SYRIATV — broadcast 20261012 220000 UTC 514 transcript segments Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking Data courtesy of The GDELT Project (https://www.gdeltproject.org/), from the Internet Archive TV News Archive. Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record. [00:00:00] Document Send [00:00:03] and be a contributing part of the news industry. [00:00:07] People in the camera People, your lens [00:00:11] makes the news. [00:00:17] people who saw the SDF these details need [00:00:26] say in this case? This [00:00:35] Welcome back. Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper said that the government [00:00:39] appointed three former leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces [00:00:42] was handed over. Most of the news to positions in Al-Hasakah governorate as part of [00:00:45] ongoing arrangements to integrate security [00:00:48] and military institutions in northeastern Syria into state [00:00:52] with Mr. Mazloum Abdo and so on institutions. The newspaper quoted security sources in Al-Hasakah [00:00:55] and others close to the SDF as saying that [00:00:58] Malik Bashar, known as Haval Damhat, assumed the presidency [00:01:02] of General Intelligence in [00:01:03] to a quota system, but this Al-Hasakah, while [00:01:05] integration is the integration of the SDF with Kaw Derk was appointed head of military security, and [00:01:08] Dijwar Amoudeh was tasked with combating [00:01:11] terrorism within the General Intelligence apparatus. [00:01:15] The appointments came after a visit by a high-ranking [00:01:19] towards extremist matters that Syrian security delegation to Al-Hasakah on the seventh of October, headed by [00:01:23] the Director of General Intelligence, Abdul Qader Al-Tahan, and accompanied by [00:01:26] the Director of Foreign Intelligence, Abdul Rahman [00:01:29] Al-Dabbagh. According to the report, [00:01:32] of the fighter Seban, also, security positions in the delegation discussed arrangements for taking over [00:01:34] and now have become leaders in that Samer and I fight? security branches and prisons in Al-Hasakah [00:01:38] unrest in the governorate. disturbances and more [00:01:42] the international coalition except Samer Al-Ahmad, journalist [00:01:46] and political researcher from Damascus, and Sherwan Ibrahim, writer and journalist from [00:01:51] and not that the matter of prohibiting Bochum, Germany, join us. Welcome [00:01:52] decisions from to you. Sherwan, how can we interpret the decision [00:01:55] to appoint three SDF officials to sensitive security positions [00:01:59] in Al-Hasakah? Good evening, my dear Muhammad, and Professor Samer [00:02:02] situation exists, and there are other situations, even in and all viewers. The decision that was published only [00:02:05] by Al-Araby Al-Jadeed website that spoke about this issue, [00:02:09] of course, even before my participation in this [00:02:13] program, we made [00:02:16] some calls, and there is [00:02:19] reason to confirm that these appointments [00:02:23] each incident will have its own story. In are likely correct, but until this moment, no official decision has been issued. [00:02:26] However, if we assume that this decision [00:02:30] is indeed official, then I think the situation is normal [00:02:32] some leaders have been integrated into this under the integration agreements between [00:02:35] the two parties, especially since there is a quota system in some [00:02:38] of these, not some, but in all of these sensitive positions [00:02:42] from a security and military perspective. [00:02:46] Almost all of these matters usually have the official from one party [00:02:49] Marwan and a large number of and the deputy from the other party. Therefore, [00:02:53] we are waiting for [00:02:56] about the general security situation. Yes, details or official confirmations and also details about [00:03:00] the matter. But as I said, until this moment, the situation [00:03:03] seems to be part of the integration process that is happening [00:03:06] and the distribution of positions between [00:03:09] do these appointments coincide with the two parties. There is another point I want to mention, which is that HAT forces, [00:03:13] which is an abbreviation for Counter-Terrorism Forces, which [00:03:16] was a military formation within the SDF, these forces [00:03:20] were and still are directly affiliated with [00:03:24] the international coalition forces and the American side, both in terms [00:03:27] of salaries and appointments, as well as in terms [00:03:31] of military orders and instructions. Therefore, I think it will [00:03:34] have a future or or a greater presence, perhaps even in [00:03:38] exist, but the government does not other Syrian areas in some [00:03:42] Bochum, operations related to combating terrorism, as the American side [00:03:45] is the one that controls more specifically [00:03:48] the fate of these [00:03:50] appointing this one and dismissing this one does forces or this formation in particular. But it [00:03:54] is not currently affiliated with the Syrian military [00:03:57] and security institution. No, no, under the integration [00:04:02] but since there are precedents, and military formation affiliated with the SDF from a public perspective, and the SDF has all integrated [00:04:06] or is integrating with Syrian government institutions. But I, [00:04:10] just as a special detail, said that this formation in particular [00:04:13] is, in common parlance, spoiled by the Americans, let's [00:04:17] tribal revenge or something. Today, this [00:04:18] reveal the fate of this say, and also trained by the American side. Therefore, [00:04:20] the fateful decision also concerns this aspect under the special [00:04:24] arrangements of the international coalition to fight terrorism. [00:04:28] Um, okay. [00:04:30] Syria, and Syria as a member state, [00:04:33] not mean that the official is from this meaning, and this issue, I think, has become [00:04:34] it practices intimidation linked to Damascus itself, meaning, and as I said, [00:04:37] we are waiting for confirmations [00:04:40] homes in about these appointments and their details. Samer, what O homes in is the impact of these appointments in the streets of [00:04:44] Al-Hasakah? [00:04:47] Yes, good evening, Muhammad, [00:04:49] to you and Professor Sherwan. [00:04:52] Actually, these appointments are normal and expected. [00:04:55] There is nothing new [00:04:59] some points. One in them, but there is, I think, some misinformation [00:05:01] that came from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed [00:05:05] regarding the second person, his name might be [00:05:07] Kawadirik, because the military security apparatus is already [00:05:11] present and led by [00:05:14] leader Thair Bilal Abu Omar, [00:05:17] who is also from Al-Hasakah. Perhaps this was his deputy, [00:05:21] like the leadership of internal security, Brigadier [00:05:23] Marwan and Brigadier Siamand, his deputy. So I think [00:05:29] to be verified, and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed was hasty in publishing these [00:05:32] news. [00:05:34] In the end, [00:05:37] the position is not clear. You say responsible for military security. No, [00:05:41] no, no, the military security leadership, [00:05:47] and some of the young men, we know them personally, so I don't think there's anything [00:05:51] new. [00:05:54] The issue is that people don't really care [00:05:58] about appointments. In the end, I haven't seen anyone object to [00:06:01] the appointment of Mr. Mazloum Abdo as an advisor to the president, or even [00:06:05] Brigadier Siamand, or even the governor. Sir, [00:06:08] the issue has gone beyond that, and everyone [00:06:11] has realized that this is an integration process, and it's closer [00:06:18] the, I mean, within the state, not a state that shares [00:06:21] with the SDF. There are some problems among some [00:06:25] young people [00:06:28] who were close to the SDF. They always used to say that it was a sharing of shares [00:06:32] or that the SDF managed the entire governorate and the state had no say [00:06:35] in it. This is not realistic. Regarding HAT, [00:06:38] I agree with Sherwan that it was the spoiled child of the United [00:06:42] States when it was present in Syria. Now the United States [00:06:45] is out of Syria, and there is no, to my knowledge, any military [00:06:49] faction that receives a salary or financial entitlements from [00:06:55] for the official entitlements, as Syria is a member of the coalition, [00:06:58] and they go to the Ministry of Defense and Interior, and there is cooperation on the matter, [00:07:02] and there is already a counter-terrorism unit in Syria in the Ministry [00:07:05] of Interior. So it is not logical, but HAT [00:07:09] information indicates that it will be integrated into the Syrian security apparatus. Um. [00:07:13] In a certain arrangement, because there is a counterpart to it. [00:07:16] I think it is the counter-terrorism unit of the Interior Ministry or even [00:07:20] the special tasks of public security. Some elements that meet the conditions can be integrated [00:07:24] into it. As for, I'm sorry, [00:07:28] but I heard two or three days ago from some [00:07:31] Kurdish intellectuals, young people, and friends that HAT is American, HAT is American. So [00:07:35] what? What's the problem if HAT is American? [00:07:38] We are talking about a national agreement that doesn't have much to do with [00:07:41] international repercussions. Today, it is being implemented, and there are no American officers supervising [00:07:45] the integration. There are Syrian officials supervising the integration, [00:07:48] and things are going smoothly. The integration issue, but let's go back [00:07:52] to the street today, Muhammad, people don't [00:07:55] care much about the appointment of a leader [00:07:58] or so on, but there are voices, frankly, Samer, you usually [00:08:02] have a different opinion. Today, you are very [00:08:05] welcoming to this [00:08:09] idea, but allow me to ask you a question. What [00:08:12] some say, whether Arabs or Kurds, is that it happened, and you [00:08:16] mentioned that word, and Sherwan perhaps, that there is a quota system, and therefore [00:08:20] some say a quota system between the SDF and the central government in Damascus, [00:08:23] of course, and the other residents and other parties have no [00:08:27] say. They have no share in this [00:08:30] quota system. [00:08:32] Of course, Muhammad, Muhammad, today even judges [00:08:36] were appointed, and the problem [00:08:38] is that some [00:08:40] think we object to a Kurd in a leadership position in the state, [00:08:44] and this is wrong. Today, among the judges, there are Arabs and [00:08:48] there are Syriacs who were appointed. Well, some of them are accused [00:08:51] of corruption and bad practices over the past years. Well, [00:08:55] some of these 11 or 15 ruled that some [00:08:58] Syrians were from ISIS and transferred them to Iraq, even though Iraq itself [00:09:02] , according to the news, returned more than 200 people whose sentences [00:09:05] were wrong. No, the investigation is still ongoing for the rest. Our [00:09:08] problem today is not a personal problem with Kurds or [00:09:12] Arabs or Syriacs. Our issue is the issue [00:09:16] of the state as a state, that positions should be for competencies, [00:09:19] and there should be no quota system. I am against the quota system, and I tell you openly, [00:09:23] what is happening in Al-Hasakah is a bad quota system, [00:09:25] and unfortunately, [00:09:29] neither the Kurdish youth are happy nor the Arab youth are happy. But [00:09:33] the problem today in Al-Hasakah after the recent demonstrations [00:09:36] is that there is an armed faction [00:09:40] outside the state and outside the SDF, by the way. I mean, outside [00:09:43] the integrated SDF, [00:09:46] and terrorism in the streets against civilians. This [00:09:50] armed faction must be dealt with. You ask me today what I think [00:09:52] about the appointments. [00:09:58] Of course, of course, these factions, the state described them as [00:10:02] outlaws. Well, how do you think the new appointments [00:10:06] will help? [00:10:06] I think [00:10:10] it's a separate issue. Today, I want to refer [00:10:14] to a statement by the Directorate of Internal Security in Al-Hasakah that was issued [00:10:17] this afternoon. A very important statement prohibiting carrying [00:10:21] weapons and roaming in neighborhoods [00:10:23] in Al-Hasakah city, and patrols have started now [00:10:27] to, according to the promises, arrest, contain, [00:10:31] and eliminate the influence [00:10:33] of these unruly groups. Even the SDF [00:10:37] leadership itself, I heard from a number of [00:10:42] leaders who integrated that they are not [00:10:45] happy, and on the contrary, they see that [00:10:49] the Revolutionary Youth are a threat even to the Kurds. Just yesterday, [00:10:52] the body of a school teacher, Professor Hassan Kallash, [00:10:56] was handed over because he was teaching the government [00:11:00] curriculum. He was kidnapped by an outlaw group, and [00:11:03] tortured, and then his body [00:11:07] from the Kurdish youth, at least, say that this Revolutionary Youth did this, [00:11:10] and this is their method, by the way. So the [00:11:13] issue has now become annoying to the Arab and Kurdish streets, that there are [00:11:17] armed factions practicing mafia-like activities in the streets [00:11:20] while the government and the SDF are living a honeymoon distributing positions. [00:11:24] Okay, allow me to pass this point to Sherwan, because as [00:11:27] we said, there is indeed annoyance from at least some [00:11:31] of the people of Al-Hasakah regarding the distribution of positions that you mentioned, [00:11:34] Sherwan, that the issue is that the SDF held the weapons, [00:11:38] and of course, now the central government there [00:11:41] is a distribution of positions, but on the other hand, there is marginalization of others [00:11:45] and the distribution of positions is not necessarily based on [00:11:48] competence. Some of those who took positions may have [00:11:52] accusations of committing previous violations. [00:11:55] Yes, why are you insisting [00:11:59] We are among the few voices that try to understand [00:12:02] each other. Anyway, no offense. [00:12:05] Regarding the quota system, no, I am just surprised by the excessive [00:12:09] calm. The other day, Samer was with us, [00:12:12] and he was very agitated. No, it is customary [00:12:16] that we understand each other. I mean, [00:12:18] one, I mean, we hope, we hope that [00:12:22] things will be calm and peaceful and stable, God [00:12:26] willing, God willing. Anyway, regarding the bad quota system, [00:12:29] yes, I also agree with Brother Samer, and I have said before, even in joint [00:12:33] conversations with you or on Syrian TV, yes, the quota system is bad, [00:12:36] but temporarily, I will accept it, because, you know, [00:12:40] the two armed parties have agreed for now, and they will not fight over [00:12:44] slogans and so on. After that, [00:12:48] the end, what the residents or the people or [00:12:52] the components in that region need is a decent living condition, [00:12:55] first and foremost. Therefore, let them share the positions. [00:12:58] The important thing is the outcome, not the distribution of positions as it was [00:13:02] before, also, whether it was the self-administration or what was [00:13:05] called the liberated areas or even the salvation government and the involvement of many parties, [00:13:09] but we used to find how incidents here and there used to happen, [00:13:13] especially regarding the living conditions. To clarify another point, [00:13:17] regarding HAT, I mean, the Counter-Terrorism [00:13:19] Forces, I said at the end of my speech and confirmed [00:13:23] that it was spoiled and close to the Americans, but since [00:13:27] Syria as a state has become part of the international [00:13:30] coalition to fight terrorism, the relationship has become through [00:13:34] Damascus. These are matters concerning the international coalition, and whether we like [00:13:37] it or not, yes, the issue of national sovereignty and such matters, [00:13:41] yes, we should consider them, but there are other points that are a reality, whether [00:13:45] in Syria or Iraq, regarding combating [00:13:48] terrorism and some national military formations that [00:13:51] have a special relationship with [00:13:55] the international coalition. This is a fact that cannot be denied, even if it [00:13:59] might be at the expense of some national matters and so on. [00:14:03] As for the armed faction or the Revolutionary Youth [00:14:07] Movement, yes, the Kurds suffered from it before the Arabs. I mean, it was basically [00:14:10] the striking hand against the Kurdish street. But just [00:14:13] as a clarification, Professor Hassan Kallash was kidnapped by [00:14:17] criminal terrorists, and until this moment, the matter [00:14:21] is still under investigation. [00:14:23] There is no accused party, [00:14:27] it is possible to accuse them, and we hope [00:14:31] that in the near future, the Syrian government [00:14:33] as a whole, I mean, integrated with each other in a [00:14:36] smooth street, will conduct [00:14:40] investigations that indeed [00:14:43] poor, innocent person. Otherwise, people have the right [00:14:46] to accuse the Revolutionary Youth or accuse the SDF itself [00:14:50] طيب شي روان اريد ان اسالك فقط يعني يعني موضوع التعيينات اللي هو موضوع [00:14:53] حلقتنا بالدرجهه الاولى بين ما قلت يعني موضوع [00:14:57] التحالف موضوع التبعيه لدمشق وموضوع ما يشير [00:15:01] اليه البعض انه هناك نوع من الاستقلاليه لقيادات قسد الان ما حدود [00:15:05] صلاحيات هؤلاء [00:15:08] هلا بخصوص صلاحيات هؤلاء انا كما قلت [00:15:11] ويعني فقط موقع العربي الجديد [00:15:14] الخبر نحن بانتظار تفاصيل اخرى [00:15:18] على اساسها سيتم تحديد الصلاحيات هناك بعض الامور ايضا [00:15:22] التي الواقع يقوم بفرضها يعني على سبيل للمثال [00:15:25] الحصر وجدنا كيف ان المحافظ ونائبه وقائد [00:15:29] الامن تعرضوا مثلا لبعض [00:15:32] الهجمات المدنيه طبعا وليست الهجمات [00:15:35] المسلحه حينما زاروا راس سريكانيه وهناك بعض الامور التي [00:15:39] تحدث يعني ربما السيد المحافظ بذات نفسه [00:15:43] قد يعني ما يكون في له موانع على منطقه الشداده بذات [00:15:46] الوقت النائب المحافظ لا يجد تلك [00:15:49] الصلاحيات التي تليق بمنصبه في منطقه [00:15:53] ديرك على سبيل المثال للحسن هذه المواضيع سنعاني منها حتى [00:15:57] ربما سنه اخرى يعني لحين يعني [00:16:00] بلورت الامور بشكل واضح اكثر ولكن كما قلت يعني [00:16:04] قصه ال المرحوم الشهيد حسن [00:16:07] كلش الذي يعني تم اغتياله بطريقه اجراميه قبل [00:16:10] ايام الجميع يعلم ما هي القوه التي تسيطر على تلك [00:16:13] المناطق ولكن [00:16:16] الناحيه الرسميه سنطالب الحكومه السوريه بالكشف [00:16:20] عن التحقيقات حينما لا توجد تحقيقات يعني مرضيه [00:16:24] للشارع طبعا من حق الجميع ان يتهموا الشبيبه الثوريه او [00:16:28] or accuse public security [00:16:31] itself, as happened in Kobani prison, as happened with [00:16:34] the story of the fighter Seban, who was kidnapped. The basis [00:16:38] is that there is a tribal blood money or tribal revenge, and all [00:16:41] these matters remain pending. All these pending matters open [00:16:45] up bad speculations and expectations, and some [00:16:48] on social media are leading the street, [00:16:51] Kurds, Arabs, and others, and independents, and so on, [00:16:57] have dire consequences for everyone and will be bad for everyone. Please, Samer, [00:17:01] what are the criteria adopted for selecting officials in Al-Hasakah [00:17:04] effectively? I mean, specifically these three [00:17:08] who were leaders in the SDF [00:17:12] security [00:17:12] files? [00:17:16] I mean, this question is not for me, Muhammad. You should ask the government. How would [00:17:19] I know? I mean, [00:17:23] we can't know what the criteria are. I mean, there are no merit-based criteria. [00:17:26] It's a quota system. [00:17:28] I think [00:17:30] this position is the SDF's share, and the SDF [00:17:34] presents the right man it wants. That's why we saw [00:17:37] a great exclusion of the Syriac component and the Kurdish and Arab [00:17:41] components from the SDF appointments, and matters were limited to those [00:17:44] loyal to it only. All the directorates that the SDF took now, show [00:17:47] me a directorate that the SDF took, or even the directors [00:17:50] of the regions who are on the SDF side, all of them were cadres, [00:17:54] I mean, the issue has become clear, we don't want to talk about it more, and when we talk [00:17:57] to the government, they say it's a political agreement to avoid bloodshed. Brother, what does bloodshed [00:18:01] have to do with bringing someone whose history is a bit clean? Is it possible that they don't [00:18:05] have a good officer with good practices? I mean, this is my question. [00:18:09] Is it possible that there is no judge, no good lawyer, no [00:18:12] good certificate from the respected Kurdish competencies to come [00:18:16] and take over the Directorate of Education or another directorate? There is a problem, [00:18:19] frankly. I am not objecting, I repeat, no one [00:18:23] in Al-Hasakah street, neither Arabs nor Kurds, objects [00:18:26] to having Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Arabs, tribal people, [00:18:30] and city dwellers. No one objects. The objection is to bad [00:18:33] practices. I mean, I'm going to bring someone with a bad history and give him a sensitive [00:18:37] administration. I mean, this is a problem, frankly. [00:18:39] And to what [00:18:42] extent [00:18:47] the protests that Al-Hasakah witnessed, and therefore to what extent [00:18:50] might they affect? No, no, separate, [00:18:52] separate. [00:18:55] Um, I mean, frankly, I saw that [00:18:58] some activists felt disappointed. [00:19:01] We are demanding that the government impose its sovereignty [00:19:04] and authority so that we can get rid of violations [00:19:08] and get rid of the Revolutionary Youth. You bring us people who perhaps [00:19:11] were leading the Revolutionary Youth and you appoint them here. These are observations that [00:19:16] respond, as usual. The phone is silent, so [00:19:20] people have started, to be honest, after the incident of Professor [00:19:23] Hassan Kallash and others, people see [00:19:27] that the SDF, by the way, the area controlled by it, I mean, [00:19:30] my brother Sherwan said it is an area under SDF control. There is no government in that [00:19:34] area, but the government is demanded to take its responsibility. [00:19:38] And this is also a call to the Kurdish youth. I mean, when [00:19:40] Seban was killed in Al-Hasakah, thousands [00:19:44] demonstrated demanding revenge for Seban and taking [00:19:47] Seban's right, and even though the killer was not the government, [00:19:51] people were talking about [00:19:55] man was killed, and he was also Kurdish and civilian [00:19:58] and a school teacher, and with respected practices. The man [00:20:01] is a politician. How was he killed in cold blood, and when [00:20:05] you tell them the Revolutionary Youth, they say no. Let's wait for the investigation results. [00:20:08] Why? Why doesn't the street come out [00:20:12] and demand to reveal the fate of the man who was kidnapped for 10 days, and finally [00:20:15] his tortured body was handed over? Who is responsible for [00:20:18] this? I don't know, frankly. Today, anyway, let's go back to Al-Hasakah [00:20:22] city, but Muhammad, it's important that Al-Hasakah city, after the Friday [00:20:25] demonstration, um, [00:20:29] perhaps some Kurdish youth have reservations about the demonstration. [00:20:32] Well, the security forces deal with if anyone [00:20:35] violated or pictures came out, although in my opinion, [00:20:38] the demonstration was largely clean, frankly. [00:20:42] Unexpected, to be clear, due to [00:20:45] the accumulation of grievances and stories and alignments, [00:20:48] it was well-behaved to a good extent. But [00:20:52] the reaction was that armed groups appeared in the name of [00:20:55] the Kurds, and the Revolutionary Youth, the Kurds are innocent of them, of course, [00:20:59] and they started to abuse. Yesterday, they arrested a young man and tried to kidnap him. [00:21:02] Today, an attempted kidnapping. Today, some residents, like those in Al-Aziziyah [00:21:06] and Al-Nashwa and others, resorted to setting up civilian checkpoints [00:21:10] and caught cars with armed men in them. Today, the state [00:21:13] or internal security was forced to issue a statement prohibiting weapons [00:21:17] in order to control the movement of the Revolutionary Youth. [00:21:20] To clarify, the Revolutionary Youth civilians do not go to their [00:21:23] centers. They patrol in civilian cars and practice [00:21:26] thuggery against civilians in the streets, of course, against Kurds and Arabs, [00:21:30] but also, but now in Al-Hasakah, the matter is escalating [00:21:33] greatly against the Arab neighborhoods, frankly. Well, today [00:21:36] internal security demands to implement its statement firmly [00:21:40] and strictly towards, [00:21:42] from my side, any armed person you see in the street must be held accountable. [00:21:46] But the organized armed groups [00:21:49] in this way, and those who have political cover, must [00:21:53] be dealt with quickly because people are heading [00:21:56] towards another explosion. I warn that people are heading [00:21:59] towards another option, and this is bad, and today the civilian incidents, this is what [00:22:03] we did not want to reach, but there is an inability [00:22:06] of the SDF leadership to contain these outlaw [00:22:10] groups. What do you have to do with Ghweran and Al-Aziziyah [00:22:13] and Al-Nashwa? And Sherwan, will these new appointments of three [00:22:17] SDF leaders in [00:22:21] Al-Hasakah lead to stability [00:22:25] or perhaps to [00:22:28] street? The issue of maintaining civil [00:22:32] peace is not related to positions, since there is an entity, [00:22:35] I mean, the positions represent the parties to the agreement [00:22:41] or allowing is for the security situation. Professor Samer spoke about [00:22:44] the Revolutionary Youth Movement or these young people who are committing [00:22:48] illegal acts. Yes, this [00:22:52] demonstrations, I mean, there were clear violations that were photographed [00:22:54] and published. Yes, I mean, the demonstration had [00:22:58] legitimate demands, and most of them were respectful, but the transgressions [00:23:01] and slogans, [00:23:04] just for observation, the weapons, my dear, since the security was present, [00:23:07] of course, they would not be able to carry weapons. In Ras al-Ain, some time ago, we saw how [00:23:11] the families who returned under the auspices of the government, [00:23:15] how they were treated, and until this moment, [00:23:18] I mean, convoys, I mean, 90% of the displaced people of Afrin [00:23:22] returned to their areas, but due to the same groups [00:23:25] similar to the Revolutionary Youth in Ras al-Ain, [00:23:28] they prevent the return of thousands of displaced Arabs and Kurds [00:23:32] to these areas. This is a clear fact. [00:23:34] If 250 families returned, Professor [00:23:38] Sherwan, families returned last week, and tomorrow another 250 families [00:23:41] are returning. Yes, yes, the fears [00:23:45] are still present. Why Afrin, which is 600 [00:23:48] km away from the area, and 90% of its people returned, [00:23:52] but Ras al-Ain itself is part of the governorate, and [00:23:55] it's just a stone's throw away, as they say, a few kilometers, [00:23:58] and until this moment, return is not possible due to the presence of these groups. [00:24:02] This situation also exists. Yes, [00:24:05] there are also [00:24:09] displaced people in Ras al-Ain, all of these are security [00:24:12] problems. That's true. And this brings us back to the question: are [00:24:15] these new appointments of security [00:24:18] officials, will that contribute to controlling [00:24:22] things and stability or the opposite? No, [00:24:25] not the opposite, nor controlling stability. The issue of appointing [00:24:28] positions is the legalization of the existing military situation, [00:24:32] but they are in security positions. I mean, this is their responsibility [00:24:35] that will be. Yes, it will be their responsibility, but [00:24:40] not mean that security will be established or security will go in a bad [00:24:44] direction, as much as the situation is linked to the political [00:24:48] and military agreement that will impose [00:24:59] On the other hand, there are other areas, I mean, from one side, [00:25:03] whether from the government side or from the SDF side, and there are no problems [00:25:07] in them. There are no problems in Tal Hamis, and all of them are under government [00:25:10] control, and there are no problems in, for example, [00:25:13] Terpe Spi or Al-Maaraba to Al-Qahtaniyah, also, and almost [00:25:17] 100% are under the control of the dissolved SDF. [00:25:20] It does [00:25:23] party or so on, as much as it needs a political agreement, and Al-Hasakah [00:25:27] city in particular, and Qamishli, I mean, [00:25:30] these cities, due to the wide mix in them, I mean the political [00:25:33] mix, not the mix of components, as it is present in the entire governorate, [00:25:37] needs a reconsideration from the Syrian government, and [00:25:41] among them, of course, the SDF that integrated. [00:25:44] There are certainly [00:25:49] النقاط احد [00:26:00] is in military security, not, yes. [00:26:02] The director, as Samer said, is probably a deputy, but he is in military security, for example. [00:26:06] Therefore, will he play a role in controlling this organization, [00:26:09] for example? I said it is not related [00:26:13] to the person holding the position, as much as it needs a political decision. [00:26:17] Can the dissolved SDF control these people and the Syrian government [00:26:20] or not, regardless of the position? I mean, let's [00:26:23] appoint you too. Do you have the ability or the final [00:26:29] matter is related to the entity as a whole, and not to [00:26:32] this, which is, I mean, at the core of its supposed duties, my dear, [00:26:36] my dear, yes, yes, at the core of the duties, but as I told [00:26:39] you, these are second and third-tier officials. They are not [00:26:42] the ones who have the final say on such a situation that has existed [00:26:46] for more than 12 years, even when the SDF alone was in control, [00:26:49] and there are some, I mean, my friends who discussed [00:26:55] the violations that resulted from this organization, and they [00:26:58] could not, I mean, combat this organization, which was [00:27:03] a burden on them themselves, I mean, and not only [00:27:06] on civilians and so on. [00:27:09] Therefore, the issue, I repeat for the fourth [00:27:13] and fifth time, is not related to the new positions, [00:27:16] if the discussion about them is proven, as much as the Syrian [00:27:20] state as a whole must issue a real [00:27:24] and not verbal decision about the state of arms chaos, [00:27:27] whether the Revolutionary Youth organization or others, resulting [00:27:31] from it, such as the abduction [00:27:35] it was based, I mean, there was a tribal [00:27:38] He was kidnapped from an area that is absolutely [00:27:41] under the control of Qasd, an integrated area, meaning joint control, [00:27:45] and he was liquidated in an area that is also [00:27:48] under the absolute control of the Syrian government. All these [00:27:52] matters require [00:27:55] higher authorities, real decisions, not formal ones. Yes, the decision [00:27:58] was issued to confine weapons to the hands of the state. Will this weapon actually [00:28:02] be, meaning, will the decision be applied to these people, regardless [00:28:06] of whether your cadres or so on from these [00:28:09] names are present in these positions? Okay, let me ask Samer, a final [00:28:13] minute. Now, so that the viewer understands, now, the security file in Al-Hasakah [00:28:16] is in whose hands? Is it in the government's hands or not? In a minute, just [00:28:20] Samer. [00:28:23] Of course, the security file is in the hands of the government, meaning the intelligence [00:28:27] and security agencies were present before the [00:28:30] integration agreement with Qasd. Now, [00:28:34] file, but the leadership of the file now is, [00:28:38] I can tell you, two-thirds to one-third, approximately. Now, [00:28:41] meaning one-third from those integrated from Qasd [00:28:44] and two-thirds from the leaders [00:28:47] who were part of the government, including Brigadier General [00:28:52] leaders now in charge of the military police, military security, and internal [00:28:55] security. The government should be asked [00:28:58] the government is not in control, meaning this is a problem. [00:29:02] Our problem is with control and sovereignty. Why did people go out in demonstrations? Because [00:29:06] today, if the quasi-revolutionary forces attack people, they go to the police station to complain, [00:29:10] but the police station doesn't even have general security active. It's not [00:29:13] active. It can't reach all neighborhoods. It can't reach all [00:29:16] cities. This is the problem. Today, what is really [00:29:19] needed is for the state's umbrella to be active, whether with [00:29:23] the integrated groups or with the government as a whole. [00:29:26] The situation is now sensitive. I warn, I warn and do not [00:29:30] call for any escalation, but [00:29:33] the situation is starting to get out of control if it is not addressed, because people [00:29:37] are fed up with what is happening. Time is up. Samer Al-Ahmad, [00:29:40] journalist and political researcher from Damascus, and Shirwan Ibrahim, writer and journalist from [00:29:44] Germany. [00:29:47] We continue with you on Syria Today. After the break, we discuss the legal [00:29:50] powers of Ektifa company, affiliated with the sovereign [00:29:54] fund, in managing the lands [00:29:55] of absentees.