YEMENTV — broadcast
20260920 080000 UTC
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[00:00:00] so on.
[00:00:15] compared to how many Americans did it kill? of the knowledge and perhaps many
[00:00:21] We were, at one point, seeing many
[00:00:30] and considered this talk, even though this to lift the siege on Sana'a,
[00:00:33] to, meaning, extend its control over
[00:00:37] Peace, mercy and blessings of God be upon you. May God grant you peace, dear viewers, wherever
[00:00:40] people. you are. Welcome to this special coverage.
[00:00:44] Since the beginning of their devilish path,
[00:00:47] the Houthis have resorted to falsifying
[00:00:52] a great legacy in this what its story is. Where did the Yemeni problem start? In facts and claiming victimhood, and inventing stories and methods that are not present in a report
[00:00:55] to their followers to deceive
[00:00:58] people that there is a siege on their areas, that
[00:01:02] America is fighting them in Yemen, that there are those
[00:01:05] who are hindering the humanitarian aspect and prisoner exchange.
[00:01:09] The roadmap is also there. There is a claim that
[00:01:12] international parties are hindering the roadmap.
[00:01:16] But what is the truth of all these
[00:01:19] is in claims and what is the truth of this devilish path
[00:01:21] that relies on portraying victimhood and falsifying
[00:01:25] facts? Welcome to this coverage. I welcome you and I welcome my guest
[00:01:28] here in the studio, Dr. Faris Al-Bayl, head of the Yemeni Future Center for Strategic Studies.
[00:01:32] Welcome. Welcome, Dr. We have
[00:01:35] a report that we will watch before we start. Let's watch this report, dear viewers, and then we will return
[00:01:41] state in Yemeni sovereignty, to start our journey. The Houthi terrorist group
[00:01:45] a religious banner, a banner, but in
[00:01:52] with a lot of did not content itself
[00:01:53] shortcomings, and a lot of with what it committed
[00:01:56] and is committing against Yemenis
[00:02:00] in terms of wickedness and criminality, but rather moved to the square
[00:02:04] of lies and falsification, where it resorted to justifying
[00:02:07] its terrorism by weaving misleading
[00:02:11] and false narratives, such as its claim that
[00:02:13] it. Okay, let it be. But the war against it came at American instigation,
[00:02:16] and that its military
[00:02:19] is advanced, but their knowledge abroad operations inside
[00:02:20] religious and outside are nothing but a response to a siege
[00:02:23] imposed on Yemen. However, recalling the facts
[00:02:27] puts both narratives to the test of truth.
[00:02:30] The conflict with the Houthi terrorist militia did not begin with the coalition to support
[00:02:33] legitimacy, but rather it was preceded
[00:02:36] by an armed Houthi rebellion and six wars
[00:02:41] that is rebellious against in Saada, leading to the invasion of Sana'a in September of 2014,
[00:02:45] Meanwhile, the issue of the war against and the seizure of state institutions and the siege of the president
[00:02:49] and the government, and then
[00:02:52] the military expansion towards
[00:02:55] and control the rest of the provinces, which led the late President Abd
[00:02:58] Rabbu Mansour Hadi to appeal to his brethren for help
[00:03:01] and intervention to restore the state and its institutions.
[00:03:05] Therefore, transforming the security and political relations between
[00:03:09] Washington and its partners
[00:03:11] into evidence that America is the decision-maker for war
[00:03:15] is nothing but an attempt to package Houthi aggression
[00:03:18] with narratives that contradict the essence
[00:03:22] affiliated with Hussein al-Houthi, who was still
[00:03:23] everyone did not of the truth that both internal and external parties know. As for the siege, it is
[00:03:26] the narrative through which the group tries to portray
[00:03:30] its military operations in the guise of defending
[00:03:34] Yemenis. However,
[00:03:37] the dangers, and the authority should the siege, in its known sense, means preventing the entry of food, medicine,
[00:03:40] fuel, and goods into a country or
[00:03:43] subjecting it to a comprehensive ban on trade
[00:03:46] and movement, and this is not the reality described by
[00:03:50] UN statements
[00:03:53] mediation from and the movement of Yemeni ports. Rather, the port of Hodeidah remained a main
[00:03:57] outlet for food, fuel, and aid
[00:04:00] points. Therefore, from to Houthi-controlled areas. And here we ask,
[00:04:04] if the goal is to lift the siege on
[00:04:07] Yemenis, then how can we explain the transformation of the Red
[00:04:10] Sea and Bab al-Mandab, which are
[00:04:13] two main arteries for Yemen's imports,
[00:04:16] into an arena for escalation?
[00:04:19] And how can targeting navigation lead
[00:04:24] the Iranian regime would expand in to a reduction in the cost of food, fuel, and medicine for
[00:04:27] are just slogans that the Yemeni citizen, of this group, we while the increase in transportation
[00:04:31] and insurance risks leads to an increase in that cost?
[00:04:48] Again, I salute you, dear viewers, and also
[00:04:50] to pressure you, doctor, and I start with you, meaning, from this
[00:04:53] victimhood that accompanies this path since the beginning of this
[00:04:56] coup, meaning since the six wars, meaning
[00:05:00] the attempt to create
[00:05:02] oppressed them, you removed them from victimhood for themselves, to make a banner or a sign for themselves
[00:05:06] under which they fight, and these banners are endless, meaning from
[00:05:10] the siege to, meaning
[00:05:13] America and Israel, then for the support of Gaza and others, under
[00:05:16] different names. Why has this
[00:05:19] victimhood accompanied them throughout their journey? First, a greeting to you
[00:05:22] and to our dear viewers, and thank you for these important
[00:05:26] media efforts. The Houthi militia, first,
[00:05:28] let's take the idea from its roots, meaning
[00:05:32] the Iranian strategic project. Since the Khomeini revolution in
[00:05:35] 1979, Iran wanted to convey all
[00:05:39] the ideas
[00:05:41] of loyalty to all Islamic countries to control them
[00:05:45] militarily and politically, but with a religious guise.
[00:05:48] Therefore, it worked on the issue of
[00:05:51] having religious issues,
[00:05:54] victimhood of minorities, playing on the weaknesses
[00:05:58] of societies in one way or another, and being religious minorities.
[00:06:01] From this perspective, it enters into the sectarian framework and so on,
[00:06:05] and adopted the same scenario that exists in more than one place, whether in
[00:06:09] Lebanon, whether in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, and
[00:06:12] it always recorded these positions
[00:06:16] as
[00:06:19] minority groups, oppressed groups,
[00:06:22] subjugated groups. It felt that the world and the international
[00:06:26] community were inclined towards these issues
[00:06:30] because there was a wave after World War II, a wave
[00:06:33] of preserving societies, equality, justice, laws, and
[00:06:37] so on. This is from one side, in addition to
[00:06:40] adopting issues such as the Palestinian issue, other religious issues,
[00:06:44] historical issues, and so on, to distract people
[00:06:48] and make this the main cover through
[00:06:50] which the military vehicle of the Iranian regime passes, in one way or
[00:06:54] another, a humanitarian banner,
[00:06:57] essence, there is a cannon inside this vehicle, and this is what
[00:07:01] the Iranian regime wanted, in one way or another, in the Yemeni experience.
[00:07:05] It began by picking up this idea
[00:07:08] that we have a Zaydi group
[00:07:13] that, we can say, has some ideas
[00:07:16] and has been subjected to injustice, or so it was portrayed at the beginning,
[00:07:19] or so it was established. After that, the matter withdrew
[00:07:22] and went beyond Zaydiism and beyond sectarianism in one way or
[00:07:26] another, but it is a cover, and it took the Palestinian
[00:07:29] issue, it took
[00:07:32] issues, fighting the greater
[00:07:35] injustice, the great powers, these issues that
[00:07:39] stir people's emotions. Yes, there are
[00:07:42] different ones, and it is the level of awareness of society. In some
[00:07:46] societies, these issues did not pass, but in Yemeni society,
[00:07:50] they passed in one way or another on a group,
[00:07:53] so that we are realistic or objective.
[00:07:56] Therefore, whoever looks at the idea that there is
[00:08:00] an Iranian strategic project
[00:08:03] that wants to reach the holy places
[00:08:07] the Islamic world, but through these
[00:08:10] ways and through this banner, you will find the nature of the Houthi militia and that its path
[00:08:14] from beginning to end passes through these
[00:08:17] banners for purposes
[00:08:20] that are not inherent in what it believes
[00:08:23] in, عفوا, far removed from reality
[00:08:26] and logic. Therefore, the Houthi militia began, when it first started, it knew that
[00:08:30] it started as a minority and that it was
[00:08:33] oppressed. And why did the group of Salafis come to
[00:08:37] Dammaj and so on, and the war against them? This was
[00:08:39] how it started, and then after that, the six wars. It claimed victimhood
[00:08:43] and it was leaking that it wanted there to be
[00:08:47] recognition of the Zaydi doctrine and recognition
[00:08:49] of their methodology. And then
[00:08:52] these banners fade away, fade away, and quickly move to another banner.
[00:08:55] I mean, if society and the state had met
[00:08:59] the demands of this group, as the mediation was
[00:09:02] then,
[00:09:05] the region,
[00:09:09] it would not have been satisfied with it, it would have gone to other
[00:09:12] the six wars to its entry into Sana'a, the discourse
[00:09:15] changed. It entered for the sake of the dose, as
[00:09:19] it says. Yes, and fighting ISIS, even though there was
[00:09:22] no ISIS in Yemen initially. Meaning that all
[00:09:26] these balloons
[00:09:28] that the Houthi militia puts out or the Iranian methodology draws for it
[00:09:32] to try to mislead society and claim that it has
[00:09:35] acceptable reasons even for the international community.
[00:09:39] Of course, the lobby, this
[00:09:42] internally, the Houthi militia works, presenting a discourse to the internal
[00:09:45] yes, and the Iranian lobby at the external level tries
[00:09:49] to convince or persuade
[00:09:51] some decision-making institutions that
[00:09:55] these are an oppressed group, a minority
[00:09:59] group. They work on this issue. Therefore, for years,
[00:10:02] many institutions and many countries
[00:10:06] and many said or leaned towards the idea
[00:10:09] that the Houthi militia are minorities and therefore have the right to fight. The authority, you
[00:10:15] authority, and so on. And these
[00:10:17] balloons
[00:10:19] that were placed are what shaped the international community's vision,
[00:10:22] unfortunately, over 12 years. Yes, Doctor, I will talk
[00:10:26] about this point, especially regarding the international community, but
[00:10:30] let me go back to the beginnings, as long as you have started, meaning you too from the beginnings.
[00:10:33] We will take the beginning of victimhood, meaning that the state
[00:10:37] besieges them, that they were besieged in
[00:10:39] Maran. How did this
[00:10:42] resonate with other parties?
[00:10:46] political parties, political and partisan forces,
[00:10:49] who were essentially convinced of the idea of their victimhood, and even sided
[00:10:53] with them at one point. How did they deceive
[00:10:55] people? They deceived themselves, even
[00:10:59] the political forces. I am talking about shrewd politicians and experienced
[00:11:02] and seasoned political forces. Let's be clear, there was
[00:11:05] a kind of political squabbling
[00:11:08] that facilitated the Houthi militia's expansion, and still does.
[00:11:12] Political squabbling and disputes are what facilitated the Houthi
[00:11:15] militia's expansion and its continued reach. Even now, it still
[00:11:18] benefits. In its beginnings,
[00:11:22] to establish this idea, in the beginnings of the Houthi militia, when it started,
[00:11:26] of course, it was the one that started, it attacked. Yes, it was the one that
[00:11:29] started, it stopped schools in Saada, it stopped public education,
[00:11:33] it prevented zakat, it disrupted many institutions, it hindered the work
[00:11:37] of local administration in Saada. It remained for periods
[00:11:40] and kept pulling all these issues, and the state
[00:11:43] took a different stance. I mean, it did not act strongly at
[00:11:47] that moment, and the state and the regime
[00:11:50] then considered it a card that could be bartered with
[00:11:53] the political community internally.
[00:11:57] Yes, and the political parties dealt with the issue
[00:12:00] as a political card as well. Therefore, when the six wars began,
[00:12:04] I remember that there was
[00:12:07] a meeting between Ali Abdullah Saleh then and some
[00:12:10] parties, including the Islah party and so on, and he invited them to
[00:12:13] participate in this battle.
[00:12:16] And they claimed
[00:12:20] that they were not, for example,
[00:12:23] a military force, and therefore they would not
[00:12:27] fight, and there was a desire of the Joint Meeting Parties bloc
[00:12:30] as a whole, and the Joint Meeting Parties bloc, but we are talking about the largest
[00:12:34] political block and the ideological political opponent
[00:12:37] for the Houthi militia, who is countered by
[00:12:40] the Islah. So Ali Abdullah Saleh said, "They are
[00:12:43] your enemies, you are
[00:12:46] primarily, as for me, I am passing by." And they considered
[00:12:49] that they were incited by Ali Abdullah
[00:12:53] Saleh against them, and therefore they wished
[00:12:56] for the two forces to clash and for them to stay away. This
[00:13:00] was the concept of the idea then. I mean, imagine that
[00:13:03] there was no strategic vision among the forces
[00:13:07] of the Joint Meeting Parties, for example, and the opposition forces
[00:13:10] and the intellectual elite, everyone, nor even among the state
[00:13:14] then at its head. Everyone looked
[00:13:18] at it as political conflicts that were manipulated,
[00:13:22] and Ali Abdullah Saleh was known for managing conflicts. Therefore, they took this into account
[00:13:25] and played this card, the Houthi card, externally,
[00:13:29] even then, although
[00:13:32] it was not, but Ali Abdullah Saleh wanted to benefit from it externally
[00:13:35] as well, to pressure Saudi Arabia when he felt that there was a rivalry then between Qatar
[00:13:39] and Saudi Arabia. He also played this
[00:13:42] card, and Qatar intervened then.
[00:13:45] The problem is that
[00:13:48] realize the dangers of the Houthi militia. They did, especially
[00:13:51] the intellectual forces that were confronting them.
[00:13:54] It should have. not looked at the issue as a conflict between it
[00:13:57] and the authority then, and it should have realized
[00:14:02] not have used this card to strike
[00:14:04] its opponents. So the Houthi militia struck everyone. Yes,
[00:14:08] the Houthi militia reached Sana'a. You
[00:14:11] said, under the name of overthrowing the dose. What happened
[00:14:14] then? Was this victimhood lifted from the shoulders
[00:14:17] of the people, or did it enter into a series of new grievances
[00:14:21] and other falsifications of facts? From one side,
[00:14:25] it is a theory, of course. It was just an entry point, but it
[00:14:28] found the door open. Why? Because to establish
[00:14:32] this idea that we mentioned earlier,
[00:14:35] when the Houthi militia entered, it was with a Western
[00:14:38] green light then. It was part of the
[00:14:42] nuclear deal in 2015 during the Obama administration.
[00:14:46] In exchange for signing, Yemen.
[00:14:49] And
[00:14:52] the Houthi militia was given the green light to enter Sana'a, and the forces were
[00:14:56] that individuals from the Houthi militia, hundreds of them, entered. How many
[00:14:59] entered with personal weapons? And there were
[00:15:02] 52 brigades around Sana'a. Why didn't they move? There was
[00:15:05] a desire, I mean, there are many details, but there was
[00:15:09] a real desire from the Obama administration
[00:15:12] then Saudi Arabia
[00:15:16] and to give Iran because there was a dispute then
[00:15:20] and to give Iran this opportunity
[00:15:23] to expand in a year. Yes, when it entered in the name of the dose, it was
[00:15:27] just a discourse to the people. They quickly forgot it after three
[00:15:30] days, meaning they are not people of a project, yes, and they are not
[00:15:34] people of victimhood, and they are not even people of moral value. Therefore,
[00:15:38] notice that in the same days, for those who review, they talk about
[00:15:41] ISIS, and they talk about the dose, and they talk about ending
[00:15:44] injustice, and they talk about partnership. At the same
[00:15:47] time, these banners existed when the Houthi militia first entered, meaning
[00:15:51] it entered knowing what was required of it,
[00:15:55] but it did not disclose it, and the major powers knew what was required of it,
[00:15:59] and the local forces, unfortunately, did not know. There were
[00:16:03] parties that thought that the Houthi militia's entry was to target it,
[00:16:08] was not true. It was a targeting of all of Yemen,
[00:16:11] and some forces used the Houthi militia's entry to strike
[00:16:15] their opponents, including the state and the opposition, and so on. There was a game,
[00:16:18] and why am I narrating these details? Yes,
[00:16:22] to clarify the nature of the Yemeni problem, where it started, and
[00:16:28] the strategic awareness of all forces and elites in Yemen, and
[00:16:31] unfortunately, this awareness is still weak even now, and this understanding is still weak
[00:16:35] even now, and this understanding is hazy and distorted even now, and this is
[00:16:39] what is extending the Houthi militia's life day after day. These
[00:16:42] differences still exist even now. Even now, they have not realized the nature of this militia and what
[00:16:46] it wants, and some
[00:16:49] deal with our battle with the Houthi militia as a sectarian one. It is not
[00:16:53] sectarian. Its truth
[00:16:56] the framework. I am a state. This
[00:17:00] group is a coup group. It destroyed the state, and therefore
[00:17:03] the state must return with the return of its institutions that protect difference
[00:17:07] and diversity and sectarianism, whatever it may be. The diversity of society, whether it is
[00:17:11] religious or tribal or whatever
[00:17:14] it may be, protects it. The important thing is the return of the state. A sectarian
[00:17:18] battle, and this is a long one that will not end.
[00:17:21] Therefore, we are still in the framework of our battle
[00:17:24] with the Houthi militia. We are dealing with the problem of the Houthi militia
[00:17:31] ambiguity, and a lot of what we can
[00:17:33] call, I don't want to say another word, but
[00:17:37] in a framework, we have not realized the true nature of the battle. If the battle was directed completely,
[00:17:41] that we have a rebellious group. It is true that it is sectarian,
[00:17:45] it is racist, it is against equality, against the democratic
[00:17:48] system, against
[00:17:51] in the end, who will eliminate all these
[00:17:54] projects? The state, the return of the state. As for fighting the Houthi
[00:17:58] militia as a sect, and I am a sect, this battle
[00:18:01] will not end for a thousand years. And fighting the Houthi militia
[00:18:04] as a minority, and I am a majority, it will not end because we are tearing society
[00:18:08] apart more. I am fighting the Houthi militia as a certain class, and I am another
[00:18:11] class. But the Houthi militia should
[00:18:14] be placed in the framework that it is a rebellious group, a group
[00:18:18] Yemeni society and its identity, culture,
[00:18:21] and laws. A group that is rebellious against the institution
[00:18:25] and the authority and the system and the law. Yes,
[00:18:28] I will take a part, meaning the cooperation of the United States of America or the nuclear
[00:18:32] deal, as you said. If they were perhaps
[00:18:35] the first helper for the emergence of the Houthis
[00:18:39] and their control over Yemen, that banner,
[00:18:42] death to America and death to Israel, under
[00:18:46] what concept can I understand it? Then
[00:18:49] the Houthi militia still says, even at this moment, that this war that
[00:18:52] it is waging is fundamentally to expel America from Yemen, and that the one
[00:18:56] funding this war is America, and the one managing this war is America. What about
[00:19:00] this? Beautiful. We indicated at the beginning that
[00:19:04] the Houthi militia's banners and justifications quickly fall. However,
[00:19:07] they change, they change, but they quickly fall. For example,
[00:19:11] two years ago or a year and a half ago, it was talking about
[00:19:15] fighting Israel and America and so on. True, and people
[00:19:19] believed, and they have the right to believe in many cases, especially those outside
[00:19:22] Yemen who have not suffered from the Houthi militia. Now, the Houthi militia allows
[00:19:26] American and Israeli ships to pass.
[00:19:28] This is from whoever talks about America
[00:19:32] now and that America and Israel
[00:19:35] are the enemy. The Houthi quickly fell.
[00:19:39] Now, the Houthi militia, when it said
[00:19:42] that it raised the slogan of death to America, death to Israel, since it entered, this
[00:19:45] is the slogan that was circulated
[00:19:48] to all Iranian proxies in the region.
[00:19:52] I remember then, in
[00:19:54] a meeting with the American ambassador after the Houthi militia entered
[00:19:58] Sana'a, when we asked him about this
[00:20:00] point, he said that these
[00:20:04] should not be taken seriously. And he said, verbatim,
[00:20:08] that we had thought well when the Houthi militia
[00:20:12] reached the south then. We had thought well of the Houthi militia,
[00:20:15] but when they entered, they
[00:20:19] crossed the lines and acted like
[00:20:22] revolutionaries. Meaning, the matter was clear
[00:20:25] to the Western community. How can you raise the slogan
[00:20:29] that you are against America, and at the same time,
[00:20:33] America stands with you in this way? Of course, America does not stand with them
[00:20:36] because they are from this religious group, or it stands
[00:20:39] for different interests, pragmatic, completely far
[00:20:43] from the classification that we deal with internally.
[00:20:45] I believe that now, after the Houthi
[00:20:48] militia reached the Bab al-Mandab Strait,
[00:20:51] many of those who believed that the Houthi militia was against America and against
[00:20:55] Israel will have this idea fall from their minds in one way or
[00:20:58] another. But we need to clarify it, we need to make the comparison.
[00:21:02] How many Yemenis did the Houthi militia kill
[00:21:05] These are simple and existing equations that an ordinary person can follow.
[00:21:09] How did the Houthi militia fight America
[00:21:13] with its slogan of death to America, while Yemenis die? The Houthi militia,
[00:21:16] how many rockets did it launch at Israel,
[00:21:20] and it did not even destroy a window, while it launched ballistic
[00:21:24] missiles at Mocha, Marib, and Al Bayda, all over the place,
[00:21:27] killing thousands of
[00:21:30] The matter is clear, but people need to realize this value
[00:21:34] as well. There is another banner that the Houthi
[00:21:37] militia relies on, which is the banner of aggression, yes, and that it
[00:21:40] preserves sovereignty. And this was extremely dangerous. I believe it is more dangerous than
[00:21:44] the issue of the war on America, as it was promoted.
[00:21:48] It says that it had submitted to peace and showed
[00:21:51] rapprochement, but those who thwarted the roadmap
[00:21:54] are the Saudis. I mean, it says that Saudi Arabia is the one that thwarted
[00:21:58] the roadmap, that Saudi Arabia is the one that
[00:22:02] perhaps besieges Sana'a and Sana'a Airport
[00:22:05] and others. What about this as well?
[00:22:08] Before that, or within the framework of this point, its root.
[00:22:12] When the Houthi militia came, everyone knows that it came
[00:22:16] with a complete Iranian arrangement and creation.
[00:22:19] Yes, completely. Therefore, this
[00:22:23] is considered in international norms a betrayal of the homeland, a violation of sovereignty,
[00:22:27] the intervention of a foreign
[00:22:31] and in the norms, in the correct equation, the one
[00:22:34] who ignited the fire in Yemen is Iran. The one who
[00:22:37] destroyed is Iran. The one who destroyed my economy is Iran.
[00:22:41] The one who bears the cost of bloodshed is Iran. This is how it
[00:22:44] should be on paper. But imagine
[00:22:46] how
[00:22:48] the equation was flipped and the tables turned, and unfortunately, people fell for
[00:22:52] this, that the Houthi militia transformed and wanted to tell
[00:22:56] people that it defends Yemeni sovereignty while it had already violated Yemeni
[00:23:00] sovereignty and became an agent for an external party.
[00:23:03] And this is known in law as treason.
[00:23:06] Its charge is execution morally,
[00:23:09] politically, and individually, even.
[00:23:11] So it promoted that it
[00:23:15] defends sovereignty, and of course, it is not
[00:23:18] the Houthi militia's discourse, it is not the intelligence or the mastermind, but
[00:23:21] rather the Iranian lobby that plots, and unfortunately, many
[00:23:25] people fell for it. Notice the issue of hostility
[00:23:28] towards America. Many did not fall for it, many did not believe it at the level
[00:23:32] if we measure it by public opinion.
[00:23:35] aggression and against Saudi Arabia, many people believed it,
[00:23:39] and many still believe it even now. What is different
[00:23:41] for reasons? I mean, among the reasons is the weakness of legitimacy and so on.
[00:23:45] I mean, there was a kind that fueled this issue, that
[00:23:49] aggression intends. And aggression, while it was the one that provided weapons. What did Iran
[00:23:53] provide to Yemen? Weapons. What does Saudi Arabia provide
[00:23:56] to Yemenis? Continuous support since the seventies until now, and it stood with us. If
[00:24:00] Saudi Arabia had not stood with us, easily, since
[00:24:03] the war began, at least as a protection for the state, the state would have fallen, it would have ended,
[00:24:07] no one would have recognized us, and legitimacy would now be
[00:24:10] in, in, in nothing.
[00:24:13] This is this issue. We don't even look at the material issue,
[00:24:16] but rather the issue of protecting
[00:24:20] the state and the framework of the state and the framework of the institution before the international community. This
[00:24:24] is a great value. Therefore, no great effort
[00:24:27] was made
[00:24:29] to refute this
[00:24:31] claim that the Houthi militia made, that it is fighting aggression and that it is the original,
[00:24:35] and that it protects the borders and protects
[00:24:38] Yemeni sovereignty, and that it is the Sana'a government. This is how, I mean,
[00:24:42] when it is said Sana'a government, it means that it is the recognized one. There was
[00:24:45] a great promotion of this issue. Therefore, I believe that
[00:24:49] the legitimacy and all opponents of the Houthi militia perhaps failed somewhat
[00:24:53] in refuting this banner
[00:24:56] that the Houthi militia launched, and this is a big mistake.
[00:24:59] Yes, if we go back to your question
[00:25:02] about the sub-issue, how does the Houthi militia claim
[00:25:06] that Saudi Arabia besieges it?
[00:25:09] Clearly, Hodeidah port, for example, these are simple
[00:25:12] examples. Hodeidah port receives more ships than Aden port receives
[00:25:16] during this period that the Houthi militia claims. The Houthi
[00:25:20] militia is the one that imposes the siege on Yemenis. Who does not pay
[00:25:23] salaries? The Houthi militia, while more than 3
[00:25:26] billion dollars go to its treasury, and the legitimate government, with all its institutions, only
[00:25:30] receives one billion dollars. Where does the Houthi militia
[00:25:34] go with all this money? The Houthi militia is the one that imposes on Yemenis
[00:25:37] the siege and kidnapping and tears apart Yemeni society
[00:25:41] and kills them. Where is the siege that the Houthi militia claims,
[00:25:44] with figures, even the institutions that claim to be independent
[00:25:48] tell us how Yemenis are besieged
[00:25:52] in the areas that it controls? Yes.
[00:25:55] Yes, I will return to you, Dr. Faris. I hope you will
[00:25:59] allow me to go to Dr. Mohammed Jamih. Belad Naladan
[00:26:03] from UNESCO. I welcome you, Dr. Mohammed, to this special coverage,
[00:26:06] and we are talking about the different banners that the Houthi
[00:26:10] militia changes under the slogan of victimhood.
[00:26:13] We search for the reasons for many
[00:26:16] of the events that the Houthi militia carries out
[00:26:20] under the concept of victimhood. What is the reality
[00:26:22] of the conflict? The Houthi militia says that it is waging this conflict
[00:26:26] today to protect sovereignty, that it is waging this conflict
[00:26:31] and that it is waging this conflict
[00:26:35] the state. What is the reality of this conflict and why
[00:26:39] hide behind victimhood, Doctor? Thank you very much, my dear brother. Greetings to you
[00:26:43] and to your guest, Dr. Faris, and to your viewers.
[00:26:46] In reality, political Shiism
[00:26:49] in general is adept at employing victimhood because they have
[00:26:54] employment since the days of, I mean, the history
[00:26:58] of Islam, the early days of Islam, and the killing
[00:27:01] of Hussein and so on. So they employ these victimhoods and have
[00:27:05] sufficient experience because they have remained on the margins of history
[00:27:09] and have remained, as one might say, in opposition to the Islamic
[00:27:12] authorities that were throughout history.
[00:27:16] Therefore, they fail in establishing a state
[00:27:19] because they have a sense of opposition
[00:27:22] and they have the tools of opposition and they have the discourse of opposition
[00:27:25] and they also find the slogans of opposition
[00:27:27] and the evasions of political opposition.
[00:27:30] But when they come to a state, they fail in
[00:27:34] managing it because they do not have experience in managing this state
[00:27:37] and because the ideology upon which
[00:27:40] they build their state is an ideology that calls for establishing authority
[00:27:44] and not for establishing a state. because authority is
[00:27:48] about taxes and control and not services,
[00:27:52] commitments, and duties, as
[00:27:55] are state affairs. So, the Houthis,
[00:27:58] stemming from
[00:28:01] your political grievances in general, are good at this.
[00:28:05] However, in reality, they
[00:28:08] are known, but the problem here is that
[00:28:11] their knowledge among a segment that may progress or
[00:28:14] lag behind in this state may progress or lag.
[00:28:18] Their knowledge internally
[00:28:21] comes late. Some abroad,
[00:28:24] such as the neighboring outside in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf,
[00:28:28] are perhaps more knowledgeable than the other Arab outside
[00:28:31] in North Africa and in the Levant. Yemenis,
[00:28:35] naturally, are more
[00:28:38] knowledgeable and experienced with this group because they live with them.
[00:28:41] And naturally, the matter is understood because whoever
[00:28:44] was far from the place, or
[00:28:48] was lacking in, or whose analysis was lacking in understanding this group,
[00:28:52] and whose experience was limited in
[00:28:55] delving into its depths. The Houthis, then,
[00:28:58] rely on slogans that
[00:29:01] are naturally exposed day after day. We
[00:29:05] remember in Saada, the slogan was self-defense,
[00:29:08] even though they were the ones who started the first drop of blood
[00:29:11] shed in the first war in 2004. It was
[00:29:15] for soldiers, two soldiers at a security point
[00:29:18] belonging to security in Saada province, attacked
[00:29:21] by elements
[00:29:25] alive then. And from that, the spark of the first war erupted, and what
[00:29:28] followed. But this war, even though the Houthis were the ones who attacked in it,
[00:29:33] was called or fought, for the Houthis, under the slogan of self-defense.
[00:29:36] Then after that, when they entered or wanted to besiege Sana'a, they changed
[00:29:40] the slogan, and the slogan became overthrowing
[00:29:43] the dose, overthrowing the government, and implementing the outcomes of the national
[00:29:46] dialogue. After that, they went to Rada'a
[00:29:49] with the slogan of fighting terrorism, Al-Qaeda,
[00:29:52] and ISIS. Then they went to Aden with the same slogan.
[00:29:54] And after the Arab coalition intervened, they returned to the issue
[00:29:58] of self-defense, but in a developed way,
[00:30:02] in the form of defending Yemen and defending the homeland, occupation,
[00:30:05] aggression, and so on. The Gaza war came,
[00:30:09] so they used Palestine, Gaza,
[00:30:12] support, axis, resistance, and all these terms,
[00:30:15] they naturally use them, and they resonate with
[00:30:18] the other who is unaware of this group.
[00:30:21] When we want to confront these slogans, or when
[00:30:25] we want to clarify the reality
[00:30:28] should not waste our time
[00:30:32] saying, "No, the Houthis
[00:30:35] are not a resistance front." We only need to present this group
[00:30:39] as it is, and the message will reach
[00:30:42] when we convey to the other, for example, the Palestinian
[00:30:46] who boasts, or some segments of whom boast about the Houthis,
[00:30:49] we convey to them a part of the suffering of Yemenis under Houthi rule,
[00:30:53] prisons, detention centers, torture, and