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[00:00:19] these details need to be verified,
[00:00:19] I heard it from a number of
[00:00:38] Welcome again. Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed newspaper reported that the government
[00:00:41] appointed three former leaders
[00:00:44] over. Most of the news from of the Syrian Democratic Forces to positions in Al-Hasakah governorate as part of
[00:00:48] ongoing arrangements to integrate security and
[00:00:51] military institutions in northeastern Syria into state
[00:00:54] institutions. The newspaper quoted security sources in
[00:00:57] Al-Hasakah and others close to the SDF. Malek Bashar, known as
[00:01:00] Haval Dimhat, took over
[00:01:04] the General Intelligence in Al-Hasakah, while
[00:01:07] Kao Derek was appointed as head of Military Security, and
[00:01:11] Dijwar Amouda was assigned the
[00:01:13] counter-terrorism file within the General Intelligence
[00:01:17] apparatus. The appointments followed a visit by a high-level Syrian
[00:01:20] security delegation to Al-Hasakah on the seventh of October,
[00:01:24] headed by the head of General Intelligence, Abdel Qader Al-Tahan,
[00:01:28] and accompanied by the head of External Intelligence, Abdel
[00:01:30] Rahman Al-Dabbagh. According to the report, the delegation discussed arrangements for
[00:01:35] Sipan also happened, I mean, in, I mean, security positions in taking over security branches
[00:01:41] turmoil in the and are now leaders in and prisons in Al-Hasakah unrest and more governorate.
[00:01:47] We are joined by Samer Al-Ahmad, journalist and political researcher from Damascus,
[00:01:50] and Shirwan Ibrahim, journalist from
[00:01:53] and not that it is the ultimate authority on Bochum, Germany. Welcome,
[00:01:55] decisions, Shirwan, how can we interpret the decision
[00:01:58] to appoint three SDF officials to sensitive security
[00:02:01] positions in Al-Hasakah?
[00:02:04] Good evening, my dear Mohammed, Professor Samer, and all viewers.
[00:02:08] and things were limited to The decision that was published only by Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed website
[00:02:12] that spoke about this issue. Of course, even before
[00:02:16] the viewer understands. Now, the security file in my participation in this program, we made some calls.
[00:02:20] There is something that suggests
[00:02:23] We don't need to talk about it more. And when we talk to that these appointments are most likely
[00:02:26] After that, each incident will have its own story. In correct, but so far, no official decision has been issued.
[00:02:30] If we assume that this decision is official, then I think
[00:02:34] leaders have been integrated the situation is normal according to the integration agreements that
[00:02:37] are taking place between the two parties, especially since there is a quota system in
[00:02:41] some, not in some, but in all such
[00:02:44] sensitive positions, and from the security
[00:02:47] and military point of view, almost all
[00:02:52] Marwan and a large number of these matters usually have the official from one party and the deputy from the other party. Therefore,
[00:02:56] we are awaiting
[00:02:58] No one objects. The objection is to details or official confirmations, and
[00:03:01] also details about this
[00:03:04] issue. But as I said, so far, the situation
[00:03:08] seems to be part of the integration process and the distribution of positions
[00:03:11] between the two parties. There is another point I want to mention, which is
[00:03:14] that these forces, which are an abbreviation for Counter-Terrorism Forces
[00:03:18] that were a military formation
[00:03:21] within the SDF, these forces were and still are directly affiliated
[00:03:25] with the international coalition
[00:03:28] forces and the American side, both in terms of salaries
[00:03:32] violations and get rid of the Revolutionary and appointments, and also in terms of military orders and instructions.
[00:03:36] Therefore, I think they will have
[00:03:39] a future or
[00:03:45] Bochum in respond. I mean, the phone an even greater presence in other Syrian regions in some of the operations related to counter-terrorism, given that the American side is
[00:03:48] the one that controls more details
[00:03:53] it will be their responsibility, but regarding the fate of these forces or this particular formation, but they do not,
[00:03:57] in fact, belong to the Syrian military
[00:04:00] and security
[00:04:02] is linked to the political establishment. No, no, under the terms of the
[00:04:04] and military agreement that will be imposed on merger and a military formation affiliated with the SDF from an announced perspective, and the SDF
[00:04:07] has all merged or is merging with the institutions
[00:04:11] of integration and agreement took place in of the Syrian government, but I just want to clarify,
[00:04:14] this particular formation is
[00:04:16] pampered by the Americans, let's say,
[00:04:20] and also trained by the Americans. Therefore, the decisive
[00:04:24] decision also concerns this
[00:04:26] by a bullet to aspect under the special arrangements of the international
[00:04:29] coalition to fight terrorism. Umm, okay.
[00:04:32] And Syria is a member
[00:04:34] SDF. It does not of it,
[00:04:36] mean that the official is from this
[00:04:36] intimidation and terrorism on the streets against and I think this issue has become linked to Damascus itself,
[00:04:39] and as I said, we are awaiting confirmations
[00:04:42] regarding these appointments and also the details. Amir, what are the
[00:04:46] repercussions of these appointments in
[00:04:47] Al-Hasakah?
[00:04:50] Yes, good evening, Mohammed,
[00:04:52] Al-Jadeed website published this to you and Professor Shirwan.
[00:04:55] Actually, these appointments are
[00:04:57] help in natural and expected. There is
[00:05:00] nothing new about them. However, there are, I believe,
[00:05:03] some inaccurate information that came from Al-Arabi
[00:05:06] Al-Jadeed regarding the second personality. His name might be
[00:05:10] Kawaderik.
[00:05:12] Because the military security apparatus already exists
[00:05:15] and is led by leader
[00:05:18] Thaeir Bilal Abu Omar, who is also from Al-Hasakah. Perhaps
[00:05:22] this was his deputy, like the internal security command, Brigadier General
[00:05:26] Marwan and Brigadier General Siamand his deputy. So I think
[00:05:31] and Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed rushed to publish these
[00:05:35] news. It says responsible for military security,
[00:05:38] and therefore the position is not clear exactly. It says responsible for military security. No,
[00:05:42] no, no, no, the military security command and the military security details
[00:05:46] have been present in Al-Hasakah for several months,
[00:05:49] and the young men, some of whom we know personally, so I don't think there's
[00:05:52] anything
[00:05:54] new.
[00:05:56] The public's reaction is that people don't care
[00:06:00] much about appointments. In the end, I haven't seen anyone object to
[00:06:04] the appointment of Mr. Mazloum Abdo as an advisor to the President, or even
[00:06:08] Brigadier General Siamand, or even the governor. Sir, the matter
[00:06:12] is and everyone realized
[00:06:15] that it is a process of integration and closer to a quota system,
[00:06:18] but this integration is the integration of the SDF with
[00:06:21] the state and not the state sharing with
[00:06:24] the SDF. There are some problems with some
[00:06:28] young men
[00:06:30] who were close to the SDF, who always said that it was a distribution
[00:06:34] of shares or that the SDF manages the entire governorate and the state has no say
[00:06:38] in it. This is not realistic. Regarding
[00:06:40] the H.A.T.
[00:06:43] I agree with Shirwan that it was the pampered child of the United
[00:06:47] States when it was present in Syria. Now the United States is outside
[00:06:50] Syria, and as far as I know, there is no military
[00:06:54] faction that receives a salary or
[00:06:56] financial dues from the international coalition except for the official dues,
[00:07:00] given that Syria is a member of the coalition, that go to the Ministry of Defense and Interior, and there is
[00:07:04] cooperation on the matter, and there is an anti-terrorism unit already present in Syria in
[00:07:08] the Ministry of Interior. So that is illogical. But
[00:07:11] it is known that the H.A.T. will be integrated into the Syrian security apparatus
[00:07:14] under certain arrangements, because it has
[00:07:18] a counterpart. I think it is the anti-terrorism unit affiliated
[00:07:21] with the Interior Ministry or even the special tasks affiliated with general security. Some elements
[00:07:25] who meet the conditions can be integrated into it. As for
[00:07:29] I'm sorry, but I heard a couple of
[00:07:32] days ago some educated Kurdish youths and friends
[00:07:36] saying, "Oh, it's American, it's American." So what? What's the problem if it's American?
[00:07:39] We are talking about a national agreement.
[00:07:43] It doesn't have much to do with international repercussions. Today it is being implemented, and there are no
[00:07:46] American officers supervising the integration. There are Syrian
[00:07:49] officials supervising the integration, and things are going smoothly
[00:07:53] regarding the integration. But let's go back to the street. Today, Mohammed,
[00:07:56] people don't care much about
[00:07:59] appointing a leader or so on, but there are voices, frankly.
[00:08:03] Samer, Samer, usually you take a different
[00:08:06] approach. Today, you are very supportive
[00:08:10] of this idea.
[00:08:20] Perhaps there is a quota system, and therefore some say it's a quota system between the SDF
[00:08:24] and the central government in Damascus, of course. And the others, the residents
[00:08:28] and the other parties, have no say,
[00:08:32] no share, in this quota system.
[00:08:35] Of course, Mohammed, Mohammed, today even judges have been appointed,
[00:08:39] and some people's problem is
[00:08:43] they think we object to appointing a Kurd to a leadership position in the state,
[00:08:47] and this is wrong. Today, among the judges, there are Arabs
[00:08:51] and Syriacs who were appointed. Well, some of them are accused of corruption
[00:08:54] and bad records during the past years. Well,
[00:08:58] and some or 15 judged some
[00:09:01] Syrians to be from ISIS and transferred them to Iraq, even though Iraq itself
[00:09:04] returned, according to the news, more than 200 people whose sentences
[00:09:08] were wrong. No, the investigation is still ongoing for the rest. Our problem
[00:09:12] today is not a personal problem with Kurds or Arabs or
[00:09:15] Syriacs. Our issue is about the state,
[00:09:19] as a state, that positions should be for competent people
[00:09:22] and not based on quotas. I am against quotas, and I tell you publicly
[00:09:26] that what is happening in Al-Hasakah is a bad quota system.
[00:09:28] And
[00:09:30] unfortunately, neither the Kurdish youth are happy nor the Arab
[00:09:34] youth are happy, but the problem today in Al-Hasakah city
[00:09:37] after the last demonstrations
[00:09:39] is that there is an armed faction
[00:09:42] outside the scope of the state and outside the SDF, meaning outside the integrated SDF,
[00:09:46] practicing
[00:09:49] civilians. This armed faction must be
[00:09:53] dealt with. You ask me today
[00:09:55] a little
[00:09:59] about the appointments.
[00:10:01] Of course, of course, these are the ones the state described as
[00:10:05] outlaws. Well, how do the new appointments, in your opinion,
[00:10:10] dealing with the issue?
[00:10:13] I think it's a separate issue. Today,
[00:10:16] a statement, I mean, I would like to refer to the statement of the Directorate of Internal Security
[00:10:20] in Al-Hasakah, which was issued this afternoon. It's a very important statement
[00:10:24] prohibiting carrying weapons
[00:10:26] and movement in the neighborhoods of Al-Hasakah city, and patrols
[00:10:30] have now started to, according to
[00:10:33] promises, arrest, contain,
[00:10:36] and eliminate the influence of these
[00:10:39] undisciplined groups. Even the SDF leadership itself, by the way,
[00:10:44] people who saw the integrated SDF leaders,
[00:10:48] they are not happy, and on the contrary, they believe that
[00:10:51] the Revolutionary Youth poses a threat even to Kurds. Just yesterday,
[00:10:55] the body of a school teacher, Professor Hassan Al-Kallash,
[00:10:59] was handed over because he was teaching the government
[00:11:02] curriculum. He was kidnapped by an outlaw group, tortured,
[00:11:06] and then his body was handed
[00:11:09] the Kurdish youth, at least, says that the Revolutionary Youth did this,
[00:11:13] and this is their method, by the way. So the issue
[00:11:16] has now become annoying to the Arab and Kurdish streets, that there are
[00:11:20] armed factions practicing gangsterism in the streets,
[00:11:23] while the government and the SDF are in a honeymoon period, dividing positions. Well,
[00:11:27] allow me to transfer this point to Shirwan, because, as we said, there is
[00:11:31] dissatisfaction, in fact, from at least part of the people of
[00:11:34] Al-Hasakah regarding the issue of distributing positions that you referred to, Shirwan,
[00:11:38] that the issue is that whoever had weapons, the SDF,
[00:11:41] and of course, the central government now, there is a division
[00:11:45] of positions, while there is marginalization of others
[00:11:47] and distribution of positions not necessarily based on
[00:11:50] competence. Some, some of those who took positions may have
[00:12:32] yes, I also agree with Brother Samer, and I have already, even in joint
[00:12:36] discussions with you or on Syria TV, yes, the quota system is bad,
[00:12:39] but for now, I will accept it, that the two
[00:12:42] armed parties have reached an understanding now, and
[00:12:45] do not fight over slogans and so on.
[00:12:51] the end, what the residents or the people or
[00:12:55] the components in that region need is the living situation first
[00:12:58] and foremost. Therefore, let them divide the positions.
[00:13:01] The important thing is the outcome, not the distribution of positions as it was
[00:13:05] before. Also, I mean, whether in the case of self-administration or what was called
[00:13:09] "liberated" or even the Salvation Government and the participation of many
[00:13:12] parties, but we used to find how, I mean, situations here and there
[00:13:15] used to happen, especially regarding the living situation. Clarification of another point,
[00:13:19] I mean, regarding what I said about these counter-terrorism forces,
[00:13:22] I said at the end of my speech and confirmed
[00:13:25] that they were pampered and close to the Americans, but
[00:13:29] since Syria as a state has become part of the international
[00:13:33] coalition to combat terrorism, the relationship has become through
[00:13:36] Damascus. These matters concern the international coalition, whether we like
[00:13:40] it or not. Yes, the issue of national sovereignty and such matters,
[00:13:43] yes, we must consider them, but there are some other points that are a reality,
[00:13:47] whether in Syria or Iraq, regarding the fight against
[00:13:51] terrorism and some national military formations that
[00:13:54] have a special relationship with the international
[00:13:58] coalition. This is a fact that cannot be denied, even if it
[00:14:02] may come at the expense of some national matters and so on.
[00:14:05] As for the armed faction or the Revolutionary
[00:14:09] Youth Movement, yes, the Kurds suffered from it before the Arabs. I mean, it was basically
[00:14:13] the iron fist against the Kurdish street. But just
[00:14:16] for clarification, I mean, Professor Hassan Kalash was kidnapped by
[00:14:20] criminal terrorists. Until this moment, the matter
[00:14:24] is under investigation. There is no accused party,
[00:14:28] but since there are precedents, they can be accused. And we hope
[00:14:31] that in the near future, the Syrian government
[00:14:35] as a whole, I mean, they are integrated
[00:14:38] with each other in a safe street, will
[00:14:41] reveal investigations that truly
[00:14:45] reveal the fate of this innocent poor person, otherwise,
[00:14:49] people have the right to accuse this party because it has
[00:14:52] precedents. Well, Shirwan, I want to ask you only about the issue of appointments,
[00:14:56] which is the topic of our episode primarily, between what
[00:14:59] you said, I mean, the issue of the coalition, the issue of dependence
[00:15:02] on Damascus, and the issue of what some refer to as a kind of independence
[00:15:06] for the SDF leaders now. What are the limits of the powers
[00:15:08] of these people? Well, regarding the powers
[00:15:12] of these people, as I said, and I mean, only Al-Arabi
[00:15:17] news. We are awaiting further details
[00:15:21] based on which the powers will be determined. There are some other matters that
[00:15:24] reality imposes. I mean, for example,
[00:15:28] we saw how the governor, his deputy, and the security
[00:15:31] commander were exposed, for example, to some
[00:15:34] civilian attacks, of course, not armed
[00:15:38] attacks, when they visited Ras al-Ain (Serekaniye), and there are some things
[00:15:42] that happen, I mean, perhaps the governor
[00:15:45] himself may not have any restrictions on the Shaddadi area,
[00:15:48] and at the same time, the deputy governor does not have those
[00:15:52] powers that are appropriate for his position in the
[00:15:56] Derik area, for example. Unfortunately, we will suffer from these issues
[00:15:59] for perhaps another year until
[00:16:03] things become clearer, but as I said,
[00:16:06] the story of the deceased martyr Hassan
[00:16:09] Kallash, who was assassinated in a criminal
[00:16:13] manner days ago, everyone knows the force that controls those
[00:16:16] areas. But here, most certainly, from an official
[00:16:19] perspective, we will demand the Syrian government to reveal
[00:16:23] the investigations. When there are no satisfactory investigations
[00:16:26] for the public, of course, everyone has the right to accuse the Revolutionary
[00:16:30] Youth or accuse the SDF itself or accuse the General Security
[00:16:33] itself, as happened in Kobani prison, as happened with the story of
[00:16:38] the fighter Sipan, who was kidnapped on the basis
[00:16:41] that there was a tribal blood feud or a tribal vendetta, and all these matters remain
[00:16:45] unresolved. All these unresolved matters open up
[00:16:48] speculations and bad expectations, and some on social
[00:16:52] media lead the street, Kurds, Arabs,
[00:16:55] and others, and independents and so on, towards
[00:16:58] extremist matters whose consequences are not calculated by anyone and are bad for everyone.
[00:17:02] Go ahead. Well, Samer, what are the criteria adopted for selecting
[00:17:06] officials in Al-Hasakah? Actually, I mean, these three specifically
[00:17:09] who were leaders in the SDF
[00:17:25] we can't know what the criteria are? I mean, there are no criteria
[00:17:28] of competence? I, I
[00:17:32] don't think this position is for the SDF,
[00:17:36] and the SDF provides the appropriate person it wants. Therefore,
[00:17:39] we saw a great exclusion of the Syriac component, the Kurdish component,
[00:17:43] and the Arab component from the SDF appointments,
[00:17:46] its loyalists only. All the directorates that the SDF took now,
[00:17:49] show me a directorate that the SDF took, or even regional
[00:17:53] directors from the SDF side, all of them were cadres. I mean,
[00:17:56] the issue has become clear.
[00:18:00] the government, they say it's a political agreement to avoid bloodshed. My brother, what
[00:18:04] does bloodshed have to do with bringing someone whose record is a bit clean?
[00:18:07] Is it possible that they don't have a good officer with a good record?
[00:18:10] I mean, this is my question. Is it possible that there's no judge, no good
[00:18:14] lawyer, no good certificate from the respected Kurdish
[00:18:17] competencies to take over the Directorate of Education or
[00:18:21] another directorate? There's a problem, frankly. I'm not objecting, I'll tell
[00:18:24] you again, no one in the Al-Hasakah street, neither Arabs nor Kurds,
[00:18:28] objects to having Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Arabs,
[00:18:31] and members of tribes and cities.
[00:18:35] bad reputations. I mean,
[00:18:37] I'm going to bring someone with a bad history and give him a sensitive administration. This is
[00:18:41] a problem, frankly. And
[00:18:44] to what extent do the appointments
[00:18:48] also coincide with the protests that Al-Hasakah witnessed, and therefore, to what extent
[00:18:51] might they affect? No, no, it's separate. It's separate.
[00:18:54] Hmm. I mean, frankly,
[00:18:58] I really saw some activists
[00:19:01] who felt disappointed that we are demanding the government
[00:19:04] to impose its sovereignty and authority to get rid of
[00:19:09] Youth, and they bring us people who perhaps were leading the Revolutionary Youth
[00:19:13] and appoint them here. These are observations that exist, but the government, as usual, does not
[00:19:19] is silent. So people, frankly,
[00:19:22] after the incident of Professor Hassan
[00:19:25] Kallash and others, people see
[00:19:28] that the SDF, by the way, the area it controls,
[00:19:31] I mean, my brother Shirwan said it's an area under SDF control. There is no government in that
[00:19:35] area. But the government is demanded to take responsibility,
[00:19:38] and this is also an appeal to the Kurdish youth. I mean, when
[00:19:41] Sipan was killed
[00:19:45] in Al-Hasakah, thousands of demonstrations came out demanding
[00:19:48] revenge for Sipan and to get Sipan's rights,
[00:19:52] even though the killer was not the government. People were talking about
[00:19:56] its traces or something. Today, this man was killed. This man is also
[00:19:59] Kurdish, a civilian, a school teacher, and with a respectable
[00:20:03] reputation, a decent man, and a politician.
[00:20:05] How was he killed in cold blood? And when the Revolutionary Youth enter, they say, "No, let's wait for the investigation
[00:20:09] results." Why? Why don't the people come out
[00:20:13] and demand to reveal the fate of the man? He was kidnapped for 10 days,
[00:20:16] and finally his tortured body was handed over. Who is responsible for
[00:20:19] this? I don't know, frankly. Today, anyway, let's go back to Al-Hasakah city,
[00:20:22] but Mohammed, it's important, Al-Hasakah city, after
[00:20:26] Friday's demonstration, perhaps
[00:20:29] some Kurdish youths have
[00:20:31] observations about the demonstration. Well, security
[00:20:34] deals with if anyone violated or photos were released,
[00:20:37] even though in my opinion, the demonstration was largely
[00:20:41] peaceful, frankly. Unexpected, to be clear,
[00:20:45] due to the accumulation of grievances and issues.
[00:20:48] And the alignments were disciplined to a good extent.
[00:20:51] But the reaction was that there were armed
[00:20:55] groups that appeared in the name of the Kurds, and they are the Revolutionary
[00:20:58] Youth, whom the Kurds disown, of course.
[00:21:02] And they started to oppress. Yesterday, they arrested the young man and tried to kidnap
[00:21:05] him. Today, an attempted kidnapping. Today, some residents, such as those in Al-Aziziyah
[00:21:09] and Al-Nashwa and others, resorted to setting up civilian
[00:21:11] checkpoints and caught cars with armed men.
[00:21:15] Today, the state or internal security was forced
[00:21:18] to issue a statement prohibiting weapons in order to control the movement of the Revolutionary
[00:21:22] Youth. Mohammed, just to clarify, civilians do not go
[00:21:25] to the Revolutionary Youth's centers. They patrol in civilian cars and practice
[00:21:29] thuggery against civilians in the streets, of course, against Kurds and Arabs,
[00:21:33] but also. But now in Al-Hasakah, the matter is escalating
[00:21:36] greatly in the Arab neighborhoods, frankly. So today,
[00:21:39] the internal security is demanded to implement its statement firmly
[00:21:43] and strictly against, from
[00:21:45] my side, any armed person you see in the street must be held accountable.
[00:21:48] But
[00:21:58] people are heading towards another explosion. I warn that people are heading towards
[00:22:02] another option, and this is bad. And today's civilian incidents, this is not
[00:22:06] what we hoped to reach, but there is an inability
[00:22:09] by the SDF leadership to contain these outlaw
[00:22:12] groups. Well, and what do you have to do with Ghweiran, Al-Aziziyah,
[00:22:16] and Al-Nashwa? I mean, a question to Shirwan: will these new appointments of three
[00:22:20] SDF leaders
[00:22:24] Al-Hasakah, lead to stability,
[00:22:27] or perhaps to
[00:22:31] street? The issue of preserving civil
[00:22:34] peace is not related to positions, as there is a party,
[00:22:38] I mean, positions represent parties, parties to the agreement,
[00:22:43] the security situation. I mean, Professor Samer spoke about the Revolutionary
[00:22:47] Youth Movement or these young people who commit
[00:22:50] illegal acts. Yes, this situation exists, and there are other situations
[00:22:54] even in demonstrations. I mean, there were clear violations that were filmed
[00:22:57] and published. Yes, I mean, the demonstration had
[00:23:01] legitimate demands, and most of them were respectful, but the transgressions
[00:23:04] and slogans
[00:23:07] just for your information, the weapons, I mean, my dear, since security was present,
[00:23:10] of course, they wouldn't be able to carry weapons. In Ras al-Ain, some time ago, we saw
[00:23:14] how the families that returned under government sponsorship,
[00:23:17] how they were treated, and until this moment,
[00:23:21] I mean, convoys of 90% of the displaced people from Afrin
[00:23:24] returned to their areas, but because of the same groups
[00:23:28] similar to the Revolutionary Youth present in Ras al-Ain, they prevent the return of
[00:23:32] thousands of displaced Arabs and Kurds to these
[00:23:35] areas. Clear, 50 returned,
[00:23:39] 250 families returned, Professor Shirwan. Families returned last week, and tomorrow there will be
[00:23:43] another 250 returning. Yes, yes.
[00:23:46] Fears still exist. Why, I mean, Afrin, which
[00:23:50] is 600 kilometers away from the area,
[00:23:52] and 90% of it returned, but Ras al-Ain itself is part
[00:23:56] of the governorate, and it's a stone's throw, I mean, as
[00:23:59] they say, a few kilometers, and until this moment, return is not possible
[00:24:03] due to the presence of these groups. This situation also
[00:24:07] exists. Yes, it must be
[00:24:08] stopped.
[00:24:11] There are also displaced people in Ras al-Ain. All these
[00:24:15] are security problems, indeed. And this brings us back to the question of whether
[00:24:19] the new appointments will bring
[00:24:25] things to stability or the opposite. No,
[00:24:28] no, not the opposite, nor will it establish stability. The issue of appointing
[00:24:31] positions is the legalization of the existing military
[00:24:34] situation in security positions. I mean, this is their responsibility,
[00:24:38] which will be, yes,
[00:24:43] appointing this one and removing that one does not mean that security will be established or
[00:24:47] that security will go in a bad direction, as much as the situation
[00:24:54] the region, and not this in this position or in that position. The same problems exist in Al-Hasakah,
[00:24:58] despite the fact that all the positions
[00:25:01] Al-Hasakah. In contrast, there are other areas, I mean, from
[00:25:05] one side, I mean, either from the government's side or from the SDF's side,
[00:25:08] and there are no problems there. There are no problems in Tal Hamis, and all of them
[00:25:12] are under government control, and there are no problems in
[00:25:15] , for example, in Terbespiyeh or Al-Ma'raba to Qamishli
[00:25:19] also, and almost 100% are under the control of the disbanded
[00:25:26] party or so on, as much as it needs a political agreement, and Al-Hasakah
[00:25:30] city specifically, and somewhat Qamishli,
[00:25:33] I mean, these cities, because of the wide mixture there, I mean here
[00:25:36] the political mixture also, not the mixture of components, since it
[00:25:40] is present in the entire governorate, needs reconsideration from
[00:25:43] the Syrian government, and including, of course, the SDF that
[00:25:47] integrated. Well, I mean, for example, one of
[00:25:50] the answers that Samer mentioned is the issue of organizing the Revolutionary
[00:25:54] Youth now, and they carry
[00:25:58] weapons. I mean, it's an armed military organization. Now, for example, whoever took over
[00:26:01] security in the military, is not
[00:26:05] the director, as Samer said, perhaps a deputy, but he is in military security, for example.
[00:26:09] Therefore, will he play a role in controlling this organization,
[00:26:12] for example? I said it's not linked
[00:26:16] to the person holding the position, as much as it needs a political decision. Can
[00:26:19] the disbanded SDF control these people and the Syrian government, or
[00:26:23] not, regardless of the position? I mean, let's appoint you
[00:26:27] too. Do you have the ability or the decisive decision in this
[00:26:31] situation? This is the issue.
[00:26:35] This is, I mean, at the core of his supposed duties, my dear.
[00:26:39] My dear, yes, yes, at the core of the duties, but as I said
[00:26:42] to you, there are no second or third-tier officials. They are not
[00:26:45] the ultimate authorities on such a situation
[00:26:49] that we have been suffering from for more than 12 years, even when
[00:26:52] the SDF alone was in control. And some of my friends
[00:26:56] who discussed with Mr. Mazloum Abdo and so on about
[00:27:00] the violations that were caused by this organization could not
[00:27:03] , I mean, I mean,
[00:27:06] fight this organization that was a burden on themselves, I mean,
[00:27:09] and not only on civilians and
[00:27:12] so on. Therefore, the issue, I repeat for the fourth
[00:27:16] and fifth time, is not related to the new appointments, if
[00:27:19] the talk about them is confirmed, as much as it is that the Syrian
[00:27:23] state as a whole must issue a real
[00:27:26] and not verbal decision regarding the state of arms
[00:27:30] chaos, whether it is the Revolutionary Youth or others. As an incident,
[00:27:34] the kidnapping of the fighter
[00:27:37] on the basis that there was, I mean, there was a tribal tribal for the incident, but
[00:27:41] he was kidnapped from an area that is completely
[00:27:44] under the control of the SDF, in an integrated area, meaning
[00:27:47] joint control, and he was liquidated in an area that is
[00:27:51] also under the complete control of the Syrian government. All these
[00:27:54] matters require
[00:27:57] meaning from the higher authorities, actual decisions, not formal ones. Yes, the decision
[00:28:01] was issued
[00:28:08] to confine weapons to the state. Will this weapon actually be used to implement the decision on these people, regardless of whether Qadi, or similar
[00:28:11] names are present in these positions? Okay, okay, let me ask Samer
[00:28:15] one last minute now, so that
[00:28:19] Al-Hasakah is in whose hands? In the government's hands or not? In one minute, please,
[00:28:22] Samer.
[00:28:26] Of course, the security file is in the government's hands, meaning the intelligence
[00:28:30] and security agencies were present before the integration agreement with
[00:28:34] the SDF, and now some
[00:28:37] into this file, but the leadership of the file now is,
[00:28:40] I can tell you, roughly two-thirds to one-third. Now,
[00:28:44] one-third of those integrated from the SDF
[00:28:47] and two-thirds of the leaders
[00:28:50] who were part of the government, including Brigadier General
[00:28:55] leaders, are now in charge of the military police, military security, and internal
[00:28:58] security of the government. I mean, in case I mean,
[00:29:02] yes, yes, the government is not in control, I mean, this is the problem, our problem
[00:29:06] is with control and sovereignty. Why did people demonstrate? Because today, if
[00:29:09] the revolutionary youth attacked people, they go to the outpost to complain. The outpost
[00:29:13] does not have, it's not even active. Public security is not
[00:29:16] active. It cannot reach all neighborhoods. It cannot reach all cities. This
[00:29:20] is the problem today. What is required is for the state's umbrella
[00:29:24] to be in place, whether with those integrated or
[00:29:27] or with the government as a whole. The matter is sensitive now. I
[00:29:31] warn. I warn and do not call for any escalation,
[00:29:34] but the matter has begun to get out of control if it is not
[00:29:38] addressed, because people have had enough
[00:29:41] of what is happening. Time is up. Samer Al-Ahmed, journalist and political researcher from Damascus,
[00:29:45] and Shirwan Ibrahim, writer and journalist from
[00:29:47] Germany.
[00:29:50] We continue with you in Syria Today. After the break, we will discuss the legal
[00:29:53] powers of Ikifaa Company, which is affiliated with the
[00:29:56] sovereign fund, in managing the lands
[00:29:58] of absentees.
[00:30:18] A series of mysterious crimes whose victims were hundreds of
[00:30:21] Syrians,
[00:30:24] many of whom were killed by bullets, and in some cases,
[00:30:29] the head.
[00:30:35] But who killed these people, and how were they killed, and why
[00:30:39] were no evidence collected and no