TELEARUBA — broadcast
20260825 173000 UTC
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[00:00:00] attracting the attention of those who were in the
[00:00:02] publication, the video was shared by users who
[00:00:06] took the opportunity to highlight the affection
[00:00:09] that exists between Colombians and their
[00:01:02] fear, is it complicated by what
[00:01:21] needs of the
[00:01:29] Word.
[00:01:46] rule out asymmetric actions by the
[00:02:02] I mentioned,
[00:02:53] real purge of the
[00:03:24] we must maintain everything
[00:03:41] be thinking about a distribution of
[00:04:36] Hello, good evening, welcome to Conclusiones, I'm Iván Pérez Armenti for
[00:04:40] Fernando del Rincón. Today here in Conclusiones, the US Treasury Secretary,
[00:04:43] Scott Bessent, threatened this Monday to impose new
[00:04:47] sanctions on countries that refuse to break their economic ties
[00:04:51] with Iran. Social media has become a
[00:04:55] new gateway for armed
[00:04:58] latest information, we disseminate groups in Colombia. Human Rights Watch warns that almost half of the minors recruited in
[00:05:02] 2025 were recruited through platforms like TikTok and
[00:05:05] Facebook. Mexican President Claudia Shaman
[00:05:09] questioned the decision of the governor with license to.
[00:05:14] to return to local government on Friday and just one day later, after the
[00:05:17] criticism, the official again requested a leave of absence, which was
[00:05:20] granted this
[00:05:21] Sunday,
[00:05:41] that has severely hit its economy, the Donald Trump government now
[00:05:45] wants to go a step further, threatening countries that continue
[00:05:49] to do business with Iran, although the US Treasury Department did not
[00:05:53] impose new significant sanctions this Monday, as it had
[00:05:56] hinted, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent did threaten to
[00:06:00] impose penalties on countries that refuse to break their
[00:06:03] economic ties with
[00:06:04] Iran.
[00:06:20] But here's a problem for Washington: Iran has been learning
[00:06:23] to survive under sanctions for decades, according to US sources, the government of the
[00:06:27] Asian country has built a complex network of shell companies,
[00:06:31] intermediaries, exchange houses and a fleet of shadow tankers
[00:06:35] that allows it to move oil and money outside traditional financial channels.
[00:06:39] The US Treasury estimates that in 2024 alone, about
[00:06:42] 9 billion dollars in Iran-related banking activity passed
[00:06:46] through correspondent accounts in the United States. Iran part of
[00:06:50] the trade is done by avoiding the dollar, with Chinese yuan, bartering and other
[00:06:53] mechanisms that make Washington's control difficult. And there is also another
[00:06:57] issue. To be truly effective, this strategy, the United States would
[00:07:01] have to pressure the large buyers of Iranian oil, the
[00:07:05] independent refineries and the banks that process those
[00:07:08] revenues. Many of these actors are linked to
[00:07:11] China. The pressure on Iran could become
[00:07:15] another front of tension between Washington and Beijing, but
[00:07:18] Tehran is showing signs of yielding. The main
[00:07:22] Iranian negotiator and Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Bager
[00:07:25] Galib, responded that the United States is not in a position to decide with
[00:07:29] whom Iran can trade and I quote, the Americans
[00:07:32] know that no one believes their
[00:07:34] bluster. Trump, for his part, raised the stakes on
[00:07:38] Truth Social and threatened with tremendous economic consequences, as he
[00:07:42] said. To countries that provide Iran with any kind of
[00:07:45] lifeline. What are these countries? Let's see. China is
[00:07:49] Iran's largest trading partner and main buyer of its
[00:07:52] oil. With Turkey there is more than 5 billion dollars in
[00:07:56] bilateral trade. In 2024 alone, 13% of its natural
[00:07:59] gas came from Iran. With Iraq there is a strong
[00:08:03] dependence on Iranian gas and electricity. With India
[00:08:06] there was more than 1.6 billion dollars of trade in
[00:08:09] 2025. While the United Arab
[00:08:13] Emirates suspended trade and financial transactions with Iran until further
[00:08:17] notice, they said. What path will the rest of the
[00:08:20] world follow? Will they heed the warnings of the United
[00:08:23] States? We are going to talk about all this with my first
[00:08:25] guest.
[00:08:31] I welcome Fernando Wilson, he is a doctor in history, specialist in international
[00:08:34] relations, academic at the Adolfo Ibáñez University in Viña
[00:08:38] del Mar, Chile. Thank you for being with
[00:08:41] us. I start by asking you about this decision by the United
[00:08:44] States, these sanctions that had been announced but ultimately do
[00:08:48] not seem to be as severe as expected.
[00:08:51] Does this move the needle in the conflict on the part of
[00:08:54] the United States, will it achieve any change or is it really just announcing
[00:08:58] something because something had to be announced? Well,
[00:09:02] these sanctions must be understood as the tip of an iceberg
[00:09:05] that is essentially based on the maritime
[00:09:08] blockade, the blockade as long as
[00:09:11] Iran is not able to export
[00:09:14] oil in large volumes, considering that it
[00:09:18] only has three operational gas pipelines
[00:09:21] and oil pipelines with countries that are not its primary customers,
[00:09:25] to supply China and East and Southeast Asia, it needs
[00:09:29] tankers, this situation or these
[00:09:32] financial sanctions
[00:09:36] clearly complicate not only the
[00:09:39] traffic or the free flow of ships sailing from
[00:09:42] Iranian ports, but also the financial
[00:09:46] management for example, future sales or
[00:09:49] any type of management that can be given
[00:09:53] to try to overcome or rather
[00:09:56] to obtain financing through advance
[00:10:00] payments in exchange for commitments
[00:10:04] to deliver oil once the problem has been overcome, in that
[00:10:07] situation one must see the Iranian circumstances basically about the
[00:10:11] signs of its internal eh the real, the
[00:10:15] Iranian currency has collapsed in value
[00:10:17] dramatically since February
[00:10:20] 28, sorry, when these attacks began,
[00:10:23] but particularly in the last two weeks the
[00:10:27] collapse has been several hundred percent in
[00:10:30] comparison with the dollar, that is a clear demonstration that an
[00:10:34] already very battered economy with severe employment problems, with
[00:10:38] severe problems of business failures, today
[00:10:41] begins to receive a blow that is
[00:10:44] cumulative, certainly one would have
[00:10:48] expected more intense sanctions,
[00:10:50] but the level of cumulative damage that the Iranian
[00:10:54] economy is receiving contrasts greatly with the
[00:10:58] statements of some of the Iranian spokesmen who
[00:11:01] state that they contrast, pardon me, with the
[00:11:05] statements of the government of the secular administration
[00:11:07] inasmuch as that term can be used with respect to the
[00:11:11] Iranian government of President Pesechkian who has started to say
[00:11:15] that the best part of value is to overcome
[00:11:18] problems, to negotiate, to debate, in Iranian
[00:11:21] rhetoric that is a significant crack within the power
[00:11:25] systems, beyond Iranian rhetoric,
[00:11:29] Iran has been dealing with sanctions and a confrontation with the United
[00:11:33] States for quite some time now, what was
[00:11:37] announced complicates the situation that was already difficult
[00:11:40] much more and on the other hand, the United States announces
[00:11:43] this because it cannot announce more, because it doesn't have more strength to
[00:11:47] do something stronger because it will escalate it, how do you
[00:11:50] see it? I tend to think that
[00:11:54] finally, considering that
[00:11:57] the political-strategic leadership of this conflict started without a
[00:12:01] clear and achievable desired end state, it was never clear
[00:12:05] if the American and Israeli objectives were the beheading
[00:12:08] of the regime, a regime change, or on the contrary, only the
[00:12:12] dismantling of the nuclear program,
[00:12:15] but already for some months we began to
[00:12:18] notice a dynamic
[00:12:21] of contrasting balances between
[00:12:25] what appear to be more professional
[00:12:29] conductors in the management of this process, for example with the
[00:12:32] determination of the maritime blockade, which by far is the strongest blow that has been
[00:12:36] inflicted on the Iranian economy and subsequently with the
[00:12:40] addition of these financial measures that complement it, now as
[00:12:43] you yourself pointed out, I tend to think that this
[00:12:47] is a measure that seeks to either escalate
[00:12:50] or de-escalate precisely in the scheme
[00:12:54] of going. gradually processing
[00:12:57] that at this point no one doubts will be long,
[00:13:01] that is, the Iranian government will hardly give in
[00:13:04] to first, the first pressure, therefore,
[00:13:07] in a dynamic of cumulative pressures coupled
[00:13:11] with the deep export problems it has because
[00:13:14] of the maritime blockade, it will probably
[00:13:18] reach a point where they will sit down to
[00:13:21] negotiate and where both sides will claim victory, but... Finally,
[00:13:25] Iran will give in on what has finally become
[00:13:28] the conflict, which is the free passage through the Strait of
[00:13:30] Hormuz, speaking precisely of the Strait of Hormuz and
[00:13:34] taking your words a bit, taking into account the maritime blockade, but
[00:13:38] also that the United States does not have total control of the Strait
[00:13:41] of Hormuz, both say they control it, the truth is that neither
[00:13:45] of them fully controls it and
[00:13:48] that this continues to escalate, do we run the risk that
[00:13:51] the war with Iran will transform into the
[00:13:54] war. in Ukraine, that it will become eternal, that
[00:13:58] years will pass and it will not be resolved and that millions will continue
[00:14:01] to be spent, bombing will continue, tensions will continue and it will not
[00:14:04] be resolved? Well, one of the critical keys
[00:14:08] of a maritime blockade is that it does not have to be exactly at the
[00:14:12] point to block, that is, the maritime blockade can be
[00:14:15] distant, as has been practiced, the British were the
[00:14:19] great kings of that process during the 16th and
[00:14:22] 17th centuries, in that situation the Americans. can
[00:14:25] impede traffic in the direction
[00:14:28] distances of hundreds if not thousands of miles from the coast or the
[00:14:32] Strait of Hormuz itself, therefore it is relatively
[00:14:37] the level of naval power enjoyed by the US
[00:14:41] Navy to apply a distant blockade without major
[00:14:44] problems, on the other hand, the
[00:14:47] claims of having escorted more than a thousand ships through
[00:14:51] the Strait of Hormuz at first glance seem
[00:14:55] exaggerated, but on the other hand there is no doubt that the US
[00:14:58] Navy has the capacity to escort merchant ships through
[00:15:01] the Strait of Hormuz and to contain any direct attack that the
[00:15:05] Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the navy or the
[00:15:09] Iranian army tries to make, missiles based on the islands of the
[00:15:12] Strait of Hormuz, in the two tumbs in Gam, Larak,
[00:15:15] etc., but on the other hand, this certainly
[00:15:19] leads us to a novel title from the
[00:15:23] 60s, a forever war by Joe
[00:15:27] Haldeman in terms of that in strict terms
[00:15:30] the conflict with Iran began
[00:15:34] in 1979 for the United States with the capture of
[00:15:38] the embassy and has never ended, they have had,
[00:15:41] there was Operation Eagle Claw, the failed rescue attempt of the
[00:15:45] Iranians, of the hostages in Tehran, then
[00:15:48] Operation Praying Mantis, at the end of the
[00:15:51] Iran-Iraq war, where after a succession of Iranian attacks on
[00:15:55] American interests, the mining of the frigate Samuel B.
[00:15:58] Roberts, the attack on facilities and
[00:16:01] floating bases in the Persian
[00:16:05] Gulf. a series of installations were demolished, an
[00:16:08] Iranian corvette was sunk, etc., therefore this has been a
[00:16:11] tense situation in which what we have is a hybrid
[00:16:15] war in which there are phases in which there is
[00:16:18] a kinetic stage of direct
[00:16:21] military actions, but in which economic sanctions,
[00:16:25] aggressions through the media, special
[00:16:28] operations, you will remember the various interferences, the hacking
[00:16:32] of the centralized control system of tens of thousands of...
[00:16:35] nuclear centrifuges that ended up delaying the Iranian
[00:16:39] nuclear program for several years that was carried out by some
[00:16:42] American intelligence agency and with the
[00:16:45] support of Israel, that is, this is a multidimensional
[00:16:49] conflict that evolves
[00:16:52] adapting over time according
[00:16:55] to the strategic
[00:16:58] moment and the conjuncture, in that situation I personally
[00:17:02] tend to think that this will
[00:17:06] slowly decline. Due to the need, especially
[00:17:09] Iranian now, but unlike
[00:17:13] Ukraine, which is a conventional conflict of medium intensity, with
[00:17:17] regular operations of conventional armed forces, here
[00:17:20] there will be sparks, I would not
[00:17:24] Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard, that is, the international
[00:17:28] action force that has carried out, well, without going any further, the
[00:17:31] AMIA bombing, etc., and
[00:17:34] I hope that this dynamic continues as
[00:17:39] of a forever war in which
[00:17:43] as long as the Islamic regime remains, it is very difficult
[00:17:46] for this to de-escalate, the great Satan is one of the great
[00:17:49] justifying factors of the theocratic regime in
[00:21:32] I continue my conversation with Dr. in History Fernando Wilson about
[00:21:36] these sanctions that the United States has announced, financial sanctions for Iran's
[00:21:39] trading partners. Fernando, I wanted to ask you, we were just at the beginning
[00:21:43] of the program reviewing the main trading partners, China at the top, and
[00:21:47] specifically regarding China I wanted to ask you. Does China
[00:21:52] the United States announces, does it add another element to the tension that already
[00:21:56] exists between the United States and China? I mean, what effect can
[00:22:00] it have on China that ends up being, let's say, the third
[00:22:03] guest at this table who is not always so present in the
[00:22:05] discussion? Well, China generally
[00:22:09] adopts very silent
[00:22:12] and discreet positions in conflicts that directly affect it, but it does
[00:22:16] not have concrete control. China is by far, as you yourself
[00:22:20] said, the main foreign client of Iran,
[00:22:24] so was India, especially for natural gas, that has been
[00:22:27] changing, courtesy of pressure from the United States
[00:22:30] and also the attitude of the government of Narendramodi, be that
[00:22:34] as it may, the concrete fact is that China had an
[00:22:37] undetermined figure, publicly,
[00:22:40] but it was speculated that it was between four and six months
[00:22:44] of oil and natural gas supplies based
[00:22:47] essentially on old tankers inverted in floating tanks
[00:22:51] and in land deposits, it has been able to
[00:22:54] manage this in some way by acquiring or
[00:22:57] increasing its volumes of oil and gas acquisitions
[00:23:00] from Russia, precisely by absorbing the
[00:23:04] quotas of fuels that Europe stopped
[00:23:08] acquiring and in that way it has managed to compensate somewhat
[00:23:11] and reduce the reduction
[00:23:14] of its strategic reserves, but this is a concrete
[00:23:18] problem, the fact that on
[00:23:20] at least three occasions Xi Jinping has been categorical about the
[00:23:24] need for an end to this conflict has drawn attention, that is very
[00:23:26] rare, very rarely does Xi Jinping make statements of that
[00:23:30] level of radicalism, which clearly shows an
[00:23:33] annoyance, but this comes at a bad time in
[00:23:36] China, let's remember that there have been internal power movements,
[00:23:40] last year there was a
[00:23:43] high command of the armed forces, several of the commanders
[00:23:47] in chief and various generals and admirals. of
[00:23:50] very high level were dismissed from their positions, therefore
[00:23:54] this catches Xi Jinping at a time when
[00:23:58] there are power platforms that are in motion within
[00:24:01] China and he has to navigate them with the best possible
[00:24:04] elegance, it certainly complicates this, this is
[00:24:08] another bad news in the face of the
[00:24:11] relative stagnation of Chinese economic
[00:24:14] growth and the severe internal problems that have been triggered
[00:24:18] by, let's say, the... demographic change and the
[00:24:22] collapse of the construction sector, therefore
[00:24:25] it's raining on them, and China cannot
[00:24:28] intervene as it did before the pandemic with the strength that an
[00:24:32] economy growing at 8% gave it, today
[00:24:35] it has to moderate a little more, it also has some
[00:24:39] problems in the Indian Ocean basin where Narendra
[00:24:42] Modi's India is being much more aggressive and therefore
[00:24:46] has to be more prudent, but it is undoubtedly hitting
[00:24:50] it, and beyond any discussion,
[00:24:53] you just mentioned India, we have very little time left and I don't want to fail
[00:24:56] to talk about Turkey, which is also another
[00:25:00] trading partner of Iran, but now it has also had rapprochement
[00:25:04] with the United States in the last NATO meeting, even Trump
[00:25:07] talked about selling planes and so on,
[00:25:10] I mean, how much does this decision complicate
[00:25:14] Turkey and what happens between the relationship of Turkey and the United States with this
[00:25:17] decision also with these sanctions?
[00:25:20] Well, Erdogan has shown formidable ability to
[00:25:23] use Turkey's central position between Europe,
[00:25:27] Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East. In that sense,
[00:25:31] although it is one of the main clients, but in proportions exponentially
[00:25:35] lower than China's, of Iran, it is also
[00:25:39] true that it is desperate to recover direct relations with the
[00:25:42] United States, and Donald Trump seems willing to do so.
[00:25:46] However, some of the key elements of that relationship, such as eventually
[00:25:49] reinstating. into the F35 program, clashes with the
[00:25:52] problem that the industrial quotas that Turkey
[00:25:56] was going to assume in the program for this fifth generation fighter have already
[00:25:59] been filled by other level 3
[00:26:02] suppliers within the Lightning 2 program, therefore
[00:26:06] it is very difficult for that to happen also that other
[00:26:09] partners of the program without going any further
[00:26:12] Greece, the different European states, Great
[00:26:15] Britain itself, etc., may manifest themselves in a
[00:26:19] less amicable way, most likely
[00:26:22] it will be released for Turkey
[00:26:25] access to the F-16 Block 70 as well
[00:26:28] as the upgrade to the Viper level of the F-16
[00:26:31] Block. and 70 already 50 sorry already existing in the
[00:26:35] Turkish Air Force, that is already a significant concession
[00:26:38] , they would be
[00:26:41] multi-billion dollar contracts in terms of the number
[00:26:45] of aircraft that would be both modernized and purchased, let's remember that Turkey
[00:26:49] has already acquired Eurofighter Typhoons, therefore
[00:26:52] it can manage these balances
[00:26:56] in some way, somehow Turkey is less trapped
[00:26:59] than India, first because it depends much. less and second because
[00:27:03] it has many more suppliers who are
[00:27:07] courting it, especially the Arab states of the Gulf, the
[00:27:11] conservative monarchies of the Persian
[00:27:14] Gulf who also have large stocks of oil to export and have not
[00:27:18] been able to extract through the Persian Gulf, but who do
[00:27:22] have gas pipelines and oil pipelines that lead to
[00:27:25] Egypt and Syria in some cases, those of Egypt
[00:27:28] are by far more practical and from there they feed tankers.
[00:27:33] or gas carriers with which to supply and Turkey is again
[00:27:37] a priority
[00:29:20] In that setting of objectives and
[00:29:23] relationships,
[00:29:27] that has been advanced. Let's not talk about other chapters such as equality between
[00:29:31] men and women. such as working conditions,
[00:29:34] such as the distribution of wealth, which is one of the problems that
[00:29:38] globalization has had. That is to say, well, you have to
[00:29:43] wealth that works and does not create tensions.
[00:29:47] Part of the tension and we don't have time for that
[00:29:51] from recent times is very, very
[00:29:55] much based on that tension produced by the
[00:29:57] global economy.
[00:30:11] I'm Andrés Oppenheimer in Miami, we are
[00:30:13] CNN.
[00:30:16] I'm Mexican-British, I've been doing
[00:30:20] journalism for 20 years in Mexico City, in
[00:30:24] the United States and now in Miami for CNN.
[00:30:27] CNN América is a multi-platform program where
[00:30:31] you will have information. Information from all areas that will
[00:30:34] allow you to understand the world from the angle you are
[00:30:37] seeing it. In these three hours you will not only have
[00:30:41] information from an economic and political perspective,
[00:30:44] but also health, from a women's perspective, but
[00:30:48] above all it is a space where we can have conversations not
[00:30:52] to polarize, but to integrate
[00:30:55] society.
[00:30:57] What excites me the most is to inform.