54] pressuring Syria. Hezbollah
[00:13:58] That is, yesterday, the van
[00:14:00] with the explosives, its quantity, type,
[00:14:04] and shape, is very
[00:14:06] similar to what we were talking
[00:14:09] about regarding Hariri's assassination, may God
[00:14:13] have mercy on him. The target could be
[00:14:17] the people. The target could be President
[00:14:21] al-Shara. You see? So Hezbollah is
[00:14:24] not leaving us alone. That is,
[00:14:27] even if we say to the world, to
[00:14:31] whom it may concern, that we
[00:14:33] are content with building the Syrian
[00:14:37] interior and we have enough problems, this
[00:14:41] does not mean that the other party will
[00:14:44] leave us alone. The Popular Mobilization Forces
[00:14:48] and the Houthis are present on the
[00:14:52] Syrian border. There are forces from
[00:14:55] Sayyid al-Hassan and his people present
[00:14:58] in Yemen. For manufacturing chemical
[00:15:01] weapons and developing missiles, they are
[00:15:04] present in Yemen. They fled from
[00:15:08] Sek, that there is a lot
[00:15:11] of information that Syria can provide
[00:15:15] or has provided to Saudi Arabia, to
[00:15:18] Yemen, as part of
[00:15:21] its participation in the war. It is
[00:15:24] not necessarily participation by sending 1,000
[00:15:27] soldiers. I do not think Saudi
[00:15:31] Arabia needs these numbers. It is
[00:15:35] something symbolic, media, true, but the
[00:15:38] reality is something completely different. That is,
[00:15:42] they say the Syrian
[00:15:45] That is,
[00:15:47] in front of the Turkish and Ukrainian drones,
[00:15:50] I think there are vast
[00:15:53] areas, with all due respect to the
[00:15:56] Syrians, but there are very advanced
[00:16:00] things that Saudi Arabia has now.
[00:16:04] But the symbolism of participation is
[00:16:07] important for Saudi
[00:16:09] Arabia. But again, what Syria possesses
[00:16:13] in terms of intelligence information and knowledge
[00:16:17] of the work of these groups that
[00:16:21] remained in Syria for a long
[00:16:24] time, I think this is the essence
[00:16:28] of the matter. And at the same
[00:16:31] time, if we convince ourselves
[00:16:35] that in Syria we do not need
[00:16:38] a new front, this does not
[00:16:42] mean that the other party, the
[00:16:45] Popular Mobilization Forces or Iran with all
[00:16:49] its groups, will leave Syria alone.
[00:16:52] So Syria is under two pressures:
[00:16:55] the pressure that it must go,
[00:16:59] and the pressure that it must
[00:17:02] stay. But again, God help the
[00:17:06] country what it has to endure.
[00:17:09] It cannot endure. You are talking
[00:17:13] about two pressures, but after the
[00:17:18] the official statements were that Syria does
[00:17:21] not want to align itself with
[00:17:27] distance itself. But the question
[00:17:30] now, with this new axis,
[00:17:33] which seems stronger than before, and
[00:17:36] which is sometimes referred to as
[00:17:40] the axis of Sunni states allied
[00:17:43] with the United States. We are
[00:17:47] talking about Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
[00:17:50] the rest of the Gulf states
[00:17:53] and the United States. Has Syria
[00:17:57] actually become part of this axis?
[00:18:00] I do not call it an
[00:18:04] axis. I call it a natural
[00:18:08] situation created by the region.
[00:18:11] You see? Today, you, as
[00:18:15] a Syrian, have returned to your
[00:18:18] natural state, that I am an Arab, I
[00:18:22] am a Muslim, I am a
[00:18:30] am, I am what
[00:18:33] I want, but I am not
[00:18:37] Iran. I
[00:18:39] am not
[00:18:41] Shia. I am not
[00:18:45] Wilayat al-Faqih. There is no,
[00:18:49] you see? That is, the
[00:18:53] issue is that
[00:18:56] with the other party in
[00:18:59] the sense of an axis, but
[00:19:02] this is the reality today.
[00:19:06] Syria is closer to Turkey and
[00:19:10] Saudi Arabia, as a people and as individuals,
[00:19:13] much more than
[00:19:16] it is close to Iran. Is
[00:19:18] it an axis? I do not
[00:19:22] think it is
[00:19:26] even in politics, Syria is considered
[00:19:29] part of it. Hamas, for example,
[00:19:33] they are not Twelver Shiites,
[00:19:36] for example. That is, it is not just
[00:19:40] an idea, but I mean,
[00:19:44] the general Syrian atmosphere. Its
[00:19:48] connection, whether the Syrian Christian
[00:19:51] or the Syrian Muslim, its connection
[00:19:55] is more with the surrounding countries
[00:19:59] than its connection with Iran, politically,
[00:20:03] socially, historically. That is, call
[00:20:05] it what you
[00:20:08] want. You have returned to a
[00:20:12] place where you feel more
[00:20:15] comfortable than being part of
[00:20:19] the Iran or Russia axis.
[00:20:22] You have returned to an axis
[00:20:25] where there is more acceptance,
[00:20:29] more comfort, and you belong
[00:20:32] to it more. Now, you have
[00:20:35] a political axis against Iran, of course.
[00:20:39] But for example, I would
[00:20:41] like to take a step
[00:20:45] forward. Do I think that
[00:20:49] Syria will
[00:20:51] Mecca agreement axis? I
[00:20:54] tell you no, Syria will
[00:20:58] not join this agreement.
[00:21:01] It cannot join. Why?
[00:21:04] Because this has become an
[00:21:08] axis that we do not want
[00:21:12] to be part of. We
[00:21:14] support it, and it will
[00:21:18] be a large part of it,
[00:21:21] and Israel
[00:21:24] occupied part of Syria
[00:21:26] every day. No, it
[00:21:30] cannot open fronts on
[00:21:34] this tripartite axis with the
[00:21:37] war in Yemen.
[00:21:41] So again, you have a
[00:21:44] Syrian balance, as is
[00:21:48] known, that we must
[00:21:52] take care of ourselves
[00:21:55] without being part of
[00:21:59] something greater than Syria's
[00:22:02] capacity to absorb, its
[00:22:06] geographical capacity, its military
[00:22:09] capacity, and its financial
[00:22:12] capacity. So I do not
[00:22:15] think it is part of an
[00:22:19] axis in the political
[00:22:22] sense of the word. I
[00:22:26] think it is part
[00:22:29] of a natural axis,
[00:22:32] in the social,
[00:22:36] and cultural sense, more
[00:22:39] than an axis like
[00:22:43] the axes of old,
[00:22:47] like the Nasserist axis
[00:22:50] against the Hashemite axis
[00:22:54] or that kind of talk. I think we
[00:22:58] are in a completely different
[00:23:03] Let me hear Dr.
[00:23:06] Ahmed's opinion on the
[00:23:11] issue. That is,
[00:23:14] Foreign Minister
[00:23:17] himself, when he visited Pakistan
[00:23:21] last August, said that we
[00:23:24] are studying the possibility of joining
[00:23:30] So is this a realistic
[00:23:33] statement that
[00:23:36] the table, Dr. Ahmed?
[00:23:40] It is certainly always on the
[00:23:43] table, and perhaps there
[00:23:46] is a mutual desire to
[00:23:49] join this agreement or
[00:23:52] this alliance. And let me say
[00:23:56] what is greater than
[00:24:00] that. It is certain
[00:24:04] that there is a Chinese-Russian-Iranian axis
[00:24:07] facing a Western-American-European-Gulf
[00:24:13] Syria is certainly part
[00:24:16] of this axis. We
[00:24:20] cannot say that Syria
[00:24:22] does not want to
[00:24:26] align itself with either
[00:24:29] of the two axes, because
[00:24:32] those who do not
[00:24:36] align themselves with an
[00:24:40] axis, as they say,
[00:24:43] will be trampled by
[00:24:47] elephants. But the statements
[00:24:51] in the first months
[00:24:54] after Assad's fall were
[00:24:58] that we
[00:25:01] want to align ourselves
[00:25:05] with axes, even if
[00:25:09] those statements were in
[00:25:12] this form. But practically,
[00:25:16] Syria's relations are very
[00:25:21] Saudi Arabia and very
[00:25:25] good with the Gulf
[00:25:28] states, and it enters
[00:25:32] into alliances and major
[00:25:35] understandings with the
[00:25:37] United States. Then, the
[00:25:41] most important point is
[00:25:44] that the overthrow of
[00:25:48] Bashar al-Assad's regime in
[00:25:52] Syria broke the Shiite
[00:25:55] Crescent, and the Shiite
[00:25:58] Crescent is the prelude
[00:26:02] to that Chinese-Russian-Iranian axis.
[00:26:06] So, Dr. Ahmed, what
[00:26:10] you are saying indicates that
[00:26:13] the possibility of sending Syrian
[00:26:17] fighters to other fronts is again
[00:26:20] being raised, because if
[00:26:23] it joins this axis
[00:26:27] or alliance, or even
[00:26:30] the Mecca Alliance, Syria
[00:26:34] does not have nuclear
[00:26:37] weapons like Pakistan.
[00:26:40] It does not have advanced
[00:26:44] military industries like
[00:26:48] Turkey. So what can
[00:26:51] it offer other than
[00:26:55] soldiers and fighters?
[00:26:58] To be part of a large
[00:27:01] axis necessarily requires
[00:27:05] sending fighters. I still
[00:27:08] believe that the
[00:27:12] Syrian leadership will not
[00:27:15] send fighters. It did not
[00:27:19] send fighters to Lebanon,
[00:27:22] and it will
[00:27:25] fighters to Saudi
[00:27:29] Arabia. And the situation,
[00:27:32] as my friend Professor Bassam
[00:27:36] said, cannot be endured.
[00:27:40] Syria, what does it
[00:27:43] want to do in
[00:27:47] light of difficult
[00:27:50] economic conditions, in light
[00:27:54] of complex security conditions,
[00:27:58] in light of great
[00:28:02] risks?
[00:28:04] And the Iranians,
[00:28:10] this moment, changes without there being an
[00:28:25] the government and the People's Assembly
[00:28:28] Quneitra.
[00:28:40] country,
[00:28:45] there is a story worth telling,
[00:28:48] and perhaps you are the one who sees it first.
[00:28:52] We at Syria TV
[00:28:55] launch the People's Camera.
[00:28:58] Document and send.
[00:29:03] Be a contributing part in making the news.
[00:29:06] People in the People's Camera,
[00:29:08] your lens makes the news.
[00:29:21] We are sitting here, and these people are here. We cry over them. By God,
[00:29:25] we hear the pain of the bones that are
[00:29:26] breaking.
[00:29:35] Every blanket I smell, I feel there is blood
[00:29:38] mixed with the smell
[00:29:40] of humans.
[00:29:43] When they call our names for torture, you actually don't know if you'll come back alive or come back
[00:29:47] dead.
[00:29:54] I remember hearing the gray hair crack
[00:29:55] in my head.
[00:30:00] The soul that is tortured is the one that doesn't leave.
[00:30:19] And the Syrians have become a country we are in
[00:30:22] the middle
[00:30:23] of.
[00:30:28] In a country living under oppression, injustice, displacement,
[00:30:31] and war. But it revolted until
[00:30:35] it triumphed. In a country where narratives
[00:30:39] are diverse and discourses
[00:30:41] contradict.
[00:30:46] We open a window to all
[00:30:49] concessions.
[00:30:53] We listen to people from inside the country and from every
[00:30:56] expatriate in dialogues.