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[00:00:44] The clocks show 5:12, so now
[00:00:46] we will tell you what Poland and the world are living for.
[00:00:50] I warmly invite Dominika Komarnicka.
[00:00:52] Let's begin.
[00:01:03] Today, the Pegasus investigative committee is to present a report
[00:01:07] on its work. The document was created for over two years. Donald Tusk
[00:01:10] published a recording on this matter on the X platform. The Prime Minister shared
[00:01:14] findings that, according to the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the contract signed by the PiS government
[00:01:18] for over 30 million zlotys focused on
[00:01:21] a system over which control remained in
[00:01:24] Israel.
[00:01:27] They paid Israel, meaning the company.
[00:02:00] This data went to the Israeli side, and the Polish
[00:02:03] side effectively had no control over it, and what's
[00:02:07] more interesting, this agreement clearly
[00:02:09] stipulated that Poland could not use this surveillance
[00:02:13] tool against phone numbers from
[00:02:17] Russia, Belarus, North Korea,
[00:02:20] countries where there is a serious terrorist threat. They
[00:02:24] could not, and they readily used this tool against
[00:02:27] Polish citizens, Polish opposition, and also against
[00:02:31] citizens of European countries such as France or
[00:02:33] Germany. You can see the parallel
[00:02:37] image from the Pegasus committee; members have already
[00:02:40] gathered. Any moment now, they should begin presenting
[00:02:44] the public part of the report concerning the purchase, legality, and method
[00:02:47] of using the Pegasus system. So, as soon as
[00:02:51] the committee begins, we will go there, and we
[00:02:55] continue this topic. The Israeli company that produced the Pegasus
[00:02:58] system had control over the operational data. Former heads of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA), Internal Security Agency (ABW), and Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW)
[00:03:02] have already been charged,
[00:03:05] concerned with time than it's time for full accountability in court, informed Justice Minister Waldemar
[00:03:09] Żurek on the X portal. In his post on the X portal, we read:
[00:03:12] According to ABW expert opinions,
[00:03:14] the CBA bought a tool over which it did not have full control. Data
[00:03:18] left Poland, the infecting module was controlled by
[00:03:22] the manufacturer, and a foreign company had technical insight into
[00:03:25] operational materials. the beginning, well, everything indicates such
[00:03:29] a summarizing
[00:04:04] final meeting of the Pegasus committee,
[00:04:07] money, the situation at the borders, these which, let's remind you, has been investigating for over
[00:04:10] two years what
[00:04:13] motives underpinned
[00:04:16] the then Law and Justice government's decision to
[00:04:20] buy, let's remember, for nearly 60 million
[00:04:23] zlotys, a tool for, well, basically such total
[00:04:26] surveillance.
[00:04:29] over the past months,
[00:04:31] when also members of parliament
[00:04:35] sitting on this committee interrogated a total
[00:04:38] of several dozen witnesses from the world
[00:04:42] of politics, but also people not directly
[00:04:45] involved in this partisan
[00:04:48] struggle, there were specific requests to the prosecutor's office, and in
[00:04:52] the case of seven people, specific charges were brought. But as, among
[00:04:55] others, the chairwoman of the Pegasus committee, Magdalena Stroka, says,
[00:04:59] it doesn't end there, because today we are to
[00:05:02] learn new facts, today we are to learn new names when
[00:05:06] it comes to people who influenced
[00:05:10] the purchase of this system, but also
[00:05:13] illegal use of this Pegasus
[00:05:17] system, however, in recent hours,
[00:05:21] information has emerged
[00:05:23] that
[00:05:26] November 16, 2016 to
[00:05:29] November 20,
[00:05:30] 2023.
[00:05:33] Ladies and gentlemen, based on the attendance list, I declare
[00:05:36] a quorum. The agenda of today's meeting is
[00:05:40] the submission of the draft position of the
[00:05:44] investigative committee after over 2 and a half
[00:05:47] years of work. The second item is current affairs.
[00:05:51] Is there a motion to expand the agenda?
[00:05:54] I don't see one. We will therefore proceed to
[00:05:57] the implementation of item one. In accordance with Article 19a
[00:06:01] of the Sejm Act on investigative committees. Today we will present
[00:06:04] to you the report of the
[00:06:07] investigative committee concerning the Pegasus
[00:06:10] system. Ladies
[00:06:13] and gentlemen, after over
[00:06:16] 2.5 years of work, we will present
[00:06:19] today a position. This is not
[00:06:22] a document about computer software; it is
[00:06:26] a document about how public authority in Poland
[00:06:30] reached for a tool, an interfering
[00:06:33] tool in our civic rights,
[00:06:37] a tool that for the first time ever fell into
[00:06:40] the hands of Polish services, how it
[00:06:44] was bought with money
[00:06:46] taken from victims of crimes, how
[00:06:50] it was launched without the legally required
[00:06:53] accreditation, how it misled
[00:06:56] courts, and how it was directed not
[00:06:59] against spies or terrorists, but
[00:07:02] against judges, prosecutors,
[00:07:05] local government officials, politicians, opposition
[00:07:08] politicians during the election campaign. I say this
[00:07:30] at the beginning so that there are no doubts as to the committee's conclusions. The committee does not question the need to equip Polish services with the most modern operational tools. The committee does question, however, that the state was treated in this matter
[00:07:34] like a private demesne, and
[00:07:37] the law as an obstacle that must be
[00:07:39] circumvented.
[00:07:42] established by the Sejm in January 2024,
[00:07:46] 432 MPs voted for its
[00:07:49] establishment, no one
[00:07:51] was against it. I remind all
[00:07:55] those who today say that the committee is
[00:07:58] illegal, that politicians of Law
[00:08:01] and Justice also voted for this law.
[00:08:05] The scope of the investigation covered the period from November 16,
[00:08:09] 2015 to November 20,
[00:08:12] 2023, which means it covered
[00:08:15] 8 years of Law and Justice rule.
[00:08:19] During this time, the committee held 130 meetings,
[00:08:23] public and classified. It heard 77
[00:08:26] witnesses in public and classified committee
[00:08:30] sessions. It heard former ministers, heads of
[00:08:34] services, service officers, special
[00:08:38] services, prosecutors, judges, officials
[00:08:41] of the Supreme Audit Office, a representative
[00:08:45] of a commercial intermediary, and surveilled
[00:08:48] individuals. It heard experts, including
[00:08:51] specialists in ICT security.
[00:08:55] It gathered thousands of documents, including
[00:08:58] documents that until their
[00:09:02] declassification for public opinion were deeply
[00:09:06] hidden. The committee also
[00:09:09] prepared notifications of the commission of a crime
[00:09:12] against 11 people, among whom
[00:09:16] are former Minister
[00:09:20] of Justice and Prosecutor General Zbigniew
[00:09:23] Ziobro, former coordinator of special
[00:09:27] services Mariusz Kamiński and his deputy
[00:09:31] Maciej Wąsik, former Minister of Justice,
[00:09:34] Deputy Minister of Justice Michał Woś,
[00:09:38] former head of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau Ernest
[00:09:41] Beida. and his deputy Grzegorz
[00:09:44] Ocieczek. Former Head of the Internal Security
[00:09:47] Agency Piotr Pogonowski. Former
[00:09:50] Head of the Military Counterintelligence Service Maciej
[00:09:53] Materka. Former Regional Prosecutor in
[00:09:56] Gdańsk, Teresa Rudkowska
[00:09:59] Szmydyńska.
[00:10:01] Former Director of the Department at the Ministry of Justice
[00:10:05] Mikołaj Pawlak. And former
[00:10:06] deputy
[00:10:09] of the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) Maciej Szpanowski.
[00:10:12] The primary charge that connects almost all these
[00:10:15] notifications is abuse of power and dereliction
[00:10:19] of duty by the aforementioned individuals. In
[00:10:23] some cases, however, it concerns much
[00:10:26] more, enabling
[00:10:29] the disclosure of classified information to foreign
[00:10:33] entities,
[00:10:35] causing significant financial damage,
[00:10:39] aiding in the acquisition of a tool for committing
[00:10:42] computer crimes. The committee
[00:10:46] also had to fight for the very possibility of working.
[00:10:49] For the first time in history, we encountered
[00:10:53] an unprecedented situation.
[00:10:56] We had to submit to the court 41
[00:10:59] motions to punish witnesses with a disciplinary
[00:11:01] penalty,
[00:11:04] 11 motions for arrest and compulsory
[00:11:07] escort, three motions for lifting
[00:11:10] immunity, two motions concerning
[00:11:13] the immunities of MEPs Mariusz Kamiński
[00:11:16] and Maciej Wąsik.
[00:11:19] The courts imposed a total penalty on witnesses who did not
[00:11:22] appear at committee meetings.
[00:11:56] there are letters from the head of the Internal Security
[00:11:59] Agency, these are technical reports
[00:12:03] and a draft agreement for the purchase
[00:12:05] of Pegasus. Correspondence between
[00:12:09] the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and
[00:12:12] the disposer of this tool and its producer, the Israeli
[00:12:16] company NSO. Pegasus is
[00:12:19] spyware from an Israeli
[00:12:23] company belonging to...
[00:12:34] often without any activity from the
[00:12:38] victim, such access, breached
[00:12:42] access, gave the ability to look
[00:12:45] into messages, photos, contacts,
[00:12:48] location, to activate the microphone and
[00:12:51] camera, as well as to data from.
[00:13:04] The committee established something that the previous government
[00:13:08] hid for years: the Polish state never
[00:13:11] had full control over
[00:13:14] the system. Pegasus did not operate
[00:13:16] locally in the CBA's
[00:13:19] server room; it operated through the software
[00:13:23] manufacturer's anonymizing network, located in various
[00:13:26] places around the world, through which data downloaded from
[00:13:30] Polish citizens' phones
[00:13:33] passed.
[00:13:36] The expert appointed by the committee said directly,
[00:13:39] "Whoever has power over the anonymizing network, has
[00:13:43] power over the data?" The committee in
[00:13:46] 2024, specifically
[00:13:49] May 24, requested the prosecutor,
[00:13:52] the national prosecutor's office, the investigative
[00:13:55] team, to perform an inspection of the system
[00:13:58] located in the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:14:01] Bureau.
[00:14:04] at the last stretch, we received
[00:14:06] documents after the opinion
[00:14:09] was prepared by the Forensic
[00:14:12] Research Bureau of the Internal Security Agency.
[00:14:16] The experts were appointed at the request of the National Prosecutor's Office by Team
[00:14:20] Three. part of this opinion, because
[00:14:24] it was performed
[00:14:33] and submitted to the committee, today we will tell you what is in the declassified
[00:14:37] part of this opinion.
[00:14:41] Ladies and gentlemen,
[00:14:44] some elements of the Pegasus system,
[00:14:48] part of the anonymizing infrastructure, were
[00:14:51] under the control of
[00:14:55] NSO Group, an Israeli company, which
[00:14:58] means that the Polish side had no control
[00:15:01] over elements located outside
[00:15:04] the CBA headquarters. The CBA did not possess,
[00:15:08] among other things, access passwords to some accounts with administrative
[00:15:12] privileges, which meant that it could
[00:15:15] not exercise full control over elements
[00:15:18] of the system located within the CBA
[00:15:22] headquarters. Control.
[00:15:50] Pegasus had the ability
[00:15:53] to access materials from operational control
[00:15:56] carried out by Polish services, when the system
[00:16:00] needed technical support from
[00:16:03] the manufacturer by fixing
[00:16:06] errors.
[00:16:57] And in 2019, already using the system, it wrote to
[00:17:01] its subordinate units that it could not
[00:17:03] rule out access to transmitted
[00:17:37] from Warsaw, only from
[00:17:40] Israel, there was another proof of who
[00:17:44] was really the host of the system,
[00:17:48] the manufacturer had the technical ability
[00:17:51] to cut off services from the system.
[00:17:55] According to the committee's findings, the license was revoked,
[00:17:58] and
[00:18:02] renewed information that
[00:18:05] discredits politicians today. Well,
[00:18:15] in 2022,
[00:18:17] this license was
[00:18:20] revoked, the Polish special service was
[00:18:24] deprived of an operational tool by the decision
[00:18:28] of a foreign corporation. This is the definition
[00:18:32] of loss of operational
[00:18:34] sovereignty during the PiS government.
[00:18:44] Pegasus, who led to its purchase? The committee's
[00:18:47] answer is unequivocal: the political decision was made at
[00:18:50] the intersection of the Ministry of Justice,
[00:18:53] where Zbigniew Ziobro was then minister,
[00:18:57] and the special services sector supervised by
[00:19:01] Mariusz Kamiński and Maciej Wąsik. Zbigniew Ziobro
[00:19:04] himself presented himself here at the meeting. September
[00:19:15] 2017, he asked the Minister
[00:19:19] of Justice for money for the purchase of special
[00:19:22] equipment. Jarosław
[00:19:24] Kaczyński testified that he had discussed the purchase,
[00:19:28] though he did not remember
[00:19:29] the details.
[00:19:35] Ladies and gentlemen.
[00:19:50] How much did Pegasus cost? This is a question that
[00:19:53] all of us have been asking ourselves
[00:19:56] since the very beginning of our work. Until now,
[00:19:59] we spoke of 25 million that was transferred
[00:20:02] from the Justice Fund to the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:20:06] Bureau. However, this is not the total cost
[00:20:10] incurred by the Polish state.
[00:20:13] 33.4 million, that's how much
[00:20:17] was paid for the purchase of the Pegasus
[00:20:20] system. Over 8 million
[00:20:24] was the percentage that went to
[00:20:27] the intermediary company in the purchase. That was
[00:20:31] the intermediary's fee. However, this is not the total cost
[00:20:34] that we incurred as a state.
[00:20:38] for this system, we also
[00:20:40] paid.
[00:20:42] The total cost is presented in the classified part
[00:20:46] of the report, it is what
[00:20:50] the system was used by the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, as well as
[00:21:12] simultaneously, and this package must be renewed,
[00:21:18] the Internal Security Agency.
[00:21:52] I can clearly state that the total cost of purchase and
[00:21:55] maintenance, administration, and license extension, which
[00:21:59] in the end, which was finally deactivated in 2020,
[00:22:02] the second year, is significantly
[00:22:05] higher. The National Prosecutor's Office, led
[00:22:08] by Bogdan Święczkowski, purchased
[00:22:12] the Pegasus system, the Hermes
[00:22:15] system. This system cost our
[00:22:19] state a total of 15 million zlotys without
[00:22:22] a tender, without a needs analysis, without tests. We will
[00:22:25] talk about this in the further part, presenting individual
[00:22:29] chapters. This system worked without
[00:22:32] accreditation, we also mentioned
[00:22:34] this to you during our committee's
[00:22:37] work.
[00:22:40] There is one fact in this matter that in itself determines
[00:22:43] the illegality of this system from the very
[00:22:46] beginning of its existence.
[00:22:50] A system that was supposed to process classified
[00:22:53] information must have ICT security
[00:22:56] accreditation,
[00:22:59] issued by the appropriate service. In this case,
[00:23:03] that service was the Internal Security Agency.
[00:23:06] Pegasus never obtained such accreditation.
[00:23:10] The CBA never applied to the Internal Security
[00:23:13] Agency for such accreditation
[00:23:15] to be carried out.
[00:23:21] The competent authority in this matter stated it directly
[00:23:25] in the post-audit report of March 19,
[00:23:28] 2025, declassified at the request
[00:23:32] of the committee. The system organized and
[00:23:35] used for obtaining information from operational
[00:23:38] control required prior
[00:23:40] accreditation. The purpose
[00:23:43] of the system,
[00:23:45] any potential system, was located in
[00:23:49] the protected zones of the CBA, so no
[00:23:52] exception to the law applied.
[00:23:55] The use of the system without accreditation was
[00:23:59] a violation of Article 48 of the Act on
[00:24:02] the Protection of Classified Information. The Senate committee formulated
[00:24:06] the same conclusion. This means that throughout
[00:24:09] its entire operational period from 2017,
[00:24:13] Pegasus operated outside the established
[00:24:16] state security system. Every head of service
[00:24:20] who allowed its use and every minister who knew
[00:24:24] about it failed to fulfill their duties, for which
[00:24:28] the law provides for criminal liability. The amendment of these
[00:24:32] provisions in 2020,
[00:24:35] introduced incidentally with the adoption of the act
[00:24:39] on the defense of the Homeland, did
[00:24:41] not legalize actions taken before
[00:24:45] its adoption. The law is judged according to the state at the time
[00:24:49] of the act. The next issue I wanted
[00:24:52] to raise is the issue of courts and
[00:24:55] the implementation of consents for operational control.
[00:24:58] The courts were misled. Pegasus defenders repeat one
[00:25:01] sentence: there was court
[00:25:03] consent for every operational control.
[00:25:06] The committee examined what this court
[00:25:09] consent was worth.
[00:25:12] of the District Court in
[00:25:15] Warsaw and the Court of Appeal.
[00:25:18] will present, the services did not
[00:25:51] inform about what tool
[00:25:54] they would use to carry out operational control. In
[00:25:58] September 2017, exactly when Pegasus
[00:26:02] was bought, the management of the district
[00:26:06] court in Warsaw was dismissed before the
[00:26:09] end of their term. Courts
[00:26:13] that consider requests
[00:26:16] for operational control were replaced by judges
[00:26:19] nominated by Zbigniew Ziobro. From that moment, the
[00:26:23] president and vice-president, nominated by
[00:26:26] the minister, decreed the requests arriving
[00:26:29] at the courts' secret chancery.
[00:26:37] We were told, ladies and gentlemen, that Pegasus was to be used
[00:26:40] to fight spies and terrorists.
[00:26:43] The committee found that this was a myth, a myth repeated
[00:26:47] by politicians of the then government. First
[00:26:50] of all, the system could not operate against
[00:26:53] numbers registered in
[00:26:56] Russia, China, North Korea,
[00:26:59] Israel, or Belarus.
[00:27:34] is such a case that we analyzed during
[00:27:37] committee meetings. We will discuss this further in the details
[00:27:41] of today's
[00:27:43] meeting.
[00:27:49] Ladies and gentlemen, the Pegasus case is not about technology,
[00:27:53] it is about whether in Poland the government can
[00:27:57] reach for the most powerful surveillance
[00:28:00] tool, pay with
[00:28:04] money that should go to victims of crimes, launch it
[00:28:07] illegally, deceive the court, use it against
[00:28:11] its own citizens just because they dared
[00:28:14] to criticize them. For 8 years, the answer was
[00:28:18] yes. The committee's position
[00:28:22] is an expression of the conviction that the answer
[00:28:25] must be never again. At
[00:28:29] this point, before we move on to discussing
[00:28:32] specific chapters of our report, which in
[00:28:35] its public part numbers
[00:28:38] 370 pages, I will give the floor
[00:28:42] to the Vice-Chairwoman, please, Joanna Kluśkowska. Thank you very much,
[00:28:45] Madam Chairwoman. Ladies and gentlemen, one of the questions we asked
[00:28:49] ourselves during these two and a half years of work was
[00:28:52] whether the system was secure, whether it was entirely
[00:28:56] in Polish hands. Both witness testimonies and
[00:29:00] documents cast a very
[00:29:03] big question mark over this
[00:29:06] question, including the fact that the agents themselves, both from the Internal Security
[00:29:10] Agency and the Military Counterintelligence Service,
[00:29:13] in their internal correspondence, wrote that it should be
[00:29:17] kept in mind that the software manufacturer might have
[00:29:21] access to data. The Forensic Research Bureau of the Internal
[00:29:24] Security Agency dotted the i's and crossed the t's.
[00:29:28] We have these documents; they
[00:29:31] arrived on
[00:29:33] October 9th,
[00:29:36] that is, last Friday,
[00:29:39] however, the documents themselves, although they are public, are not
[00:29:43] publicly available, so we cannot quote
[00:29:47] this document to you, we can
[00:29:50] tell you what is written in this
[00:29:54] document, because these documents
[00:29:57] are public, but not... they are part
[00:30:00] of prosecutor's proceedings,
[00:30:04] so briefly, so that you understand
[00:30:07] what we are talking about, what the functionality
[00:30:11] of the Pegasus system was, among
[00:30:14] other things, access to SMS messages,
[00:30:18] MMS messages, and the content of messages from internet
[00:30:21] communicators, email content, including the content
[00:30:24] of messages sent and received before the start
[00:30:27] date of operational
[00:30:30] control, call
[00:30:32] history, content of phone calls conducted in real-time by
[00:30:36] the user of the end device,
[00:30:39] location data, including information from
[00:30:42] GPS, contact lists, and calendar entries, history of visited
[00:30:46] websites, content of conversations from the surroundings in real-time, in
[00:30:49] which the end device was located through the built-in microphone,
[00:30:53] images captured in real-time through
[00:30:56] the built-in cameras
[00:30:59] in the end device, and ladies
[00:31:03] and gentlemen, from the
[00:31:06] ABW analysis, it appears that
[00:31:09] the server module responsible for infecting devices of persons who are
[00:31:13] to be
[00:31:24] This means that the victim's phone, from which all that I just read could be downloaded, was fully
[00:31:28] under the control of the Israeli company
[00:31:31] NSO Group, more when I talk about
[00:31:35] accreditation, or rather its lack. Thank you very
[00:31:38] much.
[00:31:43] Please. Now, the next point will be
[00:31:46] addressed by Vice-Chairman Tomasz
[00:31:49] Trela. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, ladies and gentlemen,
[00:31:53] today I have the opportunity to present Chapter
[00:31:56] one of the final report of the investigative committee, which answers one
[00:32:00] of the most important questions: how did it happen
[00:32:03] that the Polish state bought cyberweapons and used them against
[00:32:06] its own citizens? Chapter one proves that the purchase
[00:32:10] of Pegasus from the very beginning was based on a triple
[00:32:13] violation of the law: illegal financing, misleading
[00:32:17] state bodies, and ignoring warnings from its own
[00:32:21] services and lawyers. First
[00:32:23] of all, who was behind it? From the committee's findings and testimonies
[00:32:27] given by witnesses invited, summoned before
[00:32:30] the committee under penalty of criminal liability, it is
[00:32:33] clear: first, Zbigniew Ziobro, himself
[00:32:36] before the investigative committee, as you remember, did not voluntarily
[00:32:40] appear; it was necessary to apply coercive
[00:32:44] measures, to have him brought to
[00:32:47] the committee meeting. He himself before the committee declared: I was
[00:32:50] the initiator of this purchase. system, he
[00:32:53] declared that money would be disbursed from the justice fund, the commission
[00:32:56] identified him as the main initiator and political
[00:33:00] manager of the entire undertaking, he made
[00:33:03] the key decision to involve justice fund resources
[00:33:06] for a purpose inconsistent with its statutory allocation, creating conditions for
[00:33:10] the transaction to be carried out despite awareness of legal
[00:33:14] doubts raised by officials, as you all know,
[00:33:17] Zbigniew Ziobro after this interrogation in the
[00:33:20] near future fled Poland, first to Budapest, and
[00:33:24] now he has settled in the United States. Secondly,
[00:33:27] Mariusz Kamiński, was the political organizer of the purchase
[00:33:31] of Pegasus. Key backstage agreements between Ziobro and
[00:33:35] Kamiński were reached at the turn of 2016 and
[00:33:38] 2017 in the Prime Minister's Chancellery on
[00:33:41] the mezzanine of the building of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister.
[00:33:45] It was there that it was decided that the software would go
[00:33:47] to the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, he served
[00:33:51] as the integrator of the process at the operational and
[00:33:55] political level, he combined the technical needs
[00:33:58] of the services with the actions of the Ministry of Justice,
[00:34:01] supervising the formal implementation of the system in the structures
[00:34:04] of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. Thirdly,
[00:34:06] Michał Woś, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry
[00:34:10] of Justice, was responsible for the technical and official side
[00:34:13] of transferring funds. He signed key documents and agreements
[00:34:17] with the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau at the request of Zbigniew
[00:34:20] Ziobro, implementing the transfer of money from the Justice Fund
[00:34:24] to the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. Fourthly,
[00:34:27] Jarosław Kaczyński confirmed before the commission that he knew about
[00:34:31] the plans to purchase the device from Mariusz Kamiński and Zbigniew Ziobro
[00:34:34] even before the finalization of the transaction. In the public
[00:34:38] space, a narrative was created of the necessity to fight dangerous
[00:34:41] crime and terrorism. The report proves
[00:34:44] however, that this argument was only a pretext to acquire
[00:34:48] a tool for unlimited interference in
[00:34:51] the privacy of citizens, including opposition politicians
[00:34:55] against the United Right government, judges who opposed
[00:34:59] PiS lawlessness and the breaking of the rule of law
[00:35:02] and the deformation of the justice system, as well as other public
[00:35:05] figures who, through their actions,
[00:35:08] were a thorn in the side of the then
[00:35:11] government, resistance of the services, everyone.
[00:35:21] how the services would react to the purchase of the operating system and whether they would use it in their
[00:35:25] activities. The result: all key institutions raised
[00:35:28] objections or serious concerns: firstly,
[00:35:31] the legal office of the Police Headquarters in an opinion dated
[00:35:35] March 29, 2017,
[00:35:38] authored by legal counsel Dariusz
[00:35:40] Matejski, the appropriate signature, unambiguously
[00:35:43] indicated that, in the current legal state, the police cannot
[00:35:47] buy or use software that bypasses
[00:35:50] the security of end devices and
[00:35:53] sucks from the past, the police withdrew
[00:35:57] from the purchase. Secondly, the head of the Internal Security
[00:36:00] Agency, Professor Piotr Pogonowski, in a letter dated February 15,
[00:36:04] 2017, appropriate signature, deemed the offer
[00:36:08] to purchase Pegasus to be disqualifying
[00:36:11] due to the risk of de-conspiracy of operational
[00:36:15] interests and high costs. Thirdly,
[00:36:17] the Military Counterintelligence Service adamantly
[00:36:21] refused to participate in the purchase. An internal document of the Military Counterintelligence
[00:36:24] Service warned directly:
[00:36:27] the system used does not exclude the possibility for the manufacturer
[00:36:31] of the software, i.e., the Israeli company
[00:36:34] NSO Group, to access the transmitted data. About this,
[00:36:38] the Chairwoman Joanna Kluzik Rostkowska mentioned it subtly.
[00:36:42] Fourthly, doubts arose within
[00:36:45] the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau itself. Legal counsel
[00:36:49] of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Dr. Bartłomiej Karasiewicz,
[00:36:53] in an opinion dated April 10, 2017,
[00:36:56] warned that the legislation does not give
[00:36:59] the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau the basis to use such
[00:37:02] software without prior amendment
[00:37:05] of the act. Despite these warnings, decision-makers did not
[00:37:08] change the law in parliament but decided to circumvent the regulations
[00:37:12] by means of far-fetched legal interpretations.
[00:37:15] Prosecutor's Office, National Prosecutor's Office. Bogdan
[00:37:19] Święczkowski played a major role in this. On July 28,
[00:37:22] 2017, the National Prosecutor sent a letter to
[00:37:26] the police, response, signature, in which he issued
[00:37:29] an arbitrary interpretation that
[00:37:32] it is permissible for the police to conduct operational control
[00:37:35] of the content of correspondence sent via
[00:37:39] internet communicators, using software
[00:37:43] installed on the system platforms of the communicator
[00:37:46] user. Commission materials revealed
[00:37:50] the existence of strong top-down institutional pressure
[00:37:53] to implement a solution allowing services access to
[00:37:57] communication conducted via encrypted
[00:38:01] communicators despite the lack of accreditation and serious
[00:38:05] reservations of lawyers
[00:38:09] and legal financiers. Ultimately, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau
[00:38:12] bought Pegasus from the Israeli company NSO
[00:38:16] Group and made it available
[00:38:18] to other services contrary to the unambiguous opinions of the police,
[00:38:22] the Internal Security Agency, the Military
[00:38:25] Counterintelligence Service, and its own.
[00:38:29] Financial mechanism: the most outrageous
[00:38:32] is the mechanism for financing the purchase, financing a special
[00:38:36] service from a fund designated by law for
[00:38:39] victims of crimes required creating an appearance
[00:38:43] of legality, so that it would be correct on paper. Step one:
[00:38:47] an amendment to the Penal Executive Code was introduced,
[00:38:50] it came into force on August 12, 2017,
[00:38:54] the ruling party managed to pass an amendment to Article 43,
[00:38:58] 3 PEC, which expanded the statutory catalog of tasks of the Justice
[00:39:02] Fund. To the existing goals, assistance to victims
[00:39:05] and post-penitentiary bridge, a general
[00:39:09] sentence was added: crime prevention and
[00:39:12] detection. In addition, a provision was introduced allowing funds to be transferred
[00:39:16] from the fund to public finance sector units outside
[00:39:19] standard procedures and
[00:39:22] tenders. Step two: the regulation of the Minister
[00:39:25] of Justice, which came into force, was changed. On September
[00:39:28] 20, 2017, the Minister of Justice issued a new
[00:39:32] executive regulation that gave him the right to entrust
[00:39:35] funds from the Justice Fund without announcing
[00:39:39] a program and without an open call for applications. Step three:
[00:39:42] the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau submitted a formal request on
[00:39:46] September 15, 2017,
[00:39:49] citing the newly introduced Article 43 paragraph
[00:39:52] 8 point 1c. PEC, the head of the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:39:56] Bureau, Ernest Bejda, sent a letter to the Minister of Justice
[00:39:59] requesting the transfer of 25 million
[00:40:02] zlotys for the purchase of special technical equipment for
[00:40:06] detecting and preventing crime, in accordance with
[00:40:09] Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Act on the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:40:12] Bureau and the regulations on public finances, the activities
[00:40:16] and purchase of operational technical means for special services can only be
[00:40:20] financed from the state budget, from
[00:40:23] the operational fund of a given service, financing the purchase
[00:40:36] of the Ministry of Justice committed deliberate
[00:40:40] misinformation. The Deputy Minister of Finance,
[00:40:43] Teresa Czerwińska,
[00:40:46] was misled by concealing from her the real purpose of shifting 25
[00:40:50] million zlotys in the financial plan of the Justice
[00:40:53] Fund. The parliamentary Public Finance Committee was also...
[00:40:59] Minister Woś sent a letter on September 14,
[00:41:02] 2017, and therefore the day before
[00:41:05] the letter from the head of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau to the Ministry
[00:41:09] of Justice, these are very important
[00:41:12] coincidences of these dates, a letter with the appropriate signature
[00:41:16] with a note, very urgent, to the Undersecretary
[00:41:19] of State in the Ministry of Finance, Teresa Czerwińska.
[00:41:23] The letter concerned a request to change the financial plan of the Justice
[00:41:26] Fund. Quoting, 25 million zlotys under
[00:41:29] the slogan "other activities serving to prevent
[00:41:32] crime", it was hidden that the money would go to
[00:41:35] the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau for Pegasus,
[00:41:38] it was done by...
[00:41:41] despite the fact that other formations, including the police and
[00:41:44] other special services, issued negative opinions on
[00:41:50] the danger of its use. Disclosure
[00:41:53] of the purchase: to conceal the transaction, a private
[00:41:56] intermediary, Matik company, was included in the purchase
[00:42:00] process as a commercial intermediary between the Central
[00:42:03] Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Luxembourg
[00:42:06] company (the commercial arm of NSO Group).
[00:42:10] To the Cyber company after receiving funds from the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:42:13] Bureau, which in turn came from a grant from the Justice
[00:42:17] Fund. We come to the moment when the whole
[00:42:20] intricately woven mechanism of hiding the purchase of Pegasus fell
[00:42:24] apart. If it weren't for the meticulousness of the controllers of the Supreme Audit
[00:42:28] Office in 2018, the public might
[00:42:31] never have learned about the purchase of this cyber weapon. It is worth
[00:42:34] emphasizing once again that in no financial document,
[00:42:38] report or fact.
[00:42:47] the description of the purchase of special technical equipment used for detecting
[00:42:51] and preventing crime, in
[00:42:54] further parts of the report, we will demonstrate what
[00:42:58] Pegasus was really used for, what this weapon was used for,
[00:43:01] however, they fell into their own trap, I am talking about
[00:43:04] the rulers of that time, as
[00:43:07] I mentioned, in accordance with Article four of the Act... on the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:43:10] Bureau, purchases of operational equipment by the bureau can be
[00:43:14] financed exclusively from the state budget and from the secret operational
[00:43:18] fund. Wishing to circumvent this requirement and reach for money from the Justice
[00:43:22] Fund, the Ministry of Justice transferred
[00:43:25] 25 million zlotys from the special purpose
[00:43:28] fund, however, since the finances of the Justice Fund are by
[00:43:31] law public, the transfer documents to the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:43:35] Bureau were publicly available, every
[00:43:39] citizen could access them under the public information
[00:43:42] access regime. The Supreme Audit Office, under the leadership
[00:43:46] of Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, challenged this
[00:43:49] transfer as a violation of the Act on the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:43:52] Bureau and the Public Finance Act. The ludicrous legal
[00:43:56] construction was also pointed out. The Minister of Justice, head
[00:43:59] of the CBA, concluded an agreement representing the same
[00:44:03] State Treasury, it was an impermissible agreement of the State Treasury
[00:44:06] with itself. What happened after the detection of this?
[00:44:10] legal transaction on July 18,
[00:44:13] 2018, the Supreme Audit Office
[00:44:16] formally filed a notification of violation of public finance
[00:44:19] discipline against Deputy Minister Michał
[00:44:22] Woś for illegally transferred money and
[00:44:25] the head of the Central Anti-Corruption
[00:44:27] Bureau, Ernest Bejda, for accepting
[00:44:31] them. After the initial refusal to initiate explanatory proceedings by
[00:44:34] the lower-instance spokesman, the Supreme Audit Office
[00:44:38] filed an appeal to the head spokesman for public finance
[00:44:41] discipline, ultimately, by decisions of September
[00:44:44] 14, 2020, the then spokesman for public
[00:44:48] finance discipline, Piotr Patkowski, it is not without significance that
[00:44:52] he was one of the closest collaborators of the then Prime Minister
[00:44:56] Mateusz Morawiecki, and later Deputy Minister
[00:44:59] to refuse to initiate
[00:45:03] proceedings. In his justification, Mr.
[00:45:05] Patkowski stated that the regulations were on us, we are now moving
[00:45:09] to...
[00:45:59] we just signed a declaration
[00:46:01] deklarację
[00:46:04] on strategic partnership between the Kingdom of Norway and
[00:46:08] the Republic of Poland.
[00:46:11] This declaration is a confirmation of our hard work
[00:46:14] for years, work for the building of Polish-Norwegian
[00:46:18] relations, today better than ever in
[00:46:21] history, they were never
[00:46:24] bad, but today
[00:46:26] they are a testament to how
[00:46:30] true friendship can be built between nations and
[00:46:34] states and governments on the basis of both
[00:46:36] common interests and common values.
[00:46:41] In the modern world, where international order
[00:46:45] is violated daily,
[00:46:49] where law, principles.
[00:47:02] relations based on both business,
[00:47:05] moral, geopolitical, in
[00:47:08] the context of security, all of this is truly invaluable, and
[00:47:12] I am glad that my interlocutor, our guest
[00:47:16] today, has an identical view on Polish-Norwegian
[00:47:19] relations, and
[00:47:24] I was pleased to hear you say
[00:47:27] that Polish-Norwegian relations are
[00:47:30] the most promising process in Norwegian
[00:47:33] foreign policy in many years and that it has not been possible
[00:47:37] to intensify cooperation and relations
[00:47:39] with anyone else as much as with Norway and Poland,
[00:47:43] these are important words. As a resident
[00:47:47] of Gdańsk, I will always remember it.
[00:47:50] it goes to various places in Poland, but in
[00:48:00] the Pomeranian Voivodeship and in Gdańsk, the effects
[00:48:03] of your help, your support are
[00:48:06] particularly visible. Poland has been
[00:48:10] the largest beneficiary
[00:48:12] of the Norwegian Fund for years,
[00:48:15] and I am very proud of this,
[00:48:18] I am glad that both you and your predecessors.
[00:48:23] also assessed with great satisfaction how well we are able to
[00:48:27] utilize these funds in Poland and how visible
[00:48:29] this success is.
[00:48:32] We have a common view,
[00:48:35] and that also seems very important today,
[00:48:38] we confirmed it today during our speeches at
[00:48:42] the Warsaw Security Forum.
[00:48:45] We have a common view on
[00:48:48] the geopolitical situation, regarding solidarity.
[00:49:24] fire, on the other hand, by no means, as of
[00:49:27] today we are the only representative of NSO for the Polish
[00:49:30] market, and he also testified something important.
[00:49:33] Tomatik, on its own initiative, went to the CBA with an offer
[00:49:37] of the NSO tool from Israel.
[00:49:41] We are more concerned with time. Now
[00:49:44] let's move on to the correspondence: September 13, 2016,
[00:49:47] CBA officer Krystian Dobrzyński writes to the Vice President
[00:49:51] of Matik. Literally, I will not hide
[00:49:54] that we are more
[00:49:57] with iOS10, especially since it will be
[00:50:01] a while before the system catches on, and these types
[00:50:04] of purchases are not made on the spot. Ladies and gentlemen,
[00:50:07] let's translate this into the language of an ordinary citizen. A state
[00:50:10] service buys a tool worth tens of millions of zlotys and tells
[00:50:14] the supplier, time is more important than whether the system works on
[00:50:18] the latest phones, more important than quality, and asks for a list
[00:50:22] of 50 phones on which the system will be tested in Polish mobile
[00:50:26] networks. Here appears an attack
[00:50:30] without a click. 10 days later,
[00:50:32] September 23, 2016, the same
[00:50:36] officer writes to Matik: you must admit that the Q
[00:50:39] went a bit easy by filling
[00:50:42] part of the list with iPhones, there is also no
[00:50:45] information on which models we can perform a zero
[00:50:48] click attack, we would at least like to know.
[00:51:37] but to be honest, I actually
[00:51:40] don't notice this fact,
[00:51:43] we think alike, we work alike,
[00:51:47] the Europeanness of Norway in many fields
[00:51:49] seems more visible than in
[00:51:53] some member states,
[00:51:55] that's why our closeness, our cooperation is from
[00:51:58] the Polish point of view so important, I don't hide
[00:52:02] that our cooperation...
[00:52:05] mainly in the sphere of security, combining our efforts regarding
[00:52:09] the northern and eastern flank, Norway
[00:52:12] borders Russia. Poland is the only country in the world that
[00:52:16] borders both Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine,
[00:52:18] so we know well how important
[00:52:22] the security of the northern and eastern flank is,
[00:52:25] therefore I sincerely thank you, Jonas,
[00:52:29] for also helping me in building such deep
[00:52:32] trust throughout this northern bloc.
[00:52:48] often accompanies us in conversations and preparations, Germany, that the importance
[00:52:51] of this part of the world is already recognized by
[00:52:54] all our partners, but this is largely due to your
[00:52:58] personal merit and Norway as a state, for which I thank
[00:53:02] you very much, Poland.
[00:53:05] For us in Poland, for all of us, security is a priority
[00:53:08] and it is visible at every step,
[00:53:12] Poland and Europe and Norway are
[00:53:15] more secure than they could be without
[00:53:18] your work, our cooperation, and
[00:53:22] for that I thank you once again.
[00:53:25] Thank you very much, I would like to ask the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Norway,
[00:53:28] Jonas
[00:53:29] Gahr Støre, to speak.
[00:53:33] Thank you very much, thank you very much.
[00:53:40] Prime Minister, thank you, dear Donald, thank you very much for having me here once again, we are proud to be a partner country of the World Security
[00:53:44] Forum. I am very glad that I was able
[00:53:47] to see all these Norwegian flags today at the conference, we were there
[00:53:51] together with representatives of my government, with representatives
[00:53:55] of business, people dealing with security
[00:53:57] and defense issues. It is true, Prime
[00:54:01] Minister, that... According
[00:54:04] to my calculations, there is no other country with which
[00:54:07] Norway has become more closely aligned in the last
[00:54:10] 30 years than Poland. The world
[00:54:13] has changed in the last 30, 40 years, but if we consider
[00:54:17] 1990 and 2026,
[00:54:21] we see integration, interpersonal contacts and, as
[00:54:25] you said, 400 Norwegian companies are active in
[00:54:28] Poland.
[00:54:31] At a high level, we conduct political exchange, we are.
[00:54:39] that we work with you also partly in the
[00:54:46] south, yes, we were there at the
[00:54:50] place where Ukrainian soldiers are being
[00:54:52] trained, besides that we observed
[00:54:56] together F-35s and we only work with countries with whom
[00:55:00] there is trust, if anything is lacking in the world today, it
[00:55:03] is definitely trust. But we are able to show how much
[00:55:07] we can do when that trust exists, that is what exists between our
[00:55:11] countries. The declaration we signed today regarding
[00:55:14] strategic partnership is
[00:55:16] an excellent presentation
[00:55:20] of the wonderful level of relations between our countries, over 20 points
[00:55:24] of various actions were introduced there in various areas,
[00:55:27] cooperation regarding security, economic
[00:55:30] cooperation and contacts between our society.
[00:55:33] This concerns issues of security, defense, military
[00:55:36] mobility, preparation, readiness, resilience,
[00:55:40] protection of critical infrastructure, energy security, support for
[00:55:43] Ukraine and greater support between our defense industry
[00:55:47] companies, but what is very important here is that
[00:55:51] there is a general strong will for us to work together within these
[00:55:54] frameworks, within NATO, also on the broader European
[00:55:58] scene, you are right that Norway is not a member of the European
[00:56:01] Union, but we are integrated with the common economic
[00:56:05] market, there are
[00:56:08] certain points of conflict, where
[00:56:11] Poland always listened carefully to the Norwegian view,
[00:56:14] for which we are always grateful, within the framework
[00:56:17] of Norwegian grants we implement unique cooperation,
[00:56:21] it differs from other types of similar programs, as it is based
[00:56:25] on ideas emanating from civil society in Poland.
[00:56:28] Poland is the main recipient,
[00:56:31] receiving approximately 25% of all Norwegian grants.
[00:56:35] I have seen examples of this, which include cultural
[00:56:38] heritage, transformation towards a green economy,
[00:56:42] medical equipment, I think all of this
[00:56:45] is a method of building institutional resilience in a way
[00:56:49] that also strengthens cooperation between our countries, and once again
[00:56:53] 400 Norwegian companies present,
[00:56:56] active on the Polish market, and more are coming, large
[00:56:59] investments are appearing, more jobs will be created, that is
[00:57:03] good. In addition,
[00:57:05] we also have another common feature, namely
[00:57:09] the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border in the
[00:57:12] Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
[00:57:15] Poland three. difficult
[00:57:18] borders,
[00:57:21] in addition, we also have another common feature,
[00:57:25] namely the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border in the
[00:57:28] Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
[00:57:31] Poland three difficult
[00:57:34] borders.
[00:57:37] In addition, we also have another common feature,
[00:57:41] namely the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border
[00:57:44] in the Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300. And
[00:57:48] Poland three difficult
[00:57:50] borders, in addition
[00:57:53] we have another common feature, namely
[00:57:57] the border with Russia, we have a 200 km border in the Arctic,
[00:58:01] in the north, Finland 1300, and
[00:58:04] Poland three difficult
[00:58:06] borders.
[00:58:09] In addition, we also have another common feature,
[00:58:13] namely the border with Russia, we have a 200 km
[00:58:16] border.
[00:58:57] In addition, we also have another common feature, namely
[00:59:01] the border with Russia, we have a 200 kilometer border in the
[00:59:04] Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
[00:59:07] Poland three difficult
[00:59:10] borders.
[00:59:13] In addition, we also have another common feature
[00:59:17] namely.
[00:59:21] Finland 1300 and Poland
[00:59:25] three difficult
[00:59:26] borders.
[00:59:29] In addition, we also have another common feature,
[00:59:33] namely the border with Russia. We have a 200 km border in the
[00:59:36] Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
[00:59:40] Poland three difficult
[00:59:42] borders. In
[00:59:45] addition.
[00:59:56] and Poland three difficult
[00:59:58] borders.
[01:00:01] In addition, we also have another common feature,
[01:00:05] namely the border with Russia. We have a 200 km border in the
[01:00:08] Arctic, in the north. Finland 1300 and
[01:00:12] Poland three difficult
[01:00:14] borders.
[01:00:17] In addition we also have another common feature,
[01:00:21] namely the border with Russia, we have 200 km border
[01:00:24] in the Arctic, in the north, Finland 1300, and
[01:00:28] Poland three difficult
[01:00:30] borders.
[01:00:33] In addition, we also have another common feature,
[01:00:37] namely the border with Russia, we have 200 km border in
[01:00:41] the Arctic, in the north Finland 1300, and
[01:00:44] Poland three difficult borders.
[01:00:49] In addition we also have another common feature,
[01:00:53] namely the border with Russia. We have 200 km border in
[01:00:57] the Arctic in the north Finland 1300, and
[01:01:00] Poland three difficult
[01:01:02] borders.
[01:01:05] In addition, we also have another common feature,
[01:01:09] namely the border with Russia. We have 200 km border in
[01:01:13] the Arctic, in the north Finland 1300, and
[01:01:16] Poland. three difficult
[01:01:18] borders, meaning refugees,
[01:01:21] migration, war,
[01:01:25] alarms, I was simply
[01:01:28] afraid that this would much
[01:01:32] more intensely destroy our mental attitude.