TRTHABER — Odak Gundem
20260808 175000 UTC
1665 transcript segments
Google Cloud Speech-to-Text API (Chirp) + Gemini 2.5 Flash Non-Thinking
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Machine transcription. Treat it as a searchable index of what was broadcast, not a verbatim quotation record.

[00:00:00] However, the issue that unity in society... causes us a lot of concern is that
[00:00:03] we have a few measures that we have presented to our President
[00:00:07] and we are implementing them, but what I can say to the public
[00:00:11] is that we have conveyed our call to both sides
[00:00:14] regarding the establishment of a mechanism for declaring a moratorium
[00:00:18] on this issue. The Ukrainians also had a request
[00:00:21] regarding this, and we have already conveyed this to our Russian counterparts.
[00:00:24] We are waiting for their response on this matter.
[00:00:28] if I had stayed
[00:00:30] But when you look at the course of the war now, both sides are targeting each other's logistics,
[00:00:34] and we see that they are targeting each other's important logistics facilities.
[00:00:38] This has become a very dangerous civil
[00:00:41] side. Yes, it has spread.
[00:00:44] We were seeing this unfortunately. In 5 years, this war has come to this point.
[00:00:48] Now, why aren't mediators acting quickly?
[00:00:50] One of the reasons is that when mediating
[00:00:53] parties intervene, especially the Americans, they
[00:00:56] say this: as long as the warring parties
[00:01:02] have military capabilities that they think they can still use against each other,
[00:01:05] no one will easily take a compromising step.
[00:01:08] Frankly, this does not make the mediator's job easier.
[00:01:11] What will always make the mediator's job easier
[00:01:15] is for both sides to meet in the middle by making concessions.
[00:01:19] But in a place where no one makes concessions,
[00:01:23] the war continues to increase in intensity until it creates
[00:01:27] its own area of compromise. Unfortunately, what we are witnessing
[00:01:30] now is this. This is what I actually
[00:01:33] told my American colleagues last year.
[00:01:36] When I saw their morale decline, I said that they would now
[00:01:40] give up and leave. Now,
[00:01:43] this will happen: both sides expect
[00:01:46] that when they have completely worn each other out,
[00:01:49] they will come to a table
[00:01:54] and make peace. This was already the case before. When was this the case,
[00:01:58] if you remember,
[00:02:00] at a point where negotiations were at their peak,
[00:02:03] there was such a situation:
[00:02:07] the war had turned into what we call
[00:02:09] a war of attrition. It was a war of attrition
[00:02:13] on the front line. Soldiers on the front line
[00:02:16] were holding their positions, as in World War I
[00:02:20] and World War II, in their trenches.
[00:02:22] Because they couldn't advance, they were killing each other with drones and artillery.
[00:02:26] No one could move from their place, and thousands of soldiers were dying there every month.
[00:02:30] And countries were pouring money and people into this. At that time, we defined
[00:02:34] this as a war of attrition. When we intervened as mediators
[00:02:38] at the optimum point of this war of attrition,
[00:02:40] a ground for something emerged, a ground for compromise emerged.
[00:02:44] There, because of the
[00:02:47] territory in the Donetsk region that the Russians
[00:02:50] could not take, which they said was 24-25%
[00:02:53] last year and 15% this year,
[00:02:57] the parties could not reach an agreement because a certain amount of
[00:03:00] land could not be taken. The war was stuck here. When this also
[00:03:04] failed to yield results,
[00:03:09] the war of attrition turned into a war of annihilation,
[00:03:13] which included civilian targets.
[00:03:16] How far will it go, Mr. Minister? That's the problem. That's the problem.
[00:03:19] When
[00:03:21] this war of annihilation,
[00:03:25] this attrition on the front line, turns into attrition
[00:03:28] behind the front line, the issue is not about
[00:03:32] winning or losing a war, or winning or losing a battle
[00:03:36] on the front line; it becomes an issue
[00:03:39] related to whether you will exist as a nation.
[00:03:43] You will use your last resort,
[00:03:46] whatever it is. So,
[00:03:49] we know what Russia's last
[00:03:53] resort is. Will this go in that direction
[00:03:57] in terms of analysis? Yes, if the war of annihilation
[00:04:00] goes to that extent, unfortunately,
[00:04:04] our analyses have always been right so far. We also mentioned this to Russia
[00:04:07] during my visit, when I talked to our counterparts,
[00:04:11] because the people were demanding such a thing.
[00:04:15] We also told this to the Westerners. The Westerners also know
[00:04:18] that Russia... This is a dangerous situation, frankly.
[00:04:22] Here, we need to
[00:04:25] intervene and stop this war
[00:04:29] as the international community. Because
[00:04:32] everything that was thought to be impossible is happening.
[00:04:35] The war is expanding geographically,
[00:04:38] it is expanding in terms of targets, and it is expanding in terms of methods.
[00:04:41] And it can escalate to a higher level. We need to avoid this.
[00:04:44] This should be enough. This much attrition
[00:04:47] and annihilation should be enough.
[00:04:51] However, the perceptions of Europe,
[00:04:54] Russia, and America, as well as Ukraine,
[00:04:58] which stands as an important party
[00:05:00] to the war,
[00:05:03] not only in Turkey's fight against terrorism, present some differences. When you delve into deep discussions,
[00:05:07] as we did, we spoke with the leaders of both sides for a month, then with the Europeans,
[00:05:11] and then with the Americans. Actually,
[00:05:14] strategic assessments are currently
[00:05:18] not formed with the understanding that the cessation of
[00:05:21] war is above all other interests,
[00:05:24] that we should send very advanced and heavy efforts.
[00:05:28] Because it is thought, and I won't go into detail,
[00:05:31] in certain circles, that "if I leave this war as it is,
[00:05:35] I will have more losses than the losses
[00:05:38] that will occur from the continuation of the war."
[00:05:43] Therefore, "I shouldn't leave this war like this."
[00:05:44] The problem is,
[00:05:47] mathematically, both sides think that their losses
[00:05:51] will be the same. This is one of those rare situations.
[00:05:54] So, do you think both sides will have
[00:05:58] the same amount of losses?
[00:05:59] No, no, but there is subjectivity
[00:06:02] involved. There is sentiment involved.
[00:06:06] And of course,
[00:06:09] I don't want to go into detail here, there are some issues.
[00:06:12] Yes, thank you. Mr. Faruk,
[00:06:15] your question
[00:06:30] step was taken in the process of a Turkey without terror;
[00:06:34] the framework law proposal was submitted to the parliament.
[00:06:38] What is your assessment of this process? Well, when we look at the draft
[00:06:41] framework law, there are indeed
[00:06:44] important provisions there.
[00:06:48] This framework law's acceptance is one of the important
[00:06:51] stages for the successful completion of this ongoing process,
[00:06:54] God willing. I also hear
[00:06:58] some concerns that sometimes arise in the public regarding this.
[00:07:01] They are, of course, perhaps right to be concerned
[00:07:05] due to incomplete information, but it needs to be said that
[00:07:09] this framework law has very well-written and
[00:07:12] guaranteeing provisions.
[00:07:15] It has a beautiful language and mechanism
[00:07:19] from a legal perspective. What does it mean?
[00:07:22] It means that the organization will not be able to benefit
[00:07:26] from the provisions of this law without laying down its arms
[00:07:28] and without giving up its capabilities. As defined there,
[00:07:32] the organization's laying down its armed capabilities
[00:07:36] and its transformation into a normal democratic and civilian life
[00:07:40] is our strategic goal: the end of terror
[00:07:43] and the continuation of the people living
[00:07:46] in national unity and solidarity in a normal way.
[00:07:50] Normally, this should have been implemented since the last democratic reforms were made.
[00:07:54] You know, in 2013, major reforms were made
[00:07:58] regarding language, education in schools,
[00:08:01] elective Kurdish broadcasting
[00:08:04] televisions. That is,
[00:08:07] the organization should have evolved into this peaceful path
[00:08:11] since the period when all issues related to identity were resolved.
[00:08:15] However, at that time, as we discussed from time to time,
[00:08:18] some regional and international
[00:08:21] changes and balances
[00:08:25] would work in their favor, some others said different things.
[00:08:28] As a result, they did not benefit from it.
[00:08:32] At this stage, 13 years later, they see that the regional
[00:08:35] conjuncture and the global conjuncture are not very much
[00:08:38] in their favor. This environment of democracy
[00:08:42] in Turkey, which works for everyone's benefit,
[00:08:45] actually needs to be a part of it. That is, what is being done
[00:08:49] is not for the benefit of the Kurds. That is, it is an action style
[00:08:52] that contributes to more economic loss, more instability,
[00:08:56] and more concern. I hope that this time
[00:08:59] they will grasp this extended hand. But as I said,
[00:09:03] the leading provisions of the law have a really good mechanism.
[00:09:07] Turkey has closely followed the initiative
[00:09:10] taken.
[00:09:29] I want to ask a very clear question: What does a solution in Cyprus
[00:09:32] mean for Turkey? For Turkey,
[00:09:35] a solution, essentially, at this moment,
[00:09:37] is the recognition of a two-state solution.
[00:09:42] The ideal solution is the implementation of a two-state solution,
[00:09:45] meaning a structure
[00:09:48] where both Greeks and Turks have their own states.
[00:09:50] And for these two states to live in peace and harmony
[00:09:54] with each other on the island. This would contribute
[00:09:57] to the prosperity of the island and to regional peace and stability.
[00:10:00] This is our stance. Now, in practice,
[00:10:04] how close is this ideal of ours to reality?
[00:10:07] When we look at it from that perspective, there is a slightly different picture.
[00:10:10] We need to bridge the gap between
[00:10:14] the ideal we put forward and the practical situation.
[00:10:17] This is also why we support the Cyprus negotiations and the search for a solution in Cyprus.
[00:10:21] Our President always supports these efforts in that direction.
[00:10:25] Now, the UN Secretary-General is a truly valuable figure.
[00:10:28] Mr. Guterres, during his tenure as Secretary-General,
[00:10:32] always adopted a management approach
[00:10:35] that prioritized human dignity.
[00:10:38] Whether it was the Philippines issue or other matters,
[00:10:42] he always tried to stand by what was right.
[00:10:46] Here, too, our President trusts
[00:10:49] him personally. We believe that the initiatives
[00:10:53] put forward must be fair. Now, the Cyprus that emerged
[00:10:57] from the 1960 Treaty
[00:11:00] is not the Cyprus that the European Union admitted as a member in 2004.
[00:11:03] We recognized the Cyprus of 1960.
[00:11:06] It was a state based on
[00:11:10] the equal governance of two communities.
[00:11:13] Later, the Greeks said that they did not want Turks
[00:11:17] in the government,
[00:11:18] and they started by expelling
[00:11:21] Turks from the government. Finally,
[00:11:25] when 1974 came, the military
[00:11:27] junta in Greece, as you know,
[00:11:30] carried out a coup in Cyprus in the summer of 1974.
[00:11:33] And the issue of uniting the island with Greece emerged.
[00:11:36] Leaving aside the fact that the Cyprus of 1960
[00:11:40] was disappearing, Cyprus was completely
[00:11:43] disappearing. For this reason, while the international
[00:11:46] community was asleep, Turkey acted
[00:11:50] to protect the rights of the Turks in Cyprus and to ensure
[00:11:54] that Cyprus remained Cyprus. This is also an important point. Now, at this point,
[00:11:57] the Greek Cypriot administration is recognized
[00:12:01] as a state representing all of Cyprus. However, the Turks living
[00:12:04] in the north are ignored and neglected
[00:12:07] at this point. Who guarantees
[00:12:11] their economic and security? It is the Republic of Turkey.
[00:12:15] We have no problem with this. They are our brothers.
[00:12:18] We have accepted the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as a sovereign and independent state.
[00:12:22] Okay, we are the only ones who accept it, but
[00:12:26] this is not
[00:12:28] an issue that will change our stance.
[00:12:31] However, starting from 2004,
[00:12:35] Turkey supported the discussions that took place
[00:12:39] to see if a structure where the two communities
[00:12:42] could be equal could emerge,
[00:12:46] both in the Annan Plan and later in the Crans Montana
[00:12:50] processes. Our President approved this at the time.
[00:12:54] The 1960 state was a two-community state.
[00:12:57] Now, both the Annan Plan
[00:13:01] and other plans are two-community,
[00:13:05] two-zone, two-region.
[00:13:08] The areas where Cypriots
[00:13:09] and Greeks live
[00:13:13] are distinct places. Can a solution be reached
[00:13:16] among them? Here, Turkey's interests, the region's interests,
[00:13:19] and the issue of the Turkish Cypriot's sovereign,
[00:13:22] equal, and independent stance
[00:13:26] are important. We have always said this:
[00:13:29] the Greek Cypriot administration will never
[00:13:33] go for equal power-sharing, authority-sharing,
[00:13:36] welfare-sharing, or state-sharing
[00:13:39] with the Turks. This is a clear issue.
[00:13:42] They now have a state, they are a member of the European Union,
[00:13:46] they are represented in the UN, and they benefit from all
[00:13:49] the advantages. Now, they will go and share this
[00:13:52] with someone else. They know themselves
[00:13:56] that this is a lie. We tell the international community
[00:13:59] this, and they know it too.
[00:14:01] Continuing such a lie is not rational.
[00:14:05] In the meantime, the rights of the Turks living
[00:14:08] in the North must be protected by the international community.
[00:14:12] Thankfully, we are a strong country. Our capabilities are sufficient for that, there is no problem there.
[00:14:16] They are also a very hardworking country themselves. They have a dynamic democracy
[00:14:19] within them. You see, the opposition, the government,
[00:14:23] the parties, a very smoothly functioning process.
[00:14:26] They have economies,
[00:14:29] but they are not left alone. The Greek Cypriot administration
[00:14:32] uses its rights as a state to block all benefits
[00:14:35] that the Turkish Cypriots could receive from the international community.
[00:14:39] It blocks trade,
[00:14:43] transportation, all of these. Now,
[00:14:46] this is a very long topic. We focus on two things.
[00:14:50] Firstly, when we receive solution proposals
[00:14:54] like this, we look at who they come from. If it comes from the United Nations,
[00:14:57] if something comes from Mr. Guterres, we listen to it.
[00:15:00] Our President says that the UN, as the international community, because there was a state established
[00:15:03] by UN resolutions in 1960. The international community
[00:15:06] needs to understand this. Secondly,
[00:15:10] we support all dialogue environments
[00:15:12] that include Turkish Cypriots, because the position
[00:15:16] of Turkish Cypriots needs to be well understood.
[00:15:19] The generation 20 years ago in Europe or elsewhere,
[00:15:23] the political generation, might have understood this,
[00:15:27] but it needs to be constantly explained.
[00:15:30] There is a new generation now, and
[00:15:33] the reasons why Turkish Cypriots established a state,
[00:15:36] why they had no other choice but to establish a state,
[00:15:39] and how unfair the isolation suffered by this established state
[00:15:43] is, need to be explained again and again.
[00:15:46] That is why we support
[00:15:49] this dialogue environment. Secondly,
[00:15:53] our President developed such a method,
[00:15:57] and I suggest it to the parties on the ground.
[00:16:00] We don't need to wait for permanent solutions
[00:16:04] to achieve certain benefits.
[00:16:08] Both the north and south of the island
[00:16:11] need water, energy, and electricity. They need tourists.
[00:16:14] Joint projects and joint work
[00:16:17] can be done for these.
[00:16:20] We also stated this to the Secretary-General.
[00:16:23] That is, this can be evaluated in terms of confidence-building measures
[00:16:27] between the two sides. Because the Greek side is happy with its current position,
[00:16:30] and the Turkish side
[00:16:33] is also happy with its current position.
[00:16:37] That is, there is no longer any problem
[00:16:41] with the geographical positions of the parties,
[00:16:43] because the parties have been in the same place
[00:16:47] for more than 50 years since 1974.
[00:16:51] New generations have emerged there, life has begun
[00:16:54] and continues. However,
[00:16:58] the opportunities that the Turks have are more limited
[00:17:02] compared to others. This needs to be overcome.
[00:17:04] That is why, in return, we
[00:17:08] do not recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as a state.
[00:17:11] That is, if you do not recognize the rights of the Turkish Cypriots,
[00:17:15] I will not recognize your statehood,
[00:17:18] because you are not the state that was established in 1960.
[00:17:22] Everyone knows this. Therefore,
[00:17:25] our non-recognition is also perfectly legitimate.
[00:17:28] However,
[00:17:30] it brings certain disadvantages
[00:17:34] to the Greek Cypriot side. Actually,
[00:17:37] it is possible for both sides
[00:17:41] to take steps that will build common trust
[00:17:44] without changing their legal positions, leaving these issues for the long term.
[00:17:48] As I said, we told the other side
[00:17:52] very boldly and creatively, that energy cooperation
[00:17:55] can be done, water cooperation can be done,
[00:17:58] commercial cooperation can be done. Everyone can make money,
[00:18:02] everyone can live well. The presence of Turkish troops there,
[00:18:06] look, it has not changed the status quo at all.
[00:18:09] For 50 years, the status quo has been the same.
[00:18:13] This means that the stability and peace on the island
[00:18:16] is due to one reason:
[00:18:19] the presence of the Turkish army on the island.
[00:18:23] Is this indispensable for the island? Under these circumstances, where neither side
[00:18:27] agrees to a permanent solution,
[00:18:31] because you cannot prevent the Greeks from saying
[00:18:33] that the entire island belongs to them. Now, if you use
[00:18:38] these overwhelming capabilities you have
[00:18:42] against the Turks, who will come to the aid
[00:18:45] of the Turks? We will go again.
[00:18:48] Therefore, in a place where this is not
[00:18:50] tied to a permanent solution,
[00:18:53] and where it remains the same, you cannot expect this to change in the equation.
[00:18:57] It will not change. But as I said,
[00:19:01] if the Annan Plan had been implemented, if a conclusion had been reached
[00:19:04] in Crans Montana, perhaps different steps
[00:19:08] could have been taken. But the current status quo
[00:19:11] does not allow for any changes in the balances.
[00:19:15] Thank you. We are slowly coming to the end
[00:19:19] of our broadcast. Ms. Büşranur,
[00:19:21] please. Mr. Minister,
[00:19:32] will be offered to Turkey in this regard?
[00:19:35] Following this, what concrete
[00:19:37] steps will we see in terms of industry,
[00:19:41] that is, defense industry, increasing trade volume,
[00:19:44] and participation in regional security mechanisms?
[00:19:47] That is, as we saw in ASEAN, and as we discussed
[00:19:51] in the opening remarks earlier,
[00:19:54] in the security pact, in foreign policy,
[00:19:57] we are constantly trying to carry out certain things
[00:20:01] institutionally and structurally. That is,
[00:20:04] by anchoring ourselves in solid ground,
[00:20:08] we are trying to ensure that efficiency and success
[00:20:11] are not random, but continuous.
[00:20:15] One of the issues we have been working on
[00:20:18] for the last three years was the ASEAN
[00:20:21] partnership. Here, there were 11
[00:20:25] ASEAN countries and 11-12 of the world's largest countries
[00:20:29] that had dialogue partnerships. China, America, Russia,
[00:20:33] this is the only place where all countries meet. Because ASEAN countries
[00:20:36] are countries with a population of 700 million,
[00:20:39] which are politically neutral, but focused on economy,
[00:20:43] development, and market. There is also a big opportunity there.
[00:20:46] Right now, there is something between Cambodia
[00:20:50] and... I forgot the country.
[00:20:52] Oh, between Cambodia
[00:21:00] and... there is a border
[00:21:03] dispute. So there is a problem between them.
[00:21:07] Other than that, the region is a comfortable
[00:21:10] country, frankly. Here,
[00:21:14] there is a great economic opportunity. There is productivity.
[00:21:16] We have serious efforts
[00:21:20] to benefit from this economic productivity.
[00:21:23] We have a lot of searches, and we are working hard, frankly.
[00:21:27] Cambodia and Thailand. Thailand, Thailand.
[00:21:44] Our business people have great activities,
[00:21:47] and we have great investments. But
[00:21:50] we need to be in a constructive dialogue with this region.
[00:21:54] That is, in a place where Russia, America, China, England, America,
[00:21:58] France, and Canada are present, the absence of Turkey's economy as a structural
[00:22:01] partner was not acceptable.
[00:22:05] Actually, they had declared a moratorium, Serdar Bey.
[00:22:08] That is, the ASEAN countries said, "We are few,
[00:22:12] and our capacity to work with our dialogue partners
[00:22:15] may be limited." There was a lot of demand from the world.
[00:22:19] They had declared a moratorium on accepting new dialogue partners
[00:22:22] some time ago. But thanks to our persistent
[00:22:26] and systematic efforts,
[00:22:29] this has also been realized. We will continue
[00:22:32] to work very closely with the ASEAN region.
[00:22:35] Generally, it should be said that in this foreign policy
[00:22:39] that we pursue under the leadership of our President,
[00:22:43] our policy of developing commercial, economic, social,
[00:22:46] and political relations, going far beyond
[00:22:50] our classic areas, is very systematic.
[00:22:53] It is the same with African countries, Latin America,
[00:22:56] and Asia Pacific. God willing,
[00:23:00] we are not stuck in this. The mistake of the past
[00:23:04] in foreign policy making was that the fire
[00:23:06] in your immediate region consumed you so much
[00:23:10] that you inevitably overlooked other places
[00:23:13] where history was flowing. Now, it was necessary to have
[00:23:16] the mindset and institutional structure to manage different crises
[00:23:20] simultaneously, to see and manage crises
[00:23:24] and opportunities simultaneously. And that's what we're doing.
[00:23:28] That is, a crisis we are dealing with in the Middle East
[00:23:31] should not prevent us from reaching an interest
[00:23:35] in Asia Pacific. Our mind should not be trapped there.
[00:23:39] It is heavy, it is big, we lean into it at the leadership level,
[00:23:42] but other institutions, other structures we have established,
[00:23:46] should be able to deal with it. Thankfully, that institutional
[00:23:50] maturity, that mental awareness, and diplomatic skill
[00:23:53] are what Turkey currently possesses.
[00:24:03] the 25th anniversary of the AK Party's establishment is approaching.
[00:24:05] Excuse me. One of the areas where our country
[00:24:08] has been most effective in this process is undoubtedly foreign policy.
[00:24:12] We see that Turkey conducts a very effective
[00:24:15] and simultaneous foreign policy and diplomacy in many geographies
[00:24:18] and on many topics. How do you evaluate this situation?
[00:24:22] I tried to express this throughout the program. In fact,
[00:24:26] Turkey has very significant and constructive contributions
[00:24:29] as a respected actor to all the vital problems
[00:24:33] faced by the region and the world. There are proactive contributions.
[00:24:36] Now, how did this happen? This is actually a history
[00:24:39] of the AK Party's foreign policy at one point.
[00:24:43] 25 years ago, when the AK Party was founded,
[00:24:46] there was such a world. there was: cold.
[00:24:50] A world that had just
[00:24:52] come out of war, looking for a mental perception
[00:24:56] trying to prepare for the post-Cold
[00:24:59] War period. On September 11th
[00:25:01] 2001 happened, immediately after
[00:25:05] that, the Ak Party was formed.
[00:25:07] So here
[00:25:13] there was a need for a staff and a mind
[00:25:16] that could read and understand the new world that emerged
[00:25:20] well and position Turkey's place in it well,
[00:25:24] not just as rhetoric, goals and ideology,
[00:25:27] but also read the existing reality well. AK Party
[00:25:31] actually has a formulation that takes into account
[00:25:34] the strategic culture and strategic aspirations
[00:25:38] of this nation, and its strategic
[00:25:41] spiritual aspect, by learning from the mistakes
[00:25:45] of the past and evaluating the current conditions well.
[00:25:48] Of course, in the post-Cold War period, as you know,
[00:25:52] Turkey, NATO, Turkey had to get out of the automatic
[00:25:55] pilot situation where it felt comfortable
[00:25:58] in foreign policy during the Cold War. In that period,
[00:26:01] alliances were clear, enemies were clear,
[00:26:04] friends were clear, and your scope of action was clear.
[00:26:08] You would give foreign policy to the automatic pilot
[00:26:12] on many important and vital issues, and you would just go.
[00:26:15] But in the post-Cold War period, where friends,
[00:26:19] enemies, alliances, everything has changed, you
[00:26:21] can no longer use automatic pilot, you have to go
[00:26:25] in free mode, manual mode. And in that case, the captain
[00:26:28] is important. So the biggest advantage
[00:26:31] of our nation here is that
[00:26:34] our President
[00:26:36] emerged as a leader. He took the place of the captain
[00:26:40] pilot and you have to do foreign policy in manual
[00:26:43] pilot, which has gotten out of automatic pilot, because there is no place
[00:26:47] in the world to connect to automatic pilot anymore, that world
[00:26:51] is not that world. Automatic pilot would
[00:26:54] probably not take you to the Mecca alliance, this is not possible.
[00:26:58] I mean, automatic pilot is already
[00:27:01] gone, you are trying to keep it alive mentally.
[00:27:05] The transatlantic alliance has undergone many transformations.
[00:27:08] You have been pushed into the category of enemy
[00:27:12] due to clashes of civilizations, especially after September 11th,
[00:27:16] this has become even more apparent. You are stubbornly trying to keep
[00:27:19] it there mentally, but it is not happening at all.
[00:27:22] You are trying to join the EU, there are other kinds of problems
[00:27:25] there. All our goals, that is,
[00:27:29] our goals from the past, must be continued at the same
[00:27:32] time, but we need to take new risk environments
[00:27:35] into account and proceed. Of course, this was not easy.
[00:27:39] Look, it was very difficult. We saw this a lot
[00:27:43] in Syria, Iraq, in the fight against
[00:27:46] the PKK, and in other issues.
[00:27:49] When the AK Party came to power, Turkey was not ready
[00:27:53] for the period of uncertainty that emerged after the Cold War,
[00:27:57] neither mentally nor structurally. Its institutions were not ready,
[00:28:00] its means and capabilities were not ready.
[00:28:04] That is, we can say it now, if we were civil servants
[00:28:08] then, we could not say, we are not ready for this,
[00:28:12] we are not ready for that. This is against the etiquette
[00:28:16] of governing the state. But years have passed,
[00:28:19] and you are now evaluating some things.
[00:28:22] In the face of such impossibility, a leadership emerges.
[00:28:26] There is an accumulated problem related to internal economic
[00:28:29] development. There is an infrastructure problem.
[00:28:33] You need to solve them. You have a ton of problems
[00:28:36] related to democracy, that is, issues that were
[00:28:40] put forward as identity denial at that time.
[00:28:43] There were other democratization problems related to freedom
[00:28:47] of thought. You have a ton of problems
[00:28:50] in foreign policy,
[00:28:52] problems in domestic
[00:28:54] politics. How do you make a world
[00:28:58] where there are difficulties and good things
[00:29:01] possible, without disrupting the normal flow of life,
[00:29:04] where people will get married, have children, have grandchildren,
[00:29:08] have jobs, earn money, lose money?
[00:29:11] I mean, by normal life, I mean without disrupting
[00:29:13] normal life.
[00:29:15] In a place where everyone is on fire,
[00:29:18] your north is on fire,
[00:29:21] your south is on fire, your east is on fire,
[00:29:25] your west is on fire, everywhere is on fire,
[00:29:28] and you are running things here in manual pilot
[00:29:31] with the skill of the captain pilot. Now, this is the AK Party.
[00:29:35] This is the AK Party. I always say the same thing
[00:29:37] to the delegates and members when I speak at party
[00:29:41] organizations everywhere I go: the success here
[00:29:45] is your success, because you continuously elected the government
[00:29:48] that serves you, brings you success,
[00:29:51] and brings you benefits. You brought our President
[00:29:54] back to the position of governing. This long-term leadership
[00:29:57] brought us great strategic advantages, especially
[00:29:59] in foreign policy. That is, you cannot
[00:30:02] achieve certain alliances, certain
[00:30:06] transformations and changes in 5, 6, or 7 years.
[00:30:10] It takes many years for the same will, the same alliance,
[00:30:14] and the same cadres to act together, that is,
[00:30:17] to carry issues through various stages.
[00:30:20] Especially in our region, personal relationships
[00:30:24] and accumulated experiences have an incredible impact
[00:30:27] on managing events. As I said, you are not
[00:30:30] on automatic pilot. When you expect something
[00:30:34] from the hegemon, the hegemon comes to you with its own institutional
[00:30:38] capacity and does something. The region has always been like
[00:30:42] that, but now a person who has been a manager and leader
[00:30:45] in the region for many years, our President, comes
[00:30:49] out and says, "I have been managing this country,
[00:30:52] this region, for so many years as your brother.
[00:30:55] I am the leader of this country, and I have such a vision
[00:30:59] for this region and for Turkey." And when people listen to this, they say,
[00:31:03] "This is something that is in all our interests."
[00:31:07] Everyone wants to emulate what is happening in Turkey.
[00:31:10] Therefore, this vision put forward by the AK Party
[00:31:14] must continue without interruption, and the leadership of our
[00:31:16] President must continue.
[00:31:19] There are many issues to discuss regarding foreign policy.
[00:31:23] That is, there are many issues to discuss in the triangle
[00:31:26] of the AK Party's ideological position, the expectations
[00:31:29] and guidance of the base, and the leadership
[00:31:32] of our President. Maybe we can do that in another
[00:31:41] Well, we have to end this program, which we started
[00:31:45] with the Mecca Defense Alliance.
[00:31:48] We believe that this alliance generates trust for friends
[00:31:51] and concern for enemies. Let's get a final assessment
[00:31:55] and close our broadcast. What you said is true,
[00:31:59] trust for friends, many people are happy,
[00:32:03] especially there are countries that are not members of the alliance
[00:32:06] but are as happy as if they had joined themselves.
[00:32:10] And there are also communities of people, especially
[00:32:14] from the Islamic world, who give a lot of support to this issue.
[00:32:17] There are also those from the West who give support,
[00:32:20] in terms of those who know the truth of the matter. That is, the way
[00:32:24] for the Middle East to stop being a place that creates
[00:32:28] problems for humanity and the international community and instead
[00:32:31] becomes a place that creates added value with everything
[00:32:33] it has, passes through the realization of such constructive alliances.
[00:32:37] And those who prioritize this appreciate it, frankly.
[00:32:41] That is, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey played a big role
[00:32:45] with their leadership here. The task that falls
[00:32:48] to us is to fulfill this political will,
[00:32:52] which has been put forward by the leaders of three countries,
[00:32:55] in a very professional manner, step by step,
[00:32:58] because we are aware that it creates a great regional and global expectation.
[00:33:01] We need to fill this with professional work and proceed.
[00:33:05] And we have started to do this. Hopefully, we will continue.
[00:33:09] Thank you. Today, August 8, 2026,
[00:33:12] the guest of Anadolu Agency's editorial desk was our
[00:33:16] Foreign Minister, Mr. Hakan Fidan. Our broadcast has ended here,
[01:04:44] Hello from TRT News screens, it's 21:54, you're on focus
[01:04:48] agenda, let's take a quick look at what's on the agenda.
[01:04:52] The eyes of the whole world are turned to the Middle East,
[01:04:55] the defense agreement signed by Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi
[01:04:58] Arabia is being discussed worldwide. Uh, why is this
[01:05:02] agreement important, what does it cover, what areas
[01:05:06] will there be cooperation in? Of course, we will discuss all these in focus
[01:05:09] agenda, we will evaluate it with our guests, another important topic
[01:05:13] without terror, we can say that
[01:05:16] another important threshold has been crossed regarding the process,
[01:05:20] the bill on strengthening national solidarity and social
[01:05:23] integration was accepted in the Parliament's Justice Committee. It is expected
[01:05:26] to be brought to the General Assembly on Monday. So,
[01:06:13] Foreign Minister Mr. Fidan, Hakan Fidan, was a guest
[01:06:16] on Anadolu Agency's editor's desk program,
[01:06:19] where he made very important statements regarding the agenda.
[01:06:23] Let's see what he said, then
[01:06:25] we can discuss it.
[01:06:28] Technically, it's the same. That's why you form a security pact,
[01:06:32] that's why other countries make a final
[01:06:36] decision to join an alliance,
[01:06:39] that is, to benefit from each other's protective
[01:06:42] support. There is no problem here, there is no common threat.
[01:06:46] We will now be closely interested in each other's
[01:06:49] security. We are committed. This is
[01:06:52] a starting point, in the region, as long
[01:06:55] as it is not attacked from within or outside the region,
[01:06:59] this alliance... "It cannot have a dispute with
[01:07:02] any country, no country that doesn't attack us is
[01:07:05] our target."
[01:07:08] Now, Mr. Fidan's focus was especially on the Mecca
[01:07:12] Agreement. Regarding the Mecca Agreement,
[01:07:15] actually, he shared a summary
[01:07:18] of what has been discussed in the last few days.
[01:07:21] He said this is not based on a common
[01:07:25] threat, but a step taken to ensure each
[01:07:28] other's security. Look, it is clear that something
[01:07:32] arose out of a need. I want to discuss first
[01:07:35] what need it arose from, and then,
[01:07:39] of course, we will share excerpts
[01:07:43] from Mr. Fidan's speeches, and I will ask you to interpret
[01:07:47] what they mean exactly. Let's start with Professor Turgay first.
[01:07:50] Here, Mr. Fidan talks about the influence of non-regional
[01:07:53] actors. He says that increasing our regional
[01:07:56] ownership is important. In line with this triple alliance,
[01:07:59] the information we have gathered from his answers to the questions
[01:08:02] is that external hegemonies do not solve problems,
[01:08:05] they make them more acute. There is a will to address
[01:08:08] and stop instability in the region by ensuring greater
[01:08:11] integration and advancing the welfare of the region's
[01:08:14] people." Now,
[01:08:17] these are always said, meaning, Turkey has a role here,
[01:08:21] there are many questions about why Turkey is in this alliance.
[01:08:25] On the one hand, yes, Turkey is taking strong steps, because
[01:08:28] there was already an agreement between Pakistan and Saudi
[01:08:32] Arabia in previous years. The inclusion of Turkey
[01:08:36] here and the signals that a triple
[01:08:39] alliance will continue to expand in the future."
[01:08:43] Uh, let's understand what all this means for Turkey
[01:08:46] as an actor there, Professor. Now, for a long time, Turkey
[01:08:50] has had a foreign policy perspective, which we have also discussed
[01:08:53] through these screens, that centers on its own
[01:08:57] interests and does not reduce itself
[01:09:00] to any pact or bloc, but rather
[01:09:04] builds its interests on that axis, reflecting
[01:09:08] a foreign policy reflex of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore,
[01:09:11] it is a country that increases the diversity of its foreign policy
[01:09:14] at almost every level through cooperation with different
[01:09:18] actors. That is, while it has a dynamic relationship
[01:09:22] with Russia, it can also develop very warm relations
[01:09:25] with its NATO allies. Therefore, when we look at Turkey's
[01:09:29] relationship pattern in recent times, especially in the last
[01:09:33] 10 years, we are facing a Republic of Turkey that is trying to build its own autonomy.
[01:09:37] Now, Mr. Fidan's critical statements in these explanations
[01:09:40] also eliminate many question
[01:09:43] marks, especially in the international press, there is a discussion
[01:09:46] about why this pact was established, that is,
[01:09:49] is it a common security threat or a security
[01:09:53] umbrella targeting an actor? Mr. Fidan, by directly
[01:09:56] referring to the question marks about Iran, stated
[01:10:00] that it does not target any state, and therefore,
[01:10:03] Iran or any other country is not the target of this pact,
[01:10:07] that it is a defense pact, a security umbrella,
[01:10:10] to be implemented on a more local scale.
[01:10:14] He has a statement here, which we have written down,
[01:10:17] "there is no common threat." Uh, as far as I understand,
[01:10:21] your statement explains this a little, and he also gave
[01:10:24] a very clear answer to the questions about Iran. We even
[01:10:27] opposed military operations carried out by the
[01:10:31] United States and Israel against Iran, so we stated
[01:10:34] that a military solution is not possible. He said
[01:10:38] that Iran is not a country that we directly target
[01:10:42] in terms of our security threat. Therefore,
[01:10:45] considering the possibility of other actors, potential actors, joining
[01:10:49] this pact, the framework will expand. Tomorrow,
[01:10:52] it is also possible for Iran to be included in this pact.
[01:10:56] Perhaps due to current security priorities, Saudi
[01:11:00] Arabia and Qatar may have very tense relations with Iran,
[01:11:03] but in the medium to long term, this equation may change.
[01:11:07] One of Fidan's critical remarks, I think, also answers
[01:11:11] your initial question, "why did this come about?"
[01:11:14] He emphasized that the hegemonic powers that intervene
[01:11:17] in the region do not solve problems, but create more problems.
[01:11:21] Here, even if he didn't mention names, it is very clear
[01:11:24] who is being referred to and which countries are being
[01:11:27] indicated. Therefore, the issue of the United States,
[01:11:30] especially with Trump, retreating from these regions in its national
[01:11:34] security strategy document and returning to the Western
[01:11:38] Hemisphere, means that if America's presence
[01:11:42] here is limited one day,
[01:11:45] what kind of equation will come into play? Who will limit
[01:11:48] Israel? These are being discussed. It is clear that
[01:11:52] Israel, especially after October 7th, is a security threat
[01:11:56] not only for Gaza and Palestine, but for the entire region.
[01:11:59] Therefore, the reason for the establishment of this
[01:12:02] pact, the reason for the establishment of this security umbrella, is both to demonstrate
[01:12:06] the capacity of countries to solve their own problems
[01:12:10] and defend themselves, and to show that a deterrence
[01:12:14] capability has been built in case of a possible threat,
[01:12:17] no matter where it comes from. Therefore, here,
[01:12:21] it is stated that the purpose of establishing this pact
[01:12:24] in case of a possible attack by any actor,
[01:12:27] not based on a perception of threat or its distinctiveness
[01:12:31] through an actor, is to build a deterrence capability. Therefore,
[01:12:34] in the period after this, that is, in the medium
[01:12:37] to long term, there is a possibility of this pact expanding
[01:12:41] with new actors. Now, we will especially focus on
[01:12:44] this deterrence, because uh, it is actually
[01:12:47] one of the reasons for its inception.
[01:12:51] This is not about a war or an act of aggression,
[01:12:55] but rather a deterrence policy designed to prevent
[01:12:58] such aggression, as far as we understand. And
[01:13:01] now, I assume many of us woke up one
[01:13:05] morning and there was such an agreement, but Mr. Fidan
[01:13:09] points out that this agreement has been prepared
[01:13:11] for two years. I would also like to ask about this
[01:13:15] preparation process, exactly two years. Let me quote
[01:13:19] Mr. Fidan's statements and then leave the floor to you.
[01:13:23] "I have been in continuous talks
[01:13:25] with the partners we signed with and the countries in the region
[01:13:28] for exactly two years and eight months. There was a need for a defense
[01:13:31] alliance to eliminate instability in the region," he states one of
[01:13:35] the justifications very clearly. "The countries that signed
[01:13:38] this alliance pledge not to be a threat to each other's security.
[01:13:42] We are now in solidarity internally, not against an external actor.
[01:13:45] The Mecca joint defense agreement is technically the same
[01:13:49] as Article 5 of the NATO Agreement on collective defense," he reiterates
[01:13:52] that there is no threat. Now,
[01:14:00] it mentions a period of 2 years and 8 months, almost 3
[01:14:04] years. Of course, not all of this is open to the public,
[01:14:08] but I know that the public has been aware of the possibility
[01:14:10] of such an alliance,
[01:14:13] albeit not very intensely,
[01:14:16] since about a year and a half ago. I mean, we journalists
[01:14:20] also know it. In fact, when the alliance agreement
[01:14:23] between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
[01:14:27] was signed last week, this
[01:14:30] was also discussed. It was actually talked about
[01:14:33] that this could be a triple alliance, or even a quadruple
[01:14:36] alliance. Even back then, for example, Egypt is not in it today,
[01:14:40] but we are discussing that Egypt could have been in it too.
[01:14:43] Mr. Fidan also has a statement, "I don't want to name them,
[01:14:47] but there are other countries that want to join," he says,
[01:14:50] but he talks about Egypt
[01:14:52] a bit more openly, "we expect
[01:14:55] Egypt to join in the coming days."
[01:14:59] I remember him making a reference, so, as you also said, Seval,
[01:15:03] it's not like, "Oh, it suddenly occurred to us today, and we happened
[01:15:06] to make it on a Friday, let's go and sign an agreement
[01:15:10] in Mecca after prayers." That's not the case, of course.
[01:15:13] I mean, if you want to water down some sensitive
[01:15:17] and important issues or belittle their importance,
[01:15:21] it is debated like this, of course. And you understand
[01:15:25] why those who debate it are doing so. Some, for example,
[01:15:28] debate the issue by supporting Iran, expressing certain
[01:15:32] fears and so on. Another debates the issue
[01:15:35] from a different angle through
[01:15:38] NATO. Uh, but I find it
[01:15:42] very consistent with, of course, Turkey's emphasis
[01:15:45] on regionalism for quite some time,
[01:15:48] meaning regional alliances, regional economic
[01:15:51] cooperation, regional security, regional
[01:15:55] peace. We all know that we often
[01:15:57] hear these concepts from the mouths of
[01:16:00] actors who speak about Turkey's foreign policy.
[01:16:04] Especially since the wars in Gaza,
[01:16:07] Syria, and the attacks
[01:16:11] on Iran, that is,
[01:16:13] since this war and circle of fire
[01:16:17] came onto the agenda, Turkey's approach
[01:16:20] to regional issues has always been
[01:16:23] this... regional peace, regional
[01:16:27] stability, and the observations that hegemonic powers,
[01:16:31] when they come to the region, make problems more
[01:16:34] chronic and acute instead of solving them.
[01:16:37] These are things we often hear from both our President
[01:16:41] and Hakan Fidan. Therefore, the signing of this
[01:16:45] agreement is not surprising at all, it is very consistent.
[01:16:48] Now, there are evaluations like this, that Turkey's
[01:16:52] approach, which has been consistent with this agreement
[01:16:55] for a long time, is one of neutrality,
[01:16:58] mediation, moderating problems, and bringing
[01:17:02] them to a solution. Turkey is trying to show
[01:17:05] such a presence in all problem areas, especially
[01:17:09] in resolving disputes among regional
[01:17:12] actors. It has a very active
[01:17:16] and willing stance. uhm
[01:17:19] and it's like uhm a contradictory
[01:17:22] uhm situation, this is like that. Uhm the joint
[01:17:26] defense and cooperation agreement, uhm the Mecca
[01:17:29] Agreement, uhm it's like this is being talked about
[01:17:32] as a contradictory agreement, because
[01:17:35] what is being said, for example, if there is a problem
[01:17:38] between Pakistan and India, then
[01:17:42] these possible relations, uhm,
[01:17:45] if they are not good or there is a risk of turning
[01:17:49] into a hot conflict, uhm, countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen
[01:17:52] are being discussed. What will Turkey's stance be? Uhm,
[01:17:56] will this not contradict the principle of neutrality?
[01:18:00] I think it's probably evaluated like
[01:18:03] this. In international agreements, Ali
[01:18:06] Hoca can open a perspective for us. Uhm,
[01:18:10] when Yemen fires a rocket at Saudi Arabia,
[01:18:13] will Turkey attack the Houthis or something? Such
[01:18:17] simplistic readings that don't grasp
[01:18:21] the importance of the agreement or its true perspective
[01:18:25] uhm, we come across them. But in the
[01:18:28] final analysis, when we look at
[01:18:31] the evaluations,
[01:18:33] uhm,
[01:18:37] the Vice President also had similar statements. Uhm,
[01:18:41] actually, it's very clearly an agreement
[01:18:44] that highlights deterrence and even
[01:18:47] perhaps in the long run, countries like Iran
[01:18:51] and Israel, which are seen as sources of instability
[01:18:55] in the region today, will perhaps have to straighten
[01:18:58] themselves out a bit. This is not about a hot conflict,
[01:19:02] but a kind of intimidation. Uhm,
[01:19:05] it can be evaluated like this. I don't think there's any harm in it.
[01:19:09] Let me add one more thing. For example, Egypt
[01:19:12] was seen as a candidate,
[01:19:15] bekleniyordu, olmadı, eee
[01:19:19] eee ama şu haliyle yani üç aktörün,
[01:19:22] üç ülkenin, hep üçün de kendine
[01:19:25] eee özel hususiyetleri olan üç ülkeden
[01:19:29] bahsediyoruz, yani Suudi Arabistan işte kendi işte
[01:19:32] enerji ve bölgesel konum itibariyle bir özgür ağırlığı var,
[01:19:36] Türkiye'nin işte kurumsal kap'. kapasitesi, savunma
[01:19:39] sanayinde geldiği nokta işte jeopolitik derinliği e
[01:19:43] Pakistan'ın eee işte eee bir nükleer güç
[01:19:46] olması vesaire Suudi Arabistan'la ilişkileri bu üç
[01:19:50] ülkenin eee çok da kalabalıklaşmadan
[01:19:54] belki eee eee böyle bir pakt
[01:19:57] imzalamış anlaşma imzalamış olması
[01:20:00] aslında birazcık daha böyle konuyu şey haline
[01:20:03] getirdi sayı çok fazla olsaydı belki bu kadar böyle yoğun.
[01:20:08] ve tartışmalı bir şeye dönüşmeyecekti,
[01:20:11] çünkü hani her üç ülkede eee baktığınızda
[01:20:14] kendi çapında özgül ağırlığı olan ve
[01:20:18] bölgesel denklemde eee oyun
[01:20:21] değiştirici aktörler olarak öne çıkıyorlar eee
[01:20:25] ama ben hani uzun vadede gerçekten hani bu bölgedeki
[01:20:28] işte kaotik durumun eee
[01:20:31] giderilmesine dönük de bir projeksiyon olarak
[01:20:34] değerlendiriyorum şimdi sayın Size de şeyi sorayım
[01:20:38] eee Sayın Fidan ekliyor diyor ki cumhurbaşkanımızın
[01:20:41] vizyonunda bizim üç ülkeyle sınırlı kalmamız eee
[01:20:45] büyümemiz gerekir kalmamamız büyümemiz gerekirse bütün
[01:20:48] ülkeleri bu çatının altında toplamamız var eee sayın cumhurbaşkanının
[01:20:52] talebiyle ve diyor bölgede kalıcı istikrarı getirecek en
[01:20:56] önemli adım bu bölge son yüzyıldır Osmanlı'nın çekilmesinden
[01:20:59] beri istikrarsızlıkla anılan bir bölge
[01:21:02] yani insan ister istemez aklına acaba bu ittifak eee
[01:21:06] orada bir hali hazır? da savaş var, o savaş acaba
[01:21:10] eee cephesi genişletilecek bir savaşsa bu onun bir
[01:21:13] eee araçlarından ileride vasıtalarından
[01:21:17] biri haline mi gelecek de o yüzden mi böyle anlaşmalar yapılıyor gibi soru işaretleri
[01:21:21] olabiliyor ama ee burada e bu anlaşmanın
[01:21:24] taraflarından Türkiye'nin duruşu ve yapılan
[01:21:27] açıklamalar bu yönde yani oradaki o istikrarı kurmak
[01:21:31] ve bir şekilde eee nizamı geliştirmek üzerine atılan
[01:21:34] adımlardan bahsediyor biraz bunun üzerinde duralım mı? kimler katılır,
[01:21:38] kimler gelir e nasıl genişler ve o istikrar nasıl
[01:21:42] sağlanır orada? şimdi biz uzun zaman istikrarın
[01:21:45] eee Ortadoğu'ya demokrasi gelmesiyle sağlanacağını
[01:21:49] zannediyorduk. istikrarın eee böyle büyük
[01:21:52] would come with the construction of tall buildings
[01:21:56] in the Gulf. We thought that stability
[01:21:59] would come with Western-style democracy blowing like
[01:22:03] a wind all over the Middle East, and with the competition
[01:22:06] between hamburger and cola companies,
[01:22:09] peace and stability would come to the Middle East.
[01:22:11] However, why does the President
[01:22:15] use this word "stability"? Why does he put forward
[01:22:19] the will that we need to expand this roof?
[01:22:23] Why does he make Hakan Fidan work day and night on this issue? Right? Why does he want this?
[01:22:27] Let's ask a question. Mr. President, why are you doing
[01:22:30] something like this? What is foreseen? I mean,
[01:22:33] what's happening that you're doing this? For example,
[01:22:36] I'm looking. "Let's take an example from history."
[01:22:40] In '34 and '37, what
[01:22:44] was happening then? What was the need
[01:22:48] for you to make the Balkan Pact and the Sadabat Pact?
[01:22:51] In '34 and '37, the world was rosy,
[01:22:54] elections were happening in the West, new governments were
[01:22:57] coming, etc. In the East,
[01:23:00] they were already trying to break free from the feudal structure.
[01:23:03] Turkey was weaving the homeland with iron networks from all four corners."
[01:23:07] Right, '34, '37.
[01:23:11] World War II broke out in '39. On October 7,
[01:23:14] 2023, an earthquake
[01:23:16] happened in the heart
[01:23:19] of the Middle East, in the Philippines. Uh-huh.
[01:23:22] This earthquake
[01:23:25] proved that nothing would be the same after this day.
[01:23:29] And Turkey was the most
[01:23:32] prepared state, intellectually
[01:23:35] and mentally, for this earthquake,
[01:23:38] for this crisis. What they did
[01:23:41] in Syria after that day is clear.
[01:23:44] Uhm,
[01:23:46] what they did in the Caucasus regarding the Azerbaijan issue
[01:23:50] is also clear. "They solved their problems with Iraq,
[01:23:52] and even in Hamas, the President said, a problem emerged at the last minute again,
[01:23:56] and he said, five articles, wait,
[01:23:59] will be signed. The signature he made them sign
[01:24:02] is also clear. We will talk about a region without terrorism,
[01:24:06] we will talk about a Turkey without terrorism. It is not right to see a Turkey without
[01:24:09] terrorism and the Mecca Agreement as very separate issues,
[01:24:13] because a Turkey without terrorism,
[01:24:15] a region without terrorism is the beginning of this projection.
[01:24:19] And why does the President
[01:24:21] want this? Because it is now very
[01:24:24] clear that Hakan Fidan is not Iran,
[01:24:27] not the other one. He doesn't name countries, but
[01:24:30] these defense agreements are not against one country,
[01:24:34] but a threat to all countries. He tells Israel,
[01:24:37] "You killed children there, you bombed the other,
[01:24:41] you did whatever to the other. The reason you can do this
[01:24:44] is that we couldn't deter you."
[01:24:47] Now,
[01:24:49] in plain language, "Do it if
[01:24:52] you can." Uh-huh. Egypt
[01:24:56] will also join, its turn will come too. "Do it if you can." President
[01:24:59] Erdoğan wants to genuinely bring all countries
[01:25:03] in the region politically and militarily
[01:25:07] under this roof. The development road with Iraq,
[01:25:10] and other projects,
[01:25:13] are attempts to bring those who cannot yet join
[01:25:16] this roof economically into the first roof. Let's remember
[01:25:20] the founding process of the European Union. These are moves
[01:25:23] to bring them under this roof. All of them have a political
[01:25:26] purpose. All of them, like '34 and
[01:25:29] '37, are aimed at protecting
[01:25:32] themselves against the coming
[01:25:34] danger, protecting the region.
[01:25:38] Not just protecting, but also intimidating others.
[01:25:42] Pakistan, I mean, Azerbaijan is
[01:25:45] our closest friend, our favorite country.
[01:25:48] Turk, Muslim. Our presidents currently
[01:25:52] address each other as brothers. But Azerbaijan
[01:25:55] doesn't have nuclear power. Pakistan does. Pakistan
[01:25:58] is there. What we experienced with Saudi
[01:26:02] Arabia, let's not talk about it one by one today. He doesn't say anything when things are good,
[01:26:05] but we had big problems with Saudi Arabia.
[01:26:08] But Saudi Arabia has oil, it has money.
[01:26:12] And it's Saudi Arabia, holy lands. Strategically,
[01:26:16] it's almost in the middle, like we are a bridge.
[01:26:20] "In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is in the middle
[01:26:23] of every place that can be a source of threat.
[01:26:27] Why do we say Egypt? In the Middle East,
[01:26:31] two countries are called two great powers, one is Turkey, one is
[01:26:34] Egypt. Where Turkey and Egypt are,
[01:26:38] they will hold the strings of the Eastern Mediterranean. When Egypt is there,
[01:26:42] it will not only be the Middle East, but also the Eastern Mediterranean,
[01:26:45] because Cyprus is our second homeland,
[01:26:48] our yavru vatan." "These are
[01:26:52] examples that we can also give from earlier times.
[01:26:56] I gave the closest example from before World War II. We also
[01:26:58] experienced bad examples of this before World War I. But
[01:27:02] Turkey is currently in an incredible way,
[01:27:05] correctly interpreting the earthquake that happened on October 7,
[01:27:09] 2023, and not limiting the projection
[01:27:13] to the Middle East. It is directly related
[01:27:16] to the Blue Homeland, to the agreement signed with Libya,
[01:27:19] to the activities in the Eastern Mediterranean,
[01:27:22] to Iraq, and to the activities
[01:27:26] in the Caucasus geography. And
[01:27:28] hopefully, as Hakan Fidan pointed out today,
[01:27:32] these efforts will bear fruit.
[01:27:36] You say they will. Uhm,
[01:27:39] based on what you said, let me add Mr. Fidan's
[01:27:42] statements: "When we look at the foreign policy stances of Saudi Arabia,
[01:27:46] Pakistan, and Turkey, they are not expansionist countries. They are busy
[01:27:50] with their own troubles and development within their own borders."
[01:27:53] He adds, "No country that does not attack us is our target."
[01:27:57] Ali Hoca, I want to ask this: After the war between Russia
[01:28:01] and Ukraine, Continental Europe
[01:28:04] had different alliance quests,
[01:28:08] outside the European Union, outside NATO.
[01:28:11] Afterwards, we look at the Middle Eastern countries.
[01:28:14] They also have serious concerns regarding guarantor
[01:28:18] countries after this Iran, United States,
[01:29:03] Israel War. We see that they
[01:29:05] are making efforts to develop their security
[01:29:08] industry. Uhm,
[01:29:11] here too,
[01:29:13] uhm, if we look at the Middle East, we know
[01:29:17] that America acts as a norm-setting actor here.
[01:29:20] But it somewhat abandoned this role of being
[01:29:24] a norm-setting actor after 2011. Everyone who resorted to force
[01:29:27] uhm, remember Saddam's Iraq.
[01:29:30] It suppressed those who caused problems,
[01:29:33] protected countries against each other. It went from
[01:29:36] being a good hegemon to a hegemon that resorted to force,
[01:29:40] especially in this recent period. And in 2011,
[01:29:43] it already gave signs that it would focus on Asia
[01:29:46] and somewhat neglect this region. The countries here, of course,
[01:29:50] uhm, within themselves,
[01:29:53] they started to increase their weapon technologies
[01:29:57] and material capabilities. Turkey is one of the most important
[01:30:00] of these. At the same time, they diversified their allies.
[01:30:04] So, we are living in such an order. The old order
[01:30:08] is no more. Uhm,
[01:30:10] this is one thing, but the agreement between these
[01:30:14] three states is a bit more than that. There is another
[01:30:18] dimension, a line, that has emerged here.
[01:30:21] India, Israel, and
[01:30:24] Greece. I mean, this line creates
[01:30:28] conditions that these three countries will not like,
[01:30:31] especially Israel's excessive revisionism,
[01:30:34] its aim to change the order in the region. These countries,
[01:30:38] of course, are not aggressive. Turkey,
[01:30:40] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, they don't want the order to change.
[01:30:44] In fact, they want it to calm down. These three countries,
[01:30:48] especially Israel, don't want America to withdraw from here. They want
[01:30:52] it to be here. Mr. Hakan Fidan's statement is significant.
[01:30:55] He made a statement to the effect that "we don't want hegemons here."
[01:30:59] Israel wants it here so it can hide behind it and attack
[01:31:03] left and right as it wishes. "Let me make all conditions suitable
[01:31:07] for myself, attack Iran, attack Palestine, etc."
[01:31:10] But Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia do not want such a change.
[01:31:14] The change they want is this: there should be no hegemon here,
[01:31:18] the order in the region should be established by regional states,
[01:31:21] and there should be a deterrence against countries that cause problems here.
[01:31:24] So, did the countries agree that there was a void there before?
[01:31:27] Which countries agreed? How much of a quest did they embark
[01:31:30] on before? Yes. Is this a beginning, a milestone?
[01:31:34] I think so. Uhm, America might not
[01:31:38] be able to come here anymore. I mean, it might be experiencing
[01:31:40] its last visits to Iran. And look, it is said
[01:31:44] that America doesn't have enough ammunition for the discussions.
[01:31:48] That's an interesting situation, but Trump's recent statements
[01:31:51] "Iran doesn't want us to hit them." He said, "We are about
[01:31:55] to reach an agreement," which completely confused
[01:31:58] us. On the other hand, newspapers are full of news about America.
[01:32:11] They are making news, which means that America's power
[01:32:14] might not be enough here anymore. And anyway,
[01:32:18] America doesn't want to be here. It wants to focus
[01:32:21] on the Far East, Asia. So, a void will form here,
[01:32:24] and it has already formed. There is an Israel
[01:32:28] that is taking advantage of this void, attacking left and right.
[01:32:31] At the same time, other states,
[01:32:34] we shouldn't just point fingers at Israel. I mean, Baye also
[01:32:37] acted with Israel here. Uhm,
[01:32:41] Greece, similarly,
[01:32:44] is trying to expand its own area in the natural
[01:32:47] gas issue in the Eastern Mediterranean. Let's not just say Israel.
[01:32:50] These countries, like Turkey,
[01:32:53] want there to be no external actor here,
[01:32:56] there to be cooperation between states here,
[01:33:00] there to be stability here. No war, because there
[01:33:04] is constant war, constant instability. This affects
[01:33:07] all countries negatively, economically, humanely.
[01:33:10] I mean, people fleeing
[01:33:13] war came to Turkey, as you know, from Iraq,
[01:33:17] Syria. They are also going to other countries.
[01:33:21] At the same time, this instability here
[01:33:24] is hindering trade. I mean,
[01:33:27] Turkey and
[01:33:30] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia
[01:33:33] are looking for a different regional order here.
[01:33:36] I mean, they want a more stable, more peaceful
[01:33:40] order decided by the regional countries. So, it's not against
[01:33:44] a specific actor, but also against a specific actor. I mean,
[01:33:47] who wants to disrupt stability here? Who is trying to bring foreign
[01:33:51] powers here? Israel. So, it has other dimensions.
[01:33:55] Let me also mention this: Pakistan has nuclear power,
[01:33:58] but Pakistan has started leaning heavily on China, especially after 2011,
[01:34:02] after 2013, sorry. Currently,
[01:34:05] 80% of Pakistan's weapons come from China.
[01:34:08] So, Pakistan's dependence on China has increased greatly. To balance this,
[01:34:12] Pakistan improved its relations with America a bit during Trump's term.
[01:34:15] It was bad before that, after the Osama bin Laden incident.
[01:34:19] And it is also trying to reduce its dependence by developing
[01:34:23] its relations with other regional countries. From Saudi Arabia's perspective,
[01:34:26] it is a state completely dependent on America, especially in terms
[01:34:30] of security. During the Iraq-Iran war,
[01:34:32] and in the face of Israel's aggression, America didn't
[01:34:36] do much. Therefore, they no longer trust America
[01:34:39] as much as before. They are also doing things to reduce this dependence.
[01:34:43] For example, they have interactions with China. Saudi Arabia
[01:34:46] also has interactions with regional countries. We are already
[01:34:50] the ones who started this. We also had a very large military
[01:34:53] dependence on America, but after 2016,
[01:34:57] especially with the FETÖ incident and the YPG
[01:35:01] issue in Syria, we clearly understood
[01:35:03] that we could not trust America. And to increase our
[01:35:07] strength, steps were taken
[01:35:11] to develop the defense industry internally. Secondly,
[01:35:15] Turkey brought regional alliances much more to the forefront.
[01:35:18] Those were bad times for Turkey. I mean, there was the "precious loneliness"
[01:35:22] thing, if you remember, during the Arab Spring.
[01:35:26] We also experienced a trauma in foreign policy.
[01:35:29] After that, the normalization policy came into play.
[01:35:33] Now, on top of normalization, making long-term and solid
[01:35:36] agreements with regional states. This is a very important
[01:35:40] thing. I mean, when states attack each other,
[01:35:44] they go on common defense. You know that states
[01:35:47] make agreements among themselves, and they remain on paper.
[01:35:50] There's not much there. But this is not such an agreement.
[01:35:54] I think this is an entry into a new era.
[01:35:58] We can see it as an introduction. Now,
[01:36:00] it doesn't seem very possible for secondary
[01:36:04] states, states with secondary power, to establish their
[01:36:08] security in that way, dependent on great powers.
[01:36:11] And in this region, uhm,
[01:36:15] the rapprochement of countries that were far apart
[01:36:18] before, and this region-oriented approach
[01:36:21] is not just for us, it's also valid for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
[01:36:25] didn't want to do much in the region for a long time,
[01:36:29] because you leaned on America and it protected you.
[01:36:33] Uhm, America was also completely here with all its might,
[01:36:36] nobody could do anything to anyone. That era is over. Now we are in
[01:36:40] a new era. Can I ask Ali Hoca this question
[01:36:44] now? There is an entity called
[01:36:46] Syria. Turkey is very closely interested,
[01:36:50] and so is Saudi Arabia. I think that in the medium term,
[01:36:54] not even long term, in the medium term,
[01:36:56] perhaps Syria could also
[01:36:59] join this agreement.
[01:37:03] I don't know what Ali Hoca will say.
[01:37:06] Uhm, the other Gulf countries,
[01:37:09] small countries, uhm,
[01:37:13] Saudi Arabia,
[01:37:21] suffered damage. And all these countries have a very significant
[01:37:24] Shiite population. Uhm,
[01:37:28] this agreement, when America withdraws from the region,
[01:37:31] hypothetically, maybe not overnight, but in the
[01:37:35] final analysis, there is such a projection that America
[01:37:39] doesn't want to meddle much in these places. In such
[01:37:43] an environment,
[01:37:45] perhaps this agreement could also have an effect
[01:37:49] so that these small countries don't turn back
[01:37:52] into Iran's sphere of influence, or rather,
[01:37:56] don't turn into Iran's sphere of influence. So, in a way,
[01:37:59] there is a power sharing here, that is, "This region
[01:38:03] is truly our region, and we will decide
[01:38:07] how much power sharing will take place,
[01:38:10] who will have what kind of relationship with whom." It's also saying
[01:38:13] that in a sense. If we compare Israel,
[01:38:17] both were actually very revisionist states. But the difference
[01:38:20] is that Iran was not trying to achieve this through any external
[01:38:24] actor. Both act unilaterally, but they don't act with others.
[01:38:27] If you notice, the states they act with
[01:38:31] are their proxy forces. The regime in Syria was also like that.
[01:38:34] Now, if you look at this agreement,
[01:38:38] there were no proxy forces here. All three countries are in coordination
[01:38:42] with each other on an equal level. There is a third thing.
[01:38:45] I mean, Iran has a vision of order for a region,
[01:38:49] unilateral, completely its own sphere of influence,
[01:38:52] especially, of course, the influence of Shiism
[01:38:56] here. On one side, there is Israel, which constantly
[01:38:59] wants to keep America here, to cause instability,
[01:39:02] and to benefit from this instability.
[01:39:05] And there is a third group of countries, led by countries
[01:39:09] like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. They also want there to be no
[01:39:13] external power in the region, especially for Turkey,
[01:39:16] there should be stability, a civilization should develop here,
[01:39:20] because they are countries that can take action.
[01:39:23] Exactly. I mean, think of Europe.
[01:39:26] The reason for Europe's development within itself
[01:39:30] after World War II is the end of wars.
[01:39:33] I mean, wars will end so that the economy can develop.
[01:39:37] Who invests in a war zone, or, I don't know,
[01:39:41] how can people's lives develop in a place where there is war?
[01:39:44] For a very long time, the Middle East has completely
[01:39:48] turned into a battlefield for great powers and regional
[01:39:51] powers like Israel. I mean,
[01:39:55] all opportunities for economic development, cultural development,
[01:39:59] and civilizational development have been eliminated here. These three countries,
[01:40:03] Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and even Pakistan, we can add here,
[01:40:06] maybe Pakistan is a bit more outside, but especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey.
[01:40:10] I think Egypt will also join this. Small states.
[01:40:14] They won't join, I think. For such countries,
[01:40:17] uhm, having a strong country
[01:40:20] in their region is a great threat for them,
[01:40:23] because they cannot protect themselves
[01:40:27] against them. They usually try to balance them by inviting
[01:40:31] an external power, by following a hegemon.
[01:40:35] But they felt great concerns during the process
[01:40:38] we are going through. Therefore, they may feel the need for such a thing.
[01:40:42] Let me add this, uhm, I'm not saying that they
[01:40:46] will remain indifferent to these developments in the region and act with America.
[01:40:49] There is an expression in international relations called hedging.
[01:40:52] They will do that. They will interact with these states in the region,
[01:40:56] especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia, but they will not cut
[01:41:00] their ties with America. Because when they cut ties with America,
[01:41:03] the fear of becoming dependent may emerge there, a balance policy,
[01:41:07] that is, consider the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia,
[01:41:10] imagine them becoming dependent on it, that is, it's not
[01:41:13] a very good scenario for them, you say, can I add
[01:41:17] something very briefly, a perspective, that is,
[01:41:20] a few years ago we were talking about the Abraham
[01:41:24] Accords, now where have we come to.
[01:41:27] "Actually, maybe we can bring this agreement
[01:41:31] to mind, that is, the issues that were discussed
[01:41:34] before the Gaza genocide,
[01:41:37] such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, whether Qatar would join
[01:41:41] or not, they were even talking about Syria,
[01:41:44] and this agreement was not
[01:41:47] in favor of these regional countries, but
[01:41:51] against them, actually forcing all those
[01:41:55] countries to have good relations with Israel."
[01:41:59] agreement,
[01:42:05] that is, a possible agreement, and maybe it is possible to read
[01:42:08] it through this agreement signed today,
[01:42:11] and let's also look at it, what you said was
[01:42:15] important, let's see what
[01:42:17] capacity these states have, let my friends bring
[01:42:21] it up, let's look at it now.
[01:42:24] Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, what kind of powers are they?
[01:42:28] That is, when these three powers come together,
[01:42:30] it makes sense. As Turgay Hodja pointed out just now, I saw
[01:42:34] that President Erdoğan was behind
[01:42:37] the foreign ministers, bureaucrats, everyone who
[01:42:41] worked hard for 2 years and 8 months on the agreement, they bring
[01:42:44] it, the president reads it from the beginning,
[01:42:48] it caught my attention, and it also happened on the development road,
[01:42:52] it happened there too, I saw him reading the agreement from the beginning,
[01:42:56] he signs it at the end, he read it all, he nodded his head, and then he signed.
[01:42:58] That's interesting, thank you very much for sharing that, hocam,
[01:43:02] let's start like this, now Turkey's power,
[01:43:05] Pakistan's possession of nuclear
[01:43:09] power, of course, changes this agreement
[01:43:12] to another place. Considering Saudi Arabia's oil
[01:43:16] reserves, the most important power in the region
[01:43:19] in this sense, Turkey's ability to take
[01:43:22] action and host
[01:43:25] many agreements,
[01:43:29] its skill and capability in coordination
[01:43:31] undoubtedly make this a completely different power. Let's
[01:43:35] evaluate it like this. Now,
[01:43:39] of course, in terms of these power multipliers, the coming together
[01:43:42] of three countries indicates a very serious capacity.
[01:43:45] Especially the Republic of Turkey's emergence
[01:43:49] with its positively differentiated aspects in the defense
[01:43:52] industry, which we discussed through these screens and wrote
[01:43:56] about in our columns, is not only in Turkey, that is,
[01:44:01] but also in critical regions where it exports its defense industry capacity,
[01:44:04] it shows this transformation, and the very serious
[01:44:08] compliments towards Turkey's defense industry in the international
[01:44:11] arena already positioned Turkey as a positively
[01:44:15] differentiated actor in this sense. Just now, Ali Hodja pointed
[01:44:18] out a point, that is, Pakistan was previously more dependent
[01:44:22] on China for weapons, but perhaps
[01:44:25] after this, the weapons developed
[01:44:28] here are already being sold to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan,
[01:44:32] so perhaps it will be possible to increase this capacity
[01:44:36] after this, Ali Hodja, Pakistan
[01:44:39] is one of the countries that buys the most weapons in the world,
[01:44:42] according to the latest figures, 66%,
[01:44:45] and these weapons are generally bought from large countries,
[01:44:49] instead of buying from large countries, entering into joint
[01:44:52] production with countries at its own level is a relief for
[01:44:56] Pakistan strategically, that is, this could be a motivation
[01:44:59] for them to prefer such a thing, yes, of course,
[01:45:02] as the dependency relations decrease, the autonomy of the country increases.
[01:45:06] There is a very critical issue between the three actors. From
[01:45:10] now on, joint military exercises will be held,
[01:45:14] this has already been declared to the public, in addition, there is an issue
[01:45:17] whose signs we see even if it is not directly declared,
[01:45:21] I think it will also assume a very critical function
[01:45:23] in terms of reducing dependency, which is that the countries
[01:45:27] will jointly increase that capacity in areas such as the
[01:45:30] defense industry where Turkey is a pioneer, and they will
[01:45:34] take common steps. I mean this: Turkey
[01:45:37] is already a pioneer in many areas, and there are already
[01:45:41] defense industry moves that are in the incubation
[01:45:44] period. There may be actors who can participate in these,
[01:45:47] in terms of financing or combining other capacities,
[01:45:50] especially since consulting between Saudi Arabia
[01:45:53] and Turkey was being discussed about 2 months ago,
[01:45:57] and some of it was conveyed to the public. Now, when we look at it,
[01:46:00] it is clear that Turkey needs financing to develop
[01:46:03] this capacity in some areas. It is highly probable
[01:46:07] that this financing will be provided by the Saudis.
[01:46:10] Pakistan's place in this equation is already
[01:46:13] unique in terms of civil-military relations,
[01:46:17] Pakistan is already a very different example in political
[01:46:20] science literature, but its nuclear capacity here is
[01:46:24] one of the most important factors that increases deterrence
[01:46:27] within this tripartite mechanism. Now, on the other hand,
[01:46:31] there is also a dynamic reflected in the numbers
[01:46:35] that Turkey already stands out in the ranking
[01:46:38] of the strongest armies within NATO, that is,
[01:46:41] Turkey has more than 890 thousand
[01:46:44] personnel. The different meanings of its minimum
[01:46:47] capacity in the personnel inventory, especially in the
[01:46:51] maritime domain, we talked a lot about UAVs and SİHAs,
[01:46:55] but Turkey also has very serious breakthroughs in the maritime
[01:46:58] domain. Now, when the capacities of these three countries come together,
[01:47:02] these countries also place all actors that could directly
[01:47:05] threaten them in a very different equation through deterrence.
[01:47:09] It has also been discussed
[01:47:19] to make an agreement with Southern Cyprus, Israel, and the United States to prevent this, and
[01:47:22] the US withdrawal from this equation, on the grounds that
[01:47:25] it was not very profitable, Israel is actually
[01:47:28] the primary threat in the region, even if it is not
[01:47:32] directly stated. This primary threat is not only
[01:47:36] at the security level, but also in agreements
[01:47:40] related to other maritime jurisdiction areas and in
[01:47:43] cases of violation of these agreements, Israel emerges.
[01:47:46] The most important feature we observed in Israel after
[01:47:50] October 7, for the regional countries, not just for Palestine,
[01:47:53] is that it has become a critical security threat, and Turkey
[01:47:57] already keeps this projection very alive.
[01:47:59] Especially, the very excessive redirection
[01:48:03] of the state apparatus mechanism towards a different
[01:48:07] direction by politicians is also a global
[01:48:10] threat. Therefore, the states that foresee this threat
[01:48:14] create this deterrence under a common security umbrella.
[01:48:17] That is, in this issue of expansion, what I attach
[01:48:21] importance to, which also appears in all international
[01:48:24] press, is that if Egypt is included in this equation,
[01:48:28] Israel is seriously concerned about
[01:48:31] it, and indeed, when we look at the Israeli and United
[01:48:35] Arab Emirates press, we see that they are
[01:48:38] very uneasy about this security umbrella. However, there
[01:48:42] is nothing to be uneasy about for them, but the
[01:48:45] issue here is to create an equation that will prevent
[01:48:49] Israel's expansionist policy. This capacity,
[01:48:52] demonstrated by numbers, figures, and material power
[01:48:55] capacity, shows how deep
[01:48:59] the deterrence is. That is, you
[01:49:03] know what you will encounter if you attack
[01:49:06] any country, one of them. This
[01:49:09] prevents that attack. What was the most important
[01:49:12] dynamic in the Cold War? Perhaps in terms of the
[01:49:15] origin of the word "cold", it was the deterrence created
[01:49:19] by nuclear power. Now, since a deterrence
[01:49:22] mechanism has been established, I believe that Israel
[01:49:26] will evaluate its place and position in the region
[01:49:29] much more rationally in the future. Iran is also
[01:49:32] in a much more chaotic situation today compared
[01:49:35] to the conditions before the war. Although
[01:49:38] it has achieved some gains against Israel and the United
[01:49:42] States, especially regarding the position of
[01:49:45] Hormuz, it will now suspend
[01:49:49] its claim to be a threat in the region
[01:49:52] through Shiite expansionism, inevitably, because if
[01:49:56] Egypt also joins the countries we are talking
[01:50:00] about, a very important dynamic will emerge for the region.
[01:50:03] It is already progressing through these pacts,
[01:50:06] and the fact that the threat of both Israel
[01:50:10] and Iran, although not completely
[01:50:13] eliminated, will at least decrease to a certain
[01:50:16] extent, citing its instability as the
[01:50:20] reason, Israel has developed a relationship with the United States
[01:50:24] and managed to keep America in the region. If Iran ceases
[01:50:28] to be a threat, then the primary threat in the region
[01:50:32] will remain Israel. Before that, Iran was not a threat
[01:50:35] to either Turkey or the Saudis. It was a threat, but different
[01:50:39] diplomatic channels were activated to eliminate
[01:50:43] this threat. Especially China made a serious effort
[01:50:46] to bring Saudi Arabia and Iran together, because
[01:50:50] if they separated, a more chaotic situation could arise
[01:50:53] in the region, in favor of America and Israel.
[01:50:56] Therefore, the establishment of such mechanisms in the
[01:51:00] region is also a very critical period for the independence
[01:51:04] of the regional countries. Now, we have actually talked
[01:51:07] a little about it, but I think we need to look
[01:51:11] at the economic dimension of the issue. We also have the data
[01:51:15] we prepared for that, let them come up. Let's
[01:51:18] look at Turkey's strategic power. It has an economic
[01:51:21] size of 1.6 trillion dollars. It is strong.
[01:51:23] And there is also something else,
[01:51:27] it is important in terms of creating
[01:51:30] secure energy lines in a world that is experiencing
[01:51:33] an energy crisis. If there is stability there,
[01:51:37] then those problems that would drag the world
[01:51:40] into such a big crisis will also be eliminated.
[01:51:44] The establishment or drawing of new energy lines or alternative
[01:51:48] energy lines could be a little better. For example,
[01:51:51] Turkey's strategic power is located at the intersection
[01:51:55] of strong pipelines. Production continues in the Sakarya Gas Field
[01:51:59] in the Black Sea, and oil is being produced in Gabar.
[01:52:03] Turkey also stands out with its renewable energy capacity,
[01:52:06] and there are studies for the Akkuyu Nuclear
[01:52:09] Power Plant.
[01:52:12] petrol rezervi var, neredeyse bölgede en
[01:52:15] güçlü değil mi? bildiğimiz kadarıyla en fazla petrolün
[01:52:18] bulunduğu ülke. yaklaşık 9 trilyon metre3üp doğal
[01:52:22] gaz. rezervi var dünyanın en büyük ham petrol
[01:52:24] ihracatçısı OPEC'in en etkili ülkelerinden
[01:52:28] biri olarak öne çıkıyor Suudi Arabistan inanılmaz büyük bir
[01:52:32] ekonomik güçten bahsediyoruz. Pakistan'da
[01:52:34] ne var? 450 milyar dolarlık ekonomik büyüklüğe sahip
[01:52:38] eee orada da yine en büyük linyit rezervlerinden
[01:52:42] biri olması eee bakımından öne çıkıyor. Eee yine
[01:52:45] doğalgaz üretiminin yapıldığı eee önemli
[01:52:48] ölçüde bölgeler var. Yüksek hidroelektrik potansiyeli
[01:52:51] var. iki nükleer santralde toplam altı
[01:52:55] reaktör bulunuyor, bütün bunlar hem
[01:52:58] bölgedeki o istikrar açısından hem de Türkiye'nin kazanımları
[01:53:01] ekonomik kazanımları olarak nasıl yansır, nasıl dönüşür evet yani aslında
[01:53:05] birlikte kazanabileceğiniz bir ortam
[01:53:07] yaratırsanız birlikte kazanırsınız yani
[01:53:10] işte eee o hem aslında işte kültür
[01:53:14] gibi işte refah seviyesi gibi hem de işte
[01:53:17] yatırımlar gibi pek çok alanda aslında işte
[01:53:20] harcamadığınız eee eee çalıştığınız bir
[01:53:24] ortam yani istikrar ortamı öyle bir ortam aslında şimdi hani
[01:53:28] bölgedeki bu kaotik durumun eee bir düzene
[01:53:32] eee dönüşmesi ve bu işbirliklerinin de
[01:53:35] bir eee ürüne dönüşmesi vasatı
[01:53:38] herhalde eee işte uzunca süredir beklediğimiz arzu
[01:53:42] ettiğimiz eee bu işte hani ortadoğu
[01:53:45] dediğimiz eee devamlı işte kan gözyaşı
[01:53:49] savaşla andığımız bölgenin belki
[01:53:52] işte. "geleceğinde güzel günler
[01:53:55] eee görecek, göreceğiz hep beraber diyebiliriz, eee yani
[01:53:59] tabii ki bu hani içinde işte savaş,
[01:54:02] uçakların, silahların vesairenin eee konuşulduğu
[01:54:06] anlaşmaların eee eee
[01:54:09] hani işte barışla şunla bununla taçlanacağını
[01:54:13] düşünmek ilk etapta hani biraz tuhaf eee ya da
[01:54:16] çelişkili gelebilir ama işte
[01:54:19] eee uluslararası ilişkilerin
[01:54:22] reel politiğin eee araçları da bunlar, yani bunlara
[01:54:26] sahip değilseniz barışı da konuşamıyorsunuz,
[01:54:29] dolayısıyla hani Türkiye açısından Pakistan, Suudi
[01:54:32] Arabistan, işte Mısır bu ülkelerin. "birinde olan
[01:54:35] öbüründe yok, öbüründe olan diğerinde yok, dolayısıyla bir güçleri
[01:54:39] birleştirerek e ve bence şu da
[01:54:42] hani aktörler açısından
[01:54:45] önemli diye düşünüyorum, ya da böyle bir gözlem de yapabileceğimiz
[01:54:49] bir şey oluştu, ortam oluştu, aslında herkes de bir anlamda artık
[01:54:52] pragmatik, mesela işte Selman'dan konuşuyoruz değil mi hani Suudi
[01:54:56] Arabistan veliaht prensi eee
[01:54:59] baktığınızda aslında hiç de ideolojik olmayan çok da böyle
[01:55:02] pragmatik bir lidere dönüştü zaman için'. içerisinde işte
[01:55:06] Türkiye'nin eee meseleleri ele alışında işte
[01:55:09] uluslararası eee krizleri bile hani daha
[01:55:12] böyle parça üzerinden hani sorunun tamamını
[01:55:16] göğüslemeden eee çözülebilecek yönleriyle
[01:55:20] ele alan bir yaklaşımı var bütün meselelere böyle
[01:55:23] yaklaşıyor ve hiç kimseyle kategorik olarak eee
[01:55:26] köprüleri atmayan bir siyaset izliyor eee
[01:55:29] Pakistan'ın diğer ülkelerle ilişkilerine Türkiye ile ilişkisine
[01:55:33] bakıyoruz son derece işte tarihsel derin. olan yani Pakistan-Hindistan
[01:55:37] ayrımı olmadan bile başlayan yani işte Kurtuluş Savaşı yıllarına
[01:55:41] ee demirleyebileceğimiz
[01:55:44] çok yakın ilişkileri var. Suudi Arabistan'la Pakistan'ın ilişkileri
[01:55:47] özellikle askeri düzeyde çok eee yakın. Yani
[01:55:51] işte Suudi Arabistan Ordusunun eee önemli
[01:55:54] bir kısmının işte Pakistanlı askerlerden oluştuğu vesaire
[01:55:57] söyleniyor. Yani aslında hani bu anlaşmayı mümkün kılacak
[01:56:01] ee ekonomik, işte sosyolojik.
[01:56:05] eee tarihsel pek çok araca zaten eee
[01:56:08] sahip olan ülkelerden bahsediyoruz, dolayısıyla aslında dönüp
[01:56:12] baktığınızda hani bugüne kadar neden olmadı
[01:56:15] diyebileceğimiz bir vasat eee içerisindeyiz eee
[01:56:19] dolayısıyla ben hani son tahlilde hakikaten
[01:56:22] eee Turgay Hoca'nın ifade ettiği şey e bence çok
[01:56:25] doğru hani burada bir kazanan kaybeden diye
[01:56:29] bakmaksızın eee konuştuğumuzda da ama hani
[01:56:33] uzun orta ve uzun vadeli. projeksiyonda
[01:56:36] bölgeye barışın ve istikrarın gelmesi için iki
[01:56:40] aktörün kendi alanına çekilmesi eee
[01:56:43] çok önem arz ediyor ve bu nevi
[01:56:46] anlaşmalar belki bunu icbar edecek etki doğurabilirler
[01:56:49] bunlardan bir tanesi kuşkusuz İran eee ama asıl
[01:56:53] asıl olarak tabii ki hani son 2-3 yıldır eee artık hani
[01:56:57] gemi hazıya almış olan eee İsrail'i görüyoruz ve
[01:57:00] bu İsrail-İran arasındaki
[01:57:02] eee i ki birbirinin saldırganlığını
[01:57:06] meşrulaştırıcı düzeyde olması da zaten bölgeye çok büyük
[01:57:10] zarar verdi, eee bu bakımdan baktığımızda
[01:57:14] da eee son derece hani
[01:57:17] müspet sonuçlar doğurabilecek bir anlaşma diye
[01:57:21] nitelendirebiliriz. şimdi eee dünya basınında
[01:57:24] aslında nasıl yer aldı, neler söylediler bu anlaşma
[01:57:28] için, biraz ona da bakmak lazım, yani dünya ne
[01:57:31] düşünüyor? eee Trump'ın tebrik etmiş olması bunu?
[01:57:40] değerlendirmek lazım eee çok affedersin Hasan yani
[01:57:44] İsrail'i bir şekilde şimdi İran konusunda ya işte diğer
[01:57:46] saldırganlığı konusunda da zaman zaman böyle tehdip edici
[01:57:50] söylemleri oldu Trump'ın ama son tahlilde
[01:57:52] eee İsrail'in
[01:57:55] saldırganlığını
[01:57:58] son verecek bir aksiyon almadı ama Suriye'de de mesela
[01:58:01] eee İsrail'i sınırlandırdı
[01:58:04] Amerika. "bence bu anlaşmanın da İsrail'i
[01:58:07] sınırlandırıcı bir tarafı olduğunu
[01:58:11] Trump da görüyor, Netanyahu'dan
[01:58:14] sıkılan Trump her fırsatı değerlendiriyor diyebilir miyiz bunun
[01:58:17] için evet şimdi dünya basınına bir bakalım
[01:58:20] eee CBS News ne diyor üç
[01:58:24] bölgesel güç işbirliğini pekiştirdi eee
[01:58:27] ne zaman böyle hani Avrupa ülkelerinden ve Amerika
[01:58:30] Birleşik Devletleri'nden yapılan bir şeyle Ortadoğu'da iyi bir şey
[01:58:34] bahsedilse." de iyi bir şekilde bahsedilse, insan
[01:58:37] ister istemez bir korkuyor ama eee neticede yapılan
[01:58:41] açıklamara bakıyorsunuz, oradaki gerçekten oluşacak bir
[01:58:44] boşluğun eee çok akıllıca doldurulmasının planlanmış
[01:58:48] olmasının eee gayet makul mantıklı olduğunu
[01:58:50] düşünüyorsunuz neyse ki rahat nefes alıyor insan.
[01:58:54] Bloomberg ne diyor? Mekke'de yeni bir Ortadoğu güvenlik çerçevesi
[01:58:57] şekilleniyor diyor. BBC'ye
[01:59:00] bakıyoruz, Mekke Antlaşması dünyanın en güçlü üç Müslüman ülkesi
[01:59:03] tarafından imzalan.
[01:59:06] eee diğer basında nasıl yer almış tekrar devam edelim
[01:59:10] Lemont ne diyor Suudi Arabistan diyor Türkiye Pakistan Mekke'de eşi
[01:59:14] görülmemiş bir Savunma ittifakına imza attı eee
[01:59:17] yine Yungwelt de diyor ki yeni bir bölgesel güç bloku ortaya
[01:59:21] çıkıyor. Pentapostagma da diyor ki Mekke
[01:59:25] Antlaşması Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan için diplomatik bir
[01:59:28] zafer. El Cezire anlaşma bölgesel
[01:59:31] karışıklıkların ortasında imzalandı.
[01:59:35] the indian express de diyor ki anlaşma bölgesel dengelerin
[01:59:38] değiştiği bir dönemde imzalandı şeklinde
[01:59:42] başlıklar atıyorlar hocam bir şey yüksek lisans ve doktora
[01:59:46] öğrencileri için ya da alan? çalışanlar için şöyle
[01:59:49] bir eee zenginlik de ortaya çıkıyor, mesela 2010'dan bu
[01:59:52] yana Türkiye'nin özellikle uluslararası basında ama
[01:59:56] daha ziyade Batı basında çerçevelenme biçimlerine
[02:00:00] bakıldığında çok değişik bir grafikle
[02:00:02] karşılaşabilirler, biz ben azından tingtengçiliğimiz
[02:00:05] döneminde batı basınındaki Türkiye içeriklerine odaklanan, onu
[02:00:09] çalışan birisi olarak eğrinin çok farklı
[02:00:12] dinamiklerle bambaşka yerlere doğru gittiği bir
[02:00:16] dönemdeyiz, bu açıdan. da çok zengin ya da değişen yönünü
[02:00:19] gösteriyor aslında Türkiye'nin
[02:00:22] hım Hasan Basrak ne manşetler gördük diyor Tur nereden nereye
[02:00:26] geldik gibi bir şey anladım ben Türkiye belli
[02:00:29] belli parametreler belli konular üzerinden tedhip edilmeye
[02:00:33] çalışılan eee nüfuz altında tutulmaya çalışılan bir ülke
[02:00:37] konumundayken artık farklı konularla başlıklarla
[02:00:40] içerik haline geliyor içerik üretebiliyor aslında
[02:00:44] evet evet Hasan Basak. "güzel
[02:00:48] manşetler gazetecilik açısından güzel, tabii ki mesela
[02:00:51] BBC dünyanın en güçlü üç Müslüman devleti
[02:00:55] demiş evet mesela o vurgular hani
[02:00:57] İngiltere'den bakarken öyle görmüş oradan bakılınca ya bunlar çok güçlü
[02:01:01] bunlar bir araya geliyor olmuş Yunanlılar Erdoğan'ın zaferi
[02:01:05] demiş tabii
[02:01:08] Lomont takıntılı olduğu yerde bir
[02:01:11] öncekisi bir sonrakinde diyor ki ben
[02:01:15] okuyayım size Suudi Arabistan." Hindistan
[02:01:17] Mekke'de eşi görülmemiş bir savunma ittifakına imza attı Fransızlar
[02:01:21] eşi görülmemiş demişti evet el cezire anlaşma bölgesel
[02:01:25] karışıklığı yaşadıkları için aynen
[02:01:28] öyle fransızlar neden eşi görülmemiş diyor çünkü NATO'nun beyin ölümü
[02:01:32] gerçekleşti diyen eee
[02:01:34] ondan sonra ya bu NATO ile olmayacak biz acaba kendi
[02:01:38] aramızda bir ordu mu kursak deyip bunu beceremeyen sonra da Amerika'nın
[02:01:42] önüne geçip böyle Trump'ın önüne geçip önünü ilikleyip öğrenci
[02:01:46] gibi dizilip parmak. kaldırıp tuvalete gitme izni alan
[02:01:48] will say unheard of.
[02:01:52] So, a picture like that emerges. The Greeks
[02:01:55] say it's Erdoğan's victory. What do the Russians say,
[02:01:59] hocam? Were there any Russians? Did you see any? No,
[02:02:02] probably not. Al Jazeera
[02:02:06] also has The Indian Express, pardon me.
[02:02:09] What did the Indians say? The Indians said that the
[02:02:12] agreement was signed at a time when regional balances
[02:02:15] were changing. The message from India is this:
[02:02:18] "Gentlemen, the balances are changing." Netanyahu
[02:02:22] immediately gave a speech saying that their friendship
[02:02:25] with India and Greece is permanent. Around
[02:02:28] the same time, a new energy line, as you know,
[02:02:32] was being tried to be established through India, Israel, Greece.
[02:02:36] That also causes discomfort, of course. The President boarded
[02:02:39] the plane, the Mecca Agreement began to be written,
[02:02:43] something would happen in Mecca, three leaders were going.
[02:02:46] Actually, it was kept very secret at that time. It was
[02:02:50] like nobody knew, but the preparation phase was huge.
[02:02:54] As soon as the news came out, voices from Israel began to
[02:02:58] say things like "our bonds of friendship with Greece
[02:03:01] and India," and such news started to come. What did Russia say,
[02:03:05] hocam? I found it in English. The Mecca Defense
[02:03:08] Agreement brought together three great
[02:03:11] powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, it said.
[02:03:14] Through these three great
[02:03:17] powers coming together, they are in agreement,
[02:03:21] as far as we understand. In terms of scale, of course, it's not
[02:03:25] like Lebanon, Syria, or Iraq. Therefore, when Egypt is counted
[02:03:28] with other actors in its expectations, it is a state that stands
[02:03:32] out with different aspects. Even if you don't see it regionally,
[02:03:35] at a global scale, it's a considerable
[02:03:38] power, Egypt. So, Egypt will probably wait a
[02:03:41] bit longer because it's economically
[02:03:45] dependent on Biden.
[02:03:50] That is, I think it will follow the powerful side, whichever
[02:03:53] way it evolves. So, even if it joins, how
[02:03:56] long will it take? I don't know. Egypt has
[02:04:00] limitations. Especially after the coup,
[02:04:03] the United States. The addictive relationship it had with finance
[02:04:07] went to a very different place because there was no
[02:04:11] income stream that spread to different areas other than tourism,
[02:04:14] so foreign policy reflexes are also a bit.
[02:04:17] They are narrowing, hopefully we will see Palestine in these defense
[02:04:21] and no more guns
[02:04:24] will be pointed there. We can continue this in the other block
[02:04:28] if you want to talk, we have a little more time, let's go
[02:04:31] for a break, maybe new things will come to your mind after
[02:04:35] the break and you can add them. Are we going for a break? Okay. A break.
[02:04:38] ara.
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[02:09:23] Now in this blog, I will start with the terror-free
[02:09:26] Turkey process, but let's also look at the part
[02:09:30] of this Mecca Agreement related to the terror-free
[02:09:32] Turkey process, what kind of effect it will have,
[02:10:00] If you remember, it was not just terror-free Turkey,
[02:10:04] it was also a terror-free region, which means a stable region.
[02:10:07] Against whom? Just against the PKK, against other
[02:10:11] terrorist organizations. Even Israel, since it is called
[02:10:14] a terrorist state, perhaps it was
[02:10:17] expressed in the sense of appeasing it. He says
[02:10:21] this himself, by the way, yes, he says it is a terrorist
[02:10:24] state because what is the purpose of
[02:10:27] terror? To create instability, isn't it? To create chaos
[02:10:31] and benefit from it. Maybe it can be said that Israel
[02:10:34] applies similar tactics. So, now,
[02:10:37] both to ensure this stability in the region and to ensure
[02:10:41] stability within the countries. For example,
[02:10:44] in order to make such an agreement, to develop your
[02:10:48] defense industry, there should be no terrorist activities
[02:10:52] to appease them, and the